

MANAGING AFRICA'S VIOLENT CONFLICTS

by Richard Jackson

Conflict management research has not often compared the effectiveness of different methods such as negotiation and mediation. Consequently, applying conflict management techniques to international disputes has sometimes been ad hoc and ineffectual. This article compares the effectiveness of negotiation and mediation in African conflict management in the period 1945 to 1995. Utilizing an original data set on cases of negotiation and mediation, the analysis indicates that, overall, bilateral negotiations are more successful than mediation. However, negotiation is difficult to initiate in cases of intense, intractable civil conflicts, and works best in cases of interstate disputes. Given that Africa's worst conflicts are all intense, long-running civil wars, improving the effectiveness of mediation in the region is a top priority.

Following World War II, the desire to limit the destructive effects of international conflict culminated in the UN Declaration. Apart from charging the Security Council with the maintenance of international peace using "any means," article 33 (1) of the Charter says that "the parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or by other means of their own choice." The concern of the UN framers for international conflict management, and the efforts of diplomats in the intervening years, are belied by the rather patchy record of success. Since World War II, between fifteen and thirty million people have perished as a direct result of more than eighty major wars.¹ In the vast majority of these conflicts, efforts to settle or manage them have usually been ad hoc, uncoordinated, poorly planned, and largely ineffective.

For example, at the height of the Zairean conflict in late 1996 and early 1997, there were no less than four separate conflict management efforts in progress. In the first place, Laurent Kabila's Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Zaire-Congo (ADFL) were attempting to open bilateral negotiations with President Mobutu Sese Seko's senior officials; those offers were rejected until May 1997 when Kabila's ADFL forces were about to overrun Kinshasa, Zaire's capital city. By this stage, of course, Kabila had no need to negotiate.

The second main approach to managing this conflict came from surrounding heads of state, who were, unsurprisingly, concerned about the prospect of a country of more than forty million people imploding just across their extremely porous borders. Consequently, a series of ministerial-level, multiparty conferences were organised. On each occasion, parties whose participation was crucial to the talks failed to arrive, and little, if anything, was achieved.

Another approach came via the United Nations' proposal for a military-led humanitarian intervention aimed at providing a buffer zone between the warring factions, and ensuring refugee safety, food distribution, and eventually, refugee repatriation. However, events on the ground, combined with vacillation and delay from important parties such as the United States and the UN Security Council, saw the intervention force disbanded before it was fully organised. The most notable aspect of this particular effort was the delicate tightrope walk by international diplomats, who wanted to avoid both the shame of being seen to be doing nothing, as in Rwanda in 1994, and the humiliation of failure, such as occurred in Somalia in 1995.

The last effort to solve the Zairean conflict was a series of mediations. In an unprecedented, joint peace mission, the United Nations and the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) sent a special envoy, Mohammed Sahnoun. Then President Nelson Mandela of South Africa attempted to mediate. Neither Sahnoun nor Mandela was able to bring about a much-needed respite in the fighting, or even move the parties towards more dialogue.

In the end, Kabila took control of the whole of Zaire and renamed it the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). No one knows how many people died in the conflict, but the number is likely to be in the hundreds of thousands. The United Nations abandoned an investigation in May 1998 into the whereabouts of an estimated 250,000 Hutu refugees who disappeared in eastern Zaire in the wake of the ADFL advance. It is likely that many of them were killed in retaliation for the 1994 genocide, probably by Tutsi troops from the Rwandan army who were fighting alongside the ADFL. In any case, the vast numbers of refugees, the general upheaval, and the regional instability caused by the conflict warranted a more coherent and forceful conflict management strategy than the ad hoc and piecemeal efforts accorded it.

POSING THE PROBLEM

The dilemmas posed by this example highlight one of the central problems confronting policymakers interested in managing violent international conflicts, namely, which method would be the most effective for solving this type of conflict. In the case of Zaire, should the international community have gone ahead with the humanitarian intervention? Would such an intervention have provided the optimal environment for a cessation of violence and eventual reconciliation of the warring factions? Or, should greater efforts have been made to bring together all of the interested parties in a roundtable conference? On the other side of the coin, should the principal parties—the Mobutu regime and Kabila's ADFL—have been more forcefully encouraged to sort it out between themselves? Did the conflict require a bilateral solution to ensure a lasting peace? Or, should mediation have come sooner and from a more forceful source, such as France or the United States?

In short, policymakers need to know which method of conflict management—negotiation, mediation, multiparty conferences, or humanitarian intervention—is most likely to be successful in any given type of conflict situation. The confusion over matching appropriate interventions to conflicts is not limited to this conflict alone, however. It has been a constant feature of the post-war period, and an even greater problem in the post-cold war era, when the predominant form of international conflict changed from primarily interstate disputes to intractable, often ethnically motivated intrastate conflicts.² The problem is particularly acute in Africa.

CONFLICT IN AFRICA

Even the most cursory glance at Africa's violent conflicts provides striking evidence of how complex and intractable many of them are.³ In the first instance, a careful examination of all the world's interstate conflicts and internationalised civil wars from 1945 to 1995 reveals that the African region has been the most conflict-prone, experiencing 79 out of 295 violent conflicts (26.7 percent).⁴ These conflicts are listed in Appendix 1. Furthermore, the African region had the highest number of civil conflicts (36), and the second-highest number of interstate conflicts (43), behind the Middle East (51).⁵

Table 1 describes the most costly and intractable of Africa's conflicts and highlights some of the key characteristics of international conflict in Africa. Africa's conflicts tend to be more severe and more costly in terms of lives than conflicts in other regions. Only the conflicts in Indochina compare in severity to Africa's conflicts. A third of Africa's conflicts involved more than 10,000 deaths, and in total an estimated seven million people have lost their lives as a result of war in Africa since 1945. Between two and four million died during the period from 1980 to 1995 alone.⁶

Table 1.

Africa's Worst Conflicts, 1945–Present

Conflict Name	Dates	Estimated Fatalities	Intervening Parties
Congo Conflict	1960–65	110,000	UN force, USA, Soviet Union, Belgium
African Territories–Portugal	1961–75	100,000+	South Africa, Rhodesia, Zambia, Zaire
Eritrea–Ethiopia	1965–93	450,000–1 million	Soviet Union, Italy, China, Libya, Sudan, Somalia
Nigeria–Biafra	1967–70	1 million+	Britain, France, Soviet Union
Angolan Conflict	1975–present	300,000–500,000	Soviet Union, Cuba, South Africa, USA, Zaire
Mozambique Conflict	1976–92	450,000–1 million	Soviet Union, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Malawi, France, Britain, South Africa
Ugandan Civil War	1981–present	100,000–500,000	Britain, Tanzania, North Korea, Libya
Second Sudan Civil War	1983–present	500,000–1.5 million	USA, Libya, China, Iraq, Iran, Uganda
Somalia Civil War	1988–present	300,000–400,000	USA, Libya, Ethiopia, UN force

Burundi Ethnic Conflict	1988–present	100,000+	Rwanda, Zaire
Liberian Civil War	1989–97	200,000+	Sierra Leone, Libya, Ivory Coast, ECOWAS force
Rwanda Civil War	1990–present	500,000+	Burundi, Zaire, Uganda
Sierra Leone Civil War	1991–present	100,000+	Liberia, mercenaries
Zaire Civil War	1996–present	200,000+	Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Zaire

Source. Adapted from Copson, *Africa's Wars*, pp. 29 and 106, and from original data set in Jackson, "Negotiation versus Mediation."

The majority of these wars occurred between 1956 and 1985. This was the period of decolonisation and cold war rivalry for the allegiance of Africa's new states. The severity of many of these conflicts attests to the intensity with which the superpowers and their allies competed for influence in Africa.⁷ A more disturbing trend, however, is that nearly a third of Africa's conflicts have started since 1986, and Africa is experiencing a much greater rate of increase in conflicts than other regions. Africa currently has the highest number of ongoing conflicts. At present fighting continues in Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia and Eritrea, in the Great Lakes area (DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda), in Sudan, and in the West African states of Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, and Senegal. In southern Africa, Angola is once again at war, and there are emerging conflicts in Lesotho and Namibia.

A complicating factor in Africa's conflicts is the high level of outside intervention (see Table 1). Africa has the highest rate of outside intervention in conflicts—higher even than the Middle East, which also experiences a great deal of external interference. For the most part, conflicts in other regions more often remain uncomplicated by outside parties. This aspect of Africa's conflicts, it has been argued, is related to the fact that because African political systems "are internally incoherent and because aspects of their internal form are projections of the external environment, they are easily manipulated from the outside."⁸ In other words, there is continuity here with the interference by outside powers of the colonial and neo-colonial periods.

Interestingly, compared to other regions, there has been a relatively low level of UN involvement in conflict management in Africa. Most UN attention has been directed towards the Middle East, the Far East, and recently, Eastern Europe. This clearly reflects the cold war concerns of the great powers in the Security Council and the Eurocentric orientation of the United Nations in the post-cold war era.

Turning to the issues in dispute, it is interesting to note that very few of the seventy-nine African conflicts were fought over territory or ideology, the issues most often at the heart of

interstate conflicts. This is surprising in the light of the “artificiality” of African political boundaries and the transnational ethnic links that transcend former colonial boundaries,⁹ which have led to numerous conflicts in the Asian subcontinent, for example. Most conflicts in Africa have been independence or secessionist conflicts, and have involved intangible elements such as ethnicity, identity, and nationalism. These kinds of issues are the most difficult to resolve.¹⁰ Furthermore, as in the Middle East, African conflicts almost all involve multiple issues and are the most complex disputes. High levels of issue complexity also make conflict resolution difficult to attain.¹¹

In short, conflict management in Africa is fraught with difficulty, and the nature of Africa’s conflicts, combined with external responses, complicates the efforts of diplomats and peacemakers to manage them effectively. Added to these disadvantages is the reality that without an understanding of which conflict management technique will work best under which conditions, and a carefully managed application of conflict management strategies, pacific intervention is unlikely to be successful.

THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Unfortunately, a review of the scholarly research on international conflict management provides few clues for practitioners. A foundational study by Holsti in 1966 found, among other things, that negotiation was successful in 47 percent of its attempts, while mediation had a 22 percent success rate, multilateral conferences had a 44 percent success rate, referrals to international organisations had a 37 percent success rate, and judicial methods had a 45 percent success rate.¹² Holsti never pursued the comparative aspects of the study any further than the uni-dimensional correlation between conflict management type and outcomes.

A similar study by Northedge and Donelan in 1971 confirmed Holsti’s results, without moving beyond its uni-dimensional correlations of conflict management method and outcomes.¹³ However, since then most studies have focused on either negotiation¹⁴ or methods of third party intermediary assistance.¹⁵ To date, no one has followed Holsti’s lead and examined conflict management in international conflict either comparatively or using multiple independent variables.

The empirical problem, then, is formidable: there are no studies to suggest how successful different forms of conflict management are likely to be under contrasting conditions of international conflict. We simply do not know if mediation is better suited to violent intrastate conflicts like the Zairean conflict than negotiation, UN intervention, or multilateral conferences, for example. But the problem runs deeper than a dearth of empirical studies. There is also a conceptual gap, in that there are few theoretical frameworks for comparing different forms of conflict management.

DESIGN OF THE STUDY


The aim of this study therefore, was to attempt to address both the theoretical and empirical gaps in current research by developing an appropriate theoretical framework, and then applying it in an empirical study that compared negotiation and mediation in international conflict. The results would then provide some clues about which form of conflict management was more likely to be successful under which conditions.

In this study, I define negotiation as a means of conflict management where the principal parties to a conflict of interest communicate directly or indirectly about how they will resolve their differences and manage their future relationship.¹⁶ Mediation, on the other hand, is a means of conflict management where the parties to a dispute seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, a party not directly involved in the conflict, to resolve their differences without invoking the authority of law.¹⁷ The presence of an outside party not directly involved in the dispute, accompanied by an expanded set of communication and coalition possibilities, is the key conceptual difference between the two methods.

The theoretical approach developed here to facilitate a comparative study of negotiation and mediation is called the Contingency Framework.¹⁸ This approach, shown diagrammatically in Figure 1, is predicated on the notion that conflict management is a social process whose outcomes are dependent upon, or contingent on, aspects of the structure and process of the conflict. That is, outcomes are determined by the interaction of certain input variables mediated through the structure and actual situation of the conflict management. The Contingency Approach suggests first that conflict management takes place in three time dimensions: (1) antecedent, or past; (2) concurrent, or present; and (3) consequent, or future. The antecedent dimension refers to all those inputs and variables which exist prior to engaging in conflict management. The concurrent dimension, on the other hand, describes a comprehensive range of factors which characterise the conditions and process of a particular conflict-management situation, while the consequent dimension draws attention to the outcome of the conflict management.

The Contingency Model stipulates three clusters of variables with specific operational criteria, each of which may have an impact on the process and outcome of the conflict management. The first cluster of variables, contextual variables, refers to aspects of the nature of the dispute, the nature of the parties, and their past and ongoing relationship, the international context, and in the case of mediation, the nature of the mediator. Here we are referring to such factors as the intensity of the conflict, the issues in dispute, the parties' previous relationship, the intervention of external states, and so on. The cluster of process variables refers to activities that take place during the conflict management itself, and to the factors immediate to the parties' interaction: timing, initiation of the conflict management, environment,

Figure 1: A Contingency Framework of International Conflict Management



Source: Bercovitch and Langley, "The Nature of the Dispute," and Jackson, "Negotiation versus Mediation."

negotiator identity, and mediator strategies. The final cluster of variables, outcome variables, are the dependent variables. The nature of the exercise is, of course, to unravel what effect the process and the context have on the success or failure of the conflict management.

THE EMPIRICAL STUDY

The data collection process involved, first, identifying all the armed, or violent, international conflicts between 1945 and 1995. Using specific operational criteria, careful research yielded a total of 295 conflicts for the period 1945–1995. The second step involved examining each of these conflicts for their conflict management efforts. A total of 1,666 discrete cases of mediation and 1,154 cases of negotiation were found. Of the 295 conflicts, 225 (or 76 percent) involved either, or both, negotiation and mediation.

Each discrete case of negotiation or mediation was then coded according to sixty-eight variables relating to the context, process, and outcome of the conflict management, as specified in the Contingency Model. For example, each case was coded in terms of the issues in dispute, the intensity of the conflict, the environment in which it took place, the outcome of the conflict, and so on. The data were then subjected to a series of bivariate correlational statistical analyses, where the objective was to determine if one or both variables have an effect on the distribution of values in the other, or to establish that there is no effect at all.

The process was repeated after isolating the seventy-nine conflicts that occurred in Africa, and the 198 cases of negotiation and 506 cases of mediation applied to them. Here the aim was to determine whether there were any significant differences between negotiation and mediation in African practice compared to negotiation and mediation in international politics in general. Significantly, the subset of African cases was not in any way atypical or unrepresentative of the global picture. In other words, we can assume that the findings at the aggregate level will hold at the lower level, and the lessons learnt about conflict management over the international system as a whole can be applied to the African situation.

NEGOTIATION VERSUS MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

The empirical analysis found that it was possible to characterise certain types of conflicts, parties, and conflict management interventions that depressed success rates for both negotiation and mediation. The data also revealed a profile of those conditions which enhanced the likelihood of success. An important finding in the data relates to the comparative aspects of negotiation and mediation: overall, negotiation is significantly more successful than mediation. Negotiation has an average success rate of 47.0 percent, compared to 39.4 percent for mediation. Furthermore, negotiation successes are more durable than mediation successes, with 82.0 percent of the agreements lasting more than eight weeks. Mediation agreements, on the other hand, lasted more than eight weeks in only 51.7 percent of the cases. That negotiation would be more successful than mediation is entirely logical, and makes perfect sense theoretically. When two states can sort out their differences bilaterally, without interference from any outside parties, they normally will. It is only when the level of hostility between the parties is so high that they cannot negotiate face-to-face, or they believe they can prevail over their opponent, that mediation becomes necessary.

In other words, “when a conflict is of low intensity or narrow in scope the parties feel they can manage nicely by themselves and do not seek assistance from a mediator.”¹⁹ In fact, in such circumstances many parties perceive third-party intervention as an unwanted intrusion. Furthermore, it has been suggested that “mediation is a weak elixir for improving a dispute hostile enough to merit intervention by a third party.”²⁰ That is, the necessity for mediation implies the most difficult conditions for conflict management. It is, thus, logical that mediation would be less successful than negotiation.

Interestingly, when only those cases which occurred in African conflicts were examined, it was found that both negotiation and mediation were slightly more successful than the average success rate. Negotiation had a 51.5 percent success rate in the African context, while mediation had a 40.3 percent success rate. Furthermore, negotiation success durability was higher than average at 84.2 percent, as was mediation success durability at 58.7 percent.

Significantly, the data showed that little negotiation occurs in Africa (17.2 percent of all cases), but nearly a third of all the mediation cases (30.4 percent) occurred in the African conflicts. This is reflective of the large number of conflicts in Africa, and particularly, the large number of intractable, primarily civil conflicts that are not amenable to traditional diplomatic negotiations. On the other hand, it could be argued that, although little negotiation takes place in Africa, it is highly successful when it does occur.

In a general sense, this study suggests that negotiation is highly suited to conflicts between states that share similar capabilities, political systems, cultures, and alignment. If the conflict is narrow in scope and of a low intensity, negotiation will more often produce lasting agreements than would mediation. On the other hand, mediation can be usefully applied to more complex and intense conflicts, such as those that are currently ongoing in Africa, where negotiation is unlikely to occur. However, it will need to be applied early in the fighting, be conducted in a neutral environment between high-ranking officials, and most likely employ forceful strategies.

Finally, these findings also lend some support to the notion that parties in conflict often go through a sequence of conflict management procedures, turning to a new procedure when the old ones prove ineffective.²¹ For states, such sequences almost invariably begin with negotiation, in the sense of normal diplomatic communications. If this fails, third party intermediary assistance may be called for.

ZAIRE REVISITED: A FINAL WORD FOR PRACTITIONERS

A brief return to the Zairean case allows us to get back to the frontier where theory and reality interact. Despite the eventual victory for Kabila’s army in this conflict, the initial quandary remains: how should the international community, especially interested parties in Africa, have responded to the outbreak of war? Was mediation the only real option, and what form should it have taken? Although this study does not allow us to decide once and for all the answers to these kinds of questions, it does allow us to make a few general observations about how the various conflict management efforts could have been made more successful in this case.

In the first place, greater efforts should have been made to encourage bilateral negotiations. Initially, it was the Mobutu regime which was unwilling to enter into talks. At this point,

Western nations, such as France and the United States, which had been staunch allies of the regime for the entire cold war era, should have encouraged Mobutu to negotiate, even if they had had to exert some diplomatic pressure to do so. While outside intervention into Africa's conflicts has in the past had a deleterious effect (see Table 1), in recent years those same intervening powers have been able to use their influence to bring to an end some of the continent's worst wars.²² Pressure from the United States and the Soviet Union, for example, was partly responsible for the ending of conflicts in Namibia, Mozambique, and Angola. Clearly, external states that have long sustained Africa's conflicts during the cold war era need to take greater responsibility for working to end the continent's conflicts in the post-cold war environment. Pressing for negotiations between Mobutu and Kabila would have been an ideal opportunity for such a commitment by France and the United States.

As we have seen from this study, negotiation has a higher rate of durable success than mediation, and should always be attempted first. Only if bilateral negotiations fail or cannot be initiated should mediation be attempted.

However, the nature of the conflict suggested that negotiation, even if it could have been initiated, was unlikely to be successful in any case. The parties had a history of antagonism and violence; there were numerous intervening parties—Rwanda, Uganda, Hutu militia; both sides were extremely ethnically fragmented; the fighting was intense; and, as one side—Kabila's ADFL—was not a state, there were large differences between the capabilities and alignment of the two main parties. Furthermore, as we have seen, there was no real political will by either party to settle peacefully. Mobutu's regime was unwilling to negotiate seriously until it was clear that it was about to lose the entire country. Kabila, on the other hand, was willing to talk initially in order to obtain recognition and legitimacy, but as soon as it became apparent that the Zairean forces were not going to pose any serious threat to his military campaign to take over the entire country, his good will evaporated and he was happy to wait for the inevitable collapse of the Mobutu regime.

In short, the best hope for managing this conflict was, in fact, some form of third party intervention. In this case, the efforts of the United Nations, the OAU, and President Mandela were intuitively correct, even if they were somewhat misapplied. The question remains: what kind of mediator and what kinds of mediation would have been most effective? In order to answer this question, we need to go beyond the confines of this study for a brief moment. In the first place, it seems clear that sending Mohammed Sahnoun as the joint OAU-UN mediator was bound to fail. Research has shown that complex conflicts such as this one, with such a high degree of hostility, require high-ranking individuals with the ability to wield considerable resources and political muscle.²³ UN representatives like Sahnoun do not necessarily possess these vital qualifications.

There is a particular problem here with the efforts of African regional organisations to settle conflicts. While regional organisations are generally very successful at resolving conflicts, equipped as they are with common ideals, perspectives, and interests,²⁴ in Africa they show a poor record of success (35.1 percent). This is related to a number of inherent weaknesses, and clearly the OAU especially needs major reforms if it is to improve its conflict management role.²⁵

However, getting the right mediator is only part of the puzzle. Mediation is a contingent social behaviour, and what the mediator actually does during the process of conflict management is extremely important. This study clearly demonstrates the need to hold the

mediation in a neutral environment, and to ensure that both parties are represented by equally ranked senior officials. Furthermore, in a conflict characterised by intangible issues, high fatalities, and major disparities in high power, mediators greatly enhance their chances of success if they also employ forceful, directive strategies during the talks, such as making threats or promises, imposing deadlines, or suggesting compromise solutions.²⁶ Often, only powerful states can successfully employ these tactics. In Africa, large states that wish to establish themselves as important regional powers, such as South Africa and Nigeria, will increasingly have to take on the burden of investing significant resources in the pursuit of peace.²⁷ Peacemaking by large states from within Africa will be an important part of guaranteeing the future stability of the region.

In the end, unfortunately, the mediation efforts in Zaire were too little, too late. In any case, the political will necessary to sustain successful conflict management was conspicuously absent. A pertinent lesson here is that in the end, successful conflict management is dependent upon the conflicting parties themselves. While outside parties can greatly enhance the chances of success through careful and prudent manipulation of the site of the talks, the timing of the intervention, and the participating officials, ultimately the success or failure of the conflict management depends on the willingness of the parties. This is not to say that the quest to improve international conflict management is a wasted exercise, only to say that its limitations must be clearly recognised. In the complex world of international politics, there is no panacea for violent conflicts. Hard work and tireless enthusiasm must characterise the task of understanding, explaining, and improving methods of international conflict management. Although solving the puzzle of the pacific settlement of international disputes does not automatically furnish the political will for such an outcome, the lack of intellectual solutions almost certainly precludes it.

APPENDIX 1: LIST OF AFRICAN DISPUTES

- 01 France–Madagascar: Nationalist Rebellion (Mar. 1947–Aug. 1947)
- 02 Eritrea–Ethiopia: Independence Attempt (July 1949–Dec. 1950)
- 03 Tunisian Independence (Jan. 1952–Mar. 1956)
- 04 Kenya–UK: Mau Mau Revolt (Aug. 1952–Dec. 1963)
- 05 Algerian Independence (Nov. 1954–Mar. 1962)
- 06 Spain–Morocco: Sahara Conflict (Nov. 1957–Apr. 1958)
- 07 Egypt–Sudan: Border Dispute (Feb. 1958)
- 08 France–Tunisia: Military Bases Conflict (Feb. 1958–May 1958)
- 09 France–Tunisia: Algerian Border Incidents (Feb. 1959–Aug. 1959)
- 10 The Congo Conflict (July 1960–mid-1964)
- 11 African Territories–Portugal: Independence Struggle (1961–July 1975)
- 12 France–Tunisia: Bizerte Conflict (July 1961–Sept. 1961)
- 13 Somalia–Kenya; Ethiopia: Somali Expansionism (Nov. 1962–Sept. 1967)
- 14 First Sudan Civil War (Sept. 1963–Mar. 1972)
- 15 Algeria–Morocco: Tindouf War (Oct. 1963–Feb. 1964)
- 16 Somalia–Ethiopia: Ogaden War (Jan. 1964–Mar. 1964)
- 17 Rwanda–Burundi: Ethnic Violence (Jan. 1964–Jan. 1965)
- 18 France–Gabon: Aubanne’s Coup (Feb. 1964)
- 19 Eritrea–Ethiopia: Secession War (1965–May 1993)
- 20 Ghana–Togo: Border Incidents (Jan. 1965–May 1965)
- 21 Uganda–Zaire: Border Incidents (Feb. 1965–Mar. 1965)
- 22 Chad–Sudan: Intervention and Civil War (Nov. 1965–1972)

- 23 Namibian Independence Struggle (1966–Mar. 1990)
 - 24 Ivory Coast–Guinea: Overthrow Plot (Mar. 1966–Apr. 1966)
 - 25 Ghana–Guinea: Nkrumah Tensions (Oct. 1966–Nov. 1966)
 - 26 Zimbabwean Independence Struggle (1967–Jan. 1980)
 - 27 Guinea–Ivory Coast: Hostage Crisis (Feb. 1967–Sept. 1967)
 - 28 Nigeria–Biafra: Secession Attempt (July 1967–Jan. 1970)
 - 29 Zaire–Rwanda: Mercenaries Dispute (Aug. 1967–Apr. 1968)
 - 30 Guinean Security: Conakry Raids (Nov. 1970)
 - 31 Uganda–Tanzania: Border Conflict (1971–Oct. 1972)
 - 32 Equatorial Guinea–Gabon: Corisco Bay Islands (June 1972–Nov. 1972)
 - 33 Ethiopia–Somalia: Second Ogaden War (mid-1972–1985)
 - 34 Western Saharan Conflict: Morocco–Mauritania (Oct. 1974–1995)
 - 35 Mali–Upper Volta (Burkina Faso): Border Conflict (Dec. 1974–June 1975)
 - 36 Angola–South Africa: Intervention and Civil War (1975–1995)
 - 37 Zaire–Angola: Border War (Nov. 1975–Feb. 1976)
 - 38 Mozambique–South Africa: Intervention and Civil War (1976–Oct. 1992)
 - 39 Uganda–Kenya: Border Incidents (Feb. 1976–Aug. 1976)
 - 40 Chad–Libya: Aozou Strip and First Chad Civil War (June 1976–June 1982)
 - 41 Zaire–Angola: Shaba Invasion (Mar. 1977–May 1977)
 - 42 Second Shaba Invasion (May 1978)
 - 43 Tanzania–Uganda: Amin Overthrow (Oct. 1978–May 1979)
 - 44 Algeria–Morocco: Border Conflict (June 1979–Oct. 1979)
 - 45 Cameroon–Nigeria: Border Incident (May 1981–July 1981)
 - 46 Ugandan Civil War (Dec. 1981–1995)
 - 47 Zaire–Zambia: Border Dispute (Feb. 1982–Sept. 1982)
 - 48 Libya–Chad: Intervention and Civil War (mid-1982–1995)
 - 49 Ghana–Togo: Border Incidents (Aug. 1982–Oct. 1982)
 - 50 South Africa–Lesotho: Anti-ANC Raid (Dec. 1982)
 - 51 Second Sudan Civil War (Jan. 1983–1995)
 - 52 Liberia–Sierra Leone: Doe Tensions (Feb. 1983–Mar. 1983)
 - 53 Chad–Nigeria: Lake Chad Conflict (Apr. 1983–July 1983)
 - 54 Zaire–Zambia: Border Dispute (Sept. 1983–Jan. 1984)
 - 55 South Africa–Botswana: Anti-ANC Raids (Oct. 1984–May 1986)
 - 56 Third Shaba Invasion (Nov. 1984)
 - 57 Fourth Shaba Invasion (June 1985)
 - 58 Mali–Burkina Faso: Border War (Dec. 1985–Jan. 1986)
 - 59 Togo Overthrow Attempt (Sept. 1986)
 - 60 Zaire–Congo: Border Incident (Jan. 1987)
 - 61 Ethiopia–Somalia: Ogaden Conflict (Feb. 1987–Apr. 1988)
 - 62 South Africa–Zambia: Anti-ANC Raid (Apr. 1987)
 - 63 Congo Rebellion (Sept. 1987–July 1988)
 - 64 Uganda–Kenya: Border Conflict (Dec. 1987)
 - 65 Somalia Civil War (May 1988–1995)
 - 66 Hutu–Burundi Conflict (Aug. 1988–1995)
 - 67 Uganda–Kenya: Border Conflict (Mar. 1989)
 - 68 Liberian Civil War (Dec. 1989–1995)
 - 69 Guinea-Bissau–Senegal: Border Conflict (Apr. 1990–May 1990)
 - 70 Tuareg–Niger Conflict (May 1990–Oct. 1994)
 - 71 Senegal–Casamance: Secession Struggle (mid-1990–1995)
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- 72 Tuareg–Mali Conflict (June 1990–1995)
- 73 Rwanda Invasion (Sept. 1990–1995)
- 74 Liberia–Sierra Leone: Intervention and Civil War (Mar. 1991–1995)
- 75 Djibouti Civil War (Nov. 1991–July 1993)
- 76 Egypt–Sudan: Halaib Dispute (Dec. 1992)
- 77 Nigeria–Cameroon: Diamond Islands (Dec. 1993–Mar. 1994)
- 78 Ghana–Togo: Border Incidents (Jan. 1994–Feb. 1994)
- 79 Comoros Coup Attempt (Sept. 1995–Oct. 1995)

NOTES

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1. P. Brogan, *World Conflicts: Why and Where They Are Happening*, 2nd ed. (London: Bloomsbury, 1992).
2. See P. Wallensteen and M. Sollenberg, “Armed Conflicts, Conflict Termination and Peace Agreements, 1989–96,” *Journal of Peace Research* 34 (1997): 339–58; and J. Bercovitch and R. Jackson, *International Conflict: A Chronological Encyclopedia of Conflicts and Their Management 1945–1995* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1997).
3. The findings presented in this section are drawn largely from an analysis of the original data set described below.
4. These 295 conflicts are listed in Appendix 2 of R. Jackson, “Negotiation Versus Mediation in International Conflict: Deciding How to Manage Violent Conflicts” (Ph.D. diss.: University of Canterbury, UK, 1998).
5. See also Bercovitch and Jackson, *International Conflict*, 11.
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