‘To put oneself into the other fellow’s place’

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Abstract
It is well known in the literature on security dilemma theorising that John Herz coined the concept in the early 1950s with Herbert Butterfield developing a very similar concept at the same time. What is less well appreciated is that Butterfield powerfully argued in his 1951 book *History and Human Relations* that there was no prospect of state leaders and diplomats overcoming the dynamics of mutual suspicion and distrust that created what he had chosen to call a condition of ‘Hobbesian fear.’ Herz parted company with Butterfield on this fundamental question, considering that two adversaries could come to appreciate that what they perceived as the other’s hostile behaviour was a defensive response to their own actions. This article revisits this fundamental question that divided the pioneer theorists of the security dilemma as to whether better mutual understanding between potential rivals might be the key to mitigating fear-based hostility. The article discusses this question in relation to Herz’s ideas about surviving the nuclear age, and shows how he believed that knowledge of the security dilemma was critical if the superpowers were to mitigate their security competition. Having examined how far the end of the Cold War supports Herz’s position, the article concludes by showing how Herz became increasingly disillusioned that the United States was capable of acting to mitigate the security dilemma in the post-Cold War world.

**Keywords:** security dilemma, security dilemma dynamics, security dilemma sensibility, mitigation, uncertainty, nuclear weapons, ideological fundamentalism.

This article revisits the fundamental question that divided John Herz and Herbert Butterfield, the inventers of the concept of the security dilemma: Is a better understanding of the security dilemma the key to mitigating it? Or is distrust fatalistically inevitable? I discuss this question in relation to Herz’s ideas about surviving the nuclear age, and show how he believed that mutual security between the superpowers depended upon them recognising that their own actions
were provoking fear and distrust in their adversary. Herz was pessimistic during the Cold War that Washington and Moscow would follow such policies, but he had hoped that the end of the Cold War might lead to a lessening of the security dilemma. However, these hopes quickly retreated into a deep pessimism as the United States adopted policies which he considered had exacerbated security competition and increased the risk of nuclear war. After considering the matter for half a century, Herz, at the start of the twenty-first century, felt that the idea of the security dilemma had never been more important to an enlightened statecraft. Yet he was in despair that state leaders, especially policy-makers in the Bush Administration, would have the empathetic knowledge to realise it.

**Security Dilemma Sensibility**

Herz and Butterfield disagreed on the possibilities for mitigating the security dilemma, but they shared the same assumptions about what created it. At the heart of the security dilemma was the *inescapable uncertainty* that confronted governments about the motives and intentions of others. Herz argued in his 1951 book *Political Realism and Political Idealism* that it was the ‘uncertainty and anxiety’ about the intentions of others that ‘places man in this basic dilemma’ of “kill or perish”, of attacking first or running the risk of being destroyed.” Consequently, those committed to the status quo, knowing that their survival depended on their success in a struggle for power, would feel compelled to behave aggressively.

It is fatalist reasoning of this kind that led John Mearsheimer to claim Herz as a progenitor of the theory of offensive realism, and the following passage provides powerful ammunition for this view. In an article in 1950, Herz explained the pernicious consequences of the security dilemma in the following terms:

Wherever...anarchic society has existed...there has arisen what may be called the ‘security dilemma’ of men, or groups, or their leaders. Groups or individuals living in such a constellation must be, and usually are, *concerned about their security from being attacked, subjected, dominated, or annihilated* by other groups and
individuals. Striving to attain security from such attack, they are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others. This, in turn, renders the others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst. Since none can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of competing units, power competition ensues, and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on.6

His reflections about the states system led him to the conclusion that there was ‘apparently no escape from this vicious circle’ of the security dilemma; he believed it a necessary consequence of social life.7 Particular groups may be able to escape the dilemma, but such an escape is not universally possible: ‘ultimately, somewhere, the conflicts caused by the security dilemma are bound to emerge among political units of power.’8

Writing at the same time as Herz (but there is no evidence that he was aware of the former’s thinking on the security dilemma), Butterfield’s contribution was to elucidate the psychological dynamics that constitute the ‘irreducible dilemma’ (he never used the actual term ‘security dilemma’). Butterfield’s originality was to show how governments with peaceful/defensive intent conspired (through their failure to see themselves as others saw them) to provoke other governments to behave in ways that raised the level of mutual insecurity. The following much-quoted passage reveals how he thought a spiral of mistrust could develop between two actors even when neither had malign intentions towards the other:

For you know that you yourself mean him no harm, and that you want nothing from him save guarantees for your own safety; and it is never possible for you to realize or remember properly that since he cannot see the inside of your mind, he can never have the same assurance of your intentions that you have. As this operates on both sides the Chinese puzzle is complete in all its interlockings – and neither party sees the nature of the predicament he is in, for each only imagines that the other party
is being hostile and unreasonable. It is even possible for each to feel that the other is wilfully withholding the guarantees that would have enabled him to have a sense of security.\textsuperscript{9}

The escape from the ‘irreducible dilemma’ lay in governments understanding that others are behaving in what appears to be strategically hostile ways because they are fearful, not because they have aggressive or predatory intentions. But it was exactly this avenue of escape that Butterfield saw as closed off to policy-makers and diplomats. Butterfield wrote in a passage that goes to the heart of our enquiry here: ‘It is the peculiar characteristic of the situation I am describing – the situation of what I should call Hobbesian fear – that you yourself may vividly feel the terrible fear that you have of the other party, but you cannot enter into the other man’s counter-fear, or even understand why he should be particularly nervous.’\textsuperscript{10} For Butterfield, then, decision-makers are unable to exercise the empathy to mitigate and escape the security dilemma because they are operating with powerfully ingrained peaceful/defensive self-images.\textsuperscript{11}

Herz agreed with Butterfield that it was the inability of policy-makers to ‘enter into the [other’s] counter-fear’ that drove mutual suspicion and fear. However, as the passage below shows, he also believed contra Butterfield that it was possible for two sides caught in such a predicament to not only understand these security dilemma dynamics (that is, hostility driven by mutual fear) but also act upon this knowledge in order to promote mutual security. In the first discussion of its kind in the literature on security dilemma theorising, Herz wrote:

Both sides might even profit from the security dilemma itself, or, rather, from facing and understanding it. For, if it is true – as Butterfield has pointed out – that inability to put oneself into the other fellow’s place and to realize his fears and distrust has always constituted one chief reason for the dilemma’s poignancy, it would then follow that elucidation of this fact might by itself enable one to do what so far has proved impossible – to put oneself into the other’s place, to understand that he, too, may be motivated by one’s own kind of fears, and thus to abate the fear.
This would not resolve the dilemma entirely, of course, for one could never be entirely certain; but it might at least take some of the sting out of it and insert a wedge toward a more rational, less fear-ridden, less ideology-laden, and less emotion-beset attitude through a kind of psychoanalysis in the international field where lifting one factor into the realm of the conscious might become part of the healing process.\textsuperscript{12}

In suggesting that through ‘facing and understanding’ security dilemma dynamics, decision-makers might ameliorate the fear and suspicion which drives security competition, Herz blazed a trail that later security dilemma theorists have followed. The most important voice here has been Robert Jervis who wrote in 1978 that ‘The dilemma will operate much more strongly if statesmen do not understand it, and do not see that their arms – sought only to secure the status quo – may alarm others and that others may arm, not because they are contemplating aggression, but because they fear attack from the first state’\textsuperscript{13}

In appealing to decision-makers to place themselves in the shoes of their enemy, Herz was echoing a long line of military thinkers, stretching back to Sun Tzu, who have argued that such empathy was the key to military victory. However, what distinguished Herz’s contribution was that he wanted policy-makers to empathise with their enemies - not to destroy them - but to begin a ‘healing process’ of building trust. The priority that Herz gave to leaders understanding the fears of their adversaries, and then acting to reassure and not frighten them shows the importance he placed on agency in mitigating the security dilemma. This is a crucial argument because the theme of agency is too easily suppressed in security dilemma theorising.\textsuperscript{14} His idea of empathy as the key to mitigating the security dilemma is one that he did not develop himself, and it did not get seriously taken up in International Relations scholarship during the Cold War and even afterwards. However, one attempt to expand this particular idea is the concept of ‘security dilemma sensibility’, which might be defined as follows:
Security dilemma sensibility is an actor’s intention and capacity to perceive the motives behind, and to show responsiveness towards, the potential complexity of the military intentions of others. In particular, it refers to the ability to understand the role that fear might play in their attitudes and behaviour, including, crucially, the role that one’s own actions may play in provoking that fear.15

Security dilemma sensibility is not a panacea for the achievement of mutual security between adversaries, and it is important to realise that there are always risks and dangers – though these will vary from case to case - in seeking to promote cooperation and trust between enemies that can do each other enormous harm. Herz appreciated this stark reality from the outset, and he alerted us to two fundamental problems in operationalising what we call security dilemma sensibility (or what Herz called ‘a kind of psychoanalysis in the international field’) that have divided security dilemma theorists, and which continue to bedevil policy-makers.

The first difficulty, as Herz explained, is that even if a government considers that its own actions have provoked fear on the part of another state, ‘This would not resolve the dilemma entirely...for one could never be entirely certain’16 that this assessment of the other’s motives and intentions was correct. There can be no guarantee that one is not dealing with a government motivated by what Herz called ‘interests that go beyond security proper’ (his archetypal case was Nazi Germany).17 The worry here is that in order to dampen down security competition, a government seeking to exercise security dilemma sensibility has to effectively signal a state’s peaceful/defensive intentions – what contemporary US security dilemma theorists call ‘signalling type’.18 But these are exactly the kind of moves that might place a status quo orientated state in danger of being attacked or coerced, if the other side turns out to have aggressive intent.19

Even if decision-makers are confident that another state’s intentions are currently peaceful, can they be equally confident that this will be the case in the future when new leaders with different polices might be in power? This was the
second trouble that Herz identified in promoting an empathetic statecraft, and he was the first writer on the security dilemma to draw attention to what has become known as the problem of future uncertainty. He argued that even if governments could enter into the counter-fear of others, and promote policies of mutual reassurance, ‘how could [they] ‘trust in the continuance of good intentions in the case of collective entities with leaders and policies forever changing?’ His gloomy answer, echoed by contemporary offensive realists, was that leaders had to maximise their power against potential enemies and be prepared for “the worst”.

Overcoming the barriers of current and especially future uncertainty remains the major challenge facing decision-makers seeking to build trust with their adversaries. Herz’s emphasis in International Politics in the Atomic Age on the urgency of the superpowers developing such trust has to be seen against the backdrop of his claim during the Cold War that ‘bipolarity has given the security dilemma its utmost poignancy’, and that nowhere has this manifested itself in a more frightening way than in the sphere of armaments, and crucially nuclear weapons. But if the historically unprecedented condition of nuclear weapons and bipolarity created great fear and mistrust between the rival blocs, could decision-makers in each of the opposing camps do anything other than assume the worst in relation to the motives and intentions of the other? Or, could Herz’s hopes for an empathetic statecraft on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union triumph over the fatalist logic of the security dilemma?

**Preventive nuclear war or ‘mutual accommodation’?**

The starting point for Herz’s thinking about nuclear weapons was that they completely revolutionised statecraft. Their immense destructive power, and the lack of any viable defence against these weapons, meant that the territorial state which had hitherto provided a state’s citizens with security against external enemies could no longer serve that function. ‘Even the most highly organized and most strongly armed country or group of countries’, Herz wrote, ‘can now be destroyed without the necessity of first breaking the traditional “hard shell” of surrounding defense.’ The logical inference to be drawn from this was that if
the state could no longer provide security in an age of nuclear weapons, then a new protective unit will have to be sought. The only candidate here is some type of international authority, even a world state itself. Herz recognised the ultimate logic of this solution to the nuclear threat. He envisaged a ‘supernational authority’, possessing in the transitional period a monopoly of nuclear weapons, but then destroying them as part of creating a new global regime of nuclear abolition. He recognised that for sovereign states to take such steps would constitute ‘a most radical transformation of attitudes and approach’, but he believed that what might once have been considered idealistic was now the only realistic way to ensure survival. But it would be wrong, as Daniel Deudney does, to solely associate Herz with this interpretation of the nuclear predicament.

Herz also knew that the nuclear armed powers would be very reluctant to give up their nuclear weapons, and he considered this a prudent response to the security dilemma which had ‘reached its ultimate dimension’ in the nuclear age. He critiqued as ‘utopian’ those radical schemes advocating global nuclear disarmament for their blindness to the security dilemma. He cautioned that the security dilemma would be felt most urgently in a nuclear disarmed world because ‘nobody would be able to resist the urge to evade and conceal, if merely for reasons of security, and the ensuing uncertainties and suspicions might render conditions more unstable than they would be at higher armament levels.’ These criticisms of nuclear disarmament as utopian did not change his conviction that only ‘global authority’ could solve the problem of protection in the nuclear age, but he also recognised that it would be dangerous to make the ‘jump’ in the absence of mutual trust between the units.

Herz’s fatalist voice was never stronger than when he argued that since neither superpower could feel secure if its competitor could attack it with nuclear weapons, the only logic was ‘destruction of the other power in “preventive war”’ – ‘kill or perish’ indeed. And the ‘radical conclusion’ he drew from this depiction of the nuclear security dilemma was that ‘nothing short of global rule can ultimately satisfy the security interest of any one power, and particularly any superpower’. Such a prognosis offered no attenuation of the security dilemma since its
dynamics now promised to operate at fever pitch as each side struggled endlessly to place itself in a position where it could deliver the deadly knock-out blow, without this also leading to its own annihilation.

However, Herz also identified a competing nuclear logic which led him to conclude that, ‘The means through which the end [global rule] would have to be attained defeats the end itself’. Far from a preventive nuclear war leading to ‘one unit’s global control of a pacified world’, Herz predicted ‘mutual annihilation’ for both superpowers.31 And it followed that if both sides were like Robert Oppenheimer’s two scorpions in the bottle – ‘each capable of killing the other, but only at the risk of his own life’,32 then the search for superiority was militarily and politically pointless. Herz quickly recognised that in an age where both side’s cities were hostages to the nuclear weapons of the other, ‘what realistically has to be assumed...is not superiority (or any specific superiorities in detail) but that stalemate under conditions of “atomic plenty” or “saturation” which derives from the mutual capacity to retaliate with “absolute” power.’33 Yet he did not pursue the implications of this logic for the security dilemma. But far from the latter reaching its apogee with the emergence of nuclear bipolarity, mutual deterrence significantly mitigates its effects,34 opening the door to those polices of ‘mutual accommodation’ that Herz saw as the only basis for avoiding nuclear destruction.

Herz viewed the art of diplomacy as essential to crafting a new superpower detente built on the overriding common interest in avoiding nuclear war. This could only be a ‘holding operation’ pending the radical transformation in attitudes which would make governments finally realise that sovereignty can no longer protect them in the nuclear age. And here he felt that the transition to what he called ‘universalist statesmanship’ would require leaders who could act as ‘caretakers’ of their ‘particular units and simultaneously’ act as ‘representatives’ of global humanity.35 This vision could only be realised if the superpowers developed a lasting detente, and this depended upon both sides appreciating that their own actions were threatening to the other – in short, the intention and capacity to exercise security dilemma sensibility.
I discussed above the difficulties that face governments in operationalising security dilemma sensibility, but what concerned Herz during the Cold War was whether the leaders of both superpowers could understand the role that their own actions were playing in making the other fearful and insecure. Herz argued that what blocked such an understanding on both sides was their shared belief that they faced an ideological foe committed to their destruction. Herz rejected such ideological stereotyping on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union, believing that it could only lead to atomic destruction.

Having initially been encouraged by the detente that developed between the superpowers in the early 1970s, he cautioned a few years later that the fledgling US-Soviet experiment in security cooperation was opposed by the military on both sides.\textsuperscript{36} He was particularly critical of the SALT I Treaty for not radically cutting nuclear stockpiles, arguing that mutual deterrence could function at a fraction of the weapon numbers. The problem was that neither superpower could accept a situation which, as Henry Kissinger once described it, required the United States and Soviet Union to ‘deliberately [rest] their security on each other’s vulnerability’.\textsuperscript{37} Perhaps acceptance of this mutual hostage relationship would have been easier if each side had not viewed the other as seeking global domination, but as it was, the belief that the US-Soviet competition was a zero-sum game even played itself out in the realm of nuclear weaponry. Herz grimly reflected in 1989 that each superpower had sought to escape their dependence upon their nuclear adversary by developing ever more sophisticated weapons in the search “first-strike capacities”...[ideas about] “prevailing” in nuclear war’, and even ‘fantasies of being able to restore the old “hard shell” of impermeability through space-based shields of defense (SDI).’ He judged that as a consequence of these developments, the risks of an actual major nuclear exchange ‘has increased immeasurably’.\textsuperscript{38}

Herz’s warnings about the growing risks of nuclear war would have been apposite had they been issued at the beginning of the decade. At that time, the newly elected Reagan Administration talked cavalierly about ‘prevailing’ in a nuclear war. This reflected Washington’s belief that the Soviet leadership was ideologically committed to the destruction of US values and interests, and that it
believed nuclear superiority could help it achieve this goal. However, such fears about impending nuclear peril seem curious in the context of the late 1980s, since by this time, President Reagan and the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev had replaced Cold War antagonism with relations of mutual trust.

Moreover, Reagan and Gorbachev had achieved this remarkable feat by that very ‘abatement of ideological conflict’ and understanding of the “other fellow’s” fear and distrust which Herz had seen as the key to mitigating the security dilemma. And whilst Herz’s earlier foreboding that such a transformation would only come about after the ‘impact of [a] nuclear war’ did not thankfully come to pass, the increasing fears of general nuclear war that developed in the early 1980s, on both sides of the Cold war divide, was a crucial factor in leading Reagan and Gorbachev to lead their countries away from the abyss of nuclear destruction.

**From fear to trust: security dilemma sensibility and the end of the Cold War**

The growing fear of nuclear war in Moscow and Washington in the early 1980s is a textbook illustration of Butterfield’s notion of ‘Hobbesian Fear’. Both superpowers saw themselves as on the defensive against an implacable foe, and each failed to appreciate that its own actions were provoking fear and insecurity on the part of the other. There was no security dilemma sensibility exercised on either side because both the White House and the Kremlin remained in the grip of mindsets which determined that the other side’s ideology committed it to unremitting hostility. Neither side, then, worried that their actions might be provoking fear and distrust in the other because both had settled on an interpretation of the other side’s motives and intentions as an aggressor state. But the inability of United States and Soviet leaders to recognise that their mutual hostility might stem from security dilemma dynamics, and not predatory ambition, was compounded still further by the fact that neither side could accept that the other really believed it to be a threat. The problem, as Butterfield had first appreciated, is that a government with a peaceful/defensive self-image makes the flawed assumption that its adversary will always know this to be the
Consequently, it will interpret any hostile behaviour on the part of states with such ‘knowledge’ as indicating aggressive intent.\textsuperscript{42}

The dangers of a peaceful/defensive self-image were well illustrated by Caspar Weinberger, US Secretary of Defence when remarking about Soviet fears of US plans to develop a space-based defence against missiles. ‘The Russians’, Weinberger said, had ‘no need to worry’ about Reagan’s announcement in March 1983 of the ‘Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) because ‘they know perfectly well that we will never launch a first strike on the Soviet Union.’\textsuperscript{43} But those who are targeted by such weapon systems are not so easily reassured. And because the Kremlin believed that US leaders knew that they did not plan to attack the United States or its allies, they concluded that the comprehensive US arms build-up in the first Reagan Administration must be offensive in nature. Yet from Washington’s point of view, US plans to deploy a new generation of nuclear weapons (the MX, Trident D-5 and the Cruise and Pershing II missiles) was a defensive response to Soviet nuclear modernisation in the 1970s, and was aimed at neutralising what the first Reagan Administration viewed as Moscow’s pursuit of nuclear superiority.\textsuperscript{44}

Given this level of fear and distrust, what changed to enable the Cold War adversaries to establish a new relationship of trust? The answer is that Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev showed both the intention and capacity to enter into the counter-fear of their adversary, with spectacular results in terms of the transformation of East-West relations.

It was Reagan’s growing fear of nuclear war that led him to realise the importance of both the United States and the Soviet Union exercising security dilemma sensibility. The crucial event was the Abel Archer crisis of November 1983 which brought the world closer to nuclear war than it had been since the Cuban missile crisis. In an annual exercise, NATO simulated its nuclear release procedures, but in the climate of heightened fear and suspicion, the Kremlin believed that it might be the countdown to a US nuclear attack against the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{45} The crisis had a transformational impact on Reagan’s thinking in that he came to understand the role that fear might be playing in Soviet attitudes and
behaviour, and crucially, he came to appreciate that Moscow did not accept the White House's peaceful/defensive self-image. This was evident in Reagan's remarks after reading a US intelligence report on the intense Soviet fears in 1983. According to a number of sources, the President commented to his National Security Advisor, Robert McFarlane: 'Do you suppose they really believe that. I don't see how they would believe that. But it's something to think about'. Reagan could not recognise this image of the United States as an aggressor state, and the crisis forced him to realise that the Soviet leadership did not see the United States as it saw itself.

The near catastrophe of Abel Archer led Reagan to a new understanding of how mutual fear and distrust between the superpowers could lead to nuclear war. As Beth Fischer has argued, 'Nuclear Fears brought about nuclear learning'. Reagan later reflected in his memoirs, in a passage that showed an important awareness of security dilemma dynamics, that 'there were myths and misconceptions that had contributed to misunderstandings and our potentially fatal mistrust of each other'. Having realised that the Soviet Union could so misunderstand US intentions as to believe that Washington was preparing to launch a nuclear first-strike, Reagan was anxious to get a Russian leader in a room so as to reassure them as to US peaceful intentions.

Mikhail Gorbachev's accession to the leadership of the Soviet Union in March 1985 provided Reagan with an interlocutor who shared his desire for better relations. Moreover, as Gorbachev was to show at their summit at Reykjavik a year later, he was also committed to ridding the world of nuclear weapons. If the emotion of fear had led Reagan to the exercise of security dilemma sensibility, Gorbachev and his advisers showed a highly developed capacity for security dilemma sensibility from the beginning. Gorbachev realised that even though the Soviet Union might profess defensive intent, its enemies were not so easily reassured in the face of Soviet conventional and nuclear capabilities.

Gorbachev made that imaginative leap which Butterfield had said was impossible, and developed policies that entered into the counter-fear of the
United States and NATO. He rejected the ‘ideological fundamentalism’ that depicted the United States as inherently aggressive, and acknowledged that Soviet actions, especially its build-up of nuclear and conventional capabilities in the 1970s, had increased Western fears and insecurity. This, in turn, had led to a new wave of United States and NATO military modernisation, creating a vicious and increasingly dangerous circle of security competition. But instead of responding to this with yet a further round of Soviet military escalations, thereby perpetuating the spiralling distrust, Gorbachev called for new policies which recognised that ‘Security cannot be built endlessly on fear of retaliation…security can only be mutual…The highest wisdom is not in caring exclusively for oneself, especially to the detriment of the other side. It is vital that all should feel equally secure.’

Reagan and Gorbachev met for the first time at Geneva in November 1985. Those involved later stressed how important the meeting had been in encouraging the two leaders to believe they could work with each other. Gorbachev himself recalled that ‘our dialogue was very constructive…and increasingly friendly the better we got to know each other.’ The most important outcome of the summit was that each pledged that neither side would ‘seek military superiority’. This was a decisive rejection of the nuclear war-fighting policies that had characterised the first Reagan Administration, and an acknowledgment of the reality that the only security in the nuclear age was common security. For the first time since the nuclear age began, the superpowers had leaders committed to acting as Herz’s ‘caretakers’ of the global interest in nuclear survival.

The two leaders met again a year later at Reykjavik, when they came tantalisingly close to abolishing all nuclear weapons. The great paradox of Reagan was that the veteran Cold War warrior also harboured a lifelong dream to rid the world of nuclear weapons. This explains his obsessive commitment to SDI which he genuinely believed was a defensive weapon that would ‘give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.’ Both men were prepared at Reykjavik to eliminate their countries’ nuclear arsenals, indicating the scale of the transformation in US-Soviet relations since the time when Herz had criticised the superpowers for failing to make radical cuts in SALT
I. But what stopped these two nuclear abolitionists from reaching such a momentous agreement was Reagan’s insistence that nuclear disarmament proceed in tandem with the development and testing of SDI.\(^58\)

Gorbachev's predecessors had believed that SDI was being developed to support a first strike strategy. Gorbachev shared this worry about the offensive potentialities of SDI, but he accepted that Reagan only saw SDI in defensive terms.\(^59\) But what worried Gorbachev, and especially the Soviet military, was whether future US leaders would view SDI in such equally benign terms. It was the *future uncertainty* issue discussed earlier that significantly motivated Gorbachev’s opposition to SDI at Reykjavik. The Soviet leader revealed these anxieties when he said to Reagan at the summit: ‘If I return to Moscow and say that I agreed to allow you to test in the atmosphere and in space, they would call me a fool and not a leader’.\(^60\)

Reagan and Gorbachev’s deep disagreement over SDI prevented them from reaching a historic agreement on the abolition of nuclear arms. However, both leaders came away from the summit strengthened in their trust in each other. Gorbachev told George Shultz in 1992 that the turning point in bringing about the end of the Cold War was Reykjavik.\(^61\) This was confirmed by Gorbachev’s close advisor, Anatoly Chernyaev, who reflected that ‘A spark of understanding was born between them, as if they had winked to each other about the future’.\(^62\) Such sentiments were shared by Reagan who wrote in his *memoirs* that ‘Looking back now, its clear there was a chemistry between Gorbachev and me that produced something very close to a friendship’.\(^63\)

The best evidence of this growing trust was Gorbachev’s decision a year later to allow progress on the nuclear arms control front, despite continuing disagreement between the superpowers over SDI. This Soviet concession led to the United States and the Soviet Union signing the INF Agreement in December 1987, and paved the way for the signing of the START Treaty (under Reagan’s successor) in July 1991. And contrary to Herz’s fears at the end of the 1980s regarding the drift to nuclear war, the elimination of MIRVed ICBMs in START I significantly reduced the risks of either side launching a nuclear first-strike.
Herz had anticipated such a transformation in superpower relations in the late 1950s, though he had clearly hoped that it would not take another three decades to achieve. Having identified the core problems of current and especially future uncertainty as barriers to leaders putting themselves in the shoes of their enemies, Herz did not offer us his own ideas about how two nuclear armed enemies could build trust. As discussed earlier, leaders rarely have the confidence to make significant unilateral moves to signal their state’s peaceful/defensive intentions, for fear that they would be exposed to great danger if their act of trust proved misplaced. If this is the case, how then do we explain the trust-building moves made by Gorbachev in the period after the Geneva Summit, and crucially, the Soviet leader’s decision to de-link SDI from agreement on INF and START? In other words, why was Gorbachev so confident that his moves would not be exploited by the United States?

Chernyaev wrote in his diary in early 1986 that Gorbachev was ‘taking this gamble because [the Soviet leader believed that] nobody is going to attack us even if we disarm completely’.64 But even if Gorbachev believed this, there were others in the Kremlin who were far less certain about US motives and intentions. Given these suspicions, it is evident that had Reagan not abandoned the hostile policies of his first term, Gorbachev would not have been able to pursue his ‘new thinking’ on security.65 Even so, what seems to have reassured the Politburo that Moscow’s cooperative moves would not be exploited by Washington was the ‘margin of safety’66 provided by Soviet nuclear capabilities.67 This is not to devalue the significance of Gorbachev’s exercise of security dilemma sensibility: after all, his predecessors had proven incapable of showing a similar level of empathetic intention and capacity. However, the Reagan-Gorbachev relationship does raise the question as to whether a margin of safety is a crucial pre-requisite for building trust between nuclear enemies.

Reagan and Gorbachev felt confident about the peaceful/defensive intentions of each other’s countries, but there was the question as to whether their successors would be able to maintain the trust they had built up. Herz’s hope that the end of the Cold War might represent a ‘ray of hope at the horizon’68
quickly gave way to pessimism that once again, far from ameliorating the security dilemma, the United States was embarking on policies that could only deepen it.

In a letter to Kenneth Thompson written in 1993, Herz set out his belief that despite the thawing of superpower relations, the threat of a nuclear war has ‘hardly lessened, unless radical nuclear disarmament can be achieved, and further proliferation be prevented’. With the Soviet Union gone, Herz had hoped that the United States would finally put its enormous political weight behind radical cuts in the world’s nuclear arsenals. However, far from the United States and Russia massively slashing their arsenals to both reflect their increasing cooperation and contribute to it, neither side showed any great enthusiasm for the level of reductions that Herz felt were urgently required.

A window for radical – but stabilising – nuclear cuts had once again opened up for Washington and Moscow, but there were no leaders this time with Reagan and Gorbachev’s commitment to nuclear abolition. Rather, US planning and strategy at this time was shaped by the dark shadow of future uncertainty regarding Russian and Chinese intentions as well as insuring against new nuclear armed challengers to US interests. Jonathan Schell has captured the way in which US nuclear war-planning was virtually unaffected by the demise of the Soviet Union. ‘With or without a global antagonist’, he wrote, ‘nuclear policy and the arsenal that supported it would remain essentially unchanged’. The ideological antagonism which had prevented US policy-makers from entering into the Soviet Union’s counter-fear might have been a relic of the Cold War, but there was equally little space for security dilemma sensibility in the new circumstances given Washington’s belief that its nuclear arsenal was the ultimate hedge against the problem of future uncertainty itself.

The continuing importance that successive post-Cold War US administrations placed on maintaining a large US nuclear arsenal could only contribute to the problem of controlling nuclear proliferation. This is not to say that states like India and Pakistan were influenced in their decisions in the late 1980s to proliferate by the size of the US nuclear stockpile, but it is to argue that New Delhi and Islamabad would in all probability have approached the decision
to move into the nuclear club very differently had the United States and Russia been radically cutting their arsenals – and ostensibly aiming at zero.\textsuperscript{73}

Herz had identified nuclear proliferation as a major risk to global security in the post-Cold War world, but this reflected a concern of his that can be dated back to the early 1960s. At that time, he had warned that even if one could have some confidence in ‘rational calculation’ in a bipolar world, the spread of the bomb would lead to ‘complete instability...[and] an indefinite and infinite extension of risks of error, of action in madness, or in despair, or out of spite, or for reasons of domestic policy, or – especially in the case of conflicts between smaller powers – for the sake of local or regional policy.’\textsuperscript{74} Far from the entry into the nuclear club of India and Pakistan increasing mutual security (as some have argued), he contended that this decision had diminished security for both states.\textsuperscript{75} Herz, as a founder member of the camp of what later become known as ‘proliferation pessimism’, had argued for over four decades that the only solution to the nuclear peril was the creation of a new international authority leading to abolition. His pessimism about the world achieving this was never deeper than in the anxieties he expressed in the early 2000s about the policies of the Bush Administration.

**The Bush Doctrine and the Security Dilemma**

Writing in 2003, in his last published article on the security dilemma, Herz offered a scathing critique of President George W. Bush’s foreign policy. And just as he had argued that ideological antagonism was the barrier to ‘mutual accommodation’ during the Cold War, he considered that it was the ‘ideological guidance of the White House and the Pentagon’ with their policy of securing ‘global hegemony through maintaining an incontestable strategic superiority’ which was fuelling insecurity and war at the beginning of the new century. Here, he was highly critical of the Bush doctrine of ‘pre-emption’ which, as he appreciated, is better described as a strategy of preventive war.\textsuperscript{76} He dubbed the Bush doctrine a case of ‘extreme “realism”’, and whenever Herz encountered such extremes of either idealism or realism, he was always pulled towards the opposite pole. Faced with what he saw as the dangerous and self-defeating
policies of the Bush Administration, he called once more for that ‘radical turn in attitudes and policies’ which he saw as essential if humanity was to survive the new century.

Herz would have been dismayed to think that his ideas were in any way comparable to those of the Bush Administration, but it will be recalled that his fatalist voice had hypothesised in his earliest post-1945 reflections that only a strategy of ‘preventive war’ could make a state secure against an adversary’s nuclear weapons. This was especially the case for a superpower. He rejected such thinking as a counsel of despair leading to mutual annihilation, but it is the underlying logic of ‘kill or perish’ that underpinned the Bush doctrine as it evolved after 2000. The terror attacks of September 11, 2001, revolutionised the US approach to nuclear threats. The fear that the next attack might be by a terrorist group with a nuclear weapon, and that such actions might be supported by nuclear-armed ‘rogue states’, led the United States to adopt the position that it could only be secure if it eliminated such nuclear risks to the US homeland.

Global abolition and effective international control of the atom was Herz’s solution to the nuclear dilemma, but the Bush Administration was dismissive of resting US security on the fragile institutions of international law and disarmament. Instead, the United States would actively prevent those it viewed as ideological enemies – by military force and regime change if necessary - from acquiring the capability to threaten the United States and its allies with nuclear weapons. In his 2002 State of the Union Address, President Bush described Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as the ‘Axis of Evil’. Believing that the internal character of these so-called ‘rogue’ states committed them to the export of aggression and terror, and that there could be no long-term accommodation between the United States and such regimes, the Bush Administration defended a policy of preventive war and regime change. Bush warned, ‘I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons’.
As a strategy for ending proliferation, the Bush Doctrine has been a signal failure. The war against Iraq served to intensify the proliferation efforts on the part of the two states that were the source of the greatest concern at the beginning of the decade, namely, North Korea and Iran. The DPRK left the NPT in early 2003, and three years later announced its entry into the nuclear cabal by testing a weapon. The logic of this path had been set out by a North Korean general before the Iraq War, when he had said in response to a question as to why the DPRK was developing nuclear weapons: ‘We see what you are getting ready to do with Iraq. And you are not going to do it to us’. Iran was less blatant, but the offensive US policy underlined the strategic wisdom in Tehran of not caving into US demands that it cease its ostensibly peaceful activities of uranium enrichment. The latter is crucial to any future Iranian nuclear weapons programme, should the Islamic Republic take the momentous political decision to develop the bomb.

Perhaps the Bush Administration’s revolutionary approach to nuclear threats would have fared better if the Iraq war – the first test of ending proliferation through regime change - had not turned out to be such a political and military disaster for the United States. The United States, as Schell has argued, was the first country to proclaim force and regime change as ‘the means for solving the world’s proliferation problem.’ However, this goal depended upon others being so frightened by the power of the United States that they submitted to Washington’s will, but the failure of regime change in Iraq showed the enormous gap between the administration’s aspirations to global superiority, and its capacities to deliver this.

Herz would not have been surprised by this outcome since he had predicted that the Bush doctrine would lead to an ‘immense increase in the security dilemmas of countries which are potential targets.’ He did not say it, but the logical corollary of this was that if the Bush Administration had understood security dilemma dynamics, Washington would not have been charting such a dangerous and self-defeating course. However, even if US policymakers had been aware of security dilemma theory, the administration in its first term took the view that it faced in Iraq, Iran, and North Korea states that were
not acting out of fear and mistrust, but rather predatory ambition rooted in the internal character of their regimes. Consequently, US policy-makers believed that the exercise of security dilemma sensibility would have been both wrong-headed and dangerous.

The problem with ideological fundamentalism of the kind displayed by the Bush White House is that it closes down the possibility that others might be acting out of fear and mistrust rather than malevolence, and crucially, it disregards the role that one’s own actions have played in provoking that fear.\textsuperscript{84} It is little wonder, then, that Herz was so pessimistic about the Bush Administration’s foreign policy since this failure to understand security dilemma dynamics was what he had repeatedly warned against during the Cold War. He took it as a given that the Cold War was a product of security dilemma dynamics (that is, hostility driven by Butterfield’s ‘Hobbesian fear’),\textsuperscript{85} but this position rested uneasily with his belief that one can never really know the motives and intentions of others. What is more, he never explicitly returned in his later writings on the superpowers’ nuclear relationship to the question of whether decision-makers could enter into the counter-fear of their enemies given the obstacles of current and future uncertainty. Instead, he called for the superpowers to relax the ideological fundamentalist mindsets which were standing in the way of mutual accommodation (what he called ‘mitigation’). This had occurred in a spectacular fashion in the second half of the 1980s, but what engrossed Herz was how the lone superpower, in its response to the challenge of proliferation in a post 9/11 world, was repeating the failed and dangerous policies of the Cold War.

Late in his life he commented that he had been ‘greatly surprised’\textsuperscript{86} to discover that the concept of the security dilemma enjoyed such prominence among academics (the onset of reading blindness in his eighties prevented him from keeping up with the academic debate as much as he would have liked). But he was well aware that security dilemma arguments did not have the same level of appeal to policy-makers. With the Bush Administration’s failed policies firmly in his sights, he argued that the idea of the security dilemma was ‘still of great importance, today perhaps more than ever’\textsuperscript{87} The challenge that he left us with
is how to raise this level of awareness among policy-makers. The difficulty here is that the exercise of security dilemma sensibility remains a rarity because it requires policy-makers to both understand how their own defensively motivated actions might be seen as threatening by others and to avoid ideological stereotyping of their adversaries. Yet crucially, it also requires leaders who, in showing empathetic responsiveness to the security concerns of others, are prepared to risk the costs of misplaced trust if their interpretation of an adversary’s behaviour as motivated by fear and not aggression turns out to be wrong. But unless decision-makers are prepared to make a ‘leap of trust’ in order to test whether fear and suspicion are the result of security dilemma dynamics, they risk becoming trapped in a situation where misplaced suspicion leads to spiralling distrust that could have been avoided.
This article builds upon ideas first discussed in Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). I am grateful to Jana Puglierin and especially Ken Booth for their comments on earlier versions of the article.


Herz, *Political Realism and Political Idealism*, p. 3

Herz, *Political Realism and Political Idealism*, p. 15.

Robert Jervis has been the most prominent thinker since Butterfield in developing and elaborating the psychological dynamics that underpin the security dilemma. It is Jervis who introduced into the literature the concept of the ‘spiral model’ which is predicated on policy-makers failing to ‘recognize that one’s own actions could be seen as menacing and the concomitant belief that the other’s hostility can only be explained by its aggressiveness’ (Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 58-113, quotation at 75.


The most important voice here has been Robert Jervis who wrote in 1978 that ‘The dilemma will operate much more strongly if statesmen do not understand it, and do not see that their arms – sought only to secure the status quo – may alarm others and that others may arm, not because they are contemplating aggression, but because they fear attack from the first state’ (see Robert Jervis, ‘Cooperation under the Security Dilemma, *World Politics*, 30:2 (1978), p. 181). For other perspectives on this issue, see Booth and Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma*, p. 7, n.4.

For example, Jervis has been ambivalent as to how far better knowledge and understanding of security dilemma dynamics can trump the security competition generated by an anarchic states system. Compare the citation from Jervis in n.13 with Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, pp. 75-6.


According to Christian Hacke and Jana Puglierin, ‘Herz’s worldview was shaken by the invention of the nuclear bomb and the emergence of a bipolar world’ (Christian Hacke and Jana Puglierin, ‘John H. Herz: Balancing Utopia and Reality’, *International Relations*, 21/3 (September 2007), p. 374.
Daniel Deudney identified Herz’s book *International Politics in the Atomic Age* as representing the ‘theoretical apogee’ of what he called ‘classical nuclear one Worldism’. He defined this as the view that ‘nuclear explosives pose a radical challenge to the core security-providing function of the state and that a world state is necessary to provide security’ (Daniel H. Deudney, *Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 246.


Herz, *International Politics in the Atomic Age*, p. 187. Writing three years later (the essay was republished in his 1976 collection), Herz wrote that ‘chasing after nuclear “superiority” [was] nonsensical in an age of nuclear plenty where an opponent, even though inferior in absolute number of weapons, has in any event enough for saturation’ (Herz, ‘International Politics and the Nuclear Dilemma’, p. 134.

This proposition was later developed by Robert Jervis who wrote that ‘as long as states believe that all that is needed is second-strike capability, then the differentiation between offensive and defensive forces that is provided by reliance on SLBM’s [Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles] allows each side to increase its security without menacing the other, permits some inferences about intentions to be drawn from military posture, and removes the main incentives for status-quo powers to engage in arms races’ (Jervis, ‘Cooperation Under The Security Dilemma’, p. 210. It should be noted that Jervis was writing before SLBM’s were equipped with MIRVs.


40 Herz, *International Politics in the Atomic Age*, p. 308.

41 Herz, *International Politics in the Atomic Age*, p. 309.


43 Quoted in Glaser, *Analysing Strategic Nuclear Policy*, p. 77, emphasis added.


‘Ideological fundamentalism’ is a mindset ‘which assigns enemy status because of what the other is – its political identity – rather than how it actually behaves (Booth and Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma*, p. 65).


Quoted in Reynolds, *Summits*, p. 271.


Quoted in Reynolds, *Summits*, p. 366. See also p. 369.


This idea is developed and explored further in Booth and Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma*, p. 91, 241, 284.


69 Herz in a letter to Kenneth Thomson, Box 3, Correspondence 1991-93, Herz Papers. I am grateful to Jana Puglierin for providing me with this source from her PhD.


71 Schell, The Seventh Decade, p. 88.


75 Herz, ‘Reflections on My Century’, p. 6;


Quoted in Schell, *The Seventh Decade*, p. 141.


