The Role of National Identity in the Trajectory of Romania’s Foreign Policy (1990-2007)

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DECLARATION

This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not being concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.

Signed J. Salajain Date 22 October 2014

STATEMENT I

This thesis is the result of my own research, except where otherwise stated. Where correction services have been used, the extent and nature of the correction are clearly marked in footnotes. Other sources are acknowledged by footnotes giving explicit references. A bibliography is appended.

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Abstract

This thesis explores the significance of national identity in shaping the trajectory of Romania’s foreign policy between 1990 and 2007. It explains why and how Romania’s Euro-Atlantic national identity was subject to re-definitions and discursive dialogue prior to the European Union accession on 1 January 2007, as well as how and why these identity re-definitions influenced the state’s foreign policy decisions. The research employs a multi-dimensional framework of national identity, which draws from four academic literatures related to: constructivism, nationalism studies, collective memory and self-esteem and international recognition. National identity formation represents a two-way socio-psychological process that depends on both domestic and international factors. To identify the themes or self-images of national identity, the project has examined the discourses of elites as the primary actors of Romanian foreign policy. The three main self-images of Romania’s Euro-Atlantic national identity – ‘European’, ‘non-Balkan’ and ‘security provider’ – configured an ideational foundation that impacted on the state’s foreign policy throughout 1990 and 2007.
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**Acronyms**

CDR – the Democratic Convention of Romania (centre-right)

DA alliance – the ‘Justice and Truth’ alliance of PNL and PD (centre-right)

EU – the European Union

IR – the academic discipline of International Relations

NATO – the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OSCE – the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

PC – the Conservative Party (former PUR – centre-right)

PD – the Democrat Party (centre-left)

PDSR – the Social Democratic Party of Romania (centre-left)

PNL – the National Liberal Party (centre-right)

PNŢCD – the National Peasant and Christian Democratic Party (centre-right)

PRM – the Great Romania Party (right-wing)

PSD – the Social Democrat Party (former PDSR – centre-left)

PUR – the Humanist Party (re-named PC)

UDMR – the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (centre-right)

UK – the United Kingdom of Great Britain

US – the United States of America

USSR – the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
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Introduction: The General Foundations of the Thesis

The key purpose of my thesis is to explore the importance of national identity in shaping the story of Romania’s foreign policy between 1990 and 2007. The project analyses an empirical puzzle that has preoccupied academics and practitioners alike - how does a state’s national identity influence its international relations? In this respect, the thesis explains why and how Romania’s Euro-Atlantic national identity was subject to re-definitions and discursive negotiation prior to the EU accession on 1 January 2007, as well as how and why these identity re-definitions impacted on the state’s foreign policy decisions. My project is only concerned with highlighting and elucidating the role of national identity in the configuration of Romania’s foreign policy, in order to balance the great attention given to pragmatic or material calculations. While I acknowledge the significance of Romanian economic interests in the state’s pursuit of Euro-Atlantic integration, they are included in the category of rational or material factors, together with realist interests such as physical security and gaining power. Romania’s post-communist foreign policy had two major goals that marked the evolution of national identity – membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and in the European Union (EU). Romania became an official NATO member in March 2004 and an EU one in January 2007. The state’s post-1990 foreign policy has widely been examined through realist lenses and there is an ample scope for accounts that are not focused on material interests like power or economic and political benefits. The aim of this introductory chapter is to show the general foundation of my thesis, which will include the following: underlining the original contribution of my work, locating my arguments in the Romanian foreign policy literature and laying out the methodological underpinnings of the project. These individual components will be divided into three sections – literature review, methodology and thesis structure.
The original contribution of my research to the Romanian foreign policy field derives from conceptual and empirical aspects. This thesis features a multi-dimensional framework of national identity which draws from four academic literatures: constructivism, nationalism studies, collective memory and self-esteem and international recognition. It is not intended to be a constructivist project, because the empirical material on Romanian identity and foreign policy during 1990-2007 brought to the surface some problematic issues that could not be entirely solved by using constructivist notions and instruments. The insights and lacunae of constructivism have been supplemented by the other literatures, which together help to understand the intricacies of a state’s national identity. The inter-disciplinary nature of my ideational framework offers a complex view of national identity that captures its internal and external dynamic. National identity formation represents a two-way socio-psychological process that depends on both domestic and international factors. The internal sources of national identity are the nation and collective memories about the historical past. The external dimension of national identity requires international recognition, which is intertwined with a state’s sense of self-esteem.

Another original contribution of my thesis to the Romanian foreign policy literature is the application of national identity to a quite large time frame of the state’s post-communist international politics. The period 1990-2007 was very significant for the re-articulation of Romanian identity and provides a series of interesting case studies or ‘formative moments’.¹ These ‘formative moments’ are favourable times that allow new meanings to (re)appear and new identities to be (re)established.² To identify the themes of Romania’s national identity, my project has examined the discourses of elites as the main actors of foreign policy. The seventeen years following the 1989 Romanian popular revolution against the communist dictatorship were particularly meaningful for Romania as a democratic state and its foreign

² Ibid, p. 83.
affairs, since they constituted the opportunity for a new beginning. This time frame contains several key case studies that show the re-definitions of national identity and how the latter have influenced foreign policy actions: the 1991 Romanian-Soviet ‘Friendship Treaty’; the complicated Hungarian-Romanian relations that obstructed the signing of a bilateral cooperation treaty until mid-1996; Romania’s reactions to the escalating Kosovo crisis and eventual NATO intervention of 1999; the state’s support and military involvement in the 2003 Iraq war, as well as the domestic debates in 2006 about maintaining Romanian military presence in Iraq and the post-2005 intensified Atlanticism of national identity and foreign policy. All these cases have been discussed individually or as smaller groups in the literature, but not as a sequence of inter-related episodes that have shaped Romanian identity and international stances from 1990 to 2007. In order to clarify my position in the Romanian foreign policy field, an overview of the literatures that both touch upon and deal at length with Romania’s international relations is useful at this point.

Literature Review

The subject of Romanian post-communist foreign policy has been explored to some extent in the academic literatures, though not as extensively as the foreign policies of other states in Central-Eastern Europe. This section aims to map out the various IR disciplines that have a connection with Romanian international relations, moving from a wider to a narrower scope as the survey focuses on the literature that specifically analyses Romania’s foreign policy. The literature review is not meant to be exhaustive and contains a few key examples that reflect the arguments circulating in each field. The case of Romania has attracted substantial attention from scholars preoccupied with democratisation processes. They have studied the political and economic aspects of the Romanian transition from a communist dictatorship to a democratic regime. A few noteworthy representatives are
Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan\(^3\), Tom Gallagher’s\(^4\) numerous contributions on the general politics and abuse of nationalism in newly democratic Romania, Florin Abraham’s\(^5\) book concerning the impact of external elements on Romanian politics, as well as edited volumes by Daniel Nelson\(^6\), Lavinia Stan\(^7\), Duncan Light and David Phinnemore\(^8\) and Henry Carey\(^9\). Romanian external affairs have been discussed as part of broader historical enquiries about the country’s evolution. Some relevant examples are the work of Lucian Boia on history and myth in the Romanian consciousness\(^10\), Steven Roper’s book on Romanian political and economic development from the nineteenth century until 1999\(^11\), Nicolae Toboşaru’s monograph on the history of the Romanian-US strategic partnership\(^12\), Armand Goşu’s article on the highlights of Romania’s Eastern policy between 1990 and 2005\(^13\), along with Andrei Miroiu and Simona Soare’s historical overview with a realist outlook on Romanian security policy.\(^14\) The exclusive topic of Romanian post-1990


\(^8\) Duncan Light and David Phinnemore (eds.), *Post-Communist Romania: Coming to Terms with Transition* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001).


\(^12\) Nicolae Toboşaru, *Parteneriatul strategic dintre România şi SUA: Istorie şi semnificaţii geopolitice/ The Strategic Partnership between Romania and the USA: History and Geopolitical Implications* (Cluj: Presa Universitară, 2010).


foreign policy has been analysed by three categories of IR literatures: explanations driven by material interests, EU and Europeanisation literature and accounts based on ideational factors.

Firstly, the literature on Romanian foreign policy driven by material interests has been well developed and includes prominent realist contributions like that of Ruxandra Ivan. Her research is discussed in more detail because it is extensive and emblematic for the type of arguments put forth by this kind of material explanation. Ivan has identified three stages of Romania’s post-communist foreign policy. The first one (1990-1996) was a phase of relative confusion, when Romanian leaders hesitated about staying within Russia’s sphere or drawing nearer to Western Europe and the US. The second stage (1996-2004) clearly set NATO and EU accession as national foreign policy objectives and saw the organisation of sustained actions to accomplish these goals. The third period (2004-2006) started a stage of re-definition, when the state’s external initiatives were more intense and sometimes even aggressive. Ivan argues that Romanian behaviour in international politics has been characterised by ‘bandwagoning’. In the early 1990s, the Soviet Union’s weakened state was not obvious and Romanian elites oscillated between two forms of bandwagoning – an alliance with the East or one with the West. They firmly opted for Western integration only when the USSR disintegrated and the new Russian Federation lost its superpower status. The same bandwagoning phenomenon occurred in the case of US-European divergences on an Iraqi invasion in 2003. Romania was involved in the Iraq war and aligned with the US, since the latter was the most powerful actor.

Ivan also explains that certain internal and external factors inevitably shaped Romanian international relations. The domestic source with the greatest impact on Romanian foreign policy was the institutional triangle, which had been formed by the President, Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister. Compared to it, other internal factors like political parties and public opinion did not have a decisive contribution to foreign policy decisions. As for the external elements, the first phase of Romania’s international course was channelled by the post-bipolar configuration of the international environment and the Euro-Atlantic (Western) integration trend prevalent in Central-Eastern Europe. The strategic choices of the second phase, such as signing basic treaties with neighbouring states like Hungary, were made due to EU and NATO pressures. The conditionality exercised by the two organisations over the candidates seeking NATO and EU membership was an omnipresent consideration of Romanian international conduct after 1996.

Furthermore, Andrei Miroiu has described Romania’s international position as typical of a minor power in an anarchic system, needing to ensure its security by joining the most powerful continental blocs – the EU and NATO. Robert Weiner also thinks that Romania has opted for a realist approach to its external affairs, especially with former enemies or problematic neighbours like Russia and Hungary. He considers national interests to be the guiding premise of Romanian foreign policy in the post-1989 era, which were driven by material and rational calculations like overcoming the state’s

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international isolation and resolving its security dilemma. Romanian efforts to
normalise exchanges with Russia and Hungary simply intended to serve its
realist interests or fulfil NATO and EU demands. Tom Gallagher agrees that,
for Romania and Hungary, ‘the prospect of shedding their isolation and
becoming part of an enlarged European security system is a powerful-enough
incentive to enable them to bridge important differences between them’. Most of these types of material explanations regarding Romania’s foreign
policy are problematic because they do not open the ‘black box’ of the state. They treat states as unitary and exclusively rational actors, whose foreign
policies consist of fixed and objective preferences like physical security and
accumulating power or wealth.

Consequently, the literature based on Romanian material interests
either excludes the role of national identity or subsumes the latter under the
material constraints of elites as foreign policy decision-makers. National
identity actually has a great influence on a state’s international stance. Material and rational calculations cannot account for all the complexities of
Romanian foreign policy. A national identity framework rejects the
assumption that state elites had a unitary and objectively identifiable opinion
on Romania’s international direction. Instead, it shows the internal
contestation among Romanian officials in controversial episodes like the 1991
Romanian-Soviet ‘Friendship Treaty’. Some national leaders endorsed a
security relationship with the USSR, which could have prevented Romania
from seeking NATO and EU membership. Even so, the majority of elites
wanted a Western or Euro-Atlantic orientation for their state; they made sure
that the signed Soviet ‘Friendship Treaty’ would not be legally binding and did
not ratify it in the Romanian Parliament. National identity also supplements
the story of Romania’s foreign policy by helping to understand why and how
certain decisions were taken despite material considerations. For instance, at
a closer look, EU and NATO conditionality did not work well in the case of

23 Ibid, pp. 486-499.
Romanian-Hungarian relations and the signing of their basic treaty of cooperation. Both states had inflexible foreign policy views about what European identity meant with respect to minority rights. They did not reach a mutually agreeable compromise until mid-1996, when the international community and especially ‘Europe’ (EU, Council of Europe and OSCE) clarified their perspectives on what were the suitable liberal democratic provisions for minority rights.

The second category of approaches to Romanian post-communist foreign policy pertains to the EU and Europeanisation literature. David Phinnemore has extensively analysed Romania’s difficult road towards EU accession.25 His article in 2000 dealt with rising domestic concerns that the EU did not plan to expand, which would leave the state in a ‘grey zone’ of political, economic and social instability characteristic of South-Eastern Europe and close to Russia’s influence.26 Together with Dimitris Papadimitriou, Phinnemore has written a comprehensive book on Romania’s journey to EU membership. They covered a wide variety of issues such as the state’s initial cautious steps towards the organisation, the struggle for a credible candidacy, EU negotiations and meeting the Copenhagen criteria, the delayed political and economic reforms, along with a distinct in-depth look at the implementation of the acquis communautaire for justice and home affairs.27 The authors’ overarching argument is that Romanian success in attaining EU integration must be attributed to both external and internal elements: the EU’s decision to continue enlargement, the dynamics of that process and the actions of successive national governments to fulfil accession requirements.28 Tom Gallagher has provided a different interpretation of Romania’s relationship with the EU and eventual EU membership. His core thesis is that ‘the EU’s multi-layered system of decision-making was unequal

26 David Phinnemore, ‘Stuck in the “Grey Zone”? Fears and Frustrations in Romania’s Quest for EU Membership’, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, volume 1(1), 2000, pp. 95-121.
28 Ibid, pp. 9-10.
to the stark challenges presented by a candidate with as many problems as Romania’.\textsuperscript{29} Gallagher basically argues that the ‘story of Romania and the EU helps to illustrate the unhelpful way that Western political concepts can be transferred to the South-East European context and how they have been diluted and even deformed in the process’.\textsuperscript{30}

In the Romanian foreign policy literature, there is an increasing interest in Europeanisation or how EU integration impacts on national structures and processes of taking decisions. Sorin Denca has produced a comparative study of new EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe - Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. He affirms that even if Europeanisation has generated institutional adaptation, the structural domestic changes tend to be linked more with national factors like governmental coalitions and bureaucratic politics, rather than with European integration pressures.\textsuperscript{31} Another contribution to this field has been made by Liliana Popescu, who has tested a few hypotheses about Romanian elite socialisation, bureaucratic reorganisation, institutional and policy adjustment to the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy and projection of national interests on the EU agenda.\textsuperscript{32} She concludes that Romania’s external relations have become more coherent due to EU membership, especially with regards to advocating the Republic of Moldova’s EU candidacy and placing it more firmly onto the organisation’s agenda.\textsuperscript{33} On a related note, Mircea Micu has evaluated the methodological utility of the Europeanisation toolkit and given some insights about its application in the Romanian case. Micu discusses ‘misfit’ examples where the EU and Romania did not have a common view. He identifies the domestic elements targeted by EU adaptation pressures, detects the direction

\textsuperscript{29} Tom Gallagher, \textit{Romania and the European Union: How the Weak Vanquished the Strong} (Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press, 2009), p. 3.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid, pp. 59-61.
and degree of change if they exist and then explains these shifts through established logics like that of ‘appropriateness’.\textsuperscript{34}

An interesting ‘misfit’ case happened in August 2002, when Romania was the first state to sign a Bilateral Immunity Agreement with the US. The document granted all American citizens immunity from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. Romania’s decision initially favoured the US in an inter-state issue that was highly controversial for the EU members. In such circumstances, Micu argues that widely used EU models of foreign policy cooperation showed their relevance. The EU expected that the consultation norm would be internalised by members, as well as candidate states.\textsuperscript{35} The ‘appropriate’ EU perspective emerged after consultations and did not endorse the signing of Bilateral Immunity Agreements with the US, except within narrow parameters. These bilateral treaties could only exempt American diplomats, military personnel and extradited persons from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. Romania refusing to adopt the EU view could have affected the state’s chances for EU accession.\textsuperscript{36} The state eventually aligned with the EU and did not make the American Bilateral Immunity Agreement legally binding by ratifying it in Parliament.

While certainly interesting, most of the EU and Europeanisation approaches to Romanian foreign policy go beyond the scope of my research, which has the end point of January 2007 when the state became an official EU member. My project examines Romanian foreign policy through a different lens too, which is the state’s national identity. EU accession irrevocably confirmed Romania’s Euro-Atlantic identity, which had already been internationally recognised via NATO integration in 2004. EU and NATO membership were the major goals of Romania’s post-communist foreign policy. Nevertheless, the 2002 American Bilateral Immunity Agreement will be discussed in more detail as part of the formative period of 2000-2004. This


\textsuperscript{35} Ibid, p. 54.

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid, pp. 55-57.
episode of Romanian foreign policy underlined the state’s uncomfortable situation between the opposing US and ‘European’ (EU) positions, which would be later amplified in the case of the Iraq war (2003). Romania did modify its initial support for the American Bilateral Immunity Agreement under ‘European’ pressures. Yet the document’s key significance lay in prefiguring that Romania could prefer an ‘Atlantic’ rather ‘European’ orientation on Iraq, depending on how national identity shaped the state’s foreign policy in 2003.

The third category of approaches to Romanian foreign policy refers to ideational factors, which are similar to the enquiry of my thesis. Alina Hosu has written a very useful book chapter on Romanian identity, where she argues that ‘Romania’s security policy in the post-Cold War period is closely linked to processes of state-building and political identity formation’. Hosu thinks that, ‘through the practice of security, the boundaries of identity within Romania, and those between Romania and “the West”, have been constantly (re)drawn’. The author also mentions how Romania was frequently articulated after 1990 as ‘Central-European’ and as being a ‘security provider’. The discussion focuses on how securitisation mechanisms constructed ‘Romanianness’ and the state’s relationship with neighbouring Hungary: ‘[t]he fear that Hungary would act to attain the return of Transylvania, the threat of the non-loyalty of the Hungarian minority, and the alarm over ethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslavia point to the highly complex, and contested, processes of nation building in post-communist Romania’. The author has concluded that security discourses revealed the ‘(re)drawing of ethno-cultural boundaries’ between Romanians and Hungarians, as well as the construction of a collective subjectivity between ‘Romania’ and ‘the West’.

38 Ibid, p. 53.
39 Ibid, p. 64 and p. 72.
40 Ibid, p. 69.
41 Ibid, p. 71.
talks about a ‘foreign policy’ or ‘political’ identity that has affected the ‘Eastern vocation’ of Romanian international positions.\textsuperscript{42} She argues that -

‘Romania expresses a form of solidarity with most of its neighbors on the basis of a political identity that it shares with them (...) Romania’s path of accession to Euro-Atlantic institutions has consolidated this liberal-democratic form of its political identity and had beneficial consequences for the country’s relations with its neighbors. The exception to this pattern is Moldova, as historical identity lies at the basis of the Moldovan-Romanian relations’.\textsuperscript{43}

Angelescu has analysed three case studies as part of Romania’s Eastern foreign policy: relations with Moldova, Ukraine and the Black Sea area.

Relating each of the two ideational accounts to my research, Hosu’s book chapter and Angelescu’s article were a good move away from the usual material interest explanations of Romania’s international affairs. They are interesting contributions that examine specific segments of Romanian external policies. Both include identity as a key element in influencing the state’s foreign affairs, yet without going into details about how identity operates or compares to rationalism and material calculations. The two contributions on post-1990 Romanian identity require expansion and a systematic study of Romanian foreign policy over a longer period and across multiple cases. These latter aspects are among the aims of my thesis, which has not employed a critical approach to discourse analysis and foreign policy like Hosu’s. The focal point of my framework is the internal articulation of national identity, along with its external discursive negotiation between the self and salient others and how all the identity re-definitions have shaped Romanian international responses. My perspective does not compete with rational and material interests, but rather elaborates on why and how national identity supplements the analysis of Romanian foreign policy and explains issues unaccounted for by rationalism. For instance, in 2005-2007, the intensified Atlanticism of national identity and foreign policy impacted on Romania’s international purpose, by depicting the state as a bridge to the ‘East’ or towards the non-Euro-Atlantic vicinity. Even after obtaining the


\textsuperscript{43} Ibid, p. 124.
alleged material goal of NATO accession in 2004, Romania maintained its military presence abroad in missions coordinated by NATO or not (Afghanistan and Iraq), while also attempting to configure a more active role in democratising and stabilising the Black Sea region.

Another ambitious ideational project on Romania’s foreign and security policy has been completed by Șerban Cioculescu, who talks about the strategic culture and motivations of national decision-makers. His book deals with psychological-cognitive and constructivist notions (norms, ideas, values and perceptions) and their influence on Romanian involvement abroad. These numerous factors are linked to the state’s justification of international intervention, which has been defined as being involved in the stabilisation and reconstruction of weak countries or converting ‘rogue’ states into responsible ones.44 Cioculescu has selected examples from Romania’s engagement with the Balkans, Black Sea area and the Greater Middle East. He explains how the post-1995 security culture, which supported intervention alongside the West in order to reform the above regions, shaped ‘national role conceptions’ of foreign policy. Romania having a ‘national role conception’ means that political elites adopted ‘a coherent set of mental images concerning the country’s importance in relations with other states’.45 This national role conception had an associated palette of values and objectives that were promoted via discourse. As the author has summarised, ‘from the first post-communist years, when foreign policy oscillated between the East and the West and elites were divided about the chosen direction – neutrality and non-alignment, or a Balkan bloc, a Central-Eastern European bloc, a closer relationship with Russia, [or] NATO and EU integration – until 2000 the role of security anchor and provider was gradually configured [under the impact of] an alliance of ‘values’ (NATO) or a supranational organisation (EU), or of a US-led coalition of the willing’.46

While Cioculescu’s study has a special interest in Romania’s policies of international intervention and its ‘security provider’ role, my thesis examines

46 Ibid, p. 266.
wider trends and themes of Romanian identity and external affairs such as how the ‘European’ self-image influenced the state’s relations with Hungary (1990-1996) and the foreign policy responses to the Kosovo crisis (1998-1999). Cioculescu employs a great variety of notions - norms, ideas, values, perceptions, motivations, strategic culture and national role conceptions – and it is not clear how everything fits together in a coherent perspective. My ideational framework of national identity is broad enough to capture the complexity of Romanian foreign policy, but specific enough to keep the analysis focused and meaningful. Having illustrated and located the original contributions of my work in the Romanian foreign policy field, the general foundation of this dissertation continues with methodological aspects.

Methodology

This thesis represents a qualitative research project, which relies on discourse analysis as a methodological tool to interpret the available primary sources. The types of relevant Romanian material include a wide variety of texts that pertain to foreign policy discourses. The body of primary sources compiled for the thesis consists of the following broad categories: a) the official stances of Romanian political leaders - Presidents, Premiers, Ministers - on the state’s foreign policy, expressed through public speeches, statements, interviews or press conferences, most of them being available in libraries or archives and some online; b) the transcripts of parliamentary debates on foreign policy issues, which show the contestation among the views of different political parties and the kinds of arguments used to support them; c) legal documents such as the Romanian Constitution, the laws regulating the organisation and activity of the state’s external affairs, as well as treaties between Romania and other states; d) other official documents belonging to state institutions – national security strategies, governmental programmes, white papers, press releases - or to political parties and international organisations; e) news articles that help to fill in information blanks and underline how the media reflects discursively the subjects present on the Romanian foreign policy agenda. In order to ensure the triangulation of
research findings, my project has also used memoirs, biographies, books with interviews and other useful collections of texts from actors who have occupied state positions significant for Romania’s post-communist foreign policy. The Romanian material is examined by applying a certain methodology of discourse analysis, which will be discussed at this point.

‘Discourse’ and ‘discourse analysis’ are profoundly contested terms, whose definitions range from communication in a particular context to a theoretical framework on the study of language. Michel Foucault, who founded the concept of ‘discourse’, employed various understandings of it. His broadening of the term ‘discourse’ was intentional and quite clearly rationalised - ‘instead of gradually reducing the rather fluctuating meaning of the word “discourse”, I believe I have in fact added to its meanings: treating it sometimes as the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualizable group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for a number of statements’. Foucault’s work is not a component of the ideational perspective of my thesis. But his different meanings of ‘discourse’ are useful to identify a comprehensive working definition for the term. Throughout my examination of the Romanian empirical material, discourse alternatively illustrated each of Foucault’s three notions: ‘the general domain of all statements’, a specific ‘group of statements’ (e.g. Romanian discourse on the Kosovo crisis) and ‘a regulated practice that accounts for a number of statements’ (the main discursive themes of Romania’s national identity – ‘European’, ‘non-Balkan’ and ‘security provider’). This brings some conceptual ambiguity, yet that is inevitable because discourse has become so deeply ingrained in academic language that finding a suitable replacement to convey its complexity would be an almost impossible task. Discourse and ideas have a strong link, which is relevant for the formation of national identity. Roger Fowler has defined their relationship as follows:

“[d]iscourse” is speech or writing seen from the point of view of the beliefs, values and categories which it embodies; these beliefs constitute a way of looking at the world, an organization or representation of experience – “ideology” in the neutral non-pejorative

sense. Different modes of discourse encode different representations of experience; and the source of these representations is the communicative context within which the discourse is embedded'.

Depending on how one understands the term ‘discourse’, discourse analysis might also mean different things. First, it is a methodological instrument by which texts and speech acts are examined. Second, discourse analysis may refer to certain conceptual assumptions, which treat language as more than a transparent vehicle of communication; discourse not only constitutes social reality, but is also constructed by it. At the same time, discourse analysis stands for more than a single methodology or a homogeneous theory; it is rather a multi-faceted approach dealing with ‘the study of language in use’, as well as ‘the study of human meaning-making’ or ‘the production of meaning in social life’. In other words, ‘social reality is produced and made real through discourses, and social interactions cannot be fully understood without reference to the discourses that give them meaning’. Here it seems appropriate to say that my project applies discourse analysis as a research tool. The methodology of discourse analysis has the following objectives and features -

‘ascertaining the constructive effects of discourse through the structured and systematic study of texts (...) Discursive activity does not occur in a vacuum, however, and discourses do not “possess” meaning. Instead, discourses are shared and social, emanating out of interactions between social groups and the complex societal structures in which the discourse is embedded’.

Discourses about a state’s national identity and foreign policy are contextual and depend on international events and narratives. These discourses are not ‘produced without context and cannot be understood without taking context into consideration’; they are ‘always connected to other discourses which are

51 Ibid, p. 4.
produced earlier, as well as those which are produced synchronically and subsequently’.

A great advantage of discourse analysis as a methodological instrument derives from its flexibility. Instead of applying a fixed mechanism to every empirical example, some discourse scholars use the approach in less constricting ways and ‘articulate their concepts in each particular enactment of concrete research’. Sometimes a set procedure of doing discourse analysis limits to an extent the kind of knowledge provided by a case study. The absence of an established step-by-step scheme could be seen as a weak point, yet the interpretive nature of discourse research offers valuable advantages. For instance, content analysis focuses on pre-determined categories that need to explicitly appear in the available material. Compared to content analysis, the more flexible nature of discourse analysis enables the researcher to find both explicit manifestations and implicit meanings or assumptions that may otherwise be overlooked. The enquiry of my project has been guided by two principles put forward by Jutta Weldes, who explains how elites shape self-images, foreign policy representations and identities out of the circulating ideational structures. The first dimension of this process – articulation - has been described as follows:

‘[t]he term “articulation” refers to the process through which meaning is produced out of extant cultural raw materials or linguistic resources. Meaning is created and temporarily fixed by establishing chains of connotations among different linguistic elements. In this way, different terms and ideas come to connote or to ‘summon’ one another, to be welded into associative chains that make up an identifiable, if not a logically consistent, whole (...) With their successful repeated articulation, these linguistic elements come to seem as though they are inherently or necessarily connected, and the meanings they produce come to seem natural, come to seem an accurate description of reality’.

To configure stable images, articulation needs to be combined with a second dimension - interpellation - ‘a dual process whereby identities or subject-

52 Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak cited in ibid.
positions are created and concrete individuals are “hailed” into or interpellated by them’. The period 1990-1996 showed an abundance of (re)emerging understandings in the Romanian foreign policy imaginary, which formed the patterns and themes of an ideational foundation for the state’s post-communist foreign policy.

Moreover, the central research question investigated by my thesis is the following - what are the re-definitions of Romania’s national identity during 1990-2007 and how and why have they influenced the state’s foreign policy? By asking both ‘how’ and ‘why-questions’, my project departs from the dominant approaches to Romanian foreign policy analysis, which usually deal with answering only why certain decisions resulting in concrete actions were taken. Ontologically, ‘why-questions’ already presuppose a background of meanings, kinds of social actors and relationships. So ‘how’ and ‘what’ types of research questions take things a step further by uncovering the way in which Romanian understandings, objects and subjects have been constituted, as well as their impact on foreign policy. With regards to epistemology, Jennifer Milliken has opinionated that discourse researchers have a common rejection of ‘epistemic realism’; they employ ‘a logic of interpretation that acknowledges the improbability of cataloguing, calculating and specifying “real causes”, concerning itself instead with considering the manifest political consequences of adopting one mode of representation over another’. In more conventional IR terminology, the epistemological position of my thesis is ‘understanding’ foreign policy behaviour by looking at it through national identity lenses. As Martin Hollis and Steve Smith have noted, the approaches of ‘explaining’ and ‘understanding’ should be distinguished because they embody divergent purposes. On the one hand, ‘explaining’ is about identifying what caused a particular event or state of

affairs. In order to rigorously establish or dismiss a causal relationship between two variables, a number of cases are examined by generating and testing hypotheses. On the other hand, ‘understanding’ reflects the search for a meaning, not necessarily the cause. Such a method involves treating history not as a source of information that might falsify a theory, but as a narrative which allows a greater appreciation of the origins, evolution and consequences of an event or state of affairs. After having laid out the methodological underpinnings of my research, the discussion moves on to the last introductory segment – the analytical plan of my arguments.

Thesis Structure

This dissertation has a primary empirical concern, which has been translated into its overarching structure. Following the introduction, the thesis has been divided into six chapters – one conceptual and five empirical in nature. Chapter I offers background knowledge about Romanian history and politics, which will be necessary to better understand the main analysis of post-communist national identity and foreign policy. It features a historical survey of important ‘formative moments’ in Romania’s pre-1990 evolution and an overview of the Romanian post-1990 political context. Chapter I presents how Romanian identity and international relations developed, particularly after the Great Unification of 1918, when the provinces of Transilvania, Basarabia and Bucovina decided to join the Romanian Kingdom. The chapter also deals with the turbulent events of post-revolutionary Romania, which occurred in the early 1990s.

Chapter II configures the ideational framework of national identity that will be applied to Romanian foreign policy. The conceptualisation of national identity draws from four literatures that relate to constructivism, nationalism studies, collective memory and self-esteem and international recognition. The

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59 Ibid.
constructivist school of thought advances useful insights on how to define identity, but the case of Romania brought up some lacunae that needed to be addressed by the other intellectual fields. The four literatures create a multidimensional view on national identity, which stresses its internal and external dimensions. National identity formation is a two-way socio-psychological process that encompasses both domestic and international elements. The internal sources of national identity refer to the nation and collective memories or interpretations of the nation’s past. The external dimension of national identity is about a state’s self-images being internationally recognised, which links to an increased or reduced sense of self-esteem depending on whether or not those self-images are accepted in the global arena.

Chapter III focuses on the period 1990-1996 with its three ‘formative moments’ that were essential for Romania’s national identity and foreign policy. The first one defined the state’s international orientation towards ‘Europe’ after an episode of domestic contestation among elites – the 1991 Romanian-Soviet ‘Friendship Treaty’. Political leaders had to answer an existential question for post-communist Romania – to be or not to be ‘European’? The Romanian President signed the Soviet ‘Friendship Treaty’, which implied a security relationship with the USSR that could have prevented Romania from seeking NATO and EU membership. This ‘Eastern’ international direction was not shared by the majority of Romanian officials, who envisioned a European identity and future for their state. Having definitively opted for ‘Europe’, the second ‘formative moment’ of 1990-1996 saw the emergence of Romania’s foreign policy imaginary that featured three key discursive themes or self-images: ‘European’, ‘non-Balkan’ and ‘security provider’. These self-images feeding into national identity constituted an ideational foundation that shaped Romanian international politics between 1990 and 2007. The state’s ‘European’ self-image was particularly meaningful in 1990-1996 and influenced its problematic relations with Hungary, which engendered the third ‘formative moment’ of national identity. The latter highlighted for Romania the dynamic of European identity contestation, dialogue and external validation between the self and other. The Romanian-
Hungarian treaty could not move beyond the inflexible foreign policy stances of both states, which operated on different conceptions regarding what ‘European’ identity meant in terms of ethnic minority rights. As the authoritative ‘Europe’ was still debating this matter, Romania and Hungary did not sign a bilateral cooperation treaty until mid-1996.

Chapter IV explores the years 1996-1999, which were predominantly marked by the ‘formative moment’ of the Kosovo inter-ethnic conflict and NATO’s military intervention in 1999. The Alliance had refused to include Romania in the 1997 wave of enlargement, which could have rendered the state even more reluctant to endorse NATO actions in Kosovo. Yet Romania exhibited evolving foreign policy reactions to the Kosovo crisis, which began with partial support for the Alliance in October 1998 and changed to unconditional assistance for NATO’s Operation ‘Allied Force’ in March-April 1999. The initial Romanian position was a middle ground with a dual purpose: first, partial support (airspace access in emergencies) did not undermine the state’s Euro-Atlantic identity; second, it accommodated the dilemmas inherent in Romania’s national identity - whether to act as a ‘European’ liberal democracy and ‘security provider’ or choose the traditional Balkan affinity. This foreign policy response was re-defined under the combined impact of three factors: national identity, rational interest and shifting international context. Romania eventually assisted NATO’s campaign in Kosovo by providing unrestricted airspace access without armed forces.

Chapter V concentrates on the time frame 2000-2004, which associated a series of ‘formative moments’ that culminated in a fundamental re-definition of national identity during the 2003 Iraq war. The international discourses of early 1999 on an urgent humanitarian intervention in Kosovo facilitated the re-articulation of Romanian identity as a pro-active liberal democracy that tried to help the people suffering in totalitarian regimes. Since French-German and US opinions on how to disarm Iraq differed throughout 2002-2003, Central-Eastern European states were forced to make a ‘European’ or ‘Atlantic’ choice. Romania’s national identity underwent a crisis within its ‘liberal democratic’ self-image and the state had to opt whether to act as a
‘European’ or ‘Atlantic’ liberal democracy. The tensions in national identity were settled by invoking certain collective memory-myths that reinforced the idea of Romania becoming an ‘Atlantic’ liberal democracy.

Chapter VI looks at the period 2004-2007, when the Atlantic vocation of Romania’s national identity and foreign policy was consolidated and intensified. Although the state was an official NATO member, the self-images of ‘security provider’ and ‘pro-active liberal democracy’ continued to be very relevant for its international affairs. The Presidency’s Atlantic views shifted Romania’s foreign policy efforts from the ‘West’ to the ‘East’, where the state could have a significant role in democratising and stabilising the Euro-Atlantic community’s neighbourhood, as well as contributing to more distant theatres of operations like Iraq. This intensified Atlanticism was not accepted by all Romanian elites, especially the Prime Minister who tried to re-balance the ‘European’ self-image and Atlantic dimension of national identity and international politics. The Premier’s attempt at contestation was unsuccessful and Romania maintained its military presence in Iraq, along with pursuing an Eastern foreign policy in the Black Sea area.

The arguments of my thesis end with concluding remarks about the role of national identity in the overarching trajectory of Romania’s foreign policy between 1990 and 2007.
Chapter I: The Context of Romanian Identity and Politics

A thorough understanding of Romania’s post-communist national identity and foreign policy requires a wider knowledge of the state’s historical and political background. After 1990 the articulations of Romanian identity and international affairs had historical origins that enabled elites to recover the idealised image of a Western and democratic state. This chapter aims to configure a dual foundation for the future empirical arguments: the history underlying Romanian identity and the political context established after the revolution of 1989. The discussion contains a selective survey of ‘formative moments’ for Romania’s national identity and foreign policy before 1989, with a special focus on the post-1918 time frame which saw the Great Unification of the Romanian state. The interwar period was very important in defining an aspired Western identity and international orientation for Romania, along with long-standing ideas about the state’s relations with salient others like France. The interwar French memory-myth shaped the traditional diplomatic and cultural rapport between the two states, which would again be meaningful after 1990. As the communist dictatorship was officially installed in 1948, Romania was mostly separated from the West for more than fifty years. During this time, certain memory-myths about the US as symbol of freedom and democracy were contoured in the Romanian collective imaginary, which would be relevant in the 2003 Iraq war. The chapter also explores the ‘formative moment’ of Romania’s post-communist politics and the events that marked the state’s difficult transition to a democratic system. Thus, the chapter has been structured into four main sections: articulating Romanian identity between the West and the East, which includes the French memory-myth; Romania’s interwar domestic politics and international relations; the communist dictatorship and American memory-myth; and finally, the turbulent internal context following the Romanian popular revolution of December 1989.
A defining characteristic of Romanian national identity over time is its place between the West and East. The ‘dilemma of choice’ between these two worlds manifested from the beginning of statehood in the fourteenth century, when the Romanian Principalities (Transylvania, Moldova and Valahia) were created. The West-East encounter arguably occurred even earlier when the Dacians and Thracians (ancestors of Romanians) came into contact with the ancient Greek cities founded near the Black Sea, then were conquered by Rome in the early second century. Romania became connected with the West through its ethnic descent, neo-Latin language and historical evolution. The East marked Romanian territories via the Orthodox religion and Byzantine Empire, whose legacy shifted to relations with the Serbs and Bulgarians. The aggressive advance of Ottoman Turks in the later fourteenth and fifteenth century forced Valahian and Moldovan princes to make a stand. They identified with Western Europe and participated in Christian crusades to stop the Turks. Ottoman suzerainty eventually encompassed Moldova and Valahia and lasted until the early nineteenth century, which brought the Romanian Principalities closer to the East without completely separating them from Western influence. As Keith Hitchins has explained,

‘[t]he Romanians preserved their institutions and social structure and over time exercised greater or lesser degrees of administrative autonomy. Although vassal status prohibited formal relations with foreign powers, neither principality was isolated from the West. From the sixteenth to the eighteenth century they carried on trade and maintained diplomatic contacts, even if indirectly, with Central Europe. They were open to varied cultural and intellectual currents from the West’.  

Ottoman suzerainty had a reduced impact on Valahia and Moldova, since the Turks were satisfied with receiving the agreed tributes from their vassal countries and were not overly concerned with Romanian domestic affairs. This allowed Romanians in the two Principalities to preserve their Orthodox religion, cultural values and identity with limited outside interference. Meanwhile, the Romanians in Transilvania were ruled by the Habsburg and

61 Ibid, p. 2.
later Austro-Hungarian Empire, struggling for political rights with little success until 1918. Compared to the Ottoman suzerainty in Valahia and Moldova, the Austro-Hungarian administration was much more restrictive for ethnic Romanians and forced many of them to convert to Catholicism. The notion of a Romanian national identity was not fully expressed until all the territories united in 1918.

Moldova and Valahia managed a de facto union by electing the same Prince - Alexandru Ioan Cuza - in 1859, who after seven years was replaced by Prince Carol I of the German Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen dynasty. Domestic political elites thought that building a constitutional monarchy under a foreign king would help to consolidate the de facto union in the international context, hence preventing neighbouring empires from separating Valahia and Moldova. The united Principalities attained independence in 1878 and were recognised as the Romanian Kingdom in 1881. Therefore, Romania emerging in the twentieth century was a synthesis of West and East. The state was dramatically altered by the outcomes of World War I, whose aftermath found the Romanian Kingdom in the winning camp. The post-war settlements facilitated the unification of Great Romania in 1918. The mid-nineteenth century and interwar period were a noteworthy time in the historical trajectory of Romanian identity and foreign policy, because it was filled with re-definitions of national identity, debates about the state’s future development and international direction, as well as long-standing ideas like the French memory-myth which would be re-activated after 1990.

Articulating Romanian Identity between the West and the East

The themes of post-1918 continued the crucial discourses from before the unification. As a Romanian scholar has argued,

‘[f]rom (...) the beginning of modern Romania, systematically every two to four decades the drama of alternatives has been unleashed. The problem posed during it was,

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invariably, what path of development to follow. The dispute would flare up overnight and last a good while, then subside in favour of one of the camps (...) But then some major socio-political event would unleash the confrontation again in a new phase of this unbreakable cycle'.

Defining national identity and how that would be embodied in Romania’s evolution as a state were the primary concerns of domestic elites. A participant in the process succinctly noted - ‘West or East? Europe or the Balkans, urban civilization or the rural spirit? [Since 1860] the questions are still the same’. The great task of the nineteenth century had been the modernisation (understood as Westernisation) of Romania. The challenge was how to change ‘a patriarchal and authoritarian system, a society overwhelmingly rural, dominated by landed property, in which the modern stimulating factors of capitalism and democracy were almost completely absent’. National leaders came up with the solution of emulating the Western European political culture. They heavily borrowed institutions like a new Constitution, Parliament, responsible Government and legal codes, which were subsequently implemented in Romania to a more or less successful degree. The literary critic Titu Maiorescu wrote an influential article in 1868, in which he criticised this superficial attitude and described it as incarnating ‘forms without substance’.

Indeed, a profound transformation of Romanian mentalities and political system needed more than an imitation of the West promoted at elite level. The debates about identity and the state’s future course were bound to become more acute after the unification of Great Romania.

The aftermath of World War I gave Romania the opportunity to fulfil a long-time national aspiration. As the Austro-Hungarian Empire collapsed, the ethnic Romanians declared their wish to unite with Romania. The Romanian

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67 Titu Maiorescu, ‘În contra direcţiei de astăzi în cultura română’/ ‘Against the Contemporary Direction of Romanian Culture’, Convorbiri Literare (1868).
Kingdom was joined by Basarabia (27 March 1918), Bucovina (28 November 1918) and Transilvania (1 December 1918). The result turned out to be a doubling of Romania’s population and land.\(^\text{68}\) This fragile unification did not make Romania feel more secure, however, as Hungary was certainly not reconciled to the loss of its former territories. The international context was further complicated by the Bolshevik revolution in Russia. Romania feared that Bolshevism would spread across the borders, which sharpened anti-Russian sentiments and reinforced Western identification. Russia was now firmly the ‘barbarous East’ and was meant to be opposed by embracing the West.\(^\text{69}\) The intellectual and political discourses of interwar Romania were preoccupied with articulating national identity, although not everyone used this exact term. The ultimate objective was to form a consolidated national state, a strong economy and vibrant culture. There were three main groups debating the various representations of Romanian identity – ‘westernisers’, ‘pro-orientals’ and the ‘third way’ supporters.\(^\text{70}\) The ‘third way’ camp was not homogenous and included slightly more Western or Eastern oriented advocates. They all stressed ideas of Romanian exceptionalism that had to be protected from ‘the corrupting effects of imported civilizations’, especially the Western one.\(^\text{71}\) The westernisers and ‘third way’ promoters held the most intense and extensive debates, which suggests that pro-orientals played a marginal part in the discourse. The persuasiveness of pro-oriental arguments was certainly limited by the negative associations with Bolshevik Russia.

The discussions focussed on more than national identity and Romania’s international stance. There were many other themes entangled in the rhetoric of West or East or somewhere in between: whether to opt for industrialisation or remain an agrarian society, the type of democratic regime, the role of religion. This overview of different positions is not exhaustive and

\(^\text{68}\) Steven D. Roper, *Romania: The Unfinished Revolution*, p. 2.

\(^\text{69}\) Katherine Verdery, *National Ideology under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceauşescu’s Romania*, p. 44.

\(^\text{70}\) The categories of ‘westernisers’ and ‘pro-orientals’ have been drawn from Katherine Verdery’s work, to which I added the ‘third way’ group.

only contains the most prominent contributors. First, the pro-orientals (also called at the time the ‘Orthodoxists’) were represented by Nichifor Crainic:

‘[i]f the mission of the Romanian people is to create a culture after its image and likeness, this implies as well how its orientation must be resolved. Whoever recommends an orientation toward the West speaks nonsense. Orientation contains within itself the notion of Orient and means directing ourselves toward the Orient (...) Everywhere it is said that light comes from the East. And for us, who find ourselves geographically in the Orient and who, through our Orthodox religion, hold to the truths of the Eastern world, there can be no other orientation than toward the Orient, toward ourselves (...) Westernisation means the negation of our orientalness; Europeanising nihilism means the negation of our creative potential’.72

Here the prevalent Orthodox religion of Romanians invoked an Eastern dimension for national identity. Still, even such a radical pro-oriental voice indicated some sort of ‘third way’ that was not really about a complete Romanian identification with the East. The reason is that, until the nineteenth century, Romania was immersed in the Eastern cultural space permeated by Orthodoxism. Once debates about ethno-cultural identity dominated the national discourses, Romanians became much more aware of their ethnic descent – ‘an island of Latinity in a Slavic sea’.73 Russians stopped being ‘Orthodox brothers’ and the ‘shared religious identity seemed to pose an additional danger, threatening to facilitate the assimilation of Romania’.74

Second, the ‘third way’ group included influential figures like the philosopher Lucian Blaga, who advanced the idea of Romanian exceptionalism that retained an Eastern facet -

‘[w]e think ourselves merely Latins... lucid, rational, temperate, lovers of classical form but willingly or not we are more than that. A significant percent of Slavic and Thracian blood flows in our veins. The Romanian spirit may be dominated by Latinity, a peaceful and cultured force, but we have also a rich latent Thraco-Slavic foundation, exuberant and vital, which, no matter how much we oppose it, sometimes (...) rises up powerfully in our consciousness (...) Why should we violate our true nature, corset

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73 Lucian Boia, History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness, p. 37.
74 Ibid.
ourselves in a formula of Latin clarity, when so many other possibilities for
development lie within us in that barbarian unconscious?”

‘Third way’ thinkers agreed that Romania needed to find its own developing
path, which was based on ‘ruralizing the national essence’. In contrast to
the ‘third way’ camp, the westerniser group contained moderate promoters
like the literary critic Garabet Ibrăileanu, who accepted the already existing
Western impact on Romania and wanted to further pursue it:

‘[i]n the twentieth century, history has set Romanians the following problem: will
Romania continue to be a semi-asiatic, oriental country or will it enter the ranks of
European peoples and European culture? This problem has been answered by
history. For various reasons, Romania could not exempt itself from the European
influence [that] penetrated into our country. It penetrated through the very fact of its
superiority.’

There were more enthusiastic westernisers too, such as the writer and
diplomat Eugen Filotti, who wholeheartedly embraced Western influence on
Romanian identity -

‘[w]e mean to propagate a sense of culture that is European. Our light comes from the
West. We see our deliverance in the occidentalisation of this country (...) Balkanism,
our cherished and idealised orientalness (...) now shelters all the brigands who have
impeded political purification and opposed uplifting the people from the cultural
cesspool in which they flounder (...) [We seek] the affirmation of our genius and
specific character in the forms of European culture, in the harmonious and shining
framework of the culture of the West’.

Westernisers like Filotti sat at the opposite end of the spectrum from Crainic’s
pro-oriental stance and were the most persuasive. They treated ‘contact with
the West as liberating even while they worked for a “truly Romanian tradition”
as a result of such contact’. In this respect, the rhetoric of another
westerniser – Eugen Lovinescu - was reminiscent of the kinds of debates

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75 Lucian Blaga, ‘Revolta fondului nostru nelatin’/ ‘The Revolt of Our Non-Latin
76 Katherine Verdery, National Ideology under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in
Ceaușescu’s Romania, p. 49.
77 Garabet Ibrăileanu (1909) cited in Katherine Verdery, National Ideology under Socialism:
Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceaușescu’s Romania, p. 50.
78 Eugen Filotti (1924) cited in ibid, p. 51.
79 Katherine Verdery, National Ideology under Socialism, p. 51.
about national identity and Romanian foreign policy that post-1990 elites would later express:

‘[i]solated from the rhythm of western civilization by its surroundings and its religion, the Romanian people was unable to develop in its own manner and was detoured from the potentialities of its race (...) Time is on our side and, after ages of alienation and deformation, new prospects have arisen for the creation of a truly Romanian soul. If we seem to some historians melancholy stepchildren of a Romanian-Byzantine-Slavic-Turkish-Phanariot tradition, let us hope that in the eyes of future generations, we will seem venerable forefathers of a true Romanian tradition [through Europe]’.

The communist dictatorship would be portrayed after 1990 as having separated Romania from its aspired Western European identity and international course, which had been configured especially during the interwar years. Indeed, the interwar period brought forward the definite articulation of Romanian identity as Western, while also circulating various meanings about the state’s relationship with salient others.

The mid-nineteenth century and interwar years constitute the major formative period of the French memory-myth in Romania’s imaginary. Having opted for westernisation, Romanian elites were looking for sources of inspiration to be emulated and applied in national settings. France - ‘the great Latin sister’ - was by far the most attractive prospect since it was a strong and successful state with an influential civilisation. Belgium also exerted a certain appeal because it was a smaller Francophone state that had adapted the French model to its own needs. Westernised and modernised Romania aimed to adapt the political system of France to its own requirements as well. So the Romanian Constitution of 1866 heavily borrowed from the Belgian one, which led to the frequently used expression of Romania being ‘the Belgium of the Orient’. In 1914, a part of national elites showed a ‘visceral attachment’ to France and wanted to enter the war not necessarily to serve Romanian interests, but rather to ‘defend the threatened civilization of France’; quoting from the memoirs of a diplomat,

‘[they] wanted immediate entry into the war (...) and they wanted it only for the love of France, which could not be left to perish, as if its fate lay within our power! In their

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80 Eugen Lovinescu cited in ibid.
81 Lucian Boia, History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness, p. 160.
82 Ibid.
sincerity they hardly mentioned Transilvania, making the people whole (...) abandoning all the arguments of a national character which drove almost all of us to be against the Central Powers, and calling for entry into the war “pour voler au secours de la France” [“to fly to France’s rescue”]!\(^83\)

The fascination for France had gradually infused Romanian society since 1830. French became the language of culture and any self-respecting intellectual needed to have reasonable knowledge of it. Considering that young Romanians were studying in Paris, ‘for more than a century France would provide or influence the training of the greater part of the country’s intellectual elite’.\(^84\) Apart from consolidating the French memory-myth, the interwar period was a formative time for Romania’s democratic trajectory and international relations.

**Romania’s Interwar Domestic Politics and International Relations**

On a more general note, the interwar period was marked by ‘broad trends of political, economic, and social development’ which helped modern Romania to reach ‘its fullest expression as a nation-state’\(^85\). During the 1920s, the prospects for a Romanian democracy were promising because the two main parties – the National Peasant Party (PNŢ) and the National Liberal Party (PNL) – committed themselves to building stable parliamentary administrations. There were nine governments, most of them led by either PNŢ or PNL. The driving force behind PNL was a financial oligarchy, which had been ‘grouped around large banking and industrial families headed by the Brătianu family and its allies’.\(^86\) PNL leaders presented their party as a promoter of all social classes and their respective interests. Yet the practice of PNL policies differed greatly from Western European liberalism. PNL used whatever means necessary to increase the benefits of its financial oligarchy, which often caused other parts of society to be disadvantaged. The other main interwar party was PNŢ, which had been created in 1926 when the Peasant Party of the Old Kingdom (Valahia and Moldova) joined with the National


\(^{84}\) Lucian Boia, *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness*, p. 161.

\(^{85}\) Keith Hitchins, *A Concise History of Romania*, p. 159.

\(^{86}\) Ibid, p. 168.
Party of Transilvania. In spite of their contrasting ideologies, prominent figures from the new PNŢ offered a progressive and distinctive governing programme, becoming a credible alternative to PNL:

‘[PNŢ led by Iuliu Maniu] promised to add explicit guarantees of civil liberties and political rights to the constitution, carry out a decentralization of the state administration, and expand the responsibilities of local government. They recognized the primacy of agriculture and proclaimed their intention to strengthen the independent smallholder and promote the cooperative movement. But they also agreed to encourage industry by giving equal treatment to foreign and domestic capital and by removing burdensome protective tariffs’.  

The stability of the Romanian political system was further reinforced by King Ferdinand I, the successor of Carol I. Ferdinand preferred a neutral role in internal politics, although the 1923 Constitution granted the King ‘the power to appoint and to dismiss cabinet ministers as well as to veto legislation and to issue discretionary regulations’. The legislative agenda of the 1920s contained land reform, industrialisation and cultural policies, as well as the unification of administrative apparatuses in the newly joined provinces. The task of unifying diverse fiscal, judicial and religious arrangements proved to be very difficult. This was also due to Romania’s ‘sizeable minorities’, 28% compared to the 8% of pre-1918, ‘all making claims and looking to outside powers’. Ethnic Hungarians, Jews and other groups did not feel compatible with the ideologies of parties like PNŢ and PNL and felt isolated by the rising Romanian nationalism of the 1920s. They increasingly turned towards the Romanian Communist Party (PCR), which was founded in 1921. Unlike nationalist associations that had many members in the 1920s, PCR was quite unpopular because it advocated that Basarabia ‘should be relinquished to the Soviet Union’. In 1924 PCR was outlawed, a fact which was used by party leaders and the USSR as a propaganda weapon to attract more supporters; the attempt was unsuccessful and PCR remained at the periphery of Romanian politics during the 1920s and 1930s.

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88 Steven D. Roper, Romania: The Unfinished Revolution, p. 3.
89 Katherine Verdery, National Ideology under Socialism, p. 43.
90 Steven D. Roper, Romania: The Unfinished Revolution, p. 4.
91 Ibid.
The 1930s represented a very challenging decade for Romanian democracy. The new King Carol II ascended the throne in 1930 and ‘made no secret of his disdain for parliamentary institutions and of his intention to become the undisputed source of power in the state’. As parliamentary democracy was weakening, far right wing nationalism was intensifying to an alarming degree:

‘[t]he world depression exacerbated existing economic problems and sharpened social tensions and thus gave impetus to those forces hostile to the prevailing parliamentary system. The crisis enhanced the appeal of anti-Semitism among certain elements of society, who used it to rally support for their particular brand of nationalism’.

One extreme right wing organisation that placed anti-Semitism at the core of its ideology was the Iron Guard, founded by Corneliu Zelea Codreanu. Carol II and the mainstream parties opposed the fascism of the Iron Guard that had created a party called ‘Everything for the Country’. The Iron Guard retaliated by assassinating Prime Minister Ion G. Duca in 1933. Despite the escalating violence of Iron Guard members, the far right organisation attained its largest popularity in the mid-1930s. In February 1938, things changed dramatically when Carol II established a royal dictatorship by annulling the 1923 Constitution. He decreed the dissolution of all political parties and took drastic action against the Iron Guard, which he viewed as his main enemy; members of the Iron Guard and PCR were jailed and some killed.

With respect to Romania’s interwar foreign policy, its primary aim was to defend the borders drawn by the World War I settlements and the Great Unification of 1918. Apart from the communists, all Romanian political parties endorsed the ‘Versailles system, a stance which dictated the choice of allies and provided continuity with the foreign policy pursued immediately before the war’. Romania kept cultivating relations with France and, to a lesser extent, with the UK to preserve the territorial status quo from the revisionist attitudes of major actors like the Soviet Union and Germany or

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smaller ones like Hungary and Bulgaria.\textsuperscript{96} The relationship with France was not simply political - ‘it grew out of the Romanians’ perception of a general community of interests between the two countries, of mutual comprehension and even affection, feelings that were entirely absent in contacts with Germany’.\textsuperscript{97} Yet the lack of French and British military reactions to Adolf Hitler’s growing conquest of Central-Eastern Europe forced Romania under King Carol II to re-consider its international alliances. The King tried to reach an agreement with Germany in mid-1939, as the Nazis cooperated with the Iron Guard and other Romanian far right wing organisations too.\textsuperscript{98} Hitler’s Germany did not provoke the same fear as the Soviet Union who had been the ‘hereditary enemy, always present, always a threat’ to Romania’s existence.\textsuperscript{99} Carol II hoped that the Germans would guarantee the state’s territorial integrity and not give Basarabia to the USSR. He had no other option since France had been defeated by the German armies in June 1940. Nevertheless, Romanian elites were not aware that the non-aggression pact signed between the Soviet Union and Germany on 23 August 1939 contained a secret protocol agreed by Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov and German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop. That protocol mentioned that Basarabia and Northern Bucovina would be annexed by the USSR, a fact which occurred on 28 June 1940. Hitler also forced Romania to accept the renunciation of Southern Dobrogea to Bulgaria and a large part of Transilvania to Hungary on 30 August 1940.\textsuperscript{100}

Following the loss of Transilvania, Romanian public opinion turned against Carol II, who asked Marshal Ion Antonescu to form a new Government. Carol II intended to save his reign through the advantages of appointing Antonescu as Prime Minister of Romania. According to Keith Hitchins,

’[Carol II] wanted to use Antonescu’s connections with the Iron Guard to bring about a reconciliation between its leaders and the throne, his good relations with the National

\textsuperscript{96} Steven D. Roper, \textit{Romania: The Unfinished Revolution}, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{97} Keith Hitchins, \textit{A Concise History of Romania}, pp. 196-197.
\textsuperscript{98} Steven D. Roper, \textit{Romania: The Unfinished Revolution}, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{99} Keith Hitchins, \textit{A Concise History of Romania}, p. 197.
\textsuperscript{100} Steven D. Roper, \textit{Romania: The Unfinished Revolution}, pp. 7-8.
Peasants and Liberals to neutralize their opposition to the royal dictatorship, and his close contacts with members of the German legation in Bucharest to demonstrate Romania’s firm attachment to Hitler’s new order in Europe and ensure German support for its king and its political independence. But Antonescu, together with the PNŢ and PNL leaders, were determined to remove Carol II and replace him with his young son, Mihai (Michael). Carol II abdicated and King Mihai assumed the throne on 6 September 1940, granting Antonescu full powers via decree.

Marshal Antonescu created a coalition cabinet in which the Iron Guard was the dominant political force. Iron Guard leaders challenged Antonescu’s authority by trying to gain control over state institutions like the police and the army. They formed a separate legionary police to be used specifically against political opponents. The atrocities committed by the ‘legionary death squads’ of the Iron Guard culminated in November 1940. Among the victims were many former government ministers and other officials, including Nicolae Iorga and Virgil Madgearu. Antonescu eventually eliminated the Iron Guard from the Government and Romanian politics due to the rising violence it perpetrated internally. By 1941 Romania moved from a royal to a military authoritarian regime. In June 1941, the state ‘joined Germany in a declaration of war against the Soviet Union’ and Marshal Antonescu maintained his alliance with Germany throughout World War II.

His main foreign policy reason to side with Germany was to recover at least Basarabia and Northern Bucovina. By the spring of 1944, key figures of Romania’s democratic opposition were covertly negotiating with Western states – especially the UK and US – to avoid Soviet occupation and received disheartening replies. In May 1944, the UK and USSR divided South-Eastern Europe into military operational zones, which located Romania in the Soviet sphere. On the Romanian front, King Mihai and the democratic opposition organised a coup against Marshal Antonescu in August 1944 and managed to overthrow him. King Mihai immediately announced that Romania had joined the Western Allies against Germany and

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would mobilise all armed forces to free Transilvania.\textsuperscript{106} Even so, the Soviet Army occupied Bucharest on 31 August 1944 and treated Romania as a conquered country. The Romanian communists led by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej were preparing to take over state power. The USSR could not allow new free elections to be held in Romania as -

‘[they] would undoubtedly have prevented the installation of a friendly and docile government in Bucharest. The antipathy which the majority of Romanians felt toward the Soviet Union and their desire to maintain traditional ties to the West made the prospects of a freely elected pro-Soviet regime coming to power extremely remote’.\textsuperscript{107}

By 1946 Romania was firmly under a communist administration that had been approved by the Soviet Union. The post-war settlements returned the previously lost part of Transilvania to the Romanian state. King Mihai was forced to abdicate and leave the country in December 1947. And Soviet military troops stayed in Romania until 1958 to ensure the communist control over the state.\textsuperscript{108}

\textit{The Communist Dictatorship and American Memory-Myth}

The Romanian communists under Gheorghiu-Dej officially rose to power in 1948 and engaged in the state’s complete Stalinisation to keep receiving support from the USSR. They had ‘no independent source of legitimacy’ and their power base was almost exclusively derived from Soviet authority.\textsuperscript{109} Romania’s Stalinisation was described thus:

‘the first ten years of Communism were marked by a deep, coercive institutional isomorphic change. Along with nationalizing policies, the abolition of the multiparty system, the imprisonment of a large number of the pre-World War II intellectual and political elites, and the beginning of a rapid industrialization, the “history” of Romania was also revised to show, for instance, the allegedly positive role that Russia had played in Romania’s past’.\textsuperscript{110}

\textsuperscript{106} Ibid, pp. 211-215.
\textsuperscript{107} Ibid, p. 219.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid, p. 224.
\textsuperscript{109} Steven D. Roper, \textit{Romania: The Unfinished Revolution}, p. 19.
Gheorghiu-Dej was gradually able to ‘blend nationalism and Soviet ideology, turning issues that challenged his authority to political advantage’. He died in 1965, after having infused a nationalist character to Romanian communism which would be augmented by his successor – Nicolae Ceauşescu. Despite criticising Dej’s rule, Ceauşescu continued the former’s intention to obtain independence from Moscow. Romania’s independent foreign policy stance culminated in 1968 when Ceauşescu refused to join and objected to the Warsaw Pact’s invasion of Czechoslovakia. Unfortunately, in 1971 he travelled to China and North Korea and was fascinated with their communist models, where the dictators had nearly total control over the state and society. After those official visits, Ceauşescu transformed the Romanian communist dictatorship into a ‘sultanistic’ regime, meaning totalitarian with an extreme type of patrimonialism where the supreme leader regarded the country as his personal domain. Romania turned into a distinct example of closed-off society dominated by nationalist communism.

Against such a bleak reality, ordinary Romanians tried to find different coping mechanisms and reasons to hope. Many found their escape in dreams of an idealised West, an imagined perfect world, fundamentally different to the society in which they lived. Others were waiting for an external force to create profound changes in communist Europe or at least to reform the totalitarian system imposed by the USSR. In this collective imaginary, the US played a central role as leader of the West, symbol of freedom and prosperity and the only possible source from which help could come. It was the main ‘formative moment’ of the American memory-myth, which had been fuelled since the late nineteenth century. Romanians, particularly from Transilvania, immigrated to the US due to economic and political motivations. In 1917-1918, there were approximately 180,000 – 200,000 Romanian immigrants in

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the US; a part of them returned after Transilvania joined the Romanian Kingdom in 1918 and had earned enough income for a comfortable existence in their home country.\footnote{Nicolae Toboşaru, \textit{Parteneriatul strategic dintre România şi SUA: Istorie şi semnificaţii geopolitice/ The Strategic Partnership between Romania and the USA: History and Geopolitical Implications} (Cluj: Presa Universitară, 2010), p. 46.} They told stories about ‘America’ as a land of freedom and opportunities, which slowly formed the foundation of the American memory-myth. In Cold War Romania, the American symbolic presence was best represented by a famous phrase – ‘the Americans are coming!’ – influential in the 1940s-1950s and repeated until the present. The historian Florin Constantinescu defined it as:

\begin{quote}
[a] strange phenomenon of collective psychology (...) the strong and enduring belief that the West and above all the USA would pull Romania from beneath the Soviet boot. “The Americans are coming!” was an expression that summarised a political attitude but also a state of mind. These resisted all proof of disinterest in Western capitals towards the countries left behind the “Iron Curtain”.\footnote{Florin Constantiniu, \textit{O istorie sinceră a poporului român/ A Sincere History of the Romanian People} (Bucharest: Univers Enciclopedic, 1997), p. 450.}
\end{quote}

In the late 1960s, communist Europe became more convinced that the US and the West would only offer encouraging declarations. So the awaited US arrival ‘was symbolically replaced with the departure of Romanians/Eastern Europeans to “America” or more generally to the “West”, in search of the promised individual salvation’.\footnote{Bogdan Barbu, \textit{Vin Americii! Prezenţa simbolică a Statelor Unite în România Războiului Rece/ The Americans Are Coming! The Symbolic Presence of the United States in Cold War Romania}, p. 98.} Those who could not escape communism by immigrating to democratic states listened to a network of radio stations like Voice of America and Radio Free Europe, which broadcast in Central-Eastern European languages including Romanian. Voice of America talked in a somewhat propagandistic style about the American way of life, though the notion of democratic freedoms was certainly true. This was part of ‘the long term ideological fight against communism, which had been based on the idea of consolidating the US prestige’ in the Central-Eastern European mentality.\footnote{Ibid, p. 212.} Radio Free Europe also had a front line contribution and ‘converted itself from a weapon in the psychological war to liberate
[communist] Europe through revolution into a true nationwide station, with
diverse and good quality programmes that were listened to on a large
scale’.\textsuperscript{119} The communist authorities were aware of the widespread pro-
American sentiments and attempted to ruthlessly suppress them.\textsuperscript{120} Yet they
could not control absolutely every aspect of Romanians’ lives and the
American memory-myth continued to offer hope in a better future.
Ceauşescu’s dictatorship was removed by popular revolution in December
1989. After more than fifty years of communism, Romania could resume its
democratic path and re-establish relations with the West, represented by
NATO and EU states. Unfortunately, Romania underwent a very problematic
transition to democracy, which partially accounts for why international
discourses had many negative representations of the post-communist state.

\textit{The Turbulent Domestic Context in the Early 1990s}

After 1990, Romania had great difficulty in establishing diplomatic
relations with a quite distrustful Euro-Atlantic community. The main reasons
derived from the widespread violence associated with the 1989 revolution and
questionable transition to democracy: the execution of the dictator Nicolae
Ceauşescu, alongside his wife and co-ruler Elena Ceauşescu (25 December
1989); the Jiu Valley miners’ extremely violent actions in Bucharest (June
1990 and September 1991). Such turbulent events contrasted strongly with
the peaceful transitions occurring in the rest of post-communist Europe.
Taking each issue in turn, in December 1989, Romania experienced a violent
revolution and began a difficult transition to democratic rule. Small-scale
protests, repressed by the regime’s security forces, turned into mass
demonstrations that eventually removed Ceauşescu’s dictatorship.\textsuperscript{121} On 23
December 1989, protestors gathered in various places in Bucharest were shot
by unidentified ‘terrorists’; thousands of people were killed during those street

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid, p. 221.
\textsuperscript{120} Gheorghe Onişoru, \textit{România în anii 1944-1948. Transformări economice și realități sociale/
\textsuperscript{121} For a detailed account see Peter Siani-Davies, \textit{The Romanian Revolution of December 1989}
Two days later, the Ceauşescu couple was accused of committing genocide against the Romanian people and sentenced to death by an extraordinary military tribunal. Their execution on 25 December was seen as a ‘purifying act’ for Romanian society, until the promises of the new regime did not live up to the population’s expectations. There is still no definitive conclusion as to whether Romania went through a ‘revolution’ or a ‘coup’ in late December 1989. Juliana Geran Pilon argues that a coup orchestrated by second rank communists managed to ‘hijack’ the Romanian revolution. Katherine Verdery and Gail Klingman opine that Ceauşescu’s rule could not have been abolished without a popular uprising; a coup would simply not have been sufficient to overthrow the dictatorship. Amidst the disagreement about what prompted the removal of communism, the revolution clearly had a dual significance - consolidating Romania’s exceptionalism within the ‘velvet’ transitions of Central-Eastern Europe and shaping the state’s transition to democracy.

The Romanian transition to a democratic system was steered by the National Salvation Front (FSN) led by Ion Iliescu. It emerged in the ambiguous context of the 1989 revolution and initially served as a provisional governing body, until democratic elections were organised. But FSN converted itself into a political party and rhetorically used the revolution to gain popular support in the first post-communist elections (May 1990), with Iliescu as a presidential candidate. They competed against the two ‘historic’ parties that had been outlawed by communists in 1947: the National Peasant and Christian Democratic Party (PNŢCD) and the National Liberal Party (PNL). Iliescu and his FSN won the elections in May 1990; FSN received 66% of votes.

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123 Ibid.
cast and Iliescu 85%.'\textsuperscript{127} The May elections proved to be problematic as well. The FSN had exhibited an undemocratic attitude, prompting the European Parliament to condemn ‘all intimidation of opposition parties and their candidates in Romania, organised or condoned by the ruling National Salvation Front’.'\textsuperscript{128} Steven Roper remarked that -

‘FSN’s electoral success was due primarily to the lack of any real opposition, the manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the country’s transition. Ironically the FSN (...) benefited the most from Ceausescu’s cult of personality (...) which undermined any opposition movement or underground media. Because of the cult of personality, frustrations were focused more on the individual (or in this case the [Ceauşescu] family) than on the institution of the [communist] party’.\textsuperscript{129}

It is not surprising that FSN did not know how to act in a democratic manner, considering the lack of substantial change among Romania’s post-1990 political elites. Despite being democratically elected, the FSN administration was seen as ‘old wine in new bottles’, rather than ‘advocates of a new order’.'\textsuperscript{130} Most of its members had been connected in some form or another to the communist regime.

Unfortunately, violence did not stop in Romania after the revolution and democratic elections, which were further shadowed by the Valea Jiu miners’ extremely violent actions in Bucharest (June 1990 and September 1991). Even though FSN and Iliescu had obtained an ‘overwhelming electoral victory’, they continued to ‘treat their opponents in highly undemocratic ways’.'\textsuperscript{131} On 13 June 1990, President Iliescu made a highly controversial gesture and called for the people’s help to safeguard the new administration.

\textsuperscript{129} Steven D. Roper, \textit{Romania: The Unfinished Revolution}, p. 68.
from civil opposition groups who had been protesting in Bucharest against the election results. Approximately 10,000 miners from the Jiu Valley answered the President’s request and came to the capital, where they brutally assaulted the demonstrators and vandalised the headquarters of opposition parties. \(^{132}\) When the miners left Bucharest, Iliescu publicly declared these shocking words -

> I thank you for everything you have done these days. I thank you all once again for what you have proved these days: that you are a powerful force, having a high civic and working-class discipline (...) We know that we can rely on you. We should ask for your help whenever it seems necessary!\(^{133}\)

This was not the only time the miners interfered with Romania’s democratic evolution. In early 1991, as Parliament was debating economic legislation, FSN members did not agree on ‘the pace and substance of reform’; the faction supporting Prime Minister Petre Roman wanted a faster pace of reforms than the Iliescu wing did. \(^{134}\) In September 1991, the same Jiu Valley miners arrived in Bucharest to protest against their declining living standards and the Government in general. Roman proposed a cabinet reshuffle to prevent another crisis like the one in June 1990, yet was forced by President Iliescu to resign. The miners provided Iliescu once again with the opportunity to get rid of those who opposed his approach to Romanian politics. \(^{135}\) Nevertheless, FSN remained divided over how to implement economic reforms and several factions decided to split. Iliescu’s advocates created a new party – the Democratic National Salvation Front (FDSN) – in March 1992. The second post-revolutionary parliamentary and presidential elections were scheduled for September 1992. The largest number of votes went to FDSN - renamed Social Democratic Party of Romania (PDSR) in 1993. Iliescu was also reconfirmed as President of Romania and exerted a great influence on the FDSN (PDSR) Government. He played a key role in the state’s foreign policy between 1990 and 1996, but could not impose a certain external course and identity for Romania. This was underlined by the domestic contestation about Romania’s ‘European’ choice, which will be analysed in chapter III.

\(^{132}\) Ibid, pp. 361-362.

\(^{133}\) Ion Iliescu quoted in ibid, p. 362.

\(^{134}\) Steven D. Roper, *Romania: The Unfinished Revolution*, p. 70.

Concluding Remarks

To conclude, Romanian identity has historically been shaped at the intersection between the West and the East. In the evolution of Romanian history, the post-1918 and interwar period was very significant because it defined the Western identity and international orientation of the unified Romania. It was a time of internal debates about whether the state’s future development should look towards the West or the East. The interwar years also consolidated the traditional friendly relations and cultural affinity between France and Romania, the two Latin sisters sitting at opposite sides of the continent. Having opted for westernisation, Romania wanted to strengthen its Western links and was fascinated by the influential French civilisation. As many young Romanians studied in Paris, France exerted a substantial impact on Romania’s intellectual and political elites. This gradually formed the French memory-myth in the Romanian imaginary, which would be relevant after 1990. France would become a major advocate of Romania’s NATO accession, particularly at the Madrid summit in 1997. Romanian democracy had roots in the interwar period too. The 1920s were a favourable time for Romania’s democratic system, which was then heavily challenged by King Carol II and the rise of the Iron Guard in the 1930s. The complicated context of World War II forced Romania to align with Germany against its great enemy from the East – the USSR. Bucharest was occupied by the Soviet army in 1944, which would soon lead to the installation of the communist dictatorship. A noteworthy ideational aspect of that time was the American memory-myth, encapsulating the Romanian aspirations towards an idealised West and depicting the US as the symbol of freedom and democracy. It was a type of escapism and a source of hope for Romanians, against the desolate reality of an extremely oppressive totalitarian regime. Following the 1989 revolution against Ceauşescu’s dictatorship, Romania underwent a series of fundamental changes as part of its transition to democracy. The early 1990s provided a turbulent context for the trajectory of Romanian national identity and foreign policy, which will be apparent in the subsequent empirical chapters.
Chapter II: Conceptualising National Identity in Romania’s Foreign Policy

The central problematic of my thesis is the significance of national identity in shaping the trajectory of Romanian foreign policy between 1990 and 2007. The thesis looks at why and how Romania’s national identity was subject to re-definitions and contestation prior to the finalising of the EU accession process in January 2007. Identity in its various forms has been intensely analysed in a range of academic fields, shedding interesting light on the way we think about a state’s international relations. As Christopher Hill and William Wallace eloquently note,

‘[e]ffective foreign policy rests upon a shared sense of national identity, of a nation-state’s “place in the world”, its friends and enemies, its interests and aspirations. These underlying assumptions are embedded in national history and myth, changing slowly over time as political leaders reinterpret them and external and internal developments reshape them.”

In the overall structure of my arguments, this chapter has the main purpose of identifying the conceptual framework which will be applied in the empirical part of the project. The conceptual analysis of national identity is followed by a brief outline of the three key identity themes or self-images which circulated in Romania’s post-communist foreign policy imaginary. These discursive themes are a prelude to the core empirical discussion in the subsequent chapters. The words of Hill and Wallace resonate with the inter-disciplinary view of national identity that I have adopted in my ideational framework.

Talking about identity in IR is usually associated with constructivism. This school of thought provides very useful insights on the conceptualisation of identity and thus it formed the point of departure for my thesis. However, my project was to a large extent empirically driven and the material on Romanian identity and foreign policy between 1990 and 2007 brought up some puzzles which could not be entirely resolved using constructivist

notions and tools. Therefore, I have supplemented and modified constructivism by drawing on other literatures related to nationalism, collective memory and self-esteem and international recognition. Each one adds a different element to my conceptual framework, so as to produce a multi-dimensional perspective on national identity. With regards to structure, this chapter has four sections dealing successively with each intellectual field: identity and constructivism; identity and the nation; identity and collective memory; identity, self-esteem and international recognition. After discussing the relevant aspects of identity in the individual sections, the insights drawn from the four literatures are integrated into a working conceptual framework on national identity. The rest of the chapter prefigures the three self-images of Romania’s Euro-Atlantic identity, acting as a bridge towards the following empirical chapters.

Identity and Constructivism

The emergence of constructivism in IR can be traced back to the 1980s, within the larger context of the so-called ‘third debate’. The latter encapsulated an attempt by post-positivist scholars to contradict the dominant approaches in the field at that time, on the grounds of their scientific methodology. Constructivists favoured a middle position in the debate, seeking to bridge the gap between positivists (who believed that true results could only be obtained through natural science emulated empirical tests) and post-positivists (who argued that objective, neutral, value-free research was not possible). Constructivism, the ontological position which posits that ‘all knowledge, and therefore all meaningful reality as such, is contingent upon human practices, being constructed in and out of interaction between human beings and their world, and developed and transmitted within an essentially social context’, was used to counter various essentialist definitions of social actors as immutable and constant through time and

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Since the 1980s, constructivism has developed into a well-established IR framework that gradually incorporated new issues and strands, resulting in an ever increasing and varied body of work. Some authors even claim that it should be treated as a ‘meta-theoretical standpoint in the study of social phenomena’, rather than a specific theory of international politics. As an IR school that draws from various ideas on international relations, constructivism has few general or overarching assumptions, which means that its researchers might advance a palette of very different readings of the relationship between identity and foreign policy. Regardless of these many variations on the constructivist theme, all converge around the core understanding that reality and knowledge are socially constructed. Constructivists also emphasise that ‘[t]he social environment in which we find ourselves defines (“constitutes”) who we are, our identities as social beings’.

The most useful constructivist contributions for the conceptual dimension of my thesis are the ideational foundations of identity and the move away from exclusively rationalist approaches. Constructivism occupies the ‘middle ground’ between two very distinct and opposing groups: rationalists (e.g. realists, neorealists, neoliberal institutionalists) and supporters of interpretive epistemologies (e.g. postmodernists, poststructuralists, critical theorists like the Frankfurt school, feminist scholars). Rationalists tend to treat identity as unproblematic, hence excluding or marginalising it from empirical research agendas. They assume that all states have a series of fixed and objective preferences - usually

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physical security, accumulating power or wealth - which form their identity and national interest. In this vein, accounts of a state’s foreign policy indicate that the ideas and choices contained in national identities ‘are governed by the material constraints elites face in a given situation’. By contrast, the post-modern subject has ‘no fixed, essential or permanent identity’; subjectivity is ‘formed and transformed in a continuous process that takes place in relation to the ways we are represented or addressed and alongside the production and reproduction of the social’. For interpretive epistemologies, identity does not exist outside the structures of discourse. As advocates of the middle ground, some constructivist scholars define identity in deceptively simple terms. Ted Hopf explains how identity fulfils two necessary functions - on the one hand, expressing to the self and others who the self is; on the other hand, communicating to the self who others are. The first function of identity entails a ‘set of interests or preferences with respect to choices of action in particular domains and with respect to particular actors’. So a state’s identity influences its conduct towards other members and circumstances in the international system. For example, the interest to uphold norms of human rights is closely linked to a state’s identity as liberal democracy. The second function means that a ‘state understands others according to the identity it attributes to them, while simultaneously reproducing its own identity through daily social practice’. Hopf’s view on identity is deceptively simple since it clarifies what identity does, without actually saying what identity is and what elements constitute it.

Both conventional and critical constructivism has been preoccupied with finding a definition of identity. Alexander Wendt is a good starting point with finding a definition of identity. Alexander Wendt is a good starting point.

146 Ibid.
as his conventional constructivist work has triggered a lot of identity debates. Wendt defines state identity as the product of inter-subjective processes of meaning creation, ‘a property of intentional actors that generates motivational and behavioral dispositions’. Yet, consistent with the neorealist tradition, he regards states via the ‘black box’ metaphor, their domestic factors being irrelevant to the construction of identities. Wendt has argued that the meanings which states attach to phenomena and subsequently their interests and identities are shaped through inter-state interaction. This does reflect an important facet of identity formation, but also neglects the historical and internal contexts in which national identities are deeply embedded, because the interpretations that impact them cannot be restricted to the meanings and ideas stemming from inter-state dynamics. After all, a state’s national identity is inextricably related to the domestic actors that take decisions in its name. These agents internalise the norms characterising the international realm, yet they also approach politics with an already formed appreciation of the world, the international system and the position of their state within it. Their articulations necessarily derive from collective understandings that have origins at least partly in domestic political and cultural settings. In the words of Edward Said, society is the ‘locale in which a continuous contest between adherents of different ideas about what constitutes the national identity is taking place’. Erik Ringmar summarises this problematic aspect of Wendt’s theory by arguing that it is –

‘fundamentally one-sided: the problem of identity formation is constantly seen from the perspective of the system and never as a problem each state and each statesman has to grapple with. He can tell us why a certain identity is recognized, but not what that identity is’.

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150 Ibid, p. 401.
Moreover, if one admits that identities are simply given via systemic socialisation, analysing why and how a specific self-image or identity is more relevant at a particular moment becomes a difficult if not impossible task. The structural nature of the international system cannot explain the reasons behind identity change.\footnote{154} Relying on systemic premises also does not offer guidance as to ‘how each state, nation or other “unit” has to create its own terms or rationales, its identity and foreign policy’.\footnote{155} Under both internal and external influences, the ‘content’ of identity comes into being through difference. Here critical constructivism has made substantial and provocative contributions, stressing the boundaries marked by identity and its connections to foreign policy. For instance, according to Roxanne Doty, the discourses promoting democracy and human rights produce two categories - a morally superior identity of ‘democratic’ compared to the inferior one of ‘non-democratic’, which construct ‘the very differences that transformation would ostensibly eliminate’.\footnote{156} David Campbell’s monograph on US identity and foreign policy rejects the conventional understanding of foreign policy as the ‘external orientation of pre-established states with secure identities’; instead it reverses the causal chain between state identity and foreign policy.\footnote{157} In his opinion, national states are ‘paradoxical entities which do not possess prediscursive stable identities’.\footnote{158} Since such identities constantly undergo some process of transformation, ‘for a state to end its practices of representation would be to expose its lack of prediscursive foundations’.\footnote{159} Campbell re-conceptualises a state’s identity as the ‘outcome of exclusionary practices in which resistant elements to a secure identity on the “inside” are

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\begin{itemize}
  \item \footnote{154}{Ibid.}
  \item \footnote{155}{Ole Wæver, ‘Identity, Communities and Foreign Policy: Discourse Analysis as Foreign Policy Theory’ in Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver (eds.), \textit{European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic States} (London: Taylor and Francis, 2002), p. 21.}
  \item \footnote{156}{Roxanne L. Doty, \textit{Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations} (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), p. 136.}
  \item \footnote{157}{David Campbell, \textit{Writing Security. United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity} (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), p. 75.}
  \item \footnote{158}{Ibid, p. 11.}
  \item \footnote{159}{Ibid, pp. 11-12.}
\end{itemize}
linked through a discourse of “danger” with threats identified and located on the “outside”.160

Therefore, my conceptual framework starts from the constructivist principle that identities have an ideational basis and fluid nature, being defined and re-defined under the impact of systemic and internal factors. Another essential part of my position is the critical constructivist tenet that the content of national identity incorporates self-other relations. Still, while I agree that national identities can be subject to constant re-negotiation (depending on particular conditions or events), Campbell’s and other critical discursive approaches are not compatible with my view about the relationship between national identity and foreign policy. First, I subscribe to the idea that identity formation comes before and shapes the manifestation of a state’s international conduct, although I do not see any causal relationship between identity and foreign policy. Identities change if a certain set of circumstances occur. A highly important foreign policy situation or crisis, like the Kosovo intervention, 9/11, Iraq war, might trigger a shift in the discourses and ideational structures dominating the international environment. This discursive shift at international level may prompt in turn the re-articulation of a state’s national identity, or bring a specific facet of identity to the forefront and render it more relevant in that foreign policy context. Second, I think that national identity is a construct with a stable core, which draws meaning from a few continuously perpetuated self-images of the nation. These self-images originate in enduring historical traditions and collective memories. David Taylor makes an interesting point here – ‘[l]ong-standing historical notions of identity are not rendered irrelevant for all the arguments that they may be “mythical” or “imagined”; such ‘imagined essences of identity are potent social forces’.161

A key area where my framework disagrees with constructivism is the latter’s excessive rejection of rationalism. I do not consider national identity

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160 Ibid, p. 75.
and rational motivations to be competing explanations for foreign policy. Instead, they offer complementary accounts of a state’s international behaviour. Romania’s wish to join the EU and NATO was partly a rational foreign policy choice. NATO and EU accession would bring material advantages such as increased security and prosperity. Yet Euro-Atlantic integration was also about the international recognition of Romania’s national identity, about returning to the Western community from which it had been separated by communism. In addition to this, the external position of Romanian elites regarding critical events (e.g. Kosovo, Iraq) tried to please prominent NATO and EU members to some extent, in order to help gain membership in the two institutions. But that does not tell the whole story of Romanian foreign policy. For example, in chapter IV, rationalism cannot explain why Romania did not give unconditional assistance to NATO actions in Kosovo from the beginning. In October 1998, the Romanian response to a potential Alliance intervention in Kosovo was nuanced and granted partial support. NATO requested unrestricted airspace access and domestic leaders decided only on humanitarian relief efforts and approving airspace access in case of emergencies. It was a somewhat neutral stance for Romania which accommodated the tensions inherent in its national identity – whether to act as a European liberal democracy or prioritise the traditional Balkan affinity. A rational cost-benefit calculation would simply make Romania comply with NATO’s demands unconditionally, so as to prove its adequacy as an Alliance candidate. Thus, national identity and rationalism supplement rather than oppose each other to advance a complex picture of Romanian international rhetoric and actions.

Another distinction between my conceptual framework and critical constructivism relates to the relationship between the self and others. The working of boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’ was initially discussed by social psychology and identification theories, which summarise the process as follows -

[a] differentiation arises between oneselfs, the we-group or in-group, and everybody else or the other-groups, out-groups. The insiders in a we-group are in a relation of peace, order, law, government, and industry to each other. Their relation to all
outsiders, or other-groups, is one of war and plunder, except so far as agreements have modified it'.

Similarly, some critical constructivists see the self-other dichotomy in terms of opposition and even hostility, whereby the other is endowed with a series of negative potentially threatening traits and the self with positive ones. The other may not necessarily be a different social entity, only being the self of the past, like the example of post-war West Germany who configured its identity largely in contrast to Nazi Germany. The ‘imagined other’ could also be constructed as a threat to the unity and intransigence of the self, its most radical embodiments being used as justification for ethnic cleansing.

Jennifer Milliken allows for more variation when analysing US identity during the Cold War, which was constituted on the dissimilarities between the non-American West and the member-states of the ‘Free World’; US identity was represented by deploying a ‘leader-follower’ analogy. In this respect, I concur with critical constructivists that the self-images feeding into national identity are based on the self-other nexus, which is in turn constituted via difference. Yet I prefer a more accommodating and less inimical position on difference and the self-other nexus, which derives from the arguments put forward by Bahar Rumelili: ‘the constitution of identities in relation to difference does not necessitate a behavioural relationship between self (the bearer of identity) and other (the bearer of difference) that is characterised by mutual exclusion and the perception and representation of the other as a threat to one’s identity’. Such a premise opens up a wide variety of possibilities and relations on the self-other spectrum of difference. Unlike what some critical constructivists claim, a negative and even hostile

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relationship is not the only option between the self and others. The self can also feel compatibility, friendship or indifference towards others. The concluding part of this chapter prefigures the three main identity themes circulating in Romania’s post-communist foreign policy imaginary, whereas chapter III discusses at length how Romanian self-images and overall national identity have been shaped vis-à-vis a crucial self (‘Europe’) and salient other (‘the Balkans’).

The foreign policy imaginary is a key concept of my thesis and draws inspiration from Jutta Weldes’ notion of ‘security imaginary’, but takes things a step further by identifying the ‘real’ and ‘imagined’ basis of national identity. She introduces the security imaginary in her framework concerning the emergence of national interests – ‘A security imaginary is, quite simply, a structure of well-established meanings and social relations out of which representations of the world of international relations are created’.167 Both adaptations originate from the ‘social imaginary’ of Cornelius Castoriadis, who starts with the conviction that the symbolic carries understandings which take into account the ‘real-rational’, but also includes an imaginary dimension which ultimately comes ‘from the original faculty of positioning or presenting oneself with things and relations that do not exist, in the form of representation (things and relations that are not or have never been given in perception)’.168 Consequently, the ‘social imaginary’ is conceptualised as ‘an original investment by society of the world and itself with meaning - meanings which are not “dictated” by real factors since it is instead this meaning that attributes to these real factors a particular importance and a particular place in the universe constituted by a given society’.169 To put it more simply, the foreign policy imaginary enables answers to existential questions like ‘[w]ho are we as a collectivity? What are we for one another? Where and in what are

167 Jutta Weldes, Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), p. 10.
169 Ibid, p. 128.
we? What do we want (...) what are we lacking?’ Such questions need a reply because ultimately:

‘society must define its “identity”, its articulation, the world, its relation to the world and to the objects it contains, its needs and its desires. Without the “answer” to these “questions”, without these “definitions”, there can be no human world, no society, no culture - for everything would be undifferentiated chaos’. 

So the foreign policy imaginary offers ‘the cultural raw materials out of which representations of states, of relations among states, and of the international system are constructed’, For my identity framework, the foreign policy imaginary (defined as a ‘structure of well established meanings’) is basically an ideational foundation, which contains those stable self-images rooted in the nation’s memories of historical past and configuring national identity at present. Building on Castoriadis’ reasoning, I argue that the self-images feeding into national identity may have a ‘real’ (somewhat objectively identifiable) core – language and ethnicity, an ‘imagined’ basis or a combination of the two categories. I will expand upon this point in the subsequent section, since it relates to how the literature on nationalism can address one of the lacunae in constructivism. Regardless of the ‘real’ or ‘imagined’ essences of national identity, the foreign policy imaginary as ideational structure influences how elites think about or perceive themselves and the state they represent. It conditions agents to an extent, yet they do retain freedom of action and choice. The foreign policy imaginary is not a fixed structure and has a variety of articulations, which allows decision-makers to modify meanings or select the appropriate ones depending on the circumstances.

Furthermore, before officials can act for their state, they need to engage with a process of interpretation. This enables them to understand both what situation the state faces and how they should respond to it. The process of interpretation requires a language shared at least by those state elites involved in determining state conduct, as well as by the audience for whom

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170 Ibid, p. 146.
171 Ibid, p. 147.
172 Jutta Weldes, Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis, p. 10.
state action must be accepted as legitimate. That is why inter-subjectivity plays an essential role in the multi-dimensional social process out of which foreign policy self-images emerge. For the representations of political reality expressed by elites (governing or opposition) to be legitimate or simply accepted, they have to be conceived with reference to the collective imaginary that dominates the intended recipient society; otherwise, they risk being marginalised or just ignored completely. So the meanings promoted become legitimate if they are publicly validated by the media, civil society representatives and the population in general. In the words of Friedrich Kratochwil, reality ‘is not the thing described but rather the intersubjective validity of a characterization upon which reasonable persons can agree’. What the concept of inter-subjectivity contributes to the understanding of foreign policy and national identity is a specific take on reality. The political world and, more narrowly, the imaginary to which they refer has not been contoured in an isolated manner by one individual or a group of select few. No matter how powerful their authority might be, in democratic states it is not a question of ‘selling’ ideas to a passive or potentially ignorant audience. Those understandings derive from a complex combination of top and lower level social interactions during which the values, preferences and aspirations of a society are not only taken into account, but play an integral part in the formative process. Yet it should be noted that national identity is inter-subjectively configured both internally and externally - ‘one’s attitude, or disposition, toward another only emerges in that state’s encounter with its significant Other, and therefore, who or what a state becomes is the outcome of many intersecting and overlapping sequences of action and response [between the Self and Others]’. The international recognition aspect of identity verification will be dealt with in the last section of my conceptual

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framework, where the socio-psychological issues of national identity formation will be considered in detail.

To sum up this first section, constructivism has informed my national identity framework to a significant extent, but also contains some important lacunae which need to be supplemented with other literatures. My thesis employs the following general constructivist insights: the changing nature and ideational foundation of national identity; how it influences state action without actually imposing causality; the external and domestic dimensions at work in identity formation; the way identity is constituted via difference and entails a variety of possible representations on the self-other nexus; intersubjectivity as a feature of identity creation. Looking at each one separately, having a certain identity entails an inextricably linked array of appropriate foreign policy choices, responses and conduct. Constructivist theory has introduced the identity puzzle in IR, by rejecting the assumptions of rationalism which regard national identities and interests as fixed and unproblematic. By its lights, these should not be swept under the all encompassing umbrella of material constraints or pursuits (physical security, power, economic gains). On the contrary, identities have an ideational basis and do not possess a static nature, being defined and re-defined under the impact of both external (systemic) and internal factors. Inter-state socialisation as well as specific domestic contexts like cultural values and interpretations of history shape national identity. Despite its fluid nature, national identity draws self-images from long-standing meanings and articulations originating in the remembered historical past. These self-images and in turn national identity are constituted on the self-other nexus, being dependent on difference. The relationship between the self and others is not necessarily antagonistic and can range from friendliness or indifference to hostility.

Nevertheless, my thesis is not intended to be a constructivist project because of two reasons: the complete separation of constructivism from rationalism and the former’s lacunae when analysing national identity. First, I view identity and rationalist motivations as complementary rather than
opposing explanations for foreign policy. Rationalism may offer a basic account of why Romanian elites chose a Euro-Atlantic direction for their state and wanted to curry favour with the EU and NATO or their prominent member states. Yet that is only part of the story and cannot unpack the nuances of Romania’s foreign policy responses. This is where national identity comes in to show that deciding on an external stance is not a straightforward or objective answer. Foreign policy decision-making is often subject to domestic contestation among elites. At various more or less critical points between 1990 and 2007, Romania’s rhetoric and actions changed under the combined influence of national identity, rational motivations and shifting international context. Second, some constructivists have explored the ‘national’ component of national identity but with certain limitations. Weldes talks about American national identity and uniqueness as a construct created by discursive and non-linguistic practices such as waving the US flag, singing the national anthem, citizenship rites, establishing and patrolling borders around the national territory. Yet such accounts neglect to mention the fundamental domestic sources of the nation and national identity. Does the nation have a core that distinguishes it from others and can be somewhat objectively identified? What role do ethnicity, common ancestry and shared historical memories play in the emergence of national identity? Constructivism does not provide all the necessary resources to examine Romanian exceptionalism, which stresses its Western European heritage through the Roman ethnic descent and Latin language. Consequently, by necessity and choice, my framework must draw from other intellectual fields to specify both the internal and external elements of national identity. The logical next step is to think about national identity in relation to its first domestic source - ‘the nation’, how the latter’s origins and constitutive aspects shape a state’s national identity.

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177 Jutta Weldes, *Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis*, pp. 110-111.
Identity and the Nation

The literature on nationalism analyses the national foundation of identity, which contributes to the dynamic relationship between a state’s national identity and foreign policy by clarifying the former’s internal basis and components. The combined insights of scholars like Benedict Anderson and Anthony Smith shed light on the imagined nature of national identity which still retains a stable ethno-cultural core (same ancestry, language, territory, historical myths and memories). Within nationalism studies, primordialists (or essentialists) and modernists (or constructionists) have contrasting opinions on the nation.\textsuperscript{178} Primordialists treat nations as communities bound together by common biology and culture over centuries of a shared past. This perspective, which characterised most of the earlier literature on nationalism, says that nations are objective units and can be scientifically examined as a basic human group that has persisted throughout history.\textsuperscript{179} Primordialism regards national identity as an entity whose origins can be traced back to the ‘mythical times of the community’; it is considered a product of biological features, as well as social and cultural propensities. As Clifford Geertz points out,

‘[b]y primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the “givens” - or more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed “givens” - of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering coerciveness in and of themselves’.\textsuperscript{180}

\textsuperscript{178} For an overview see Umut Özkirimli, \textit{Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction} (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).


Furthermore, Geertz’s elements and in turn national identity have both an essentialist and perennial nature. Here Kathryn Woodward unequivocally notes: an ‘essentialist definition of identity suggests that there is one authentic set of characteristics which all share and which do not alter across time’.\(^{181}\) Such a stance entails that identity is a ‘primordial given’ which the modern social actor completely embraces or not at all. More contemporary studies question the reification and objective nature of nations, instead arguing that they are constructed social entities which emerge out of specific social practices and contexts. Ernest Gellner and Eric Hobsbawm, who stand at the opposite side of the spectrum to primordialism, view the nation as a purely modern phenomenon and product of social engineering. Using Gellner’s words, ‘[nationalism] invents nations where they do not exist’.\(^{182}\) Hobsbawm goes even further and describes nationalism as a fabrication of elite groups; whereas Gellner accepts the sociological reality of nations and nationalism once they have been formed, Hobsbawm dismisses their reality as purely artificial and invented.\(^{183}\) Aspects of these two positions are synthesised in ethno-symbolism, represented prominently by Anthony Smith. He claims that, even though modern nations are constructed, they have stable historical roots in the ethnic groups (‘ethnies’); ethnies provide the shared ‘myths, memories, values and symbols’\(^{184}\) which are necessary for the formation of nations. Despite its elaborate presentation, Smith’s argument has been criticised for not giving a sufficiently persuasive reason to see ‘ethnies’ as less constructed than ‘nations’.\(^{185}\)

This gap has opened the way for alternative approaches to analysing the nation, one of the most challenging being through discourse. The discursive conceptualisation of nations refers in many ways to Benedict

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Anderson’s contributions, another advocate of modernism. He regards nations as an ‘imagined’ phenomenon because ‘the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion’. Printed standardised language helped to spread and forge the idea of a nation. As Anderson put it, ‘the convergence of capitalism and print technology on the fatal diversity of human language created the possibility of a new form of imagined community, which in its basic morphology set the stage for the modern nation’. In terms of national identity, the modernist school attempts to minimise the primordial notion of previously set and perennial traits, which become a fundamental property of national identity. According to Stuart Hall, national identity is a perpetually unfinished process of reconstruction: ‘perhaps instead of thinking of identity as an already accomplished fact, which the new cultural practices then represent, we should think, instead, of identity as “a production” which is never complete, always in process, and always constituted within, not outside, representation’. Madan Sarup agrees that ‘identity is a construction, a consequence of a process of interaction between people, institutions and practices’. This position thus embodies the idea of change, flexibility, fluidity, the negotiation of national identity in relation to social change and dominant cultural aspects.

How are these debates in the literature on nationalism useful for my identity framework? Primordialism has a very restrictive viewpoint on the origins of national identity, which does not accept the possibility of change. A quite severe critique concluded that ‘[a] more unintelligible and unsociological concept would be hard to imagine (...) a variety of sources from sociology, anthropology, and psychology (...) render the concept theoretically vacuous

187 Ibid, p. 46.
and empirically indefensible’. The modernist camp is much more accommodating towards change, yet its members disagree on the degree of construction or invention at work within national identity. For my purposes, a combination of insights from Anderson and Smith is most helpful for understanding Romanian national identity. If nations are ‘imagined communities’, then national identity is also ‘imagined’; it is not determined by material circumstances or objectified reference points, but rather emerges out of the agents’ interpretation of existing ideational structures. While Anderson emphasises how central the continuous issue of identity building is (‘the imagining of the community’), he does not imply that nations are fictitious. On the contrary, they are a genuine phenomenon rooted in historical processes.

Smith’s ethno-symbolism similarly conceives nations as ‘historical phenomena, not only in the generic sense that they are embedded in particular collective pasts and emerge (...) through specific historical processes, but also because, by definition, they embody shared memories, traditions, and hopes of the populations designated as parts of the nation’. National identities are usually grounded in and ‘presume some prior community of territory, language, or culture, which provide the raw materials for the intellectual project of nationality’. Therefore, from Anderson my thesis adopts the imagined essence of the nation and national identity. From Smith, it takes the concept of ‘ethnie’ to identify an ethno-cultural core for national identity. They fit with the constructivist premise of identity being shaped by internal factors, but supplement it by clarifying what are the fundamental domestic sources of national identity.

Within mainstream interpretations of the nation, many authoritative voices have tried to unpack the specific basis of national identity. Smith’s notion of ‘ethnie’ has utility in highlighting a core for national identity - ‘a

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191 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, chapters II and III.
named human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories and one or more common elements of culture, including an association with homeland, and some degree of solidarity, at least among élites. Elsewhere, Smith lists historical territory, common myths and collective memories, mass public culture, common legal rights and obligations and common economy as sources for national identity. William Bloom also underlines the role of internalised national symbols; Hall again mentions the impact of national culture, while Ernest Rennan discusses the contribution of remembering and forgetting in creating the nation’s story. These distinct yet inter-related issues are relevant to my framework because they circle around the ethno-cultural core of national identity taken from Smith. The ethnic component of national identity has resonated especially in Central and Eastern Europe, where the national consciousness of ethnic groups developed before they could institutionalise their nation as a sovereign state, since they belonged to different multinational empires. In this respect, Miroslav Hroch elaborates on the national movements in the region as follows:

‘[their] goals covered three main groups of demands, which corresponded to felt deficits of national existence: (1) the development of a national culture based on the local language, and its normal use in education, administration and economic life; (2) the achievement of civil rights and political self-administration, initially in the form of autonomy and ultimately (usually quite late, as an express demand) of independence; (3) the creation of a complete social structure from out of the ethnic group’.

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The ethno-cultural basis of the Romanian nation – language, ethnic
descent, territory, collective memory - played a vital part in the contemporary
articulation of national identity, considering that the modern state of
Romania was achieved only in the early twentieth century (1918). At first,
language unified the divided ethnic group and facilitated communication
between those who eventually identified themselves as Romanians, being
invoked even now as a putatively objective proof of the nation’s Roman
ancestors and Western European heritage. The common language
consolidated the idea of Latin origins in the Romanian consciousness, which
meant that the Romanian nation had the same ethnic descent as the French,
Italian, Spanish and Portuguese nations. The ancient Romanian land of Dacia
had been conquered by Rome in the second century and then divided into
three main historical provinces. Despite being separated into different
territories and under the rule of various empires, the Romanian nation was
bound by long-standing collective memories that circulated as shared
historical narratives and symbols. Collective memories of past events are
crucial to the transmission of national identity through time. They shape
national identity from within (internal level) by giving meanings and
articulations which reside and are interpreted in the state’s foreign policy
imaginary. Yet constructivism and nationalism studies do not deal with these
aspects in sufficient detail. So, to fully understand the internal dynamic of
national identity, my framework turns to the literature on collective memory.

Identity and Collective Memory

Why is collective memory essential to the formation of national identity?
Simply because a nation’s history and how the past has been remembered
inform the very fabric and foundations of its national identity. In the words of
Robert Bellah and his co-authors,

“[c]ommunities (...) have a history - in an important sense are constituted by their past
- and for this reason we can speak of a real community as a “community of memory”,
one that does not forget its past. In order not to forget that past, a community is involved in retelling its story, its constitutive narrative’.\textsuperscript{201}

Common values, ideas and interpretations of events, stories of ancient descent situate ‘the collectivity inside a shared history’, which is ‘constantly reaffirmed and reproduced through resonant rituals and symbols’.\textsuperscript{202} Broadly defined, collective memory is ‘how members of society remember and interpret events, how the meaning of the past is constructed, and how it is modified over time’; it refers to the dissemination of beliefs, feelings, moral judgments and knowledge about the past, both for self-understanding and for winning power in an ever-changing reality.\textsuperscript{203} According to Maurice Halbwachs, the first social scientist to provide a systematic analysis of this concept, collective memory is a social construction that develops in specific social contexts which he termed ‘the social framework (\textit{cadres sociaux}) of memory’.\textsuperscript{204} For Halbwachs, studying memory is not a matter of reflecting on the properties of the subjective mind; rather, memory is a matter of how minds work together in society, how their operations are structured by social arrangements:

‘[i]t is in society that people normally acquire their memories. It is also in society that they recall, recognize, and localize their memories’.\textsuperscript{205}

Halbwachs has thus pointed out that it is impossible for individuals to remember in any coherent and persistent fashion outside of their group contexts. Group memberships provide the materials for memory and prod the individual into recalling particular events and forgetting others.\textsuperscript{206} That is why the social group to which the individuals belong influences and conditions their memories of the past.


\textsuperscript{202} Duncan S.A. Bell, ‘Mythscapes: Memory, Mythology, and National Identity’, \textit{British Journal of Sociology}, volume 54(1), 2003, pp. 69-70.


\textsuperscript{205} Ibid, p. 38.

\textsuperscript{206} Ibid, p. 40.
Moreover, collective memory originates from shared communications about the meanings of the past, anchored in the lives of individuals who participate in the life of a specific collective.\textsuperscript{207} Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan talk about ‘collective remembrance’ rather than ‘collective memory’, with an emphasis on social agency, activity and creativity.\textsuperscript{208} Their perspective is concerned with the middle ground -

‘between those who argue that private memories are ineffable and individual, and those who see them as entirely socially determined, and therefore present whether or not anyone acts on them (...) In between is the palpable, messy activity which produces collective remembrance’.\textsuperscript{209}

Compared to Halbwachs’ collective memory, Winter and Sivan’s concept captures ‘an individualist notion of memory that underpins the collective acts of remembrance’.\textsuperscript{210} So collective memory or remembrance is ‘the result of the process whereby individuals interact socially to articulate their memories – of lost relatives, of protest and dissent, of days gone by’.\textsuperscript{211} Rafael Narvaez explains that ‘[c]ollective memory is not only about remembering (the past) or about social order and action (the present), but, critically, it is about how social groups project themselves toward the future’.\textsuperscript{212} Consequently, in my identity framework, collective memory is a group-based subjective perception of the past, which gives meaning to the group’s existence and conveys potential future aspirations. That is why a nation’s contemporary self-images feeding into national identity are based on memories about past accomplishments and trajectories. Similarly to the individual level, group memory combines the past, present and future to define the group’s identity.\textsuperscript{213}

\textsuperscript{208} Ibid, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{209} Ibid, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{210} Jenny Edkins, \textit{Trauma and the Memory of Politics} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 33.
\textsuperscript{211} Duncan Bell, ‘Mythscapes: Memory, Mythology, and National Identity’, p. 72.
How states portray themselves, what they believe in and their reactions to more or less critical foreign policy situations are guided by the manner in which past experiences have been remembered. Stressing the close relationship between identity and memory, John Gillis notes that:

‘the notion of identity depends on the idea of memory, and vice versa. The core meaning of any individual or group identity, namely, a sense of sameness over time and space, is sustained by remembering; and what is remembered is defined by the assumed identity’.\(^{214}\)

Collective memory can be described as ‘a powerful cohesive force, binding the disparate members of a nation together’; it draws boundaries between the self and others, being ‘passed from generation to generation’ and ‘transmitted across multiple historical contexts’.\(^{215}\) Duncan Bell advances an interesting take on ‘the fluid interface between memory and political identity’; as identities are contested, memories are used ‘to defend unity and coherence, to shore up a sense of self and community’.\(^{216}\) A state’s national identity promoted from within may or may not receive external validation from fellow members in the international system. If its national identity is confronted with lack of recognition, the state falls back on the domestic source where more ideas about the self have been circulating. The purpose is to both reinforce national identity and hopefully find further arguments which will convince others to accept that self-image or national identity. It is worth clarifying that collective memories do not structurally determine a particular national identity or foreign policy behaviour. Instead, they are ideational structures whose meanings are interpreted and re-interpreted by elites. Collective memories internally influence national identity and the foreign policy imaginary, which is reflected in the state’s international relations. Thomas Berger’s words capture this aspect as he elaborates on the ‘practical function’ of collective memories:

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\(^{215}\) Duncan Bell, ‘Mythscapes: Memory, Mythology, and National Identity’, p. 70.

[t]hey provide the collectivity with an identity and a common myth of origin. They endow it with emotional and normative underpinning. They simplify the task of organising collective action by providing its members with a common language and set of understandings about how the world functions and ought to function’.\textsuperscript{217}

When analysing the link between memory and national identity, Bell argues against the widespread ‘running together (and even conflation) of memory and mythology’.\textsuperscript{218} He particularly disagrees with Anthony Smith who has persistently illustrated the ‘relationship of shared memories to collective cultural identities: memory, almost by definition is integral to cultural identity, and the cultivation of shared memories is essential to the survival and destiny of such collective identities’.\textsuperscript{219} For instance, Romania’s National Day (December 1) celebrating the Great Unification of 1918 helps to re-inscribe identification with the nation, whether or not people are actually old enough to remember the original day. Bell prefers to call this type of example a myth, a narrative which gives meaning to notable events, people and locations. He conceptualises a nationalist myth as ‘a story that simplifies, dramatizes and selectively narrates the story of a nation’s past and its place in the world, its historical eschatology: a story that elucidates its contemporary meaning through (re)constructing its past’.\textsuperscript{220} My thesis subscribes to a broader sense of memory which is prevalent in the related literature, while acknowledging that there is a mythological dimension to the historical narratives transmitted as collective memories in the nation’s evolution. By bringing the two sides together, collective memory-myths enable my framework to indicate how these stories about the historical past serve to anchor people’s identities within an overarching national identity. At the same time, collective memory-myths about history allow the multiple individual selves to be situated within wider temporal contexts of meaning.


\textsuperscript{218} Duncan Bell, ‘Mythscapes: Memory, Mythology, and National Identity’, p.70.

\textsuperscript{219} Anthony D. Smith, \textit{Myths and Memories of the Nation}, p. 10.

\textsuperscript{220} Ibid, p. 75.
and belonging. The ‘Roman foundation myth’\textsuperscript{221} has a special resonance for Romanians that contributes to the articulation of their present Euro-Atlantic national identity, clarifying in a simple and selective manner their Latin origins and Western European ancestry.

All these insights have been useful to find a definition for collective memory-myths, to show how they operate over time by binding the nation together and internally shaping national identity. The literature on collective memory has supplemented my framework by providing the second domestic source of national identity. While examining the latter’s first internal factor (the nation), nationalism studies mentioned collective memories as part of the ethno-cultural basis of the nation, yet did not explain in sufficient detail how their contribution to national identity works. Although collective memory-myths suggest how a nation orientates itself towards the remembered past, the memory literature has a limitation when dealing with an identity framework that looks both within and outside for elements impacting on national identity. The formation of national identity is a two-level process where a domestic self-image needs to be validated by external audiences. Nationalism and collective memory studies have configured the internal components of national identity. Now the discussion needs to be brought back to IR and literatures that contain the two external and final dimensions of my perspective – the role of self-esteem and international recognition in shaping national identity.

\textit{Identity, Self-Esteem and International Recognition}

Almost all strands of political theory can benefit from psychology in explaining or supplementing what is not easily accounted for by the dominant rational model of decision-making.\textsuperscript{222} Political psychology enriches the study

\textsuperscript{221} Lucian Boia, \textit{History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness} (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2001), p. 85.

of international relations ‘by advancing our understanding of the individual and social cognitive and emotional mechanisms’. \(^{223}\) Perhaps the most straightforward justification for making connections between psychology and IR theory is that, in many respects, states behave just like individuals. This can certainly be a useful premise in foreign policy analysis, considering that the idea of states acting as people has become ‘so deeply embedded in our common sense that it is difficult to imagine how international politics might be conceptualized or conducted without it’. \(^{224}\) Somehow it is also unavoidable to treat states as individuals for another crucial reason - ‘unlike many of the other things that we commonly tend to anthropomorphize, states are actually governed by people in the form of their individual leaders’. \(^{225}\) Nevertheless, whether the state as a subject is comparable to a person has been contested on the grounds that this view embodies ‘an explicitly Eurocentric argument’, with ideational roots in the international system of late Renaissance Europe. \(^{226}\) Parallels between states and people are obviously problematic since a state ‘has no unified consciousness, no single memory, and no subjective will’. \(^{227}\) A convincing way of settling the dispute is that the subjectivity of states has been enshrined and become routine in international law, where a state is ‘a subject endowed with rights and obligations, and it is an actor who can think rationally and be held responsible for the consequences of its actions’. \(^{228}\) That is why my framework adopts the conception of states as subjects, as well as the idea that their national identity and rationality are very significant for foreign policy decision-making.


\(^{227}\) Ibid, p. 4.

\(^{228}\) Ibid, p. 5.
In the light of such opinions regarding the subjectivity of states, I want to briefly introduce the social identity approach as a psychological stepping stone for my framework and then focus mainly on the IR literature concerning self-esteem and international recognition. During the 1970s and 1980s, drawing on sociological and psychological insights, the social identity approach (social identity and self-categorisation theories) conceptualised the notion of ‘identity’ as the product of socio-cognitive processes of self-identification and categorisation, with particular relevance to explaining intergroup behaviour.\(^{229}\) This perspective argued that identity was based on being the member of a specific social group, thus creating boundaries between the self and others. Talking about the psychological foundations of identity, Richard Mole mentions that, at its simplest, identity seeks to ‘convey who we are or are perceived to be’ and how we ‘locate ourselves and others in the social world’, either as individuals or groups.\(^{230}\) Therefore, according to the social identity approach, national identity can be defined as a form of collective self-identification which derives from membership in a social group called the nation. Although not a revolutionary deduction, this nonetheless lays the necessary groundwork for opening up another aspect of the identity puzzle.

Romania as a state and its citizens proclaiming to have a Romanian national identity is not that surprising. But what if Romania is internally portrayed as part of a group (‘Europe’) and its national identity self-identifies with European identity, yet neither assumption is validated by external audiences? National identity formation is a two-way socio-psychological process that requires recognition, the latter being intertwined with self-esteem. The social identity approach has strongly incorporated self-esteem as a motivator for outcomes. While it has not always been empirically clear that


self-esteem is important, studies have shown that group memberships are often a source of self-esteem.\textsuperscript{231} As Alicia Cast and Peter Burke conclude, self-esteem comes from and is a key ingredient in the process of identity verification or recognition.\textsuperscript{232} In a number of projects, Burke and Jan Stets have researched the effects of failing to verify an identity on people's emotions. When identities are verified by the responses of others, people experience positive emotions and generally have enhanced self-esteem; when an identity is not recognised, individuals feel distress, anxiety and other negative emotions, including lowered self-esteem.\textsuperscript{233} Since my thesis is primarily based in IR, it seems natural to explore and draw from intellectual applications of self-esteem and recognition to international politics, which are two separate literatures that can be fruitfully interpolated into a multi-dimensional definition of national identity.

Some IR authors have sought to mix psychological theory with constructivism, albeit not in an extensive manner.\textsuperscript{234} Ted Hopf engages with cognitive psychology to conceptualise identities as social cognitive structures shaped by internal factors. The result is a richly detailed study of Russian identity, which takes into account the impact of history and partly addresses the shortcomings inherent in Wendt's purely systemic view.\textsuperscript{235} Hopf's stance, however, favours a structural account of how identity influences conduct, neglecting agency and the possibility of identity change or re-definitions – 'the unthinking, unintentional, automatic, everyday reproduction of the Self and Other through a collection of discursive practices that relies neither on the need for the denial and suppression of the Other nor on the conscious

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{231} Peter J. Burke and Jan E. Stets, \textit{Identity Theory} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 70.
\item \textsuperscript{233} Peter J. Burke and Jan E. Stets, 'Trust and Commitment through Self-Verification', \textit{Social Psychological Quarterly}, volume 62(4), 1999, p. 347.
\item \textsuperscript{234} This trend has been called 'psychological constructivism' by Jacques E.C. Hymans, 'The Arrival of Psychological Constructivism', \textit{International Theory}, volume 2(3), 2010, pp. 461-467.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
selection of behaviour based on a particular norm’. As mentioned above, my framework adopts a middle position in the agent-structure debate. The foreign policy imaginary as ideational structure affects and sets certain parameters within which decision-makers interpret and respond to international situations. Still, it does not constrain actors to take a specific course of action; they have a variety of meanings and possibilities from which to choose.

Anne Clunan has tried to remedy Hopf’s overt structural determinist approach by putting forward ‘aspirational constructivism’. Her monograph on Russia’s foreign policy starts with a theory building exercise, bringing together social psychology and constructivism to locate both external and domestic sources of national identity. This kind of dual focus on identity resonates with my conceptual blend, although there is an area where our stances diverge. Clunan explains how various competing self-images are introduced into the discourse, then tested for practicality (being effective given the prevailing environment) and historical legitimacy. The self-image that best fits both criteria becomes dominant, enabling elites to define national identity. She analyses at length the internal sources of national self-images and management strategies employed by the bearer of identity (Russia). Thus, the domestic context is implicitly given priority over external factors like identity verification or recognition by others. My framework pays greater attention to the external dimension of national identity, how self-images are negotiated between Romania and its significant Euro-Atlantic selves (EU, NATO, US and Western European states in general). Clunan’s process of identity formation is also closely linked with political elites who seek to enhance their state’s collective self-esteem and look at the past when promoting future aspirations to international status. Self-esteem as motivator in foreign policy is certainly a useful idea and goes back to the social identity approach. Yet, despite incorporating aspirations and the need

236 Ibid, p. 11.
238 Ibid, p. 11.
239 Ibid, p. 10.
to enhance self-esteem, Clunan continues to work within a constructivist framework that competes with rationalism in terms of understanding a state’s international relations. I prefer not to completely reject rationalism and to acknowledge a complementary rather than oppositional relationship between national identity and rationalist motivations, and this plays out quite interestingly in Romania’s case.

Clunan’s ‘aspirational constructivism’ shares a common ground with another IR literature analysing self-esteem, prestige and status as general drivers of state foreign policy. Richard Ned Lebow introduces a cultural approach that takes a closer look at changes in norms, beliefs and values and how these changes are often brought about by factors called the motives - appetite, spirit, fear and reason - which may dominate political decision-making in societies. Lebow argues that the spirit aspires to esteem through honour and standing, which renders self-esteem an important element in the formation of identity. Nationalities, nations and other cultural entities seek, at least to some degree, enhanced self-esteem through their victories and suffer a loss of esteem, even humiliation, when experiencing setbacks. For the ancient Greeks, honour was a status which described the outward recognition given by others in response to Greek excellence. Here Lebow touches on the connection between honour (self-esteem) and external recognition, although not in the explicit sense of identity validation which is necessary in my framework.

Andrei Tsygankov’s first book on the evolving identity and foreign policy of Russia successfully integrated the key components of national identity. My thesis adopts a similar position without being a constructivist project. He argues that ‘interactions with external environment, as well as local conditions, establish identity as a relatively stable system of meanings with a

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241 Ibid, p. 90.
242 Ibid, p. 17.
243 Ibid, p. 64.
well-consolidated context in which to act'. Apart from the same two-level view on national identity, Tsygankov does not reject the input of rationalist theories and chooses to regard them as not ‘fully satisfactory’ in explaining the changes and continuity of Russian foreign policy. He does subscribe to social constructivism though, indicating that the national interest ‘is about social adaptation to the constantly changing international and local conditions, and it is about recognition by the identified significant Other’. In a more recent monograph on Russian foreign policy, Tsygankov also places honour at the core of his analysis, in order to better understand the state’s perceptions and actions. He affirms that honour ‘defines what is a “good” and “virtuous” course of action in the international system vis-à-vis the relevant other’, hence containing ‘standards of appropriate behavior’. Lebow and Tsygankov’s work reinforces the intrinsic link between identity, self-esteem and a state’s external attitude, which is part of my multi-dimensional framework.

On a similar note, Liah Greenfeld has said that national identity ‘is, fundamentally, a matter of dignity’. In other words, national identity is driven by the desire of the community to justify itself and legitimise its standing, at the minimum protecting what has been achieved, but ultimately seeking to enhance one’s position and credentials. This IR literature nicely bridges the gap between psychology and international relations, with self-esteem as a defining element for national identity and foreign policy. Even so, with the exception of Tsygankov’s contribution, a recurring question remains – what about the external validation of identity? A state’s national identity does not circulate in a social vacuum and is highly dependent on whether other actors like fellow states accept it or not. Otherwise, that identity simply does not exist as a social construct in their bilateral or multi-lateral

244 Andrei P. Tsygankov, Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity (Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010), p. 16.
245 Ibid, p. 20.
246 Ibid.
interaction. Together with self-esteem, should we not see international recognition as a motivator for state conduct? After all, ‘not only physical, but also social survival is at stake’ in international politics.249

Social survival in the international system means having a stable national identity, which is not contested by others. In his path breaking study, Axel Honneth emphasises the key role of recognition in developing a stable identity which involved a basic sense of self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem.250 That is why, in an anarchic international environment, one of the main motivations of states is to gain recognition for their self-images and identity.251 Recognition can be defined as ‘a social act that ascribes to a state some positive status, whereby its identity is acknowledged and reinforced as meaningful by a significant Other, and thus the state is constituted as a subject with legitimate social standing’.252 Thomas Lindemann further describes that if ‘there is a rough equivalence between our asserted self-image and how we are treated, meaning that if others treat us according to what we consider ourselves to be, our self-image is recognized’.253 The configuration of national identity is hence understood as an inter-subjective negotiation and dialogue between the self and legitimate others. As succinctly put by Ringmar, ‘all stories require audiences’ and the latter must agree with the self-images and narratives expressed by a state.254 The categories of audiences include variations on the ‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy, whether allies or enemies, partners or rivals. For example, representing a state as a liberal democracy would not be meaningful without

some form of confirmation from fellow liberal democracies. There must be ‘visible signs’ for being part of a certain group so as to enable identification, because ‘we belong together if we simultaneously perform the same acts or utter the same words, and if we are aware that others are doing the same together with us’. A similar idea has been expressed by Bill McSweeney who thinks that telling a narrative of identity ‘means to sustain an account of a self which is already in the public domain and can therefore make sense to others’.

Furthermore, this external dimension of having self-images validated becomes vital because it renders the entire social process effective in practice. If external actors recognise the roles, ideas and identity internally attributed to a state, they give invaluable credibility to that domestic collective imaginary. In their search for international recognition of identity, political elites might attempt to not only present their state in accordance with national societal demands, but also constantly adapt the articulations depending on outside reactions conveying support, threat or simply indifference. So recognition is fundamental to securing a healthy sense of subjectivity; without it, actors are liable to feel shame and humiliation and taken further still, from a cognitive perspective, having one’s identity recognised and confirmed by others can be fundamental to establishing a sense of self in the first place. This is another reason why it is only possible for identities to develop a sense of self in dialogical relationships with external others. Non-recognition can be a significant source of psychological anxiety and anguish to the extent that it threatens an actor’s sense of self-esteem and self image. Indeed, at a collective level and taken to the extreme, non-recognition represents a challenge to the symbolic existence of the group or nation. More usually, however, non-recognition adopts the form of positive

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255 Ibid, p. 87.
257 Thomas Lindemann, Causes of War: The Struggle for Recognition, p. 2.
self-images not being verified by salient others, leaving the self with the dilemma to either redouble efforts to secure future acceptance of claims made about the self, or to take non-recognition to heart via the renegotiation of a new narrative for the self. That is why the state may engage in processes of re-narration and re-constitution by projecting an alternative biography of the self, perceived as being more suitable for the new situation and in turn establishing a new set of meanings and concomitant identity claims supportive of the new position. As a synthesis, Ringmar elaborates on three options that states have when confronted with denial of recognition. First, simply give up and find ‘an alternative self-description and re-brand itself as something else’, without any guarantees that a second attempt will be successful either. Second, ‘accept the verdict of the audience’ and maintain the self-images in question, at the same time ‘embarking on a program of self-reformation’ (adopting the missing traits to hopefully be recognised). Third, preserve the national narratives, self-images and identity by trying to convince others of their validity. These strategies and general dynamics of international recognition will be seen as particularly relevant to Romania’s national identity and foreign policy. They underline how Romania reacted to having a ‘European’ self-image at least partially denied, since the authoritative Euro-Atlantic self continued to construct post-communist candidate states as ‘liminal Europe’ or ‘Europe but not quite Europe’.

**Conclusions of a Multi-Dimensional View on National Identity**

To conclude this outline of my conceptual framework, the different sources and their useful insights need to be integrated into a coherent whole. A student of IR interested in identity tends to first make contact with a vast and rich constructivist body of work. Constructivism was my initial step

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262 Ibid.
263 Ibid.
towards finding the suitable conceptual blend for understanding Romanian national identity and foreign policy. This thesis employs the following general constructivist ideas: the changing nature and ideational foundation of national identity; how it influences state action without actually imposing causality; the external and domestic dimensions at work in identity formation; the way identity is constituted via difference and entails a variety of possible representations on the self-other nexus; inter-subjectivity as a feature of identity creation. Taking each one in turn, identities are fluid and grounded in a shifting ideational basis, at the same time guiding a state’s foreign policy conduct without causally determining it. They might be subject to constant re-definition under the influence of both systemic and internal factors. More specifically, national identity is shaped by inter-state socialisation and domestic aspects such as cultural values and interpretations of the nation’s historical past. Although it has a changing nature, national identity draws self-images from a series of enduring meanings and articulations prevalent in the nation’s distant or more recent history. The self-images feeding into national identity are based on the self-other dichotomy, being dependent on what distinguishes them from more or less salient others. As Bahar Rumelili states, ‘[i]dentities are always constituted in relation to difference because a thing can only be known by what it is not’. Such a stance does not necessarily involve an antagonistic behavioural relationship between the self and others or their mutual exclusion. On the contrary, the scale of perception ranges from friendly to threatening others.

Moreover, all these understandings relevant to identity circulate in a discursive space called the foreign policy imaginary - a key notion adapted from Weldes. This represents a structure of well established meanings, a reservoir which contains the long-standing self-images derived from a nation’s interpretations of the remembered past. The foreign policy imaginary influences national identity by affecting how elites perceive their state and decide the appropriate responses to international events. Yet leaders enjoy

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freedom of choice and action, since the foreign policy imaginary offers many articulations and potential interpretive avenues, which may be selected depending on the actors and circumstances involved. These issues refer to my project’s favoured middle position in the agent-structure debate. On a related note, the foreign policy imaginary just like national identity is shaped both from within and outside. So the logical next step is to identify the internal factors of national identity formation, followed by the external ones. The nation constitutes a fairly obvious domestic source of national identity and has been the traditional concern of nationalism scholars. The debates in nationalism studies shed light on the imagined essence of the nation, which does not imply that nations are fictitious. They stem from and retain a stable ethno-cultural core based on ethnic ancestry, language, territory and collective memories like internalised historical narratives and symbols. The combined insights of Anderson and Smith not only configure a foundation for the nation and national identity, they also indicate another intellectual gap. The first three constitutive features of national identity (ethnic descent, language, territory) are quite straightforward in the Romanian case. But the concept of collective memory is much more problematic and represents a second internal factor of national identity creation.

Generally speaking, my framework considers collective memory to be a subjective interpretation of the nation’s remembered past, which gives meaning to the self-images that make up national identity and conveys future aspirations. I prefer the term collective memory-myths, since they can be understood as historical narratives and symbols that bind members of a nation together under a common national identity over a long period of time. Having pointed out the two domestic sources of national identity, what has been left is the external dimension of the identity process: self-esteem and recognition. As my thesis incorporates socio-psychological insights, it is premised on the subjectivity of states; in other words, states behave like individuals and their national identity and rationality are essential to foreign policy. Self-images and in turn national identity also require validation by others to be effective in social practice. Identity verification is intertwined with self-esteem which is an important motivator in foreign policy decision-
making. If identities are validated by the responses of others, this mechanism results in positive emotions and enhanced self-esteem. If a state’s national identity is not accepted by external audiences, then people and political elites by extension experience a host of negative feelings including lowered self-esteem. Social survival and the pursuit of self-esteem explain why states seek to gain international recognition for their identities. Self-images and national identity are negotiated between the self and its significant others. If they are not internationally recognised, the state resorts to different coping strategies such as trying to adapt or re-define its self-images, in order to convince external audiences of their validity. While not denying the utility of Realpolitik, my multi-dimensional framework has compiled a conceptual toolbox for ‘a new Identitätsproblematik’\(^{266}\), which will show a different kind of perspective on Romania’s foreign policy. These views on national identity will be reflected in the following bridge section, which briefly introduces the key ideas of the Romanian foreign policy imaginary that will be explored in more depth in the rest of the thesis.

*Romania’s Foreign Policy Imaginary*

The fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of the Soviet Union generated a tectonic shift in the balance of constraints, freedom and ideas for countries in the affected regions. These changes produced critical ruptures that destabilised the boundaries of national identities, since the previously dominant Cold War representations were no longer valid. At the same time, the need for new ideational foundations and the shaping of more stable identities became imminent. That is why the seventeen years following the Romanian popular revolution against the communist dictatorship (1990-2007) could be regarded as a series of ‘formative moments’ – a notion borrowed from Ringmar.\(^{267}\) He argues that in ‘normal times’ the matter of

\(^{266}\) Erik Ringmar, ‘The International Politics of Recognition’, pp. 3-4.

identity is simply taken for granted, yet there are also ‘formative moments’ or certain periods in the life of individuals and societies when pre-conceived issues come under scrutiny. Formative moments should be seen as opportunities for new meanings to appear and new identities to be established.\textsuperscript{268} My thesis adopts the concept of ‘formative moment’ as symbolising a period in which the transformation of identity becomes more likely if compared to other times with less significant or smaller re-definitions. According to Ringmar, formative moments often appear as times of ‘unprecedented poetic freedom’ when actors believe they can ‘become whatever they want to be’.\textsuperscript{269} Post-communist Romania was finally free to reject its totalitarian past and pursue the self-images it deemed appropriate in international politics.

Before outlining the three main themes present in the Romanian foreign policy imaginary, some conceptual clarifications are in order about the connection between self-images and national identity. Burke and Stets affirm that the self ‘emerges in social interaction within the context of a complex differentiated society’.\textsuperscript{270} Because a state has several social positions in the international system, it needs to ‘reflect this differentiation into components’ or ‘multiple selves’.\textsuperscript{271} Each of these smaller selves or self-images feeds into an overall national identity. The self-image might be called an identity in its own right, but it also subsumes hierarchically to a larger identity. Looking at the Romanian case, the ‘Euro-Atlantic’ identity has become the supreme or overarching national identity. Post-communist Romania has come to view itself as part of the Euro-Atlantic community or Western world, which comprises of two key institutions: NATO and the EU. Romania’s ‘Euro-Atlantic’ identity then encompasses three self-images: ‘European’, ‘non-Balkan’ and ‘security provider’. These are the three main themes of Romania’s foreign policy imaginary and formed an ideational foundation that influenced external relations between 1990 and 2007.

\textsuperscript{268} Ibid, p. 83.
\textsuperscript{269} Ibid, p. 86.
\textsuperscript{270} Peter J. Burke and Jan E. Stets, \textit{Identity Theory}, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{271} Ibid; initial idea by William James, \textit{The Principles of Psychology} (New York: Henry Holt, 1890).
After the tumultuous restoration of democracy in 1990, Romanian foreign policy decision-makers gradually advocated that accession to Euro-Atlantic structures would be their state’s only ‘natural’ international orientation. The idea received strong support from political parties and the majority of the population. According to the Foreign Affairs Minister Adrian Năstase,

‘[e]ven in December 1989 it was clear to us that the European dimension of Romanian foreign policy was to become a priority. There was domestic consensus, both political and at society’s level, regarding the need to detach ourselves from the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence (...) and one way or the other return to the interwar foreign policy traditions which sought to anchor Romania within the Western European bloc’.272

Năstase’s words introduce a few aspects related to Romania’s ‘European’ identity, which is the first self-image of its national identity. Among the different facets of Romanian identity, the ‘European’ one was deeply rooted in the foreign policy imaginary and meant to show the state’s Western heritage. That is why, especially in the period 1990-1996, Romania was very frequently depicted as a ‘European’ state.

The articulation started taking shape immediately after the fall of the communist dictatorship, as the provisional Foreign Minister Sergiu Celac underlined in January 1990: ‘Romania is a European country. That is something given by our history and spirituality’.273 Romania returning to Europe was seen as a natural direction because it resonated with the state’s interwar identity and foreign policy. In the realm of collective memory-myths, the interwar period has been constructed as a time of stability and prosperity, when Romania was internationally acknowledged as a European state. It was a defining moment for the Romanian people as the aftermath of World War I facilitated the unification of Great Romania in 1918. The historical provinces of Basarabia, Bucovina and Transilvania joined the Romanian Kingdom, made up of Valahia and Moldova that had already united in 1859. The

interwar years are still remembered and perceived as a time when Romania had a national identity worthy of its people’s neo-Latin origins. Therefore, national foreign policy elites discursively reinforced the ‘European’ self-image to dissociate the new state from its communist past and promote a collective identity with the West.

Secondly, Romania’s relationship with ‘the Balkans’ embodied a mixture of rejection and acceptance. Foreign policy decision-makers put intensive efforts into conveying that Romania was not part of the Balkans, particularly to international audiences. In October 1993, Foreign Affairs Minister Meleşcanu argued that geography constituted Romania as a ‘non-Balkan’ state – ‘Romania, being located north of the Danube, does not belong geographically to the Balkan region’.

Such articulations aimed to detach the Romanian state from the negative connotations that had been associated with the Balkan region. The outbreak of the Yugoslav wars in the early 1990s brought the proliferation of pejorative imagery and stereotypes in the West concerning the Balkan area. Romania’s national identity vis-à-vis the Balkans illustrates quite meaningfully how self-images are based on difference, without necessarily entailing animosity or depicting the other as threatening. Thus, the Romanian self-image of ‘non-Balkan’ coexisted with amicable representations (e.g. ‘our friends to the south’).

Regarding the third key theme of Romania’s Euro-Atlantic identity, the post-1992 foreign policy discourse contained a range of interconnected self-images: ‘security provider’, ‘source of stability’, ‘reliable partner’. Romanian officials frequently mentioned or alluded to their state’s contribution towards promoting stability among its turbulent neighbours. For example, Foreign Affairs Minister Teodor Meleşcanu said that:

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275 Ibid.
‘Romania does not intend to simply be positioned at the receiving end of European security arrangements, instead wishing to play a role of security provider. The fact that Romania is considered a factor of stability in its geographical area speaks for itself in this respect. The political stability of Romania, its balanced, responsible and predictable international behaviour recommend it as an asset for NATO’.  

The self-image of ‘security provider’ did not simply emerge as a response to NATO’s discursive influence. Its ideational roots were closely linked to an enduring articulation of Romania as defender of Europe or the West, which features prominently among the Romanian collective memory-myths about the national past.

Apart from highlighting the identity palette within Romania’s foreign policy imaginary and their internal ideational sources, my conceptual framework will also help to explain why and how certain self-images become more visible in the state’s international affairs. As the general context of ideas shifted in the global system under the impact of powerful events (e.g. the Kosovo intervention, 9/11 and the Iraq war), Romanian leaders needed to respond by re-interpreting the meanings of their foreign policy imaginary. Such systemic ‘formative moments’ have engendered considerable contestation or dialogue between the Romanian self and its salient others. At various points throughout its foreign policy course, Romania’s national identity and its self-images were denied recognition or were only partially accepted by the authoritative Euro-Atlantic self; hence begins a Romanian story of identity re-definition and negotiation, which shaped foreign policy until 2007.

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Chapter III: To Be or Not to Be ‘European’?
(1990-1996)

The years 1990-1996 were one of the key formative periods of Romania’s post-communist national identity and they exhibited a bewildering array of emerging and re-emerging ideas. The restoration of democracy provided Romania with the opportunity to freely choose a new international direction. As Eva Hoffman observed, Romanian history has been shaped by ‘discontinuity more than continuities, by oppression more than independence, by various forms of authoritarianism more than by liberalism’.277 This chapter aims to explore how Romania chose a European orientation, despite internal contestation over this foreign policy decision. Another aim is to analyse some of the complexities entailed in that choice, by discussing how the ‘European’ self-image circulated in the foreign policy imaginary with the other two self-images (‘non-Balkan’ and ‘security provider’), as well as by examining debates about what it meant to be ‘European’ – and to be partially accepted as such – through the lens of the case study of the Romanian-Hungarian treaty. During 1990-1996, there were three crucial ‘formative moments’ for Romanian identity and foreign policy. The first one defined the state’s international course towards ‘Europe’. Political leaders had to decide whether post-communist Romania would become closer to the Euro-Atlantic community or opt for Russian influence. In this context, the 1991 Romanian-Soviet ‘Friendship Treaty’ was a controversial foreign policy move that was contested among domestic elites. President Iliescu’s support for the treaty was not shared by the majority of state officials, who envisioned a European identity and future for Romania.

Having made the definitive choice for Europe, the second key ‘formative moment’ dealt with Romania’s foreign policy imaginary, which articulated three main discursive themes: ‘European’, ‘non-Balkan’ and ‘security

provider’. These self-images feeding into national identity formed an ideational foundation that shaped Romanian international behaviour between 1990 and 2007. The ‘non-Balkan’ and ‘security provider’ self-images became particularly relevant during critical events like the 1999 Kosovo crisis and 2003 Iraq war. As for Romania’s ‘European’ identity, it was intensely re-defined in the period 1990-1996. At the same time, the European self-image impacted on the state’s problematic relations with Hungary. This brings us to the third ‘formative moment’ of Romanian identity and foreign policy, which focuses on the process of European identity contestation, dialogue and external recognition between the self and other. The Romanian-Hungarian treaty story revealed the intersection of three discourses – international (Euro-Atlantic), Hungarian and Romanian, which said different things about Romania’s European self-image. The international narratives had gradually evolved towards placing human rights outside the domestic jurisdiction of states. Euro-Atlantic discourses also portrayed Romania as not fully complying with liberal democratic norms in terms of minority rights. Romanian leaders in turn challenged the European meanings on minority rights by depicting the latter to be an internal affair. At stake were two contrasting views of what ‘European’ identity meant with respect to minority rights. Romania argued that its democratic Constitution, individual rights and extensive minority language provisions were sufficient to protect ethnic minorities. For Hungary, collective rights and some form of ethnic autonomy for its co-nationals living abroad was the appropriate ‘European standard’. As these aspects were still debated by the authoritative ‘Europe’, the inflexible stances of both Romania and Hungary prevented the signing of a bilateral treaty until mid-1996.

Therefore, the chapter has been structured according to these three key ‘formative moments’. During the first ‘formative moment’, Romania had to answer an existential question - to be or not to be ‘European’? The second ‘formative moment’ included the three main self-images of national identity: Romania as ‘non-Balkan’, Romania as ‘security provider’ and Romania’s ‘European’ self-image. The third ‘formative moment’ contained the story of the Romanian-Hungarian treaty, which has been divided into two sections:
international narratives on human rights and Romania, and Hungarian vis-à-vis Romanian meanings on minority rights and European identity.

To Be or Not to Be ‘European’?

In terms of the nuances of Romanian identity and foreign policy, the period 1990-1996 featured a rich variety of re-emerging meanings and a crucial ‘formative moment’ which defined the state’s international orientation. After many decades of communist dictatorship, Romania’s political elites had the opportunity to freely find the answer to an existential question: to be or not to be ‘European’? Should the new democratic state become closer to the Euro-Atlantic community or gravitate towards Russian influence? The answer was not straightforward (at least not for all the actors involved) and the years 1990-1991 showed a degree of internal contestation regarding Romania’s national identity and external direction. The most compelling evidence in this respect was a Romanian-Soviet ‘Friendship Treaty’, which was negotiated by Foreign Affairs Minister Adrian Năstase in March 1991, signed by President Iliescu during his official visit to the USSR in early April, yet never ratified by Romania’s Parliament. The wider international context had been changing rapidly and in January 1991 the Soviet Union adopted a set of initiatives towards the democratic Central-Eastern Europe. The USSR aimed to pay greater attention to Europe’s post-communist states and prevent them from becoming ‘sources of anti-Soviet sentiments’; it also intended to keep them ‘free of foreign military bases and forces’. The Warsaw Pact (a military alliance between the USSR and its satellite socialist states) was declared disbanded in February 1991. So the Soviet Union tried to establish some sort of cooperation with Central-Eastern Europe and states in the region were more or less receptive to this new arrangement.

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Romania was the only post-communist country that signed a ‘Friendship Treaty’ with the USSR. The document triggered intense international speculation about relations between the two states, including the claim that Bucharest identified itself with the Russophile group from the Balkan area, together with Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.279 At a domestic level, the main controversy surrounding the Soviet ‘Friendship Treaty’ stemmed from the inclusion of a few rather vague ‘security clauses’ that could have conceivably impacted on Romanian foreign policy actions. Three articles proved to be the most problematic. First, Romania and the USSR agreed not to participate in ‘any kind of alliances against each other’.280 Second, other parties would not be allowed to use the signatories’ territory ‘for committing aggression against each other’. Third, if Romania or the USSR entered an armed conflict with a third state, neither the Romanian nor the Soviet side would ‘give any type of assistance to such a state’.281 Consequently, by signing the terms set in the ‘Friendship Treaty’, Romania consented not to be involved in any organisation, alliance or security arrangement which went against Soviet interests. This obstructed and potentially jeopardised the state’s independent foreign policy decision-making. In other words, an alarming reading of the document was that Romania would not be able to choose its European identity or pursue the latter’s external recognition by seeking NATO and EU membership without Soviet approval. Finalising the treaty and having it ratified in Parliament would have arguably ‘mortgaged’ Romania’s future and condemned it to the Russian sphere of influence for a long time, if not irrevocably.282

To this day, many aspects concerning the episode of the aborted 1991 Romanian-Soviet treaty remain somewhat mysterious. Why would some political leaders (i.e. President Iliescu and Foreign Affairs Minister Năstase) accept stipulations that could have prevented Romania from joining NATO and the EU? Other post-communist states rejected such articles in their treaties with the Soviet Union, specifically on the grounds of those restrictive ‘security clauses’. Instead, they later signed bilateral agreements with the Russian Federation: the Czech Republic and Slovakia (1 April 1992), Poland (22 May 1992) and Bulgaria (4 August 1992). The memoirs and statements of relevant Romanian elites contain contradictory stories that are further complicated by the scarcity of available official documents. The Romanian Prime Minister, Petre Roman (1990-1991), accused Năstase of ‘duplicit y and premeditated misinformation’ about the negotiations for the treaty’s content; the Premier was allegedly trying to persuade Iliescu that the document should not be adopted, a request which was apparently refused by the President.283

Roman also described his premiership as a ‘de facto cohabitation’; he thought that the ‘two opposing wills, one installed at the presidency, the other within the government’ were the reasons behind ‘the hesitancies and ambiguity’ noticed by foreign observers.284

Although Năstase conducted the treaty negotiations in 1991, the directives and final say belonged to Iliescu. The President argued that the document had been misinterpreted and it was only meant to build a different ‘positive’ relationship with the USSR, based on ‘the principles of international law and the new post-Cold War realities’.285 He denied the idea that the Soviet Union was effectively given the right to veto Romania’s alliances and NATO accession; in the same context, Iliescu declared that his signing the ‘Friendship Treaty’ was a collective decision from all the main state

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institutions – Government and Parliament. The President also pointed out that, throughout 1992, NATO representatives had stopped considering ‘Russia’ as ‘an adversary’, which eventually materialised in ‘the NATO-Russia special partnership’. The latter statement suggests that in 1991 Romania was ahead of the Alliance in promoting security cooperation with the USSR. This does not take into account the fact that, for the Euro-Atlantic community, the Soviet Union (a dictatorship) was very different and a much less acceptable ally compared to the Russian Federation (a state supposedly undergoing democratisation). Regardless of how one interprets the treaty (in a more or less alarming light), the fact remains that Romania through President Iliescu was the only post-communist state to accept such a controversial text. So it was not surprising that, after the treaty’s signing and content was made public, a large part of the Romanian media accused Iliescu of favouring a close relationship with the USSR and ignoring the will of Romanians who overwhelmingly aspired to a European future.

Further controversial evidence for this assumption was recently found in the Russian archives. It was a note containing the detailed minutes of a meeting between Vadim Zagladin (Mikhail Gorbachev’s adviser) and his Romanian counterpart - Ioan Mircea Paşcu (presidential foreign affairs counsellor 1990-1992) on 9 February 1991. The meeting had been requested by Romania’s Presidency to directly convey ‘Iliescu’s message’ to the USSR leader. Concerning the future of their bilateral relations, Paşcu said that President Iliescu believed in the deepening of political and economic cooperation. Romania was not attempting to weaken its ties with the USSR; on the contrary, it ‘expected the Soviet side to replace the Warsaw Pact with a “new strategic initiative”’ and become more involved in post-communist


287 Ibid.

288 Şerban Papacostea, ‘Sfârşitul unei tiranii şi începutul unei mistificări istorice’.


290 Ibid.
These aspects indicate that up to 1992 Iliescu’s perspective on Romanian foreign policy leaned towards the Soviet Union/Russia, in spite of his public declarations about Romania being ‘European’ and developing ties with the Euro-Atlantic community. Here a few clarifications about the differences between the international and Romanian discourses are relevant. At the international level, President Gorbachev and NATO representatives talked in earnest about their future close cooperation, which meant that Russia would be included in the ‘Common European Home’. According to this understanding, Romanian foreign policy elites did not necessarily have to opt between the West (Euro-Atlantic community) and the Soviet Union/Russia. Even so, Romania’s dominant internal discourses conveyed the inevitability of such a choice because Russia was not articulated as ‘Western’. Russia in its various incarnations had been considered the ‘barbarous East’ since the interwar period, the Bolshevik revolution and the later forceful imposition of communism. Therefore, in the Romanian collective imaginary, a potential close security relationship with Russia was the equivalent of an Eastern orientation that excluded the West (NATO and EU).

That said, clarity on what transpired in Moscow is not easy to attain. Paşcu has disputed the authenticity of the above note and offered another version of what was discussed with Zagladin on 9 February 1991. According to him, the meeting had also been witnessed by the Romanian ambassador to the USSR (Vasile Şandru). Paşcu stated that the topic did not refer to Soviet-Romanian bilateral relations, but rather ‘the situation of military operations in the Gulf’ and a Romanian request for the USSR to fulfil its commitment in delivering a specific amount of gas. He stressed that, ‘at least on the Romanian side, no one can verify the document’s authenticity’ and it simply constituted a means of spreading falsehood. Simion Gheorghiu is the researcher who found the note in the Archives of the International

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291 Ibid, p. 233; the phrase ‘new strategic initiative’ was a direct quote of Paşcu used by Zagladin in the meeting minutes.
293 Ibid.
Foundation for Socio-Economic and Political Research (Gorbachev section), while undergoing archival work for his PhD thesis. He gave full reference details when publishing the Romanian translation of his finding and explained there was no apparent reason to suspect the document’s authenticity. Amidst conflicting claims, the Moscow episode remains impossible to verify definitively with the evidence available currently. If the note in question is authentic, it reinforces the idea that President Iliescu was pro-active in pursuing a close security relationship with the Soviet Union. This went against the wishes of domestic public opinion and the proclaimed intentions of other foreign policy leaders like the Prime Minister, who aimed to validate Romania’s European and Euro-Atlantic identity through EU and NATO integration. If the note is indeed fabricated, then the context goes back to the opposing statements of key actors (President, Premier, Parliament members) who have told different stories about the same event. This adds another uncertain layer to the unclear circumstances surrounding the ‘Friendship Treaty’. Yet whatever the precise truth of what occurred and the individuals’ motives, the treaty was widely regarded as a moment of foreign policy decision which was internally contested.

Thus far, the treaty narrative emerges as an intriguing and quite elusive puzzle. President Iliescu’s main argument for signing it was that he implemented a decision made together with Parliament and Government representatives. If the text was indeed agreed upon by every relevant institution, then why not take the next logical step and legalise it through parliamentary ratification? Why was the document not officially forwarded to Parliament, at least for deliberation? Despite Iliescu’s claims of unanimity, important parliamentary figures and members of the government party declared that they had no knowledge of the treaty prior to its signing. The role of the legislative body was discussed by two members who had been involved in those events: Alexandru Bărlădeanu, National Salvation Front (FSN – governmental party) senator and chairman of the Senate (the higher chamber

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of Parliament), and Sabin Ivan – PNL senator in the opposition. Bârlădeanu said he was not aware of such a treaty with the USSR and had not been informed of President Iliescu’s decisions.\textsuperscript{295} He had first heard about it from Cornel Mănescu, another FSN senator and head of the Parliament’s Foreign Policy Commission.\textsuperscript{296} Mănescu had read the treaty text and wanted Bârlădeanu’s support to block the ratification of it in Parliament, mainly because the document did not denounce the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact.\textsuperscript{297} Bârlădeanu advised Mănescu to first talk with the President about his serious objections and the matter was not brought up again in their discussions.\textsuperscript{298} Furthermore, senator Sabin Ivan concluded from various conversations with FSN members of Parliament around March-April 1991 that they disagreed with the USSR treaty and would have voted against it.\textsuperscript{299} He also speculated that Mănescu had explained to President Iliescu the governing party’s widespread negative reaction, which prompted Iliescu to stop pursuing the ‘Friendship Treaty’.\textsuperscript{300}

Therefore, the 1991 Romanian-Soviet treaty was a ‘formative moment’ which defined for Romania an essential identity and foreign policy question: to be or not to be ‘European’? Realist scholars think that the state displayed the typical behaviour of a ‘minor power’, seeking to ‘hedge’ or simultaneously balance between the two regional hegemons (NATO and the USSR/Russia).\textsuperscript{301} However, such an account is not persuasive since it operates on two problematic assumptions: that close security cooperation with the Soviet Union was a unanimous option among Romanian elites (realists avoid opening the ‘black box’ of the state and do not explore what happens inside it); it seems that some Romanian leaders (i.e. President Iliescu) were not hedging but making a rather firm choice to gravitate towards Moscow. On

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{296} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{297} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{298} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{299} Ibid, p. 165.
\item \textsuperscript{300} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{301} Simona Soare, ‘Romania’s National Security Strategy – A Critical Approach of Transformational Politics’, \textit{Monitor Strategic}, number 1-2, 2008, p. 56.
\end{itemize}
that second aspect, the available documents do not allow us to identify without doubt the President’s intentions. Yet his endorsement of the ‘Friendship Treaty’ was clearly not shared by the majority of elites.

Apart from the memoirs and statements of the relevant actors already mentioned, the most concrete evidence of a domestic contestation about Romania’s identity and international course is the fact that the controversial text was not ratified in Parliament. Even more interestingly, the document was never officially submitted to the Romanian Parliament for either deliberation or approval. If all state institutions had consented to its signing, the governmental party’s majority would have made the ratification process smooth and quick. Although Iliescu appeared to favour the Soviet ‘Friendship Treaty’, the dominant opinion among decision-makers including his loyal political party did not support a potentially non-European vision for Romania. For example, in February 1991 at the Warsaw Pact meeting, Foreign Affairs Minister Năstase declared that Romania opted for Euro-Atlantic integration: ‘[w]ithin this context, a priority direction for Romania after 1989 is to promote wide partnership relations with the North-Atlantic Alliance and the Western European Union, to associate with the European Economic Community and to participate in the other European structures’. Among the three key themes in the Romanian foreign policy imaginary, the ‘European’ self-image was the most intensely re-defined between 1990 and 1996. The reason is that Romanian national identity tends to be first associated with a European subjectivity by both elites and the general public opinion. As the provisional Foreign Minister Sergiu Celac said in January 1990 - ‘Romania is a European country. That is something given by our history and spirituality’.

Whatever his personal affiliation or convictions, President Iliescu needed to adapt to what the elite-level and popular majorities wanted: a European and Euro-Atlantic identity confirmed via NATO and EU accession.

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Following the dissolution of the USSR in December 1991, the ‘Friendship Treaty’ became obsolete. During 1992-1996 diplomatic exchanges with the Russian Federation were tentative at best and the negotiations for another bilateral agreement fell through. The internal contestation surrounding the Romanian-Soviet ‘Friendship Treaty’ marked the emergence of Romania’s firm European choice. The years 1990-1996 resonate especially with Romania’s European orientation and what meanings of national identity and international conduct it translated into. As outlined in chapter II, two other self-images were present and re-articulated in the foreign policy imaginary (‘non-Balkan’ and ‘security provider’). They were slightly overshadowed by the ‘European’ self-image in this period, but would become highly significant in the subsequent foreign policy contexts (the Kosovo crisis and the Iraq war). The foreign policy imaginary with its three main themes configured between 1990 and 1996 formed an ideational foundation that has shaped Romanian identity and external relations until the present.

Romania’s Self-Image as ‘Non-Balkan’

As prefigured in chapter II, another main self-image feeding into the Romanian national identity derives from the state’s complex relationship with the Balkans. This self-image was part of a wider international context that shaped the Romanian foreign policy imaginary, especially Western perceptions of the Yugoslav wars. In July 1990, NATO invited the Central-Eastern European states (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria) and the Soviet Union to create regular diplomatic relations with the Alliance. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was founded in 1991 as another step in the institutionalised dialogue between NATO and the post-communist states. Since the USSR disintegrated later that year, NACC became the suitable mechanism through which to enhance cooperation with Central-Eastern Europe. By the early 1990s, many post-communist states had expressed their wish to join NATO. Following the end of the Cold War, the Alliance faced an ‘identity crisis’ and ‘had to reassess its strategic concept, its views of the types of war or hostilities it could expect to deter and fight and,
more broadly, re-evaluate its role in international security and politics’.\textsuperscript{304} Given this post-Cold War identity crisis, some argued that enlargement would provide NATO with a new purpose. Alliance expansion to newly democratic Central-Eastern Europe sparked a lot of debate and the first wave would eventually occur in 1999. Meanwhile, the EU was re-considering its identity as well. Post-1990 the supranational organisation had to decide whether it aimed to be something more than a ‘problem-solving entity’ that only promoted the interests of its member states.\textsuperscript{305} The collapse of communism confronted the EU with the opportunity to become a ‘value-based community’, which would extend its principles and form a common identity with Central-Eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{306} At the Copenhagen European Council in 1993, the EU decided to enlarge and drafted a set of political and economic criteria that candidate states would have to fulfil to obtain membership. Yet both the EU and NATO proved to be unprepared to deal with what was happening in Yugoslavia.

The Yugoslav Federation had six constituent republics: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. By 1990 Yugoslavia was undergoing drastic transformations. Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, followed by Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992. The Serbs living in these republics retaliated and were supported by Belgrade, leading to armed inter-ethnic conflicts. The timing of such outbreaks relates to the wider global context. When the international order maintaining a certain level of regional security disappears, individuals search for security in their national or ethnic identity.\textsuperscript{307} The revolutions in communist Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet Union helped to break down the dictatorial system ensuring a tentative stability in the Balkan area.

\textsuperscript{306} Ibid.
Long-standing inter-ethnic tensions resurfaced and turned into the Yugoslav wars of the early 1990s. Unfortunately, the ‘well established derogatory connotations’ also re-emerged, as ‘the fighting precipitated by the break-up of Yugoslavia has probably left these more entrenched in the popular imagination than ever’; not only communism was ‘blamed for the mass violence, but ethnic diversity itself, and historical cleavages between religions and cultures’. Nevertheless, the causes of the Yugoslav wars are complex and varied. One of them was the aspiration of Balkan peoples to create viable nation-states, which differed little from what the rest of Europe had experienced in the nineteenth and twentieth century. Gale Stokes explained this process:

‘[r]emapping state boundaries onto ethnic lines is one of the major threads of post-French Revolutionary European history. The process began with the unifications of Italy and Germany, ran through the creation of new states at the end of World War I, and had its most catastrophic outcomes (...) with the Holocaust and the [later] expulsion of the Germans from Eastern Europe (...) [T]he wars of Yugoslav succession are not some aberrant Balkan phenomenon; they are the last stages of a process of European redefinition that has been going on since the French revolution’.

Another cause of the Yugoslav wars referred to controversial figures like Slobodan Milošević, who manipulated national sentiments for their personal gains or for what they perceived to be the benefit of their ethnic group. Since Western political elites ‘struggled to make sense of an otherwise perplexing conflict’, simplistic accounts of the Yugoslav wars became increasingly appealing. These explanations were rooted in negative stereotypes of ‘the Balkans’, which had been articulated as ‘Balkan ghosts, ancient Balkan enmities, primordial Balkan cultural patterns and proverbial Balkan turmoil’. The negative imagery of ‘the Balkans’ dated back to the early 1900s and gradually intensified to the point that even World War II was seen

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as the Balkans’ fault.\textsuperscript{312} For example, the journalist Robert Kaplan said that - 'Nazism (...) can claim Balkan origins. Among the flophouses of Vienna, a breeding ground of ethnic resentments close to the southern Slavic world, Hitler learned how to hate so infectiously'.\textsuperscript{313} In the case of the Yugoslav wars, such pejorative stereotypes and derogatory remarks proliferated. Ioan M. Paşcu regretfully noted that:

‘the conflict is usually viewed as another irrefutable instance of the perpetual violence and proverbial lack of civilization characterizing a region incapable of overcoming its traditional condition as Europe’s powder keg. In today’s vocabulary, these terms imply a judgement that Balkan peoples exhibit a total incapacity to learn and practice democracy and market economy’.\textsuperscript{314}

As a State Secretary in the Ministry of National Defence, in 1994 Paşcu elaborated upon Romania’s stance on the Yugoslav wars:

‘Romania’s official position with regard to the Yugoslav conflict has three major components. First, we hold the view that the only viable solution is to be reached by the parties which are directly involved. Regardless how impatient the outside world might become – and for good reason – its main mission would be to create conditions for bringing the parties to the negotiating table and to facilitate their agreement. External efforts aimed at finding a solution to the conflict should not be viewed, in other words, as a substitute for an accord between protagonists (...) Second, Romania has firmly abstained from any military involvement in the conflict (...) Third, Romania has declared that she is disposed to explore diplomatic solutions to Yugoslav wars. Romania is thus materializing her uncontested advantages (lack of any interest in the conflict itself, good relations with practically all former Yugoslav republics, and a relatively correct understanding of the situation, given her knowledge of the Balkan region)’.\textsuperscript{315}

The Yugoslav wars and their connection to ‘the Balkans’ impacted on the Romanian foreign policy imaginary and a key self-image of national identity - Romania as ‘non-Balkan’.

Romania’s discursive relationship with ‘the Balkans’ has been an interesting combination of rejection and acceptance. Foreign policy decision-

\textsuperscript{312} Ibid, pp. 118-119.
\textsuperscript{315} Ibid, pp. 159-160, emphasis in original.
makers put great effort into explaining that Romania was not part of the Balkans, particularly to international audiences.\textsuperscript{316} They promoted instead the subjectivity of a Central European state neighbouring or ‘in immediate proximity’ to that region.\textsuperscript{317} Similarly to the ‘Eastern European’ articulation, Romania’s post-communist national identity was dissociated from representations like ‘Oriental’, ‘Byzantine’ or ‘Balkan’, which illustrated ‘biased’ and ‘bad faithed’ categorisations with the intent of ‘stigmatizing the perspectives of our [democratic] evolution’.\textsuperscript{318} In October 1993, Foreign Affairs Minister Meleşcanu argued that not only geography constituted Romania as a ‘non-Balkan’ state – ‘[w]e Romanians prefer to describe ourselves as a Central European country close to the Balkans (…) Romania, being located north of the Danube, does not belong geographically to the Balkan region’; since a ‘country belongs to the area where its problems lie’, Romania’s ‘well-known’ good relations with ‘any Balkan or successor states in the former Yugoslavia’ lead to the conclusion that Romania cannot be Balkan.\textsuperscript{319} Within the same context, Meleşcanu went on to add: ‘[t]his clarification might help our friends to the south to understand that the way we characterize Romania implies neither a denial of enduring economic, political and cultural ties, nor a diminution of the important Balkan dimension of our foreign policy’.\textsuperscript{320} In the light of such constructs, Romania shaped its national identity to be different from two significant others – ‘Eastern’ and ‘Balkan’. Like the underlying Orientalism of Western narratives, Balkanism explores a more geographically specific but equally problematic and negative representation of ‘otherness’. Maria Todorova aptly concludes in this respect: ‘[a]s in the case of the Orient, the Balkans have served as a repository of negative characteristics against

\textsuperscript{316} Tom Gallagher, ‘To Be or Not to Be Balkan: Romania’s Quest for Self-Definition’, \textit{Daedalus}, volume 126(3), 1997, p. 69.


\textsuperscript{320} Ibid, emphasis added.
which a positive and self-congratulatory image of the “European” and the “West” has been constructed. The urgency of Romanian efforts to dissociate national identity from the label ‘Balkan’ was related to international Western debates about the ‘Balkan’ character and the Yugoslav wars, which abounded in negative stereotypes. A key text of this Balkanist pejorative discourse, influential in the West, was Kaplan’s ‘Balkan Ghosts’ based on his travels in several countries including Romania. For Kaplan and his growing number of readers, Romania was emphatically ‘Balkan’.

Upon closer examination of the Romanian foreign policy discourses, the self-image of ‘non-Balkan’ coexisted with articulations like ‘our friends to the south’. The long-time ‘friend’ in the region was Yugoslavia, whether in its past political form or contemporary individual entities. President Iliescu clarified and reinforced those understandings:

‘we have a good tradition in terms of relations with Yugoslavia. We could even say that Yugoslavia was our best neighbour, the history of our relations having never known any conflict. We had permanent communication and supported each other; a solidarity based on common history was created. We are very sensitive from that point of view. The Romanian people show a certain solidarity and a feeling of frustration because of this tragedy affecting a heroic people with a rather tumultuous past’.

The representations of Balkan states as ‘friends’, ‘best neighbour’, two mentions of ‘solidarity’ in quick succession and ‘common history’ suggest that Romania’s national identity was not constructed by applying a mutually exclusive and hostile relationship of otherness vis-à-vis the Balkans. Romanian identity was defined as ‘non-Balkan’, yet retained a Balkan affinity and traditional friendly rapport with the Balkans. Once Romania was accepted as an EU and NATO candidate, its official discourses gradually encountered external sources that promoted different articulations about Romanian identity. It is essential to remember that national identity formation involves both self-projection and external recognition. In other words, Romanian discursive attempts to portray the state as ‘non-Balkan’

321 Maria N. Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, p. 188.
322 Here Iliescu referred to the conflict in Bosnia.
would be unsuccessful without Western validation. So, even though Romanian political leaders sought to dissociate their state from ‘the Balkans’ by invoking geographic, historical and cultural arguments, their representation was partially supported by international narratives. Many external audiences did not seem inclined to differentiate between Romania and the Balkan region. Their influence needed to be accommodated by national discourses, shaping modified meanings for Romanian identity. From 1994 onwards, Romania was often depicted as ‘marking the border of different, even divergent, areas of civilization: Central, but also South-Eastern Europe’. Apart from the ‘European’ and ‘non-Balkan’ self-images, Romanian national identity had historically resonated with the idea of being a ‘security provider’.

**Romania’s Self-Image as a ‘Security Provider’**

The second self-image of Romania’s Euro-Atlantic identity and discursive theme of its foreign policy imaginary is that of ‘security provider’. The post-1992 Romanian discourse showed a range of interconnected articulations – ‘security provider’, ‘source of stability’, ‘reliable partner’. Romanian elites often explicitly mentioned or suggested their state’s contribution to generating stability among its troubled neighbours. For instance, Foreign Affairs Minister Meleșcanu stressed the following:

‘[Romania’s] internal stability and responsible, predictable international conduct have so far made it possible to physically separate two areas of open or latent conflict. The mutual reinforcement of the eastern and the southern “arcs of crises” has been prevented. Had this not happened, the problems currently confronting the European Union, NATO and the WEU [Western European Union] would have been considerably greater, perhaps even unsolvable’.325

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President Iliescu said on several occasions that ‘we are deeply concerned with the tragic developments in the former Yugoslavia’ and that Romania, ‘situated in the immediate vicinity to areas with high possibility for conflict’, can play an important role in ensuring regional security.\textsuperscript{326} Even though variations on this theme also circulated in the foreign policy imaginary pre-1992, Romania’s official discourse indicated a notable emphasis on the ‘security provider’ self-image after November 1992 when Meleşcanu (the new Foreign Affairs Minister) came into office. He insisted on depicting Romania as a ‘security generator’ that could export democratic stability to the Balkans. Such external efforts would be supported by the ‘unbiased’ and ‘traditional good relations’ with former Yugoslav states -

‘[w]hether it is openly admitted or not, Romania has been perceived more and more by all its southern neighbours as a factor of stability for the Balkans (...) Romania does not intend to comfortably position itself as mere beneficiary of the security arrangements in Europe. Commensurate with our resources, military capability and comparative advantages in terms of strategic position and infrastructure facilities at Romania’s disposal, we are also able and willing to play the role of security generator’.\textsuperscript{327}

Meleşcanu had an important role in configuring this self-image and appeared to be the most emphatic about it in 1993-1996. His professional background as a long-time diplomat brought another type of elite perspective on Romanian national identity and external relations. Unlike President Iliescu, who was generally perceived to have a strong affinity towards Russia (due to his education in Moscow and especially due to the 1991 Soviet treaty episode), Meleşcanu had been socialised in a different and more ‘Western’-oriented setting. He had attended postgraduate courses in IR and earned a PhD in International Law at the University of Geneva during 1966-1973\textsuperscript{328}, during which he was exposed to several ideas that affected the future Minister’s interpretation of the Romanian and international imaginaries.

\textsuperscript{326} Ion Iliescu, ‘Speech delivered at the NATO Headquarters’ (Brussels, February 1993) in \textit{Romania in Europe and in the World}, pp. 70-71.

\textsuperscript{327} Teodor Meleşcanu, ‘Romania – Factor of Stability in the New Europe’, p. 43 - emphasis in original.

Meleşcanu’s studies influenced him as a foreign policy practitioner who distinctly reinforced Romania’s chosen European and Euro-Atlantic direction. Being a firm advocate of it, the Foreign Affairs Minister elaborated on the ‘security provider’ self-image (as opposed to consumer) in the context of NATO accession:

‘Romania does not intend to simply be positioned at the receiving end of European security arrangements, instead wishing to play a role of security provider. The fact that Romania is considered a factor of stability in its geographical area speaks for itself in this respect. The political stability of Romania, its balanced, responsible and predictable international behaviour recommend it as an asset for NATO’.329

These speeches were delivered in London and Washington, where the intended audiences were highly influential Alliance members. Romania, just like the other post-communist candidate states, needed to highlight and convince NATO decision-makers that it could contribute to allied capabilities. A purely rational account would argue that Romanian officials created the representation of ‘security provider’ in order to alleviate NATO’s concerns about Romania becoming a potential net consumer of security once given membership. Yet the evidence shows that there is more to the story of foreign policy than mere cost-benefit calculations. This is particularly relevant in the Romanian case, where deeply ingrained meanings about national identity shaped the state’s main self-images and international behaviour.

Thus, the construct of ‘security provider’ did not simply emerge as a response to NATO requirements. Its ideational roots were closely linked to a long-standing collective memory-myth of Romania as defender of Europe and the West, which features prominently in the Romanian imaginary. As discussed in chapter II, collective memory-myths are a domestic factor of national identity formation, a source from which elites draw understandings about the state’s self-images. They also constitute subjective interpretations regarding the nation’s remembered past. When talking about the construction of Romanian ‘uniqueness’ or exceptionalism in historiography, Anca Baicoianu distinguishes three major coordinates – geographic, historical and cultural. Geographically, Romania occupied the strategic position of a

329 Teodor Meleşcanu, ‘Romania as a Security Provider’ (Washington, 15-17 July 1996) in 
\textit{Rena\v{s}terea diploma\c{t}iei rom\^ane\v{s}ti}, pp. 134-135.
‘turning point’ between the East and the West, as well as a necessary ‘defence line against all invasions’. Second, the historical coordinate obsessively portrayed the ‘heroic and civilizing’ double descent (Dacian and Roman), which was invoked to ‘claim superiority over the closest neighbours and to legitimate Romania’s place as a rightful member of the European choir of nations’. Third, culturally speaking, ‘the ever increasing feeling of isolation’ turned ‘the idea of uniqueness into a true framework of Romanian identity’; unable to find a suitable pace and constantly fearing exclusion from an ideally imagined Western Europe, Romanian culture ‘struggles to achieve a however fragile balance between its specificity and a longing for integration’. The collective memory-myth of Romanian exceptionalism, its articulation as defender of the West and stronghold protecting European civilisation against invading foreigners, was sometimes openly expressed in the foreign policy texts: ‘situated in Central Europe, Romania has certainly been central to Europe. For centuries, the Romanian countries were the bastions of European civilisation, independence and freedom’.

The above quote is a good example of how the Romanian past has been dramatised under the ‘remarkable functionality’ of the myth of the struggle for independence. In this respect, Lucian Boia explains how the ‘pressure of foreigners from outside and from within, real up to a point but hyperbolized in the national imaginary, generated the besieged fortress complex which is so typical of the Romanian mentality of the last two centuries’. Such interconnected collective memory-myths hold a triple purpose: ‘highlighting the virtue and heroism of the Romanians, justifying their historical late-coming in terms of the sacrifices imposed by ceaseless aggression, and, finally,

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332 Anca Baicoianu, ‘The Trap of Memory: Auto-Orientalism as Victimization’.
335 Ibid.
attracting the attention of the West to its debt of gratitude towards the Romanians who defended it from the Ottoman onslaught’.336 So the ‘security provider’ self-image had a solid and older ideational foundation to be built upon, resonating with Romanian understandings of the nation’s past. It hence drew on a historical reference point to mould and guide one of the main facets of Romania’s post-communist national identity and foreign policy role. As Boia concludes,

'[t]he image of a West protected thanks to Romania’s sacrifice and a Romanian society strained and held back by fulfilling the function of defender of the European civilization has become deeply ingrained in the political vision of the Romanians, in their behavior and their reactions’.337

The various articulations on the ‘security provider’ theme are enduring yet fluid meanings of Romania’s Euro-Atlantic identity and foreign policy imaginary, influencing international positions in critical events like the Kosovo crisis and Iraq war which will be analysed in chapters IV and V. Although all three self-images (‘non-Balkan’, ‘security provider’, ‘European’) have an equal significance when defining national identity in 1990-2007, each one becomes more relevant in certain temporal and situational contexts. European identity was the prominent focus of Romania’s official discourse between 1990 and 1996, because post-1991 the state had opted for a firm European orientation. Romanian foreign policy leaders persistently promoted their state’s ‘European’ identity, but it needed to be negotiated and at least partially recognised or accepted by the salient external self – ‘Europe’.

Romania’s ‘European’ Self-Image

Among the three main self-images circulating in the Romanian foreign policy imaginary, the European one was the most intensely re-articulated during 1990-1996. The reason is quite simple, as Romanian national identity tends to be first associated with a European representation by both elites and the general population. Broadly defined, being a ‘European’ state or having a

336 Ibid.
337 Ibid, p. 156.
European identity refers to being known and accepted as a Western European inspired liberal democracy, which upholds two key principles – the organisation of regular democratic elections and the protection of human and civil rights and liberties. In this time frame, the European self-image was subjected to particularly frequent re-definitions because it had to simultaneously converse with influential domestic and international discourses. The process of European identity contestation, dialogue and external recognition with its foreign policy implications will be analysed in the case study of Romanian-Hungarian relations. For now, a detailed account of what meanings were constructed in relation to Romania’s European self-image is in order. Point nine of the statement proposal issued by the National Salvation Front in December 1989 hinted at a European direction for Romania: ‘[t]he country’s entire foreign policy is to promote good neighbourly relations, friendship and peace in the world, integrating itself in the construction process of a united Europe’.\textsuperscript{338} Following the first post-communist parliamentary and presidential elections of May 1990, at the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) Summit in November, President Iliescu gave a clear indication of the state’s foreign policy goals: ‘[t]he new Romania resulting from the Revolution of December 1989 has adopted a policy oriented towards re-establishing historical and traditional relations with the other countries of Europe and North America, as well as towards developing relations with states sharing the same Latin culture and civilisation’.\textsuperscript{339}

Romania’s second post-1989 democratic elections in September 1992 reconfirmed Iliescu as President and placed the centre-left Social Democratic Party of Romania (PDSR) in government. Throughout the electoral campaign for a new mandate, Iliescu argued that his main vision of the country’s external trajectory was ‘integration into (...) the structures dominating the

\textsuperscript{338} The National Salvation Front, ‘Statement towards the Country’, initially broadcast on the national television and radio, then published in Monitorul Oficial al României/ The Official Registry of Romania, number I(1), 22 December 1989.

\textsuperscript{339} Ion Iliescu, ‘Speech at the CSCE Summit’ (Paris, 21 November 1990) in Adevărul/ The Truth, number I-239, p. 3.
European and Euro-Atlantic area’.

The message delivered in Parliament by the re-elected President indicated the same foreign policy choice, as he stressed that ‘[Romania’s] long-term interests demand, in my opinion, the development of privileged relations with the United States, Germany, Great Britain, France and with all the other European states’. The official discourse evolved in 1992-1996 towards the recurring representation of NATO and EU accession as Romania’s ‘natural’ direction. Meleşcanu, the new Foreign Affairs Minister appointed in November 1992, declared that: ‘the option of Euro-Atlantic integration is a natural choice. It is a well known fact that the institutions, the political, cultural and economic life of modern Romania have always – with the exception of the Cold War period – been an intrinsic part of European civilisation’.

Or as President Iliescu explained in November 1994 -

‘[t]he central orientation of Romanian foreign policy is based on the decision adopted in the first day of the Romanian revolution and supported, then and now, by all political forces in the country – full integration into the political, economic and security structures of democratic Europe. This decision was nothing short of natural, considering that, through its civilisation, culture, history and geographical position, the Romanian nation has always been an inseparable part of European culture and civilisation’.

In terms of targeted audiences, Romania’s decision-makers were addressing such speeches to mostly external recipients. Their messages indirectly aimed to remind the Euro-Atlantic community of the ‘kidnapped, displaced West’, the European peoples who had not abandoned their identity even during communism. This notion of ‘natural’ choice certainly belied the range of foreign policy and security alternatives actually available to post-

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communist Romania and Central-Eastern Europe in general, which included ‘a reformed alliance with the former Soviet Union, neutrality or non-alignment, regional security cooperation within Eastern Europe, pan-European collective or common security through the CSCE, a realpolitik balance of power or reliance on national defence’. Yet the Euro-Atlantic orientation was domestically validated ‘with an impressive unanimity by the entire political elite’ gathered for consultations at Snagov in 1993. If Romania had a range of international security options, why did the post-1992 official discourse construct Euro-Atlantic accession as natural? NATO and EU membership provided the surest and fastest way in which Romania could receive international recognition for its desired Euro-Atlantic identity. The Western self would thus validate unequivocally that the Romanian other was part of the Euro-Atlantic community in both civilisational and institutional meanings. Among the different discursive facets of Romanian identity, the ‘European’ self-image was deeply rooted in the foreign policy imaginary and was meant to show the country’s Western origins. Since the Euro-Atlantic self continued to construct candidate states (including Romania) as ‘liminal Europe’ or ‘Europe but not quite Europe’, the foreign policy imaginary needed to be re-defined in reaction to Western representations.

In the 1990-1996 official discourses, Romania was very frequently depicted as a ‘European’ state. This self-image started taking shape soon after the fall of the communist dictatorship, as the newly appointed Foreign Affairs Minister Năstase stated in the wake of Romania’s first free elections (May 1990) - ‘[t]o my view, things are clear. Romania is a European state’. President Iliescu also summed up what this identity meant for the country historically and in terms of values:

due to its culture, civilisation and political tradition, Romania decidedly belongs to classical Europe, inheriting both the ancient Greek-Roman tradition and the modern principles of statehood – citizenship, freedom, fundamental human rights, the separation of powers within the state, the rule of law'.

When studying the evolution of Romania’s post-communist foreign policy articulations, two recurring and interconnected themes become apparent - recovering the ‘European’ identity and ‘returning to Europe’, both politically and economically. This was definitely not a unique approach, as obtaining Euro-Atlantic membership was the general aspiration for Central and Eastern European states, while most of their leaders gradually incorporated in speeches the concept of ‘European identity’. Despite the common theme, there were specific nuances and meanings associated with the overarching European identity in each state. In the Romanian case, the official discourse articulated several variations (‘European’, ‘Western’, ‘Latin’), all of which were meant to dissociate the new state from its communist past and promote a collective identity with the West. The latter two are inextricably linked, if one takes into account the shared ethnic, cultural and linguistic origins of the French, Spanish, Portuguese and Romanian peoples as descendants of the ancient Romans. The Latin identity of Romanians was portrayed as ‘an undeniable sign of our connection to the great family of Western European peoples’. The state’s Western subjectivity and ‘return to Europe’ were associated with key moments of European history –

‘[t]he generation of 1848 and that of the Union [1918] linked the Romanians’ country to Western civilisation, extricating it from Oriental rule. The current generation of the Romanian nation will re-adopt that tradition’.

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349 Ion Iliescu, ‘We Need One Another, just like All of Us Need a United Europe, a Europe of the Nations’ – Speech delivered at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London, 3 November 1994), in Toamna diplomatică/ The Autumn of Diplomacy (Bucharest: Redacția publicațiilor pentru străinătate, 1995), p. 94.


351 Teodor Meleşcanu, ‘Romania Has Refused to Give Up Its European Identity even in the Context of Bipolar Confrontation’ (Excerpts from Speeches of late 1995) in Renașterea diplomației românești, p. 115.

So the approximately fifty years of communism were seen as yet another period which had forcefully separated Romania from its Western family, or ‘a sort of parenthesis in the country’s historical destiny’.\(^{353}\)

In early 1991, a pivotal shift occurred in the foreign policy discourse, which attempted to distance Romania from its traditional ‘Eastern European’ representation, moving towards that of ‘Central European’. The motivations behind the change in terminology could be attributed to the fact that ‘Eastern Europe’ had acquired specific political and ideological connotations during the Cold War, primarily defining the Soviet Union’s satellite states.\(^{354}\) It should be noted that the political entity of ‘Eastern Europe’ had been created in the aftermath of the Yalta Conference (1945), where the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom discussed and controversially decided the reconfiguration of war-torn Europe. The concept of ‘Eastern Europe’ was invented by Western Europe as its other half in the Enlightenment (eighteenth century), the imagined space where ‘European’ civilisation encountered ‘Oriental’ barbarism.\(^{355}\) During the Cold War, NATO and the EU defined their eastern boundary as a defence line for ‘European unity’, which enabled them to construct a superior Western identity based on shared democratic values.\(^{356}\) Or, to adapt the Orientalism of Edward Said, the Euro-Atlantic community developed a ‘Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over’ Eastern Europe.\(^{357}\) Being articulated as part of ‘Eastern Europe’ did not help the efforts of a state aspiring to form a collective identity with the West. Romania’s discursive responses were a combination of acceptance and resistance: accepting the authority of the Western European self yet refusing to be placed in the ‘East’. Therefore, the official discourse started describing Romania as ‘Central European’. The re-defined self-image

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became most obvious in foreign policy documents - ‘[Romania’s] geopolitical location is that of a country belonging to Central Europe’. In April 1992, the Romanian Foreign Affairs Minister defined ‘Central European’ states to be all those forcefully placed behind the borders of the extended Soviet empire.

As the contemporary articulation and heir of ‘Mitteleuropa’, this notion of ‘Central Europe’ was advocated by candidate states in the early stages of NATO and EU enlargement, trying to symbolise a stronger European subjectivity. It had been first revived in February 1991 by three post-communist states (Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary), in an attempt to stand out among fellow Euro-Atlantic aspirants. They formed the self-entitled ‘Visegrad Group’, which ‘reflects the efforts of the countries of the Central European region to work together in a number of fields of common interest within the all-European integration’. Romania opposed the Visegrad Group’s discursive differentiation and exclusive appropriation of ‘Central Europe’. On 19 June 1992, the Western European Union (WEU later incorporated into the EU) issued a statement in which it included all post-communist states as part of ‘Central Europe’. Talking about the WEU declaration, the then Foreign Affairs Minister Năstase mentioned the importance of external validation and clarified what being ‘Central European’ meant for Romania:

I think that things are now better because this document certifies our philosophy concerning the area where we are situated, so there can be no more discussions about a division between Central (Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia) and Eastern European

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361 The Visegrad Group, About the Visegrad Group; http://www.visegradgroup.eu/about (April 2014).
362 The Western European Union, Declaration after the Extraordinary Meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers with States of Central Europe (Bonn, 19 June 2002); available within ‘Key Texts’ at http://www.weu.int/ (April 2014).
countries (Romania, Bulgaria and, perhaps, the Baltic states). We have managed to express our view: the area between the former Soviet Union and Western Europe is a unitary zone, which is indivisible from the security perspective and must be treated as such (...) all these countries belong to Central Europe’. 363

The next years highlighted the articulation of different versions on the same ‘Central European’ theme, which showed the fluid process of national identity formation and how the discourse did not crystallise a specific image. For example, according to President Iliescu, Romania ‘is an intrinsic part of the Central-European area’364; and since ‘the map of Europe’ stretched ‘from the Atlantic to the Ural Mountains and the Caspian Sea’, Romania was located ‘not only in the centre of Europe, but even in the centre of Central Europe’. 365

Foreign Affairs Minister Meleşcanu reinforced a similar line – ‘Romania is situated at an equal distance from the western and northern, as well as the eastern borders of Europe (...) [it] is the second largest country in Central Europe after Poland’. 366

Having established the ideational parameters of the post-communist foreign policy imaginary, the focus of this chapter shifts to the Romanian-Hungarian basic treaty. It was one of Romania’s most important foreign policy accomplishments during 1990-1996 and a product of difficult negotiations. The bilateral document brought the long awaited historical reconciliation between the two states in 1996. The treaty story is a natural extension to the European self-image, which underlines the key role of external recognition in legitimating Romanian national identity. Romania chose and professed to be ‘European’, but only the self (‘Europe’) had the authority to validate such an identity in the international realm.

What does ‘European’ Identity Mean? Narratives around ‘The Treaty between the Republic of Hungary and Romania on Understanding, Cooperation and Good Neighbourhood’

The basic bilateral treaty between Romania and Hungary reflects their problematic and sometimes conflictual post-1989 relations. Treaty dialogue did not actually start until mid-1995, due to the inflexible foreign policy positions of both Hungary and Romania. In addition to this, the international context was in a state of flux. During 1989-1994, the EU lacked a coherent policy towards Central-Eastern European states seeking to become members in the organisation. The EU’s uncertain attitude is understandable considering the divergent internal opinions as to whether it should enlarge at all. Instead, the EU initially decided not to differentiate between post-communist candidate states.367 In the Romanian case, a Trade and Cooperation Agreement was initiated in early June 1990. But the EU postponed it when the Jiu Valley miners attacked democratic protestors in Bucharest. Romania and the EU eventually signed the Trade Agreement in October 1990 and the Europe Association one later in February 1993. At the EU level, there was a much clearer stance towards Central-Eastern Europe after 1993. The ‘Stability Pact’ (introduced by French Prime Minister Édouard Balladur in 1993) established the requirements of good neighbourliness, ethnic minority rights protection and the resolution of any disputes as compulsory conditions for EU accession or simply ‘European respectability’.368 The Stability Pact or Balladur Plan was the result of France being frustrated with ‘the EU’s inability to bring about a diplomatic end to the Yugoslav wars’; it was ‘positively received in EU capitals’ and finalised in December 1993 as ‘the first Joint Action of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy’.369 The pact aimed to prevent the reoccurrence of ethnic conflicts, like the Yugoslav wars, in post-communist Europe. The EU candidate states were supposed to sign bilateral Treaties of ‘Cooperation and

368 Ibid, p. 149.
369 Ibid.
Good Neighbourhood’, which would codify their mutual agreement that problems of borders and ethnic minorities had been settled.

The treaty between Romania and Hungary is significant because it encapsulates the meeting point of three discourses: international (NATO, EU, other Euro-Atlantic voices), Hungarian and Romanian, which told different stories about Romania’s European self-image. The case is a micro study of what it means to be ‘European’, through the lens of minority rights. No matter how intensely national leaders promoted the European facet of their state’s national identity, only the European self held the authority to recognise that the Romanian other identified with ‘Europe’. In that respect, the international narratives described Romania as not fully embracing liberal values and being unstable due to ethnic tensions, which contrasted with and did not validate the state’s internal European self-image. International discourses also constructed human and minority rights as not being the exclusive domain of state jurisdiction. Romania challenged the European meanings on minority rights by portraying the latter to be a domestic affair. The state further contested European opinion trends by saying that its democratic Constitution, individual rights and extensive minority language provisions were sufficient to protect ethnic minorities. Thus, it fulfilled the criteria of being ‘European’ and faced no danger of inter-ethnic conflict. But Hungary had a very different set of definitions of what ‘European’ identity meant for national minority rights. So negotiations for the much anticipated basic treaty between the two states could not move beyond their intransigent positions on ethnic minorities particularly, and divergent views on European identity more generally. Romania advocated individual rights and no minority autonomy, while Hungary wanted collective minority rights and some type of territorial autonomy based on ethnic grounds. In the early 1990s, Western Europe did not have a definitive interpretation about what being European meant in these terms – the concept of minority rights and its implications were still being debated. In this sense, Romania and Hungary were active agents in the struggle to define European identity with respect to minority rights. The undisputed European stance and appropriate meanings for minority rights were not clarified by the international and European community until 1996.
Without the discursive intervention of the authoritative European self, it is highly doubtful that that the two aspiring European states would have reached a mutually agreeable compromise.

a. The International Narratives on Human Rights and Romania

After two devastating world wars, the international community evolved towards a conception of human rights that saw the individual as the focal point of societal development. Matters related to the protection and promotion of human rights were gradually transferred from the domestic realm to the international level. The United Nations (UN) Charter signed in June 1945 stipulates at article 2.7 that nothing will authorise interference in ‘matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state’. But subsequent amendments placed human rights outside national sovereignty, at least in normative terms. In December 1946, during the first session of the UN General Assembly, Resolution 96(I) was passed on genocide, which officially became a crime against international law; its punishment was defined as ‘a matter of international concern’. On 10 December 1948, the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted and addressed three main categories of rights: the integrity of the human being or freedom from state intervention against the individual, political and civil liberties and social and economic rights. Article 30 concluded that ‘[n]othing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein’. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights proved to be a source of inspiration for another relevant document - the Helsinki Final Act. The latter was drafted by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE later OSCE) in August 1975. The Helsinki negotiations lasted three years and resulted in ten principles.

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The first principle dealt specifically with sovereignty – ‘[t]he participating States will refrain from any intervention, direct or indirect, individual or collective, in the internal or external affairs falling within the domestic jurisdiction of another participating State’.374 The seventh principle tried to ensure respect for human and minority rights, as well as certain provisions to foster them: ‘[t]he participating States on whose territory national minorities exist will respect the right of persons belonging to such minorities to equality before the law, will afford them the full opportunity for the actual enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms and will, in this manner, protect their legitimate interests in this sphere’.375 Both the US and Soviet Union signed the Helsinki Final Act, but it was not legally binding. As Sarah Snyder noted, ‘it was a declaration of intention, and therefore the obligations therein were only moral and political’.376 She also argues that ‘a transnational Helsinki network’ was gradually developed, where individual and groups across state borders ‘pressed for adherence to the human rights and human contacts provisions of the Helsinki Final Act’.377 The end of the Cold War brought increased international concern about human and minority rights. Several catalysts that had been emerging since the 1970s culminated in this intensified Western interest. Soviet and Central-Eastern European dissidents talked about the abuses of communist dictatorships. The US

374 Ibid, p. 6
375 Ibid.
foreign policy had undergone a liberal shift after the disastrous Vietnam war (1954-1975), whereas Europe was searching for a new post-Cold War identity.\textsuperscript{378} The international context of post-1989 facilitated the appearance of normative changes regarding human rights.

Other texts underlying the international dimension of human rights continued to be drafted. Even more significantly, Resolution 688 of the UN Security Council explicitly linked adherence to human rights with maintaining international peace and security.\textsuperscript{379} This resolution authorised the 1991 intervention in Iraq of a multi-national coalition under the UN flag; its humanitarian purpose aimed to protect the Kurdish minority who had been repressed by the Iraqi government.\textsuperscript{380} The many and very serious humanitarian crises, which occurred in the last decades, showed the diminishing of rhetorical support for the rule of non-intervention, particularly in the case of states that visibly perpetrate violence against their citizens. It could even be argued that modern attempts to breach the principle of non-intervention, in order to foster fundamental human rights, invariably undermined the foundation of the sovereignty doctrine.\textsuperscript{381} As a UN special rapporteur aptly concluded in 1992, the stipulations of article 2.7 in the Charter ‘are not applicable to issues pertaining to international protection of human rights (…) human rights are a matter of international concern and do not fall under the internal jurisdiction of states’.\textsuperscript{382}

To reflect these changing international norms, CSCE specifically engaged with minority rights:

‘[i]ssues concerning national minorities, as well as compliance with international obligations and commitments concerning the rights of persons belonging to them, are matters of legitimate international concern and consequently do not constitute exclusively an internal affair of the respective State’.\textsuperscript{383}

The topic of protecting minority rights and preventing ethnic conflict was especially sensitive in the European context, where the atrocities of the Yugoslav wars brought increased humanitarian awareness and a more pro-active attitude to avoid such tragic developments. Similarly, other organisations re-defined their perspectives on ‘security’ or ‘security risks’. The Western European Union signed a declaration with post-communist states (including Romania) in June 1992, which noted that - ‘security in its broadest sense encompasses not only military but also political aspects, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as economic, social and environmental aspects’.\textsuperscript{384} NATO’s 1991 strategic concept was elaborated to incorporate the new post-Cold War environment and security challenges. Paragraphs 9 and 15 contained ideas relevant here:

‘[r]isks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in central and eastern Europe (...) Based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has worked since its inception for the establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. This Alliance objective remains unchanged’.\textsuperscript{385}

From the strategic concept’s viewpoint, it was quite clear that NATO would only consider ‘stable’ post-communist states as suitable candidates for accession, meaning those not posing any potential security risks such as ‘ethnic rivalries’ and/or ‘territorial disputes’. This was underlined by Warren Christopher’s succinct claim that ‘a future new member will have to demonstrate that it complies with the principles of democracy, individual freedom and respect for human rights (...) in short, the values that NATO


\textsuperscript{384} The Western European Union, \textit{Declaration of the Extraordinary Meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers with States of Central Europe - Point 3} (Bonn, 19 June 1992); see ‘Key Texts’ at www.weu.int (April 2014).

embodies’. The EU followed the same line and had proclaimed to be founded on principles like human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights; all of these norms formed the ideational basis for integration and cooperation criteria applied to EU candidates.

Romania was generally found wanting by the standards of these international benchmarks. The international narratives on Romania were far from describing a European-inspired liberal democracy or a stable state upholding minority rights. In his 1990 article on European security, John Mearsheimer discussed ‘the serious tensions’, which had the potential of a ‘future war’, between Hungary and Romania over the situation of the Hungarian minority in Transilvania. The communist era had displayed two radically different approaches to engaging with the Hungarian minority. The first two decades brought a moderate stance which organised a complete educational system (including university) in the mother tongue for the Hungarian community. In the late 1970s, the communist dictatorship adopted an aggressive nationalist policy to surmount its legitimacy crisis and harshly restricted native language education. European institutions were aware of the negative turn for handling minority issues taken by the Romanian state under Ceauşescu. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe opined that human rights violations in communist Romania were ‘more specifically directed against the Hungarian and the Tzigane minorities’. Post-1990, Mearsheimer’s war scenario between Hungary and Romania was perhaps too pessimistic, yet his opinion on highly strained inter-ethnic dynamics was shared by many international observers.

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For example, a special report presented in the North Atlantic/NATO Parliamentary Assembly portrayed Romania as ‘one of the European countries where issues of minority rights protection are the most pressing’. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute published a report which argued that:

‘[o]ver the past three years, Romania has developed a tremendous sense of insecurity from the existence of such a large Hungarian minority in Transylvania and has gone to extraordinary lengths to defend itself from Hungarian charges of discrimination. However, there is a great deal of evidence that over the past two years inter-ethnic relations in the region have polarized dramatically and that much of the trouble has been caused by Romanian extremists, working with the “approval” of seemingly compliant officials’.

Other external sources reinforced the same image of instability and volatile minority problems. This ranged from ‘nationalist tensions have not disappeared (...) both the Romanian and Hungarian sides are guilty of instigation’ to Romania being depicted as a ‘potential theatre of inter-ethnic conflicts like in the former Yugoslavia’. The mildest representations were in the Association Agreement signed by the European Community/EU and Romania on 1 February 1993. Its main objective was to help prepare the state for future membership. The document highlighted ‘the importance of the traditional links existing between the Community, its Member States and Romania and the common values that they share’. Nevertheless, it identified ‘the need to continue and complete, with the assistance of the Community, Romania’s transition towards a new political and economic

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395 Parliament of Romania, ‘Agreement Establishing an Association between the European Economic Communities, Their Member States and Romania’, Monitorul Oficial al României/ The Official Registry of Romania, number 73, 12 April 1993.
system which respects the rule of law and human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities'.

To sum up, between 1990 and 1994, the international narratives on Romania contained mostly negative articulations which had been fuelled from within by the state’s violent and somewhat questionable transition to a democratic regime. A common point of alarming criticism in such external voices configured Romania as not fully complying with liberal democratic values and being unstable due to ethnic tensions that could imminently degenerate into conflict. While international norms evolved towards placing human rights outside the internal jurisdiction of states, the CSCE stated that minority rights were not the exclusive concern of domestic affairs. These dominant Euro-Atlantic discourses need to be kept in mind to understand Romania’s foreign policy reactions, how national identity and its European self-image were discursively negotiated between the self and other. Romania challenged European meanings by arguing against the internationalisation of ethnic and minority issues. It is interesting to note that, although the broader trend internationalised human and minority rights, Romania was eventually successful in promoting a narrower interpretation of these aspects. The state also contested the international narratives which constructed it as not being sufficiently ‘Western European’. Romanian-Hungarian relations constitute a story of ‘European’ identity with contrasting notions, acceptance and rejection, dialogue and ultimately reaching a rather unexpected agreement.

b. The Treaty Story: Hungarian vis-à-vis Romanian Meanings on Minority Rights and European Identity

The story of the Romanian-Hungarian basic treaty spanned the period 1990-1996, being alternatively marked by regression and tentative progress. Throughout his electoral campaign in May 1990, the future Hungarian Premier József Antall announced on several occasions that he would like to

\[396 \text{Ibid.}\]
be the prime minister ‘in spirit’ of fifteen million Hungarians. This figure far exceeded the people residing within national borders, made up of approximately ten million citizens. After being elected, Antall organised the Secretariat of Hungarians Abroad, which was under the direct coordination of the Hungarian Prime Minister’s office. The initiative became a concrete example of the Hungarian administration’s external agenda and its claim that ‘it was entitled to defend the interests of co-nationals’ in neighbouring countries and the rest of the world. The Antall government actually prioritised the improvement of status and treatment for ethnic Hungarians living abroad, which took precedence even over domestic reforms. The main targets were territories redistributed by the Treaty of Trianon signed at the end of World War I (1920); they were mostly returned to contemporary Romania, Slovakia and the former Yugoslavia. Thus, President Arpad Göncz defined ‘the enforcement of collective and personal rights for the Magyars living in the Carpathian Basin’ as the main objective of Hungary’s foreign policy. State Secretary Géza Entz added that ‘ethnic Hungarians beyond borders form an integral part of the Hungarian nation’. The discourse gradually gained more momentum and conveyed the Hungarian nation’s re-birth, recently freed from communism and which could not be fulfilled without at least the spiritual reunification of Great Hungary.

On 25 September 1991, in front of the UN Security Council, the Foreign Affairs Minister (Géza Jeszenszky) declared the following: ‘We must resolutely condemn any efforts or attempts at the forcible change of borders, external

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398 Tom Gallagher, Romania after Ceauşescu, p. 119.
400 ‘Magyar’ is synonymous with ‘Hungarian’, being derived from the native name of Hungary – ‘Magyarorszag’ (The Magyar Country).
and internal alike’. Jeszenszky only denounced the **forceful** reconfiguration of borders, which indirectly suggested the possibility for a peaceful revision of the Trianon Treaty and Peace Conference in Paris. This would allow the Hungarian state to recover some of the lands given to Romania and Czechoslovakia. In 1992 the Defence Minister Lajos Für said that ‘the safeguarding of Hungarians everywhere is inseparable from the security of his nation and the Hungarian government and parliament should do everything in their power, using all legal and diplomatic means, to end the threat to the minority and to guarantee their survival’. The Antall government refused to sign bilateral agreements or basic treaties with its neighbours, unless the documents guaranteed collective rights for ethnic minorities. As Jeszenszky underlined using quite radical language in 1993, external relations would depend on ‘when and which of our neighbors recognize the need to abandon the policy of oppression (...) petty restrictions on Hungarian minorities and of trying to create homogeneous nation-states’. All these aspects prompted some academics like László Kiss to talk about the ‘ethnification’ of Hungary’s foreign policy.

However, the so-called ‘petty restrictions’ derived from a much more problematic issue – the legal difference between individual and collective minority rights. A long-standing and as yet unresolved matter is whether the minority rights stipulated by international conventions, declarations and other frameworks should be awarded to the group as a whole or only to its

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405 Géza Jeszenszky, ‘Hungary’s Foreign Policy Dilemmas’, *The Hungarian Quarterly*, volume 34(130), Summer 1993, p. 11.

members as individual right-holders.\footnote{Douglas Sanders, ‘Collective Rights’, \textit{Human Rights Quarterly}, volume 13(3), August 1991, p. 368.} The fundamental legal basis for minority protection is article 27 of the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which entered into force in March 1976. It says that:

‘[i]n those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language’.\footnote{The United Nations General Assembly, \textit{International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights} (1966); available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3aa0.html (April 2014).}

A recurring phrase in all such international or regional documents is ‘persons belonging to’, which configured the individual nature of minority rights. The more recent UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities was adopted in December 1992. Although the Declaration on Minorities is not legally binding, article 1 ‘goes beyond the tentative article 27’ before reverting to the ‘cumbersome “persons belonging to” formula’\footnote{Miodrag Jovanovic, ‘Recognizing Minority Identities through Collective Rights’, \textit{Human Rights Quarterly}, volume 27(2), May 2005, p. 628.} –

‘[s]tates shall protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity of minorities within their respective territories and shall encourage conditions for the promotion of that identity’.\footnote{The United Nations General Assembly, \textit{Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities}, A/RES/47/135 (18 December 1992); available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/47/a47r135.htm (April 2014).}

Patrick Thornberry argued that this Declaration contained a limited collective dimension for minority rights, which represented ‘a via media between the rights of individuals and full collective rights’.\footnote{Patrick Thornberry, ‘The UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities: Background, Analysis, Observations and an Update’ in Alan Philips and Allan Rosas (eds.), \textit{Universal Minority Rights} (Åbo Akademi’ University Institute for Human Rights, 1995), p. 54.}

Narrowing things down to the European level, the Council of Europe made some attempts to differentiate between individual and collective minority rights, but they remained inconclusive. Its Parliamentary Assembly issued Recommendation 1134 (1990), which introduced the following minimum principles on the rights of minorities:
'10.1 every citizen must have equal access to the courts and be afforded the rights safeguarded by the European Convention on Human Rights including the right of individual petition set forth in Article 25; 10.2 introduction of a general non-discrimination clause in the European Convention on Human Rights; 10.3 the special situation of a given minority may justify special measures in its favour; 10.4 minorities shall be allowed to have free and unimpeded peaceful contacts with citizens of other states with which they share a common origin or heritage, without, however, infringing the principle of the territorial integrity of states'.

The text carefully balanced between a minority’s ‘special situation’ calling for potential ‘special measures’ and the state’s territorial integrity, in order to avoid legitimising separatist movements. Recommendation 1134 further gave ‘national minorities’ a range of rights - ‘the right to be recognised as such by the states in which they live; ‘the right to maintain and develop their culture’; ‘the right to maintain their own educational, religious and cultural institutions’; for this purpose, ‘the right to solicit voluntary financial and other contributions including public assistance’; ‘the right to participate fully in decision-making about matters which affect the preservation and development of their identity and in the implementation of those decisions’; ‘every person belonging to a national minority is required to comply with the obligations resulting from his citizenship or residence in a European state’. Still, the subsequent Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1995) re-introduced the phrase ‘persons belonging to’ even in those areas where Recommendation 1134 had identified the rights of ‘national minorities’. Its article 3(2) states that: ‘[p]ersons belonging to national minorities may exercise the rights and enjoy the freedoms flowing from the principles enshrined in the present framework Convention individually as well as in community with others’. All in all, international law advocates an individual emphasis on minority rights, because the

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413 Ibid.
ongoing debates about collective rights focus on ‘the perceived threat to state security that these would entail’ like irredentism or secessionism.\textsuperscript{416}

The Hungarian views were simultaneously shaped at an external level (through the elites of Hungary) and at an internal level in Romania. There were domestic voices who wanted collective rights for the Hungarian minority in Transilvania. The Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) played an important role in the treaty story. It had been established as a political party representing the Hungarian minority and won seats in the Romanian Parliament since 1990. In late 1993, UDMR intensified its ethnic programme and demanded the ‘territorial autonomy’ of some counties in Transilvania, where a larger proportion of the Hungarian minority resided. The party submitted a ‘Draft Law on National Minorities and Autonomous Communities’ to Parliament in November 1993. The text defined a national minority of Romania as an ‘autonomous community’ that exercised its ‘rights according to the principles of self-determination’.\textsuperscript{417} UDMR depicted the Magyar ethnic group as ‘a constitutive factor’, having the same function of ‘political subject’ like the state. The current Romanian Constitution limits state authority through the rule of law and individual human rights; if the UDMR project were to be applied, the Romanian state would have to compete with an ‘autonomous Magyar entity’ and this would inevitably cause the fragmentation of sovereignty.\textsuperscript{418} Both Romania’s government and political opposition found unclear the logic underlying that draft law and had suspicions about the idea of minority self-determination. Any form of minority autonomy was considered an unacceptable challenge to Romania as a unitary

state because it was associated in the collective imaginary with possible separatism and even annexation of Romanian lands by Hungary.419

With regard to the Romanian foreign policy discourses, the state challenged European meanings on minority rights by constructing the latter as an internal affair. Romania also rejected the international narratives which portrayed it as not embracing European liberal values and being plagued by instability due to ethnic tensions. To begin with, article 6.1 in the Romanian Constitution stipulates individual minority rights – ‘[t]he State recognises and guarantees to persons belonging to national minorities the right to maintain, develop and express their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity’.420 The non-discriminatory treatment of people belonging to minority groups is conveyed by article 4.2: ‘Romania is the common and indivisible homeland of all its citizens, without any discrimination in terms of race, nationality, ethnic origin, language, religion, sex, opinion, political affiliation, wealth or social origin’.421 The Hungarian government’s rhetoric on minorities in general and collective rights in particular was interpreted as threatening by Romanian elites. As noted by Paşcu (presidential adviser), ‘one of our former allies Hungary has transformed herself openly into a potential enemy’; he invoked as evidence ‘statements and actions that interfere in Romania’s domestic politics’.422 At the CSCE meeting in March 1992, Foreign Affairs Minister Năstase highlighted that ethnic minorities needed to respect the territorial integrity of states, while insisting that minority rights were already codified in the Romanian Constitution and international law.423 Elaborating upon Năstase’s arguments, in April 1993 President Iliescu described the internal situation using the following terms:

‘the Romanian legislative level has the most extensive rights for minorities in political and cultural practices. I do not believe you will find many states in Europe where

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421 Ibid.
423 Edith Oltay, ‘Minorities as Stumbling Block in Relations with Neighbours’, *RFE-RL Research Report*, volume 1, number 19, 8 May 1992, p. 27.
national minorities have representatives in the country's Parliament. Not to mention their representation in the local administration and native language education. The Hungarians at least enjoy [the latter] from primary education to university. An entire network of schools exists in the areas where they live, along with cultural institutes, magazines, newspapers, radio and television programmes exclusive to the Hungarian population. So, from this point of view, no restrictions are in place.424

The above excerpt remained a meaningful indication of Iliescu’s foreign policy discourse on Hungarian minority rights in Romania. It basically suggested that the state had not only adopted European values, but had gone a step beyond them via the presence of UDMR in Parliament. Article 32.3 in the Romanian Constitution stressed the educational rights of minorities quite strongly, ensuring the teaching of the mother tongue in compulsory school, as well as making arrangements for minorities’ full education in their native language – [t]he right of persons belonging to national minorities to learn their mother tongue, and their right to be educated in this language are guaranteed; the ways to exercise these rights are established by law.425 Apart from educational and linguistic rights, ethnic minorities benefited from political representation in Parliament and local authorities. The Council of Europe invited Romania to join in July 1993 at the recommendation of the König report, which made some proposals –

‘[b]ecause of the often difficult relationship between Romania and its Hungarian minority (...) further confidence could be built if the Romanian Parliament adopted legislation on the rights of minorities and on education. If Romania, as emphasised by members of the government and several political parties, already grants many rights to its minorities de facto, the adoption of these texts, which are already pending before parliament, should not pose insurmountable difficulties’.426

The Council of Europe acknowledged that Romania granted many minority rights, but also recommended the adoption of separate special laws in this respect. It received assurances that the Romanian authorities would base

‘their policy regarding the protection of minorities on the principles laid down in Recommendation 1201 (1993)’. Yet, in February 1995, the Parliament of Romania issued an official declaration that clearly configured its position concerning minority rights and UDMR demands for Hungarian autonomy:

> ‘the citizens [of national states], regardless of their ethnic origin, enjoy the same rights, same protection on the part of the state and are the bearers of national sovereignty (...) The Romanian state has never undertaken any measures to assimilate its citizens belonging to national minorities and neither does it have such aims’.

The text mentioned the ‘internationalisation’ of minority problems in disapproving terms – ‘[w]e believe that statements according to which the matter of minorities cannot be solved in Romania denote the attempt to “internationalise” this issue at a time when the image of Romania’s stability can be decisive to its integration into Euroatlantic structures’. President Iliescu reinforced a similar idea in April 1995: ‘in our country tendencies have appeared that exaggerate local misunderstandings, convert them into “inter-ethnic conflicts” at national level, even internationalise the so-called “ethnic problems”’.

Within a relatively short complex sentence, there are several linguistic devices that downplay the seriousness of ethnic minority topics - the articulation of the Romanian story through words such as ‘exaggerate’, ‘misunderstandings’, the juxtaposition of contrasting notions (‘local’ versus ‘national’), the use of inverted commas to emphasise with a hint of irony the inaccurate nature of the phrases in question. The President seemed to disapprove as well of actors trying to ‘internationalise “ethnic problems”’, which again contested the European narrative on minority rights. Moreover, in the same context, Iliescu indirectly referred to the main problematic aspects of the basic treaty with Hungary. He did not see any reason to move

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427 Ibid.
429 Ibid, p. 4.
beyond the existing democratic legislation and qualified as ‘unacceptable’ the territorial autonomy advocated by UDMR for Hungarians -

‘[t]he democratic system ensures the right of minorities to preserve and express their ethnic identity in the existing legal framework, rejecting any discrimination which could affect fundamental human rights. In this sense, we consider unacceptable the tendencies to institute forms of isolation or “autonomy” based on ethnic criteria that lead to ethnic segregation’.\footnote{Ibid.}

Consequently, the Romanian and Hungarian foreign policy imaginaries operated on two different conceptions of ethnic minority rights - individual versus collective, which also reflected different notions of what being ‘European’ entailed. For Romania, having a European identity meant that a democratic Constitution, individual rights and wide native language regulations were sufficient provisions for minorities. Hungary and UDMR disagreed with such ideas, refusing to acknowledge Romania’s European identity because they viewed collective rights and some form of ethnic autonomy as the appropriate European standard. The inflexible stances of both Hungary and Romania led to heightened tensions between the two states, as well as the inability to start a proper dialogue on the bilateral treaty throughout 1990-1993.

The year 1994 brought several shifts in the international context and the foreign policies of individual states. The Stability Pact or Balladur Plan, adopted by the EU in December 1993, began to exert a more solid pressure on the EU candidates. The plan represented ‘the solemn commitment of all the governments of post-Cold War Europe to political stability and abstention from war to solve conflicts and disputes over borders, territory and national minority problems’.\footnote{Fulvio Attina, ‘The Security-Culture Divide in the Mediterranean’ in Emanuel Adler, Beverly Crawford, Federica Bicchi and Rafaella Del Sarto (eds.), \textit{The Convergence of Civilizations: Constructing a Mediterranean Region} (London: University of Toronto Press, 2006), p. 252.} Post-communist Europe welcomed the pact ‘to manifest both compliance with Western values and their commitment to act as reliable partners’, with the prospect of EU membership.\footnote{Ibid.} Alluding to the still inexistent Romanian-Hungarian treaty, Foreign Affairs Minister

\footnote{Ibid.}
Meleşcanu subtly recalled that ‘a considerable part of Romania’s roads towards Europe pass through Hungary’.\textsuperscript{434} Poland managed to establish a good relationship with its neighbours, while also supporting Polish minority groups who resided in those states. The Czech Republic remained largely indifferent, since it had few ethnic minorities either at home or abroad.\textsuperscript{435} In Hungary, the Antall government’s focus on collective rights and vague statements about the peaceful revision of borders did not sit well with the objective of EU and NATO integration. By 1994, some international officials and journalists ‘hinted that Hungary was no longer on the list of states likely to join NATO in the first wave’.\textsuperscript{436}

Considering the problematic status of Hungary’s NATO and EU candidacy, it is not surprising that a new socialist administration led by Prime Minister Gyula Horn was elected in July 1994. He underlined in an address to Hungary’s Parliament – ‘this government will complete the process of accession to the EU and NATO (...) [it] will subordinate everything else to this end’.\textsuperscript{437} Horn even declared that Hungary ‘is ready to begin discussions regarding those basic treaties that could contain the reciprocal renunciation of territorial demands and the recognition of present borders (...), as well as the commitment to ensure the recognition, guarantee and practical application of national minorities’ rights living in their countries, in accordance with EU norms’.\textsuperscript{438} The new socialist-liberal coalition renounced the militant foreign policy of the Antall government and espoused more moderate attitudes. It also unequivocally gave up talks about territorial claims and peaceful revisions of borders. This facilitated the signing of a basic

\textsuperscript{434} Teodor Meleşcanu cited in David Phinnemore, ‘Romania and Euro-Atlantic Integration since 1989: A Decade of Frustration?’ in Duncan Light and David Phinnemore (eds.), \textit{Post-Communist Romania: Coming to Terms with Transition} (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p. 256.

\textsuperscript{435} Milada A. Vachudova, \textit{Europe Undivided. Democracy, Leverage, and Integration After Communism}, p. 149.

\textsuperscript{436} Ibid, p. 150.


\textsuperscript{438} Gyula Horn cited in Mihai-Romulus Vădean, \textit{Relațiile româno-ungare în contextul integrării în structurile europene și euroatlantice/ Romanian-Hungarian Relations in the Context of European and Euroatlantic Integration} (Iași: Lumen, 2011), p. 73.
treaty with Slovakia in March 1995, in which Budapest denied any ‘irredentist notions’ and Bratislava granted more extensive rights (albeit not collective ones) to its ethnic Hungarians. Arguably, the criteria of Euro-Atlantic integration acted as an incentive for both states to settle their long-standing disputes, before the conference on the EU’s Stability Pact in Europe (1995). But EU and NATO conditionality did not work so well in the Romanian-Hungarian case, since the two countries were unable to reach a mutually agreeable solution at that time. The individual or collective dimension of minority rights was still pending. And the ambiguous content of Recommendation 1201 from the Council of Europe had to be clarified as well.

On the one hand, Hungary insisted on including Recommendation 1201 in the treaty text because it viewed the document as ‘the acceptable standard for the protection of national minorities’. On the other hand, Romania’s government and political opposition had serious concerns about the content of article 11:

‘[i]n the regions where they are in a majority the persons belonging to a national minority shall have the right to have at their disposal appropriate local or autonomous authorities or to have a special status, matching the specific historical and territorial situation and in accordance with the domestic legislation of the state’.

Certain phrases like ‘autonomous authorities’ and ‘special status’ were associated in the Romanian imaginary with UDMR articulations for a Hungarian minority’s ‘special status’ and ‘autonomous community’. Territorial autonomy based on ethnicity had been constructed as unacceptable by Romanian official discourses and perceived as a challenge to the unitary state. Domestic anxieties about the potential implications of Recommendation 1201 were so great that the last part of article 11 did not

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register – ‘in accordance with the domestic legislation of the state’. Some academics argued that, in practice, these stipulations ‘offer the possibility to choose, depending on the respective country’s internal legislation and the political will of the state, between three variants: local authorities, autonomous authorities and special status’.\textsuperscript{442} Romanian negative interpretations were reinforced by the fact that Hungary abruptly changed its moderate foreign policy rhetoric. On 4 July 1996, Prime Minister Horn held a meeting with the representatives of Hungarian organisations abroad. At the end, a ‘Joint Declaration’ was published which called for ‘establishing local governments and granting autonomy’ to Hungarians living abroad; concrete measures were discussed in order to develop a ‘national strategy’ for achieving such a goal in neighbouring states.\textsuperscript{443}

The above Hungarian declaration seemed to prompt the international community to finally clarify its narratives on minority rights. This indicates that both Romania and Hungary were active participants in defining what being European meant with regards to minority rights. In late July 1996, the American State Department rejected the concept of territorial autonomy on ethnic grounds and expressed hope that Hungary was not changing its government policy.\textsuperscript{444} To address Romanian and Slovakian concerns about Hungary’s external attitude, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities sent a letter to the Hungarian Foreign Affairs Minister in August 1996. Its content dealt extensively with minority rights, the Council of Europe’s Recommendation 1201 and territorial autonomy:

‘[m]y hope and expectation is that Hungary, in trying to promote the interests of Hungarian minorities in neighbouring countries, will respect the limits drawn by international law, including bilateral treaties, and will equally respect the constitution and the laws of the neighbouring states (...) I noted that article 3 of the Joint Declaration refers to autonomy as a means of settlement of the situation of the Hungarian communities abroad based on constitutional equality. In this context I permit myself to underline that even the right provided in article 11 of

\textsuperscript{442} Valentin Stan, \textit{România şi eşecul campaniei pentru vest/ Romania and the Failure of the Campaign for the West}, p. 225, emphasis in original.

\textsuperscript{443} Andrew Felkay, \textit{Out of Russian Orbit: Hungary Gravitates to the West} (Westport: Greenwood, 1997), pp. 121-122.

\textsuperscript{444} Tom Gallagher, ‘Danube Détente: Romania’s Reconciliation with Hungary after 1996’.
Recommendation 1201 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, according to the expert interpretation of the European Commission for Democracy through Law (the Venice Commission), “does not imply for States either its acceptance of an organised ethnic entity within their territories, or adherence to the concept of ethnic pluralism as a component of the people or the nation, a concept which might affect any unitarity of the State”.  

Indeed, on 25 June 1996, the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly adopted Recommendation 1300 on the protection of minority rights. It considered the opinion of the Venice Commission on interpreting article 11 of Recommendation 1201 as ‘a most important reference document’. The Venice Commission in turn concluded that -

‘international law cannot in principle impose on States any territorial solutions to the problem of minorities and that States are not in principle required to introduce any forms of decentralisation for minorities’.

Both the OSCE and the Council of Europe based their perspectives on the Venice Commission, which had the legal and political authority to impose certain European understandings of minority rights. It removed any possible basis for collective rights and any obligation for states to give territorial autonomy. For once European narratives validated Romania’s foreign policy discourse on what were the sufficient provisions for minorities. So the European self-image of Romanian national identity was partially recognised by the shifting discourses at international level. Full external recognition would only be attained through EU membership. Since the international community clarified these matters on minority rights, the Romanian-Hungarian treaty negotiations were quickly finished in September 1996. The two states compromised by introducing Recommendation 1201 as an annexe and by including a footnote to it. Romania used the footnote to state that -

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‘[t]he Contracting Parties agree that Recommendation 1201 does not refer to collective rights, nor does it impose upon them the obligation to grant to the concerned persons any right to a special status of territorial autonomy based on ethnic criteria’.

What does the Romanian-Hungarian treaty story tell us about Romania’s foreign policy and identity? No matter how intensely Romanian elites promoted the ‘natural’ Euro-Atlantic orientation and the European self-image of national identity, the latter was not accepted by external audiences. Only the European self held the authority to legitimate that the Romanian other was part of ‘Europe’ in both identity and institutional terms. Yet Western Europe preferred to construct its post-communist candidate states as ‘liminal Europe’ or ‘Europe but not quite Europe’. Thus, in the treaty context, Romania was viewed as a democratising country with possible instability due to ethnic tensions; an aspiring European liberal democracy that needed to work further on minority rights. On the one hand, Hungary agreed with such assessments and advocated that collective rights leading to potential territorial autonomy would settle the pending minority issues. On the other hand, Romanian officials argued that their state’s democratic Constitution, individual rights and wide Hungarian language regulations were sufficient provisions for minorities and complied with European values; autonomy based on ethnicity was considered unacceptable and a threat to Romania as a unitary entity. All three narratives contained valid points to some extent.

Although Romania implemented constitutional minority rights concerning native language education, these had to be separately stipulated in the national legislation. Romanian decision-makers could also have been more open to alleviate the concerns of ethnic minorities, who had been subject to assimilationist treatments during communism. But where to draw the line and obtain European acknowledgement that the state was a stable

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liberal democracy upholding adequate minority rights and had a partially recognised European identity? Here European institutions like the Council of Europe showed double standards at times, since it was not clear what being ‘European’ actually entailed. As previously mentioned, the Council of Europe was reluctant to codify collective rights as an appropriate form of protecting national minorities. It still refused to partially validate Romania’s European identity and compliance with liberal values, even though prominent members like France did not recognise minority languages and provided limited legislation to foster ethnic diversity and bilingual education.\textsuperscript{449} In addition to this, many liberal democracies did not offer even ‘limited ethnic autonomy’ and refused to be forced to do so.\textsuperscript{450} Therefore, Romania was somewhat justified in challenging the ambiguous European position on minority rights – individual or collective rights? Yes or no to territorial autonomy? Which of these elements defined ‘Europe’ in the end? Clarifying the European meanings on minority rights was essential both in moving forward the Romanian-Hungarian treaty and in partially legitimating Romania’s European self-image. On this occasion, international discourses agreed with Romania that individual minority rights without territorial autonomy were sufficient to protect ethnic minorities and constituted the ‘European’ standard. The Romanian-Hungarian treaty was a significant episode in Romania’s longer Euro-Atlantic journey towards international recognition and inclusion.

\textit{Concluding Remarks}

In conclusion, the period 1990-1996 was quite fertile for Romania’s national identity and foreign policy. It featured a rich palette of re-emerging meanings and three key ‘formative moments’. The first one defined the state’s international orientation towards ‘Europe’. The newly restored Romanian democracy provided the political leaders with the opportunity to answer an


existential question: to be or not to be ‘European’? Should post-communist Romania look towards the Euro-Atlantic community or opt for the Russian sphere of influence? The 1991 Romanian-Soviet ‘Friendship Treaty’ is an important episode of foreign policy decision which was internally contested. The available evidence makes it difficult to establish whether or not President Iliescu had a non-European agenda on Romanian identity and international relations. But his endorsement of the Soviet ‘Friendship Treaty’ was not shared by the majority of elites who wanted a Euro-Atlantic future for Romania. Although signed by the President in April 1991, the treaty was never ratified by the Romanian Parliament and became obsolete when the USSR disintegrated in December 1991.

After Romania chose the European course, another key ‘formative moment’ shows how its European self-image was contested by and negotiated with external audiences. Romanian foreign policy discourses consistently constructed the state’s European identity between 1990 and 1996. Yet the Romanian-Hungarian basic treaty underlined the problematic aspects of obtaining partial identity validation from the authoritative European self. Hungary and Romania had two contrasting conceptions of what European identity meant in terms of ethnic minority rights. For Romania, European identity entailed a democratic Constitution, individual rights and wide native language regulations as sufficient provisions for minorities. Hungary and the UDMR disagreed with such views because they considered collective rights and some form of ethnic autonomy as the suitable benchmarks for European identity. As ‘Europe’ was still debating these issues, Romania and Hungary were active participants in defining what ‘European’ identity meant with respect to minority rights. Once the international discourses on minority rights were clarified, the two states found a mutually agreeable compromise for the treaty text in September 1996. Sometimes compared to the historical reconciliation between Germany and France, the signing and parliamentary
ratification of the Hungarian-Romanian treaty was ‘a very clear signal’ that their relations would finally be ‘normal or rather “European”’.451

The years 1990-1996 also crystallised the ‘formative moment’ of the three main self-images of Romania’s national identity: ‘European’, ‘non-Balkan’ and ‘security provider’. The ‘European’ self-image was more prominent in this time frame, but the others were articulated as well. Together they formed the foreign policy imaginary which would influence Romanian international behaviour between 1990 and 2007. Romania’s relationship with the Balkans has been characterised by a combination of rejection and acceptance. State officials explained at length that Romania was not a Balkan country, especially to external audiences. However, the ‘Balkan other’ was not represented as a threat. On the contrary, the region was often described as ‘our friends to the South’, with Yugoslavia depicted as ‘traditional partner’ and ‘best neighbour’. These meanings configured a ‘non-Balkan’ Romania that retained an affinity with the Balkans. The ‘security provider’ self-image of Romanian identity had a range of representations, including ‘reliable partner’ and ‘source of stability’. To some extent, this self-image was related to NATO accession since Romania needed to convince Alliance members that it could contribute to military capabilities. Nevertheless, the construct of ‘security provider’ was not merely a response to NATO rhetoric and membership criteria. Its ideational origins were closely linked to a long-standing collective memory-myth of Romania as defender of Europe and the West. The self-images of ‘non-Balkan’ and ‘security provider’ will become particularly relevant in subsequent chapters, when discussing Romania’s external reactions to the Kosovo intervention and Iraq war. As Romania has re-articulated its European self-image, the state’s story of national identity and foreign policy moves on to the inherent dilemmas of a European liberal democracy and security provider that also has Balkan ties.

Chapter IV: The Inherent Dilemmas of Acting as a ‘European’

Among the formative periods of Romanian national identity and foreign policy, the years 1996-1999 were marked by a series of important re-definitions which predominantly occurred during the Kosovo crisis. This chapter aims to show how Romanian self-images translated into the post-1996 discourse and the events surrounding the NATO summit in July 1997. Although they represented the same Romanian self-image, the ‘liberal democratic’ facet of national identity circulated more frequently than the ‘European’ one in the post-1996 internal discourses. The ‘security provider’ self-image was reinforced by domestic elites and usually connected to the area where it could be externally validated – the Balkans. Romania’s national identity also retained a Balkan affinity, which continued to manifest itself after 1996 through traditional amicable relations with rump Yugoslavia (essentially Serbia). Considering the Alliance’s refusal to include Romania in the first wave of enlargement, a large part of the chapter has been devoted to the ‘formative moment’ of the Kosovo conflict and Romanian responses to it. NATO allies had initially tried to solve the Kosovo crisis by using peaceful methods, such as multilateral negotiations and imposing economic sanctions on the Yugoslav government. Yet the escalating violence in Kosovo and the failure of diplomatic dialogue forced both the Alliance and the international community to adopt an even firmer stance, which eventually led to NATO initiating Operation ‘Allied Force’ on 23 March 1999. Romania exhibited an evolving foreign policy position regarding Kosovo, which started with partial support for NATO (October 1998) and later changed to unconditional assistance for the Alliance’s military intervention (March-April 1999). The initial reaction was a nuanced and relatively comfortable middle ground, which had a dual purpose. First, partial support (airspace access in case of emergency) did not oppose NATO or undermine Romania’s Euro-Atlantic identity. Second, partial assistance for the Alliance campaign accommodated the dilemmas inherent in the state’s national identity – whether to act as a
'European' liberal democracy and 'security provider' or choose the traditional Balkan ties.

This foreign policy response was re-defined under the combined influence of three elements: national identity, rational interest and shifting international context. Romanian leaders anticipated that NATO air strikes on Yugoslav territory would bring substantial economic costs and a drastic decline in their popularity, since the state’s public opinion was overwhelmingly against a military intervention in Kosovo. From a rational perspective, they were necessary sacrifices to obtain the ultimate goal of NATO membership. The rational factor of Romania’s journey towards Euro-Atlantic integration contributed to its decisions on Kosovo, but cannot explain why the state did not opt to fully support the Alliance from the beginning. This is where national identity supplements the analysis by identifying the tensions between the two self-images - ‘European’/‘liberal democratic’ and ‘security provider’ – and Balkan sentiments, which shaped Romanian foreign policy. Critical events like the Kosovo conflict facilitate the re-articulation of international discourses. In March 1999, the rational component of Romania’s NATO accession was still present but, more importantly, the international ideational context had changed. Many authoritative Euro-Atlantic voices endorsed a discourse of urgent humanitarian intervention in Kosovo. The normative pressure had increased so much that any established liberal democracies or those in the course of gaining recognition had to act decisively without delay. This ideational background influenced a hierarchical process within Romanian identity, with the ‘European’/‘liberal democratic’ self-image and the ‘security provider’ one becoming more relevant than traditional relations and affinity with the Balkans. Once the tensions within national identity were resolved, any past dilemma was replaced with the appropriate international choice of fully and unconditionally supporting NATO. With regards to chapter structure, the discussion begins with a section on the re-definitions of Romania’s foreign policy imaginary, followed by the volatile context of the Kosovo conflict and the evolving Romanian foreign policy on Kosovo.
The Re-definitions of Romania’s Foreign Policy Imaginary

Romania’s political administration changed after the parliamentary and presidential elections of November 1996, the third general round of free elections following the 1989 revolution. The centre-left government (Social Democratic Party of Romania – PDSR) under the leadership of President Iliescu was replaced by a mostly centre-right governing coalition which had the majority of votes in both houses of Parliament. The new governing coalition included three parties: the Democratic Convention of Romania (CDR) with 37.06% of seats, the Social Democratic Union (USD) with 16.08% and the ethnic Hungarian political party (UDMR) with 7.69%.\footnote{The Central Electoral Bureau, ‘The Parliamentary Elections Results (3 November 1996)’, AGERPRES; http://www.agerpres.ro/documentareparlamentare2012/2012/10/30/alegerile-parlamentare-din-3-noiembrie-1996-17-15-50 (May 2014).} CDR was in turn made up of two historical pre-1947 parties - the National Peasant and Christian Democratic Party (PNŢCD) and the National Liberal Party (PNL). The 1996-2000 coalition was heterogeneous and contained parties with different ideological affiliations, which caused Government incoherence and lack of consensus about domestic reforms. CDR and UDMR were centre-right political entities, while USD was centre-left. PDSR gained 28.67% in the parliamentary elections and formed the opposition, together with two right-wing parties - the Party of Romanian National Unity (PUNR – 4.9%) and the Great Romania Party (PRM – 5.59%).\footnote{Ibid.} In the second ballot of presidential elections, Emil Constantinescu defeated Iliescu by obtaining 54.4% of the votes and thus became the new President of Romania.\footnote{The University of Essex, ‘Romania: 1996 Parliamentary Elections’, Election Results; http://www2.essex.ac.uk/elect/database/indexCountry.asp?country=ROMANIA&opt=elc (May 2014).} Internationally, these shifts in governmental and presidential power were seen as positive outcomes, which clearly indicated that the Romanian democratic system was more consolidated and would not be reverting to some form of authoritarianism. As the NATO Secretary General put it in February 1997,
the way this important election has been conducted is a sign of your country’s commitment to democratic and pluralistic values. Within a short time, Romania has gone very far indeed’. Some analysts even argued that the 1996 electoral events ‘culminated in the first democratic and peaceful change in Government since 1937’, demonstrating that the post-communist state ‘had overcome many of [the] earlier problems and its slow political development’.

As the most popular post-1996 political party and de facto leader of the governing coalition, CDR had said before the elections that the main goal of the state’s foreign policy should be ‘convincing the international community of the Romanian people’s attachment to the principles of democracy’, while also identifying the state’s past and present ‘European role’ and stressing the need to ‘cultivate its vocation as partner and mediator, open to dialogue and cooperation’; in other words, the party’s aim would be ‘to give the world the true image of a resurrected Romania’. So the new government’s self-declared mission was to consolidate the internal democratisation process and gain its external recognition, thus contributing towards restoring Romania’s ‘natural place’ in Europe. The discursive themes crystallised in the period 1990-1996 were also expressed by the new administration, although with some re-definitions. According to Prime Minister Victor Ciorbea, ‘historically and culturally Romania belongs in the West’ even if it was previously alienated due to the fifty years of communist dictatorship. On 4 February 1997, President Constantinescu highlighted the main principles of Romanian foreign policy in front of the North Atlantic Council:

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that I wish to convey is the firm option of the Romanian people to integrate into the Euro-Atlantic structures, as soon as the gates of the Organization open to receive new Member States’.\footnote{Emil Constantinescu – President of Romania (29 November 1996 – 20 December 2000), ‘Speech to the North Atlantic Council’ (Brussels, 4 February 1997), \textit{Romanian Journal of International Affairs}, volume 3(2), Spring 1997, p. 3.} Apart from reaffirming the Euro-Atlantic course, Constantinescu advanced some interesting articulations which suggested an ideational shift towards the role of democracy in Romanian present and future:

‘[m]ore than fifty years ago, Romania suffered from essential evil. She was detoured from her normal path, that of a democracy (...) The only substantial remedy for Romania is reintegration into the democratic world. The willingness of the Alliance Member States to be the guarantors of democracy and freedom is the main reason for which Romania wishes to join You’.\footnote{Ibid, p. 4.}

At first glance, the latter meanings seem somewhat different from the prevalent national discourses of 1990-1996, when Romania’s ‘European’ self-image held a central role and particularly influenced the state’s external relations with both Hungary and ‘Europe’. They are actually variations on the same European identity theme, whose broad definition entails being known and internationally accepted as a Western European inspired liberal democracy which upholds two key principles – the organisation of regular democratic elections and the protection of human rights and freedoms. If the period 1990-1996 shows Romania’s journey towards opting for a European direction and what that choice meant for its foreign policy, the years 1996-1999 bring forward the dilemmas inherent in Romanian national identity. What is the appropriate ‘European’ course of action when faced with a humanitarian crisis in the Balkan area? How should a legitimate liberal democracy react when its loyalties are divided, considering Romania’s friendly relations and great affinity with the Balkans? Post-1996 elite discourses referred to the liberal democratic facet of national identity more often than the ‘European’ one, but they both represented the same self-image. For instance, President Constantinescu had strong beliefs about the ‘essential good’ of democratic regimes -
‘[w]e are realistic in our approach. We do not believe Romania is threatened by another nation. On the contrary, we think that when democracy triumphs all over the world, wars of aggression should be excluded from our vocabulary. For precisely this reason we would not want our quest for NATO membership to be understood as a cry for help for someone else to take charge of our defence’. \(^{461}\)

The ‘essential good’ of democracy was a recurring notion, which indirectly configured NATO as not simply a military alliance but rather an embodiment for the peaceful association of liberal democratic states. In this sense, Romania was reiterating NATO’s self-image as it had been constructed by the Alliance discourse after 1991: ‘[b]ased on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has worked since its inception for the establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe’. \(^{462}\) The state’s aim was both to ingratiate itself and show ideational compatibility with NATO. In June 1997, the Romanian President expressed these ideas more explicitly –

‘[f]ar from being a mere coalition around increasingly sophisticated weapons, NATO has been conceived and developed until today as an alliance based on values: representative democracy, political pluralism, freedom of economic initiative, defence of human rights, tolerance and the right to be different’. \(^{463}\)

Constantinescu attributed the aforementioned values to ‘Western civilisation’ and argued for their extension to Europe as a whole, emphasising that Euro-Atlantic integration would be the deserved validation for Romania’s national identity:

‘Romanian society does not regard accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a form of protection against a threat, but rather as a way to regain an identity that was unjustly denied to it for five decades. For us, NATO is not a shelter but a community based on shared values, now recovered’. \(^{464}\)

\(^{461}\) Ibid, p. 6.


\(^{464}\) Ibid, p. 456.
The ‘European’ (‘liberal democratic’) self-image of Romania was not the only one re-defined after 1996. To give external credibility and substantiate the state’s self-image of ‘security provider’, the two key foreign policy decision-makers - President Constantinescu and Foreign Affairs Minister Adrian Severin - initiated a network of trilateral cooperation arrangements surrounding Romania, which placed the country as mediator of potential conflicts in neighbouring regions: Romania-Bulgaria-Greece; Romania-Ukraine-Poland; Romania-Bulgaria-Turkey; Romania-Republic of Moldova-Ukraine; Romania-Hungary-Austria. As Severin explained, his perspective on foreign policy included the fact that Romania ‘needed to adopt a sub-regional role which would demonstrate its Euro-Atlantic vocation’, combined with more open pathways towards Poland, Hungary and settling unresolved issues with Ukraine, Russia and Moldova. The Romanian self-image of ‘security provider’ was also more explicitly reiterated in the post-1996 foreign policy discourse. According to Severin, ‘[r]egional cooperation has emerged as a significant dimension of the stability and security in Europe and Romania has committed itself to be an active promoter of such cooperation’. In a June 1998 speech, Constantinescu made a reference to Nicolae Iorga (prominent Romanian historian and politician), who had created the modern concept of ‘South-Eastern Europe’ – ‘close to the Balkans yet different from them because it encapsulates, north of the Danube, Romania’s connection to the centre of the continent’. It was a diplomatic way of reinforcing the state’s national identity as ‘Central European’ and introducing the area where Romania could externally validate its self-image of ‘security provider’: ‘Romania truly has a South-Eastern European vocation, increasingly manifested today though its role as equilibrium factor and place of dialogue

between Europe and the Balkans still torn apart by conflicts’. The quote prefigured how Romania’s international stance on the Kosovo situation would be shaped by the tensions within its national identity – ‘European’ (‘liberal democratic’) and ‘security provider’ self-images versus Balkan ties. The foreign policy decision on Kosovo had to accommodate the identity requirements of being a liberal democracy with a regional security role, as well as the traditional friendly relations with Yugoslavia.

To be consistent with its self-image of ‘security provider’, Romania was always quite eager to show its strategic and military potential. In late 1993, the state’s accession into NATO had been unequivocally declared by political leaders as a top foreign policy objective. President Iliescu addressed a letter to the Secretary General in September 1993 where he reinforced ‘Romania’s decision to effectively participate alongside the NATO member states in their efforts to strengthen European and regional security and stability’. The international context brought a promising opportunity in January 1994, when NATO heads of state and government decided to ‘reaffirm that the Alliance remains open to the membership of other European countries’. On the same occasion, they also announced the formation of the Partnership for Peace (PfP), an initiative which aimed to forge stronger political and military ties with candidates from Central-Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The goal of PfP was to foster a closer cooperative relationship with the Alliance at ‘a pace and scope determined by the capacity and desire of the individual participating states’; to work ‘in concrete ways towards transparency in defence budgeting, promoting democratic control of defence ministries, joint planning, joint military exercises, and creating an ability to operate with NATO forces in such fields as peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations, and others as may be agreed’.

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468 Ibid.
terms, constituting the PfP was beneficial to NATO for three key reasons. First, it put in place a process that indicated membership to be the eventual target for some partners. Second, the PfP allowed for self-differentiation among partner states without giving them the full benefits of Alliance integration. Third, it served NATO’s mission of exporting stability as configured in the 1991 Strategic Concept.\textsuperscript{472} At the same time, candidates benefited from a more extensive access to NATO’s political and military bodies, as well as a ‘flexible and practical set of mechanisms that went far beyond the soft dialogue and cooperation framework’ set up by the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC).\textsuperscript{473}

On 26 January 1994, Romania was the first post-communist state to sign the official documents and join the PfP. In April 1994, a formal application for NATO accession was submitted and concrete discussions with Alliance representatives started. Under the coordination of President Iliescu, Romanian authorities debated and elaborated ‘The Strategy for Romania’s Integration into NATO’ in June 1994.\textsuperscript{474} The text was then sent to Parliament for approval and further improvement, its broad ideas being presented by Foreign Affairs Minister Meleşcanu at a NACC meeting soon after. During the first year as a PfP member, Romania took part in 58 related activities and four exercises or joint training sessions with the Alliance, allotting $0.8 million for these efforts; by 1997, the sum of almost $8 million had been set aside to cover PfP expenses.\textsuperscript{475} As much as its resources allowed, the Romanian state contributed to a variety of peace-keeping missions like Desert Storm (Saudi Arabia), UNOSOM II (Somalia), UNAVEM III (Angola), IFOR/SFOR (Bosnia) to name but a few; the involvement mostly consisted of


sending field hospitals, military observers and engineers.\textsuperscript{476} The PfP put forward ‘a set of criteria that the emerging democracies would have to satisfy to ensure their political, economic and military compatibility’ with NATO.\textsuperscript{477} The state’s participation in the PfP was the main instrument for achieving the interoperability between Romanian and NATO armed forces, but also an important step in the bilateral military cooperation with the US. The PfP was a necessary evaluation stage that helped prepare Romania and the other post-communist candidates for eventual NATO membership.\textsuperscript{478}

The post-1996 Romanian administration was very preoccupied with NATO entry and the upcoming Madrid summit in July 1997. In June 1996, Romania’s Parliament adopted a decision and formulated an appeal which was sent to all of the Alliance member state Parliaments. Article 1 of that decision contained the following:

‘[t]he Parliament of Romania considers vital, in order to consolidate the Romanian modern democratic society, Romania’s integration into Euro-Atlantic structures as a free, independent, sovereign and democratic country, and requests the Government, as well as the other institutions and state bodies involved in this process, to intensify their actions towards accelerating Romania’s accession as a member with full rights to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’.\textsuperscript{479}

A highlight of early 1997 was the French President Jacques Chirac’s official visit to Romania, which launched the special partnership between the two states and cemented France’s strong support for Romanian Euro-Atlantic membership. Chirac’s declaration encapsulated that attitude -

‘France wishes to build with Romania, in all fields, an exceptional relationship worthy of our common history. I realised with great satisfaction that you share this objective (...) There is more than friendship between Romania and France. We have the same origins, the same struggles and hopes, our two nations have forged very close ties (...) France supports with enthusiasm your European commitment. She will do everything...

\textsuperscript{479} The Parliament of Romania, ‘Decision Number 4 on 5 June 1996 regarding the Appeal Addressed to the Parliaments of NATO Member States’, \textit{Monitorul Oficial al României/ The Official Registry of Romania}, number 119, 7 June 1996.
possible to ensure your accession to the North Atlantic Alliance. She will be the advocate of Romania’s candidacy to the European Union (...) My country will not spare any effort to help Romania recover its family: Europe’.

Constantinescu’s response expressed the Romanian appreciation for French diplomatic efforts and concluded that:

‘I believe in a future when our countries will share the same European destiny within an inevitable new global architecture. I believe in France’s greatness, generosity and vision, in its firm and consistent actions towards a united Europe’.

In the months leading up to the 1997 Madrid summit, NATO decision-makers engaged in detailed evaluations of the reform process in candidate states. The prevailing view on Romania was that, after seven years of delays under the socialist government of President Iliescu, the state had finally taken serious steps towards liberalisation and democratisation. The socialists’ electoral defeat in 1996 and the establishment of a different government opened a new chapter in the process of redefining Romania’s post-communist identity and made possible a new type of engagement with Euro-Atlantic institutions, including NATO. Nevertheless, substantial reforms had yet to take place before Romania could be a serious candidate for admission to NATO. In the words of Ronald Asmus who was an active contributor to NATO’s Eastern enlargement,

‘Romania’s prospect for NATO membership had been considerably strengthened by the election of a new pro-reform government led by President Emil Constantinescu (...) Domestically, he was committed to making a clear break with the country’s nationalist and xenophobic past and to mending fences with the Hungarian minority. In foreign policy terms, he was pro-Western and determined to anchor his country to the West as well. Constantinescu was an impressive figure and these were admirable goals, but Bucharest’s economic backwardness left it with little chance of being included in the first round of EU enlargement’.

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Except for a brief time in the late 1960s, Romania lacked economic and political openness before 1989. The first post-communist administration (1990-1996) ‘preferred governmental stability to reform’ and ‘refused to take unpopular and radical measures, adopting chaotic changes and avoiding systematic reforms’. 

Apart from the slow pace of internal reforms, another significant impediment to Romania’s NATO accession was related to memory-myths and their influence on national identity. After 1990, a considerable number of Romanian political and intellectual elites refused to acknowledge the state’s complicity in the Holocaust and tried to rehabilitate Marshal Ion Antonescu. He had installed a fascist military dictatorship in Romania (September 1940) and been instrumental in the extermination of thousands of Romanian Jews and Roma mostly between 1941 and 1943.

But institutionalised anti-Semitism was not just a characteristic of the Antonescu regime. As Alexandru Florian explained,

‘[s]imilar to the Nazi policy in Germany, the Holocaust in Romania had as its base the legal identification of the “enemy”. All the Romanian governments from December 1937 to August 23, 1944 promulgated anti-Semitic legislation. The foundations were laid well before Antonescu’.

The International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania (directed by Nobel Peace prize laureate Elie Wiesel) published a final report in 2004, which noted the contradictory aspects of the Antonescu dictatorship and the Holocaust in Romania:

‘[t]he Antonescu regime, which was rife with ideological contradictions and was considerably different from other fascist regimes in Europe, remains difficult to classify. It was a fascist regime that dissolved Parliament, joined the Axis Powers, enacted antisemitic and racial legislation, and adopted the “Final Solution”'

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[extermination] in parts of its territory (...) At the same time, however (...) the regime did succeed in sparing half of the Jews under its rule during the Holocaust’.486

Antonescu became a controversial figure in Romanian historiography post-1948, who was alternatively condemned or applauded by the communist propaganda. The historical narrative was initially re-written to legitimise the communist dictatorship and depicted Romania as a ‘heroic victim’ of fascism; ‘the issue of anti-Semitism was avoided and the word Holocaust never used’.487 After Nicolae Ceauşescu came to power in 1965, communism underwent a nationalist shift and Antonescu’s anti-Soviet attitude was useful for the ‘new national saga’; the Marshal was officially rehabilitated, ‘with the fascist dimensions of his regime downplayed and his anti-Semitism presented as moderate, non-Romanian, and thus anti-popular, an error that was due only to Nazi Germany’s overwhelming pressure’.488 The decades of communist indoctrination have impacted on the memory-myths about the Holocaust in Romania. During the 1990s, the newly democratic Romanian discourses were infused with various meanings which negated the state’s involvement in the Holocaust. In this sense, Michael Shafir has introduced four main categories to describe the Romanian post-communist discursive practices: the ‘outright’ denial, ‘deflective’ negation, ‘selective’ negation and ‘comparative trivialisation’ of the Holocaust.489

First, outright denial was a rare occurrence illustrated in Romania by Corneliu Vadim Tudor, leader of the Great Romania Party (PRM). In March 1994, Tudor claimed to have ‘learned that English and American scientists are contesting the Holocaust itself, providing documentation and logical

arguments proving that the Germans could not gas six million Jews, this being technically and physically an impossibility’.  

PRM had been a parliamentary party between 1990 and 2004, which suggests that a part of the Romanian public opinion agreed with Tudor’s views. Second, deflective negation of the Holocaust portrayed Romania as ‘a victim, rather than a state sharing the Nazis’ antisemitic ideological credo and participating in the perpetration of crimes’. Romanian guilt was transferred or externalised to other parties like the Germans or the Jews themselves. For example, Petre Ţurlea – a member of the National Salvation Front (FSN) – declared in June 1991 that responsibility for the Holocaust of Romanian Jews belonged to ‘special repression troops of the German army’; at the same time, he proposed ‘a moment of silence’ in Parliament to commemorate Marshal Antonescu.

Third, selective negation admitted that the Holocaust happened elsewhere in Europe, yet denied that Romania had contributed to the tragedy. This discursive method also rehabilitated Antonescu and regarded him as innocent of any wrongdoing. Fourth, Shafir defined the practice of ‘comparative trivialisation’ with respect to the Holocaust as follows:

> ‘the wilful distortion of the record and of the significance of the Holocaust, either through the “humanization” of its local record in comparison with atrocities committed by the Nazis, or through comparing the record of the Holocaust itself with experiences of massive suffering endured by local populations or by mankind at large at one point or another in recorded history’.

The varied meanings on the Holocaust negation were not only a Romanian phenomenon. Such interpretations of history were present to different extents in all the countries of Central-Eastern Europe. Romania’s circumstances were the most complicated because memory-myths denying participation in the Holocaust did not help its already precarious case for

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490 Corneliu Vadim Tudor cited in Michael Shafir, ‘Between Denial and “Comparative Trivialization”’, p. 49.
491 Ibid, p. 58.
493 Michael Shafir, ‘Between Denial and “Comparative Trivialization”’, pp. 67-68.
NATO and EU accession. The allegations of individuals like Tudor and Ţerlea were particularly visible since they were members of Parliament. And the fact that they had been elected as parliamentary representatives indicated that a segment of the Romanian population resonated with their viewpoints. According to Maria Bucur, the ‘perverse image’ of Marshal Antonescu was not ‘the product of a propaganda campaign led by right-wing extremists, but a pervasive myth fed by historical debates and political contests’, to which the Romanian public seemed ‘indifferent’ or ‘unproblematically’ accepting.\textsuperscript{495} At the very least, attempts to rehabilitate Antonescu and to downplay or negate the state’s role in the Holocaust of Romanian Jews and Roma reinforced doubts about Romania’s commitment to a Western and European path. Combined with the slow progress of reforms, it was unlikely that Romania would join NATO in the first wave of enlargement. Yet post-1996 Romanian foreign policy decision-makers made a last-chance effort to obtain NATO entry at the Madrid summit in July 1997.

At the NATO Council ministerial meeting in Sintra (29-30 May 1997), Romania managed to gain support for its inclusion in the first enlargement wave from most European member states, including France and Germany. At the Madrid summit (8-9 July), President Chirac argued in favour of five not just three states to be invited, with clear emphasis on the Romanian candidacy – ‘[b]eing democratic, at peace with its neighbours, Romania will strengthen the southern flank and the geographical cohesion of our Alliance’.\textsuperscript{496} But five invitations constituted ‘a more ambitious expansion than the [William] Clinton administration felt it could defend when the time came for US Senate ratification’; the US was also ‘mindful that adding Romania and Slovenia would reduce the likelihood of a follow-up round of enlargement in the near future to include the Baltic States’.\textsuperscript{497} The US was not prepared to admit more than three new members into the Alliance, partly due to the vocal

\textsuperscript{496} Jacques Chirac, \textit{Address at the Meeting of the North-Atlantic Council} (Madrid, 8 July 1997); French version at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_25608.htm (May 2014).
domestic opposition to NATO expansion. Romanian candidacy had three strikes against it in 1997: the slow pace of reforms, the failure to acknowledge the state’s complicity in the Holocaust and the unfavourable American internal context. Asmus aptly summarised this situation:

‘[w]e had great sympathy for the people in these [candidate] countries and, in particular, for the new Romanian government. But our primary responsibility was to think about what was best for the U.S. and NATO (...) Romania was not yet ready for NATO—and we were not ready for it’.498

The US, along with the UK and Iceland, remained inflexible and Romania was denied accession at Madrid. The official press statement did give some form of acknowledgement and hope for the future -

‘[w]ith regards to the aspiring members, we recognize with great interest and take account of the positive developments towards democracy and the rule of law in a number of Southeastern European countries, especially Romania and Slovenia (...) So it is not a question of whether they join but when’.499

On 11 July 1997, only days after the NATO summit, President Clinton made a conciliatory visit to Bucharest. The idea was proposed by Mircea Geoană (Romanian ambassador to Washington) to encourage the state’s efforts considering the rejection at Madrid.500 Perhaps overwhelmed by the extremely warm reception of the Romanian public despite his opposition to Romania’s entry, Clinton remarked that he ‘can see no stronger candidate’ when referring to the state’s future chances at Alliance membership.501 This was a more or less reliable consolation statement, which still prompted Foreign Affairs Minister Severin to think that ‘Romania could be labelled a leading candidate and a motor of further NATO enlargement’.502 President Constantinescu was firm about the state continuing its external direction:

‘[o]ur irreversible option towards European and Euro-Atlantic integration translates not only in accelerating the transformation processes of Romania into a credible and useful partner of these two cooperative structures, but also in complementary policies

500 Ronald Asmus, *Opening NATO’s Door*. p. 239.
bilateral and multilateral relations. We will continue our efforts to develop efficient forms of regional and inter-regional collaboration, with our neighbours and states from the area. We consider these actions as a basis for regional stability'.

Being left out of the first wave of NATO enlargement was not the only key international episode faced by Romania between 1996 and 1999. The state also had to formulate foreign policy responses to the Kosovo inter-ethnic conflict. The significance of Romania’s reactions to the Kosovo military intervention derives from showing how foreign policy is re-defined in times of crisis, when certain self-images of national identity ('European'/'liberal democratic' and 'security provider') become more relevant and eventually take precedence over other affiliations (Balkan ties).

**Romania and the Military Intervention in Kosovo**

As mentioned in the introduction, a substantial part of this chapter has been devoted to the escalating Kosovo crisis and Romania’s evolving foreign policy stance on it. The case study is particularly meaningful because NATO’s intervention in Kosovo represents another ‘formative moment’ of Romanian national identity. The state’s foreign policy on Kosovo was re-defined under the combined influence of three factors: national identity, rational interest and shifting international context. Rationalism is a component of Romania’s wish to join NATO that also impacted on Kosovo decisions. Yet it cannot explain why the state did not fully support Alliance actions in the province from the beginning. In October 1998, Romanian elites settled on partial support for NATO operations - airspace access only in case of emergencies. This position accommodated the dilemmas inherent in Romanian national identity, which stemmed from the two self-images ('European'/'liberal democratic' and 'security provider') versus Balkan sentiments. But critical events like the Kosovo intervention facilitate the re-articulation of international discourses. Many authoritative Euro-Atlantic voices promoted a

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discourse of urgent humanitarian intervention in Kosovo. The normative pressure was so high that liberal democracies or those seeking recognition for their liberal democratic credentials had to act without delay. The changing international context of ideas enabled a hierarchical process to occur within Romanian identity, with the ‘European’/‘liberal democratic’ self-image and the ‘security provider’ one becoming more relevant than the traditional Balkan affinity. Once the tensions within national identity were resolved in March-April 1999, Romania’s dilemmas of appropriate behaviour were replaced with unconditional assistance for NATO’s intervention in Kosovo.

a. The Volatile Context of the Kosovo Conflict

The literature on the Yugoslav wars has tried to understand why the different ethnic Balkan groups resorted to violence for the pursuit of their goals. One factor is that controversial figures like Slobodan Milošević manipulated national sentiments for personal gains. For instance, as Warren Zimmerman affirms, ‘Yugoslavia’s death and the violence that followed resulted from the conscious actions of nationalist leaders who coopted, intimidated, circumvented, or eliminated all opposition to their demagogic designs’. Sabrina Ramet insists that the Balkan communities nurtured ‘differing truths’ about the same issues or events, which contributed to the outbreak of inter-ethnic conflict. In the specific case of Kosovo, as Christopher Layne succinctly argues, the ‘immediate cause of the struggle’ was ‘the clash of rival Serbian and ethnic Albanian nationalisms, which led to a situation in which the political demands of the two sides were irreconcilable’. Kosovo seemed to be the location where regional ethnic tensions culminated to the most dangerous degree. The ethnic Albanians, who were the majority among the province’s population, invoked the principle

of national self-determination and were seeking independence in a place of great historical symbolism for Serbia. Since the Serbs regarded Kosovo as a crucial part of their national identity, they adamantly refused to lose the province.\textsuperscript{507} Kosovo had been the core of the Serbian medieval empire, but constituted a key landmark for the history of both Serbs and Albanians and their respective nineteenth century evolution.\textsuperscript{508}

Although ‘the confrontation between the province’s Albanian leadership and the Serbian regime had been simmering’ for many years and was visible to international public opinion, the Kosovo conflict appeared to catch most Western leaders unprepared.\textsuperscript{509} In the early 1990s, the ethnic Albanian movement, under the leadership of the League for a Democratic Kosovo (LDK), had used peaceful methods to achieve the goal of independence. Yet over time many Kosovar Albanians became dissatisfied with the lack of results from LDK’s moderate policy.\textsuperscript{510} By 1996 they organised the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), whose purpose was to wage an ‘armed insurgency and other unsavoury activities’ with terrorist roots against the Yugoslav government, in order to create a Greater Albania.\textsuperscript{511} Belgrade’s brutal military responses ‘triggered a spiral of rising violence’, which prompted the reactions of international observers and eventually required NATO’s involvement.\textsuperscript{512} The US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, speaking before a meeting on Kosovo in London (March 1998), urged her colleagues from the UN Ministerial Contact Group to push for immediate actions, rather than rely on diplomatic relations and rhetoric:

‘[w]hen the war in the former Yugoslavia began in 1991, the international community did not react with sufficient vigor and force. Each small act of aggression that we did not oppose led to larger acts of aggression that we could not oppose without great risk

\textsuperscript{511} James G. Jatras, ‘NATO’s Myths and Bogus Justifications for Intervention’ in Ted Carpenter (ed.), \textit{NATO’s Empty Victory: A Postmortem on the Balkan War}, p. 25.
\textsuperscript{512} Christopher Layne, ‘Miscalculations and Blunders Lead to War’, p. 13.
to ourselves. Only when those responsible paid for their actions with isolation and hardship did the war end. It took us seven years to bring Bosnia to this moment of hope. It must not take us that long to resolve the crisis that is growing in Kosovo; and it does not have to if we apply the lessons of 1991. This time, we must act with unity and resolve. This time, we must respond before it is too late.\textsuperscript{513}

Initially, a series of economic sanctions on the Yugoslav government were attempted, but their implementation took a long time. Five of the six Contact Group states agreed ‘to consider additional measures, including instituting a complete arms embargo, denying visas to senior Serb government and security officials, placing a halt on export credit financing, and freezing Serb-held funds abroad’.\textsuperscript{514} Only three months later did NATO allies start to analyse how military force could be used to pacify the situation in Kosovo. During a meeting in May 1998, the North Atlantic Council announced the following:

‘in order to have options available for possible later decisions and to confirm our willingness to take further steps if necessary, we have commissioned military advice on support for UN and OSCE monitoring activity as well as on NATO preventive deployments in Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (...) We are determined, through the ongoing activities of the Alliance through Partnership for Peace and the additional measures we have decided today, to contribute to the international efforts to solve the crisis in Kosovo and to promote regional security and stability’.\textsuperscript{515}

In his remarks to the press after the meeting, Secretary General Solana emphasised – ‘[t]he North Atlantic Council will also keep the situation in and around Kosovo under very close review. It will consider further deterrent measures, if the violence continues. Let me stress, nothing is excluded’.\textsuperscript{516} Since the violence in Kosovo was escalating, certain NATO members argued for more practical approaches like military actions to settle the inter-ethnic

\textsuperscript{514} Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, \textit{Winning Ugly}, p. 29.
conflict. For example, the German Defence Minister Volker Rühe was firmly against continuing inconclusive sanctions and said that:

‘[w]e cannot afford any longer to focus on hollow solutions of rather symbolic character like border-securing missions in Albania or Macedonia, thus sealing off Kosovo from the outside (...) What we now have to focus on in order to support the ongoing political process is to elaborate credible military options aiming at the core of the problem: the extensive use of violence by Serbian security or military forces against the Albanian civil population in Kosovo’.

There were three obstacles that prevented a NATO consensus. First, some allies ‘feared that NATO intervention against Serb forces would favour the military and political fortunes of the KLA’. Second, even those who felt that military action was necessary did not agree on the most effective and least risky strategy. Third, the legal basis of an Alliance intervention was still uncertain because Russia threatened to veto ‘any UN resolution authorising NATO’s use of force’. Through the voice of Secretary of Defence William Cohen, the US declared in June 1998 that a UN mandate was optional in the end – ‘as most members agree, I believe, that we would like to have UN or OSCE endorsement. The United States does not feel that that is imperative – it’s desirable, not imperative’. Even though the allies had been debating the possibility of a UN mandate for quite some time, by early October 1998 they were no closer to finding a solution than they had been at the beginning. Some NATO states reasoned out that ‘the humanitarian urgency, combined with the Security Council’s inability to act, created a situation in which an exception to the agreed norm could be justified’. This last point convinced even France of the need to intervene, despite being

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518 Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, p. 34.
519 Ibid.
520 Ibid.
522 Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, p. 44.
concerned about using force without UN approval. As President Chirac said on 6 October,

‘France (...) considers that any military action must be requested and decided by the Security Council. In this particular case, we have the resolution which does open the way to the possibility of military action. I would add, and repeat, that the humanitarian situation constitutes a ground that can justify an exception to a rule, however strong and firm it is. And if it appeared that the situation required it, then France would not hesitate to join those who would like to intervene in order to assist those that are in danger’.  

As the international community became increasingly preoccupied with the subject of Kosovo, Romania had to configure its external responses to the escalating crisis, including to a potential military intervention. To understand why Romanian elites first decided to provide only limited support for NATO actions regarding Kosovo in October 1998, but then shifted to a position of unconditional support in April 1999, one needs to look at the tensions between the three self-images of Romania’s national identity. Early on in his presidency, Constantinescu’s discourse suggested he believed communism and any form of dictatorship to be ‘evil’, although the case of Yugoslavia was complicated for the Romanian imaginary. During the ‘formative moment’ of 1990-1996, along with articulations of European and Western identity, Romania’s foreign policy discourse also promoted traditional ties and an affinity with the Balkans. The discursive themes were discussed at length in chapter III and the key point to be born in mind was that the ‘Balkan other’ had not been constructed as a threat. On the contrary, the region was often referred to as ‘our friends to the South’, with Yugoslavia particularly described as ‘traditional partner’ and ‘best neighbour’. In May 1996, these aspects were formalised though a bilateral treaty of friendly relations signed by the two states. Therefore, when formulating a clear Romanian stance on the Kosovo conflict became urgent, it was interesting to look at how the

inherent tensions within Romanian national identity played out, how the ‘European’/‘liberal democratic’ and ‘security provider’ self-images vis-à-vis Balkan affinity competed for precedence in the collective mindset of state officials.

b. Romania and Its Evolving Foreign Policy Decisions on Kosovo

Romania’s general international stance on the Balkan area was already prefigured in December 1996, through the voice of Secretary of State Lazăr Comănescu:

‘although a deterrence capability is still needed, the future of the Balkans cannot be built by military force (...) we believe that it is [European] integration rather than deterrence that must be a key instrument for long-term stability of the region (...) These countries should be offered a vision for the future which would detach them from the obsession of the past. International assistance should not be construed by them as an ever lasting means of existence, but as an instrument for the development of trade and economic cooperation among them and with other countries’.525

Specifically asked about how his state would react to a military intervention in Kosovo, Defence Minister Victor Babiuc said the following on 18 June 1998:

‘Romania is part of the Partnership for Peace and as such has a series of commitments towards its partners. If the allies intervene in Kosovo, Romania will honour those commitments. Still, I hope that the wisdom of Yugoslav and Albanian leaders will find a political solution to the crisis’.526

The above quote exemplifies how the responses of foreign policy decision-makers were shaped by the Romanian self-image of ‘security provider’ and its related articulation of ‘reliable partner’, when thinking about future international conduct. From a strictly formal point of view, the PfP framework document required its signatories to comply with two provisions regarding military actions: ‘c. maintenance of the capability and readiness to contribute,

525 Lazăr Comănescu - Secretary of State representing the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement at the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (Brussels, 11 December 1996); http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-A105296C-07401405/natolive/opinions_25086.htm (May 2014).
subject to constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the CSCE; d. the development of cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training, and exercises in order to strengthen their ability to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed'.

A military intervention orchestrated by NATO is neither an exercise nor a mission under UN and CSCE flag. It constitutes a planned aggression, legitimate if given a UN mandate, to impose peace via force. So Romania was under no obligation to wage war together with NATO members against Yugoslavia. But the PfP had been interpreted by most post-communist candidates as a training and evaluation stage towards eventual NATO integration. Considering Romania wanted to be recognised as a liberal democracy worthy of Alliance membership, it would have been difficult to explain why domestic elites did not agree with NATO’s military intervention. After all, a conscientious democratic student is expected to follow the example of its much older and wiser Euro-Atlantic teachers, who had the authority to decide if the former’s performance was satisfying enough to pass the quite fluid criteria of NATO accession. Even though allied members had been divided on how to deal with the Kosovo crisis and needed a long time to reach the final resort of armed force, once air strikes were agreed upon, NATO candidates had little choice in supporting these actions. Otherwise, they could have been seen as not fitting in with the established liberal democratic club.

The story of Romania’s reactions to the Kosovo conflict contains two distinct episodes: first, the international response of October 1998 when NATO initially requested unrestricted airspace access for operations which were aborted by resumed peace talks; second, the position around March-April 1999 when the violence re-escalated, ‘Allied Force’ was launched and another request for NATO aircrafts’ access was received. According to President Constantinescu, on 7 October 1998 he was informed that the situation in Kosovo had become ‘explosive’, which prompted the urgent need

to configure a foreign policy position and to prepare for any potential negative developments. During informal consultations with Prime Minister Radu Vasile, Foreign Affairs Minister Andrei Pleșu, Defence Minister Victor Babiuc, General Constantin Degeratu – Chief of the General Staff (the highest rank in the Romanian Armed Forces), presidential advisers Zoe Petre and Dorin Marian, the widespread idea was for Romania to support a military strike against Yugoslavia only if all other means of dialogue and peaceful solution to the conflict had been exhausted. Constantinescu also asked for the Supreme Council of National Defence (CSAT) to convene in a few days’ time, so as to reach an official agreement and issue a public statement regarding the recent developments in Kosovo. But the premises of the scheduled CSAT meeting were drastically altered in the evening of 9 October, when the official note number 98/1023 came in and communicated NATO’s request to be granted ‘unlimited access’ to Romanian territory for the air campaign directed against Yugoslavia.

Establishing a semi-presidential system based on the French model, the 1991 Romanian Constitution gave considerable prerogatives to the President in terms of foreign policy and national security. During the 1996-2000 administration, the three Premiers (Victor Ciorbea, Radu Vasile, Mugur Isărescu) were content to only deal with the multitude of domestic problems and left President Constantinescu to be the primary foreign policy decision-maker. Thus, while he did consult with other prominent members of the executive and presidential advisers, the final say on NATO’s request for unrestricted airspace access was solely Constantinescu’s responsibility. His resolution would then be moved to Parliament for deliberation, where the normal expectation would be for the legislative majority of the governing coalition to approve it. The President’s letter addressed to Parliament on 14 October 1998 summarised four main ideas. First, it was an appeal to find a

528 These state officials were also members of Romania’s Supreme Council of National Defence, a forum and instrument of decision-making in terms of foreign policy and national security.
529 Emil Constantinescu, Timpul dărâmării, timpul zidirii/ The Time of Demolition, the Time of Building, volume I, p. 168.
530 Ibid, p. 169.
peaceful solution for the Kosovo crisis. Second, the letter requested the Parliament of Romania to grant NATO allied aircraft access to the state’s airspace ‘in case of emergency and unexpected situations’. Third, the President thought that Romania should choose not to be directly involved in the intervention from a military point of view. Fourth, the letter asked the legislature to debate the possibility of sending a mobile multi-functional contingent for humanitarian assistance on the ground.

Before going into the parliamentary debates, the pending question would be how Romania decided on refusing NATO ‘unlimited access’, instead offering humanitarian relief efforts (medical section, refugee housing, reconstruction division) and help to air operations only in emergencies. Constantinescu’s memoirs indicate that he was very torn about the appropriate course of action. On the one hand, despite the rejection at Madrid, he believed that Romania ‘should act like a de facto NATO member’ and fully support the Alliance’s intervention in Kosovo. On the other hand, the target of NATO’s campaign was Yugoslavia – a country towards which ‘Romanians have truly fraternal feelings’. The CSAT convened on 11 October to discuss things further and elaborate an official response to NATO. The context was further complicated by the fact that Bulgaria, fellow candidate and close competitor towards Euro-Atlantic integration, had just declared ‘its readiness to grant NATO access to Bulgarian airspace’ without limitations and contributed materially with ‘a military reconnaissance aircraft for participation in the NATO-led operation “Eagle Eye”, the NATO Air Verification Mission in Kosovo’. The pressure on Romania to fully support the Alliance had substantially increased, since Bulgaria displayed little

532 Ibid.
533 Emil Constantinescu, Timpul dărâmării, timpul zidirii/ The Time of Demolition, the Time of Building, volume 1, p. 169.
apparent hesitation in doing so and was not hindered by Balkan ties. A purely rational analysis of the costs and benefits regarding Romanian involvement in the Kosovo military intervention underlines several drawbacks. Governmental elites had a lot to lose (economically and in terms of public opinion) because of the war. As a frontline state during the crisis, Romania would be faced with serious financial costs derived directly and indirectly from the air campaign targeting Yugoslav infrastructure. The national economy, fragile and still adapting with popular sacrifice to the liberal markets, had to stretch already very thin resources. Being neighbouring states, a substantial number of ethnic Romanians lived on Yugoslav territory. There was obvious concern for their welfare due both to the air strikes and to the perceived betrayal of Serbia by its long-time Romanian friend and partner.

Furthermore, on the domestic public opinion front, things looked equally difficult to manage. The dominant views portrayed the Serbian population as victims of Slobodan Milošević’s totalitarian regime, innocents who should not be punished for the crimes of a dictator. Throughout the Kosovo crisis, Romanians remained ‘critical of Western action’ and their national leaders’ response to it, with about 78 percent being against the military operation. NATO also remained vague about what would happen if candidate states engaged in the intervention were at risk due to possible Serbian retaliation. Secretary General Solana, when asked about the security of states neighbouring Yugoslavia during a press conference on 13 October 1998, declared the following:

‘[w]ell, we are very grateful, logically, for the solidarity and support of partners, which is another example of how the security of partners and that of the Alliance are difficult to separate, impossible to separate as a matter of fact. Any threat to the security of partners will be viewed with the utmost seriousness and will be met with an appropriate response’.  

The lack of any concrete reassurances or promises from NATO reinforced the idea that NATO would not make any formal commitment to defend or help partner states (including Romania) in case of Serbian aggression. Even so, if the pragmatic goal was to obtain NATO membership, then all these aspects could be necessary costs to achieve the ultimate benefit. Interestingly, Romania settled for a more nuanced answer in October 1998 which did not go against NATO and thus potentially jeopardised the main interest of integration, yet at the same time it appeased the tensions inherent in the state’s national identity – whether to act as a ‘European’ liberal democracy or choose the traditional Balkan affinity. The dominant views during the CSAT meeting were that, while Romania must side with NATO and adhere to UN Security Council Resolution 1199, it ‘could not take part in fighting operations on the Yugoslav territory’. In order to maintain a ‘consistent stance’, neither could the Romanian state put its airports at NATO’s disposal for use as bases of attack. Both General Degeratu and Foreign Affairs Minister Pleșu had argued that giving access to airspace or land essentially amounted to the ‘same thing – it’s still called direct involvement’; Constantinescu agreed with that assessment.

The CSAT decided to write a memorandum, in the name of the Foreign Affairs and National Defence Ministries, which basically reiterated the main points of Resolution 1199: immediate ceasefire, resuming diplomatic dialogue between Yugoslav authorities and Albanian leaders in Kosovo, humanitarian relief efforts. The memorandum also ‘heavily underlined the necessity to preserve Serbia’s territorial integrity, with a large autonomy for Kosovo’. Coming back to the parliamentary debates regarding the motion to grant access to national airspace, they produced radically different opinions. In the

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537 United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1199 (1998)*; it demanded at point 1 that ‘all parties, groups and individuals immediately cease hostilities and maintain a ceasefire in Kosovo’; at point 12, it called upon UN member states ‘to provide adequate resources for humanitarian assistance in the region’; http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1199 (May 2014).


539 Ibid.

1996-2000 legislature there were nine parliamentary parties and groups – the governing coalition (PNŢCD, USD, PNL, UDMR), the opposition (PDSR, PRM, PUNR), the groups of other national minorities different from the Hungarians and the independents or members without party affiliation. Sorin Lepşa, speaking on behalf of PNŢCD, emphasised that two questions needed to be answered in the context of the Kosovo crisis: ‘1) do political forces in this Parliament wish for Romania to be considered a serious partner of NATO?; 2) do we want to prove that Romania has the expected reactions of a member state in the Alliance?’ He also made reference to a position piece presented by state officials during the first round of individual dialogue on NATO enlargement (29 March 1996), in which Romania committed itself, depending on the Alliance’s preferred option and the concrete developments in the European security area, ‘to offer allied forces the infrastructure facilities necessary to conduct operations’.

Representing the main opposition party (PDSR), Ion Iliescu argued for continued efforts towards finding a peaceful solution to the Kosovo issues which preserved Serbian sovereignty and territorial integrity, also reminding that Romania had always maintained neutrality and non-involvement in the Yugoslav conflicts. Valeriu Tabără (PUNR) discussed NATO’s hypocritical conduct towards Kosovo, when in so many other disastrous humanitarian cases it decided to not interfere; he warned against the problematic implications of such an unprecedented military intervention. Here the first MPs conveyed the tensions inherent in Romania’s national identity, which reflected the two contrasting foreign policy choices. On the one hand, the ‘security provider’ self-image and its ‘reliable partner’ articulation meant full support for NATO. On the other hand, Romanian traditional good relations and affinity with the Balkans suggested that a neutral stance on Kosovo was more suitable.

542 Ion Iliescu – PDSR Senator, ibid.
543 Valeriu Tabără – PUNR Deputy, ibid.
Moreover, Bogdan Niculescu-Duvăz (USD) stressed the ‘wisdom of having a clear attitude of political support’, specifying that the object of debate was not even about helping logistically; rather it essentially constituted ‘humanitarian assistance’. This position indicates that some idea of humanitarian intervention for Kosovars was already present in the mindset of certain Romanian elites, which aligned with the ‘European’ or liberal democratic self-image. When asked to give further clarifications on how the state was supposed to contribute towards NATO operations, Defence Minister Babiuc said:

‘[t]here is a great difference between entering a country’s air space without any restrictions and giving permission to enter it with the specification “in case of emergency or unexpected occurrences”, and the respective notions are neither vague nor unknown’. Babiuc continued his argument by making reference to the Chicago Convention (1944), where aircraft emergency or distress situations had been defined in connection with airplane and pilot problems such as technical difficulties, urgent need for re-fuelling and injury. To explain the concrete meanings of ‘unexpected occurrences’, he invoked the standard operating procedures used during the joint activities of NATO with partner states, which highlighted two issues: changing the plane’s direction due to objective reasons like insurmountable meteorological conditions and search and rescue operations. Adrian Năstase cautioned that:

‘[i]n international law the only body able to approve military operations like those discussed until now is the UN Security Council. Resolution 1199 (...) says a multitude of things yet does not mention or mandate such a [NATO] operation (...) Romania should be wary of giving up the umbrella of international law’. In the end, the members of Parliament voted with 244 in favour, 160 against and 82 absences to grant the Alliance access to the state’s airspace in ‘case of emergency and unexpected situations’. This was a nuanced foreign policy stance that accommodated the dilemmas inherent in Romanian national

544 Bogdan Niculescu-Duvăz – USD Deputy, ibid.
545 Victor Babiuc, ibid.
546 Ibid.
547 Adrian Năstase – PDSR Deputy, ibid.
identity, where the ‘European’/‘liberal democratic’ and ‘security provider’ self-images competed with Balkan ties for precedence.

The five months between the cancelled air strikes against Yugoslavia (October 1998) and NATO initiating Operation Allied Force (23 March 1999) showed signs that President Constantinescu was re-defining his position on the Kosovo crisis. In a speech dedicated to the Day of National Solidarity against Dictatorship, made official around November 1998, Constantinescu voiced such thoughts:

‘the evil which we had removed from our lives along with the fall of dictatorship cannot be forgotten, cannot be minimised. Democracy is like health – you realise its significance only when it’s gone. Memory is the most effective medicine to this kind of danger (...) Solidarity against dictatorship should not be symbolic. It has practical value as long as those old dictatorships have left deep scars in and among us’.549

Remembering the painful communist past and the wounds inflicted by Ceauşescu’s autarchy appeared to be the key towards a brighter democratic future, also rendering Romanians much more sympathetic towards other peoples suffering from the same or comparable plight. Kosovo had some respite from violence between October 1998 and early January 1999. Unfortunately, that brief relief ended on 15 January 1999, when Serbian armed forces devastated the village of Račak in southern Kosovo, leaving behind a large number of dead and mutilated victims. US Ambassador William Walker witnessed the aftermath and described it as ‘an unspeakable atrocity’ that represented ‘a crime against humanity’; he said that he would not ‘hesitate to accuse the government security forces of responsibility’.550 Račak became a turning point for NATO allies and the international community as a whole. On 28 January, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan had a meeting with the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, which he ended with a highly symbolic message:

‘[w]e must (...) further refine the combination of force and diplomacy that is the key to peace in the Balkans, as everywhere (...) The bloody wars of the last decade have left
us with no illusions about the difficulty of halting internal conflicts - by reason or by force - particularly against the wishes of the government of a sovereign state. But nor have they left us with any illusions about the need to use force, when all other means have failed. We may be reaching that limit, once again, in the former Yugoslavia'.

Some scholars have argued that Annan ‘implicitly provided his blessing to threatening and even using force against a sovereign state’, although ‘such action was never explicitly authorized by the UN Security Council given the certainty of a Russian veto’. Within hours of Annan’s statement, NATO Secretary General Solana emerged from a North Atlantic Council meeting and affirmed more strongly NATO’s readiness to act militarily -

‘[t]he appropriate authorities in Belgrade and representatives of the Kosovo Albanian leadership must agree to the proposals to be issued by the Contact Group for completing an interim political settlement (...) NATO stands ready to act and rules out no option to ensure full respect by both sides of the demands of the international community, and in particular observance of all relevant Security Council Resolutions (...) the North Atlantic Council has decided to increase its military preparedness to ensure that the demands of the international community are met. The North Atlantic Council will follow developments closely and will decide on further measures in the light of both parties’ compliance with international commitments and requirements and their response to the Contact Group’s demands’.

The most influential European allies started endorsing a similar rhetoric. Joschka Fischer, the German Foreign Minister, declared that: ‘I am not a friend of using force, but sometimes it is a necessary means of last resort. So I am ready to use it if there is no other way. If people are being massacred, you cannot mutter about having no mandate. You must act’.

The following day, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac issued a joint statement saying that they were ‘willing to consider all forms of military action, including the dispatch of ground forces, necessary to accompany the implementation of a negotiated agreement. If an early political agreement proves impossible, the two leaders believe that all options will need

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552 Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, p. 75.
554 Joschka Fischer cited in Tom Gallagher, Balkans in the New Millennium, p. 49.
to be considered’. The US did not want to place troops on the ground, which left the option of air strikes. The North Atlantic Council reinforced this discourse on 30 January, when it stated that ‘NATO is ready to take whatever measures are necessary in the light of both parties’ compliance with international commitments and requirements, including in particular assessment by the Contact Group of the response to its demands, to avert a humanitarian catastrophe, by compelling compliance with the demands of the international community and the achievement of a political settlement’. To ensure NATO’s responsiveness to the evolving situation, ‘[t]he Council has (...) agreed today that the NATO Secretary General may authorise air strikes against targets on FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s] territory’.

At the end of this intricate series of statements, the preferred strategy for dealing with the Kosovo conflict was clear. One way or another, there would be a resolution of the conflict shortly. Even so, Chirac argued for ‘one more attempt to negotiate a political solution’ and that ‘Europeans must take responsibility for Europe’. Blair also agreed with a final attempt at negotiations: ‘[t]he consequence of these threats was so serious in terms of the military action, for goodness sake let’s give it another try with the political process, let’s stick all the people together, get all the pressure we can on both sides to come round the table and sort it out’. Thus came the decision to bring the Serbs and Kosovar Albanians together at the fourteenth century château of Rambouillet, about 44 kilometres southwest of Paris, to try to reach a settlement. Before the opening of the Rambouillet talks, on 4 February 1999, US Secretary Albright warned all parties involved in the process that:

‘three outcomes are possible. If President Milosevic refuses to accept the Contact Group proposals, or has allowed repression in Kosovo to continue, he can expect

555 Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, p. 75.
557 Ibid.
559 Tony Blair cited in ibid.
NATO air strikes. If the Kosovo Albanians obstruct progress at Rambouillet or on the ground, they cannot expect the NATO and the international community to bail them out. Decisions on air strikes and international support will be affected, and we will find additional ways of bringing pressure to bear. If the two sides do reach agreement, we will need to concentrate our efforts on making sure that it is successfully implemented.\footnote{Madeleine K. Albright, \textit{Remarks and Q&A Session at the U.S. Institute of Peace} (Washington, 4 February 1999); available at http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/statements/1999/990204.html (May 2014).}

The negotiations at Rambouillet (6 – 23 February 1999) failed as no agreement was reached between the Serbs and ethnic Albanians from Kosovo.

Nevertheless, what happened at Rambouillet remains a controversial topic. Michael Mandelbaum summarised the peace conference as follows:

‘[NATO] summoned the Serbs and the KLA to the French chateau of Rambouillet, presented them with a detailed plan for political autonomy in Kosovo under NATO auspices, demanded that both agree to it, and threatened military reprisals if either refused. Both did refuse. The Americans thereupon negotiated with the KLA, acquired its assent to the Rambouillet plan, and, when the Serbs persisted in their refusal, waited for the withdrawal of the OSCE monitors and then began to bomb.’\footnote{Michael Mandelbaum, ‘A Perfect Failure’, \textit{Foreign Affairs}, volume 78(5), September-October 1999, p. 3.}

Some claim that impossible demands were placed on the Serbian side and the talks were designed to fail; unsuccessful negotiations provided a good pretext for the Alliance to intervene in Kosovo.\footnote{James G. Jatras, ‘NATO’s Myths and Bogus Justifications for Intervention’ in Ted Carpenter (ed.), \textit{NATO’s Empty Victory}, p. 24.} Two major obstacles prevented the Serbs from accepting the Rambouillet agreement. First, the document stipulated ‘the transitional occupation of Kosovo by NATO-led forces’, which included the free use of all of Yugoslav territory and resources’.\footnote{Elizabeth Allen Dauphinee, ‘Rambouillet: A Critical (Re)Assessment’ in Florian Bieber and Zidas Daskalovski (eds.), \textit{Understanding the War in Kosovo} (London: Taylor and Francis, 2005), p. 103.} Second, the text ‘intimated a future independence referendum as the resolution mechanism’ for Kosovo.\footnote{Ibid.} The Serbs could not willingly renounce the province, since they had been fighting against Kosovo independence to begin with. Whether or not NATO had already decided on an air operation against
rump Yugoslavia and was simply looking for a pretext, the Rambouillet conference is ‘a textbook example of how not to practice diplomacy’.565

The allied states were generally more inclined towards a humanitarian intervention due to the shifting international discourses. As the Kosovo situation deteriorated, the international ideational context about humanitarian intervention changed as well. Discursive support for an intervention in Kosovo was orchestrated through rhetorical means such as the negative consequences of appeasing totalitarianism and analogies with the Holocaust. For example, in a Washington Post article on 25 March 1999, the US republican senator Jesse Helms criticised the Clinton administration for its foreign policy of appeasement towards Balkan dictators:

‘Yugoslav strongman Slobodan Milosevic has for the past year waged a brutal campaign of genocide against the Albanian population of Kosovo (...) All this is merely the latest in Milosevic’s reign of terror in the Balkans. In his proxy war against Bosnia-Herzegovina, he killed hundreds of thousands, opened the first concentration camps since the Holocaust, and almost single-handedly restored “genocide” to the European vocabulary (...) This must stop. And the only way it will stop ever is if we address the underlying cause of the problem in the Balkans: Slobodan Milosevic’s continued rule’.566

The British Prime Minister also proved to be an emphatic anti-appeaser of dictatorship. Speaking to the House of Commons in March 1999, Blair reminded that ‘[w]e know from bitter experience throughout this century, most recently in Bosnia, that instability and civil war in one part of the Balkans inevitably spills over into the whole of it, and affects the rest of Europe too’.567 Kosovo ‘represented Blair’s “awakening” to humanitarian interventionism, because he “saw the former Yugoslavia, and the machinations of the Serbian President Slobodan Milošević, in moral terms”.568

Alexandra Gheciu explains that, as the inter-ethnic violence was escalating in

565 Christopher Layne, ‘Miscalculations and Blunders Lead to War’, p. 15.
Kosovo, Western states and NATO gradually developed a specific reading of the conflict:

‘[a]ccording to [NATO’s] interpretation, the crisis involved a conflict between the progressive, modern values of liberal democracy and the barbarity embodied in the Milosevic regime. As the institutional embodiment of the Euro-Atlantic community, NATO was acting in a civilized (“surgical”) manner to protect Kosovar civilians against the authoritarian, undemocratic government of Slobodan Milosevic’.

The changing international context and discourses about Kosovo were bound to impact on Romania’s foreign policy. The state needed to re-consider its external attitude of October 1998 towards NATO actions in Kosovo, when the Alliance’s military intervention became imminent in March 1999. On 21 March 1999, President Constantinescu made a public statement to the domestic population and, in the end, it constituted a fairly clear Romanian foreign policy position:

‘[f]rom the beginning Romania has contributed to the OSCE, NATO and EU efforts of solving the Kosovo crisis through discussions. Our own political experience has proved that there always is a way towards dialogue if both parties show good faith and the will to avoid conflicts (...) Unfortunately, all these efforts still face major difficulties resulting in the tragic loss of lives, the brutal dislocation of refugees and escalation of tensions in the entire region (...) States do bear the responsibility to manage internal conflicts. Yet, when this management does not calm but rather amplifies a conflict endangering regional and even European security, the international community must put a stop to it (...) If peace negotiations fail, Romania considers a NATO intervention to be necessary and legitimate and reiterates its decision to support the re-establishment of peace and humanitarian operations’.

Constantinescu was ‘acutely aware that the two words remembered from the whole speech’ would be ‘those justifying NATO’s actions – legitimate and necessary’; yet he thought ‘the time for half measures’ had passed and Romania needed to ‘unequivocally side with the democratic countries’, hoping ‘friends in Yugoslavia’ would understand that Romanians were joining ‘the fight against Milosevic and not Serbia’.

The initial stance of October 1998 was re-defined under the combined influence of three factors: national identity, rational interest and shifting international context. There is an undeniable rational component to Romania’s quest for Euro-Atlantic integration, but that is only part of its evolving foreign policy on Kosovo. The state could have maintained the comfortable middle ground of supporting NATO missions only in case of emergency and unexpected occurrences. However, the five months from October 1998 to March 1999 had drastically altered the international context. The escalating violence (in particular the Račak massacre) in Kosovo had great emotional impact and constrained both NATO and the international community to be firmer and more decisive in using the last resort of force. The UN Secretary General, the US, France, Germany and the other Alliance members reinforced the discourse of urgent humanitarian intervention. The normative expectations of saving Kosovo were so high that any self-respecting liberal democracy had to adopt the same views in order to receive external validation. Under this changing ideational background, Romania’s national identity underwent a process of hierarchy, where the ‘European’/‘liberal democratic’ self-image and the ‘security provider’ one became more relevant than traditional ties and affinity with the Balkans. Once the tensions within Romanian identity were settled, the appropriate international choice was to fully support Operation ‘Allied Force’. President Constantinescu communicated the state’s new position two days prior to the Secretary General’s announcement that NATO would begin air strikes against Yugoslavia:

‘[l]et me be clear: NATO is not waging war against Yugoslavia (...) We must halt the violence and bring an end to the humanitarian catastrophe now unfolding in Kosovo (...) We must stop an authoritarian regime from repressing its people in Europe at the end of the 20th century. We have a moral duty to do so’,

On 24 March 1999, in his statement concerning Operation ‘Allied Force’, Constantinescu advanced further clarifications -

‘[a]s previously declared, our position is firm: we unconditionally support the efforts for the settlement of the crisis through political dialogue, as well as NATO’s efforts

towards an immediate resolution of the conflict (...) I express as clearly as possible that Romania will not take part in fighting actions on the territory of the Yugoslav Republic. Romania did not offer combatant forces'.

At that time the ‘unconditional support’ for the allied intervention was purely rhetorical, since the state continued to refuse any military contribution. In late April 1999, the Romanian government received NATO’s second request to be granted unrestricted access to the state’s airspace, for the purpose of carrying out bombings on targets in Yugoslavia; on this occasion, Constantinescu asked the Parliament to approve it ad litteram. Compared to October 1998, accepting such a request implied Romania’s unequivocal aggression towards a long-time partner, which caused great controversy among political elites and public opinion. Even if the President was in favour of unrestricted airspace access, it was possible that the majority of Parliament could disagree with his request. Looking at the parliamentary discourses, a joint meeting of the two Chambers was quickly arranged on 22 April 1999 and the heated government-opposition debate began. Ioan M. Paşcu, representing the main opposition party (PDSR), presented a cautious point of view:

‘[b]eing against the use of force in any adverse matter, PDSR felt responsible to warn NATO that military means would negatively impact on the crisis and its effects (...) As a direct consequence of the Alliance’s military intervention, the [Kosovo] situation today is far worse and shows no sign of improvement (...) Basically, we are asked to adopt the obligations of a NATO member state, without benefiting from any rights and security guarantees’.

He concluded that the best solution would be to maintain the decision of October 1998, only allowing access in case of emergencies or humanitarian reasons. Teodor Meleșcanu, speaking for a large number of independents,

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stressed that either approving or rejecting the allied request would have long-term implications for Romania.\footnote{Teodor Meleşcanu – Independent Senator, ibid.}

Though simply alluded to during the deliberations, the bilateral treaty signed with rump Yugoslavia (basically Serbia) in 1996 had a very clear article 7 – ‘[n]one of the contracting parties will permit its territory to be used by a third state to conduct an act of aggression towards the other (...) and will not give any help to such a third state’.\footnote{The Parliament of Romania, ‘Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourhood and Cooperation between Romania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’, Monitorul Oficial al României/ The Official Registry of Romania, number 250, 16 October 1996.} This was another reason why Romania could have chosen not to side with NATO and re-state the response of October 1998. What an examination of the transcript highlighted were the competing ideas associated with the national interest. One member of the government coalition argued that the national interest demanded Romania to ‘unconditionally support’ NATO’s stance on Kosovo, in order to be recognised as a reliable ally.\footnote{Ioan Vilău – USD Deputy, ‘Joint Session of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies’ (22 April 1999).} The main opposition party reinforced the state’s Euro-Atlantic commitments, yet at the same time reminded that it was in Romania’s national interest to consider all the consequences of its foreign policy. The smaller right-wing party (PRM) pointed out that Romania should be wary of supporting the Kosovo intervention, which could set a dangerous precedent for potential secessionist movements within Transylvania. Consequently, the ultimate national interest should be safeguarding the state’s territorial integrity.\footnote{Corneliu Vadim Tudor – PRM Senator, ibid.} The different kinds of international interests reflect which self-image of Romanian identity different MPs focused on – ‘security provider’ (whether in the external or domestic realm) or more reserved Balkan endorsement which did not see military force to be a long-standing solution for Kosovo. The speeches that generated widespread agreement and eventually shifted the balance belonged to representatives of the government coalition. Both explained how Romania should respond to Kosovo in terms of national identity and democratic values. Călin Popescu Târîceanu (PNL) said the following:

‘Today Romania must adopt its responsibilities as a European and civilised country (...) We have the moral obligation to participate in the international community’s refusal to accept such totalitarian practices (...) Romania should not support NATO actions because of political opportunism, but to reaffirm our own democratic choices’.\(^{580}\)

Similarly, Petre Roman (USD) emphasised that the final vote would demonstrate the consistency of the national commitment to democracy and to being part of the ‘civilised and democratic world’.\(^{581}\) Even those who questioned the approval of NATO’s unrestricted access felt the need to reassert their attachment to liberal democratic ideas and values. To quote another member of Parliament: ‘the decision we make today is essentially our choice for a type of civilisation’.\(^{582}\)

So the parliamentary debates clustered around the same tensions within Romanian identity, although the two camps were more vocal now. Compared to the session in October 1998, the Friendship Treaty with rump Yugoslavia was alluded to yet no one actually framed it as a reasonable argument against support for NATO. This suggests that even members of the opposition had interpreted like President Constantinescu the hierarchy of self-images within national identity. The reason why the notion of liberal values and acting like a recognised democracy was so widely appealing refers back to the changing international context, which endorsed humanitarian relief at the cost of using force. In April 1999, Blair summarised this aspect in a memorable speech, where he qualified the military intervention in Kosovo as a ‘just war’ due to its humanitarian concerns -

‘No one in the West who has seen what is happening in Kosovo can doubt that NATO’s military action is justified. Bismarck famously said the Balkans were not worth the bones of one Pomeranian Grenadier. Anyone who has seen the tear stained faces of the hundreds of thousands of refugees streaming across the border, heard their heart-rending tales of cruelty or contemplated the unknown fates of those left behind, knows that Bismarck was wrong (...) This is a just war, based not on any territorial ambitions but on values. We cannot let the evil of ethnic cleansing stand. We must not rest until it is reversed. We have learned twice before in this century that

\(^{580}\) Călin Popescu Tăriceanu – PNL Deputy, ibid.

\(^{581}\) Petre Roman – USD Senator, ibid.

\(^{582}\) Sergiu Cunescu – Independent Deputy, ibid.
appeasement does not work. If we let an evil dictator range unchallenged, we will have to spill infinitely more blood and treasure to stop him later.\textsuperscript{583}

The Romanian Parliament’s final resolution contained three articles, each with a mixed proportion of votes. Article 1 granted NATO ‘unrestricted access to Romania’s airspace during the air operations’ in Yugoslavia; it had 214 votes in favour, 37 against and 97 abstentions (PDSR delegates mostly).\textsuperscript{584} At article 2, Parliament asked the Romanian government to continue its efforts with regards to: a) ensuring ‘some security guarantees and the state’s territorial integrity erga omnes’ (towards all); b) providing ‘the technical infrastructure’ for NATO aircrafts; c) ‘obtaining assistance in eliminating the negative effects of the regional crisis’.\textsuperscript{585} It enjoyed a large majority of votes in favour, 20 against and 12 abstentions. Article 3 included the ongoing wish for ‘a political solution to the conflict’ and re-affirming the willingness to contribute to such a goal; it only had 4 votes against and 5 abstentions.\textsuperscript{586} These amendments were added to the presidential request which featured just the first article, indicating Parliament’s more active role in shaping this foreign policy resolution. After the difficult stage of the Kosovo war had ended, on 11 June 1999, President Constantinescu concluded that:

‘Romania has to remain a pillar of stability and equilibrium in the region and must participate as such in the process of reconstruction (...) In this critical period, we successfully passed a test. A test of being firm and consistent about the alliances we choose and the principles we wish to defend. We proved that we were capable of both words and actions’,\textsuperscript{587}

Romania demonstrated that the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of its national identity and international conduct surpassed any other traditional friendly ties, including those with the Balkans.

\textsuperscript{584} The Parliament of Romania, ‘Joint Session of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies’ (22 April 1999).
\textsuperscript{585} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{586} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{587} Emil Constantinescu, \textit{Message to the Romanian People on the Kosovo Conflict} (Bucharest, 11 June 1999); http://www.constantinescu.ro/discursuri/311.htm (October 2012).
Concluding Remarks

In conclusion, the years 1996-1999 brought forward a few significant re-definitions of national identity and foreign policy. The discursive themes crystallised between 1990 and 1996 were consolidated by the new centre-right political administration, although with some re-articulations. President Constantinescu and the CDR-led Government reconfirmed Romania’s Euro-Atlantic orientation, while also configuring an ideational shift towards the role of democracy in the state’s past and future. The Romanian foreign policy discourses showed a preoccupation with the ‘essential good’ of liberal democracy. These understandings were closely related to Romania’s ‘European’ self-image, which had shaped the state’s relations with Hungary and ‘Europe’ in 1990-1996. They were actually variations on the same European identity theme, whose broad meaning referred to being internationally recognised as a Western European liberal democracy that upheld two key principles – regular democratic elections and the protection of human rights and freedoms. Post-1996 elites mentioned the ‘liberal democratic’ self-image of Romanian identity more frequently than the ‘European’ one, yet they were facets of the same articulation. Another re-defined self-image was that of ‘security provider’, being more explicitly reiterated in the post-1996 foreign policy imaginary. This was often associated with the Balkans, the area where Romania could validate its representations of ‘security provider’ and ‘source of stability’. After choosing the European direction and discursively negotiating what that option entailed for its foreign policy between 1990 and 1996, the period 1996-1999 focussed on the dilemmas inherent in Romanian national identity. State officials had to decide what would be the right ‘European’ course of action, when confronted with a humanitarian crisis in the Balkan region. Romania’s loyalties were divided since it was an aspiring liberal democracy with a security provider role, which had a friendly rapport and affinity with the Balkans as well. The state’s reactions to Kosovo came soon after Romania was left out of the first NATO enlargement wave at Madrid in 1997. Romanian candidacy had obtained the firm support of France and Germany, but the US remained opposed to it. There had been slim chances for Romania to be included in the
1997 round of Alliance expansion, due to a combination of factors: the slow pace of national reforms, the failure to acknowledge the state’s complicity in the Holocaust and the fact that US domestic politics did not favour issuing more than three NATO invitations (Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary). NATO rejection was nonetheless a quite bitter pill to swallow and could have rendered Romania even more reluctant to endorse the Alliance’s military intervention in Kosovo.

The Kosovo case study is particularly relevant because it constitutes a key ‘formative moment’ of Romanian national identity and international responses. Romania exhibited an evolving foreign policy stance on Kosovo, which began with partial support for NATO (October 1998) and later changed to unconditional assistance for the Alliance’s military campaign in March-April 1999. The initial position of October 1998 was a nuanced and relatively comfortable middle ground with a dual purpose. First, partial support – airspace access in emergencies – did not specifically oppose NATO or undermine Romania’s self-declared Euro-Atlantic national identity. Second, partial assistance for the Alliance operations accommodated the inherent dilemmas of Romanian identity – whether to act as a ‘European’ liberal democracy and ‘security provider’ or opt for the traditional Balkan ties. This foreign policy decision was re-defined under the impact of three elements: national identity, rational interest and shifting international context. Romanian elites anticipated that NATO air strikes on Yugoslav territory would lead to very high economic costs. Figures from the Danube Commission - an organisation monitoring the maintenance and improvement of navigation conditions along the Danube – estimated that ‘replacing all eight bombed bridges over the vital river’ would amount to ‘at least £80 million, up to ten times more than the cost of destroying them’.

The oil embargo caused its share of ‘severe losses’ too, resulting in ‘increased prices for Romanian goods domestically and abroad’. Romanian political leaders were also aware of the

potential drastic decline in their popularity, as internal public opinion was overwhelmingly against intervening militarily in Kosovo. According to rationalism, these were necessary sacrifices for the ultimate objective of NATO membership. Rational interests were part of Romania’s Euro-Atlantic choice and contributed to its stance on Kosovo, yet they cannot explain why the state did not fully support Alliance actions from the beginning.

Here national identity comes in to supplement the analysis and identify the tensions between the two self-images - ‘European’/‘liberal democratic’ and ‘security provider’ – and Balkan affinity, which influenced Romanian foreign policy. Critical events like the Kosovo crisis enable the re-articulation of international discourses. In early 1999, the Euro-Atlantic ideational context was shifting towards endorsing an urgent humanitarian intervention in Kosovo. The Serbian attack on the village of Račak in southern Kosovo seemed to be the turning point for NATO states and the international community as a whole. Allied members were prepared to use force without a UN mandate. Prominent Euro-Atlantic voices rhetorically promoted the negative consequences of appeasing dictators and a certain reading of Kosovo as a conflict between the progressive values of liberal democracy and the barbaric regime of Milošević. The normative pressure increased so much that established democracies or those seeking external recognition had to act without delay. This changed ideational context facilitated the emergence of a hierarchy within Romanian identity. The ‘European’/‘liberal democratic’ and ‘security provider’ self-images became more meaningful than traditional relations and affinity with the Balkans. Once the dilemmas of national identity were settled in March-April 1999, Romania unconditionally supported NATO’s air campaign in Kosovo by granting unrestricted airspace access without combatant forces. The Romanian presidential and parliamentary discourses resonated with the notion of their state behaving like a veritable liberal democracy. President Constantinescu had been aware that expressing full backing for Operation ‘Allied Force’ in March 1999 would come at a high cost. Popular trust in him plummeted by about 20% and never recovered. In Constantinescu’s words, Romanians ‘could not forgive their president for using the adjectives “necessary and legitimate”’ to describe the
military intervention in Kosovo. After deciding to act like a credible ‘European’ liberal democracy and security provider, Romania’s trajectory of national identity and foreign policy moves on to another key question – whether or not to be an ‘Atlantic’ liberal democracy and align with the US on the Iraq war.

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590 Emil Constantinescu, Timpul dărâmării, timpul zidirii/ The Time of Demolition, the Time of Building, volume I, p. 190, emphasis in original.
Chapter V: To Be or Not to Be an ‘Atlantic’ Liberal Democracy? (2000-2004)

The initial post-communist decade of Romania’s national identity journey focused on having its ‘European’/‘liberal democratic’ self-image externally recognised, as well as on what this self-image meant in terms of appropriate foreign policy actions. The period 2000-2004 was no exception since Romania had to decide whether it should be a ‘European’ or ‘Atlantic’ liberal democracy. This chapter aims to explore how a series of ‘formative moments’ for Romanian identity and foreign policy culminated in the fundamental re-definition of national identity during the 2003 Iraq war. Romania’s identity was re-articulated in the escalating Kosovo conflict of early 1999, when international discourses intensely advocated the democratic duty of humanitarian intervention. This changing ideational context shaped Romania’s ‘European’/‘liberal democratic’ self-image, which was re-defined as a pro-active liberal democracy that tried to save the people suffering in totalitarian regimes. The 2003 invasion of Iraq was another critical event that facilitated important re-definitions of Romanian identity and foreign policy attitudes. French-German and American opinions on how to disarm Iraq persistently differed, which placed Central-Eastern European states in an uncomfortable situation because they did not want to choose between ‘Europe’ and the US. Romanian identity underwent a crisis within its ‘liberal democratic’ self-image and the state had to opt whether to act as a ‘European’ or ‘Atlantic’ liberal democracy. The tensions in national identity were settled by invoking certain collective memory-myths and Romania chose to become an ‘Atlantic’ liberal democracy. Romanian elites and public opinion felt an emotional solidarity with the US, even at the expense of France who had been Romania’s traditional ally. These sentiments were rooted in Cold War experiences and memory-myths that had impacted on national identity.

With respect to structure, this chapter starts with a general overview of the Romanian foreign policy imaginary under a new political administration.
Then the discussion looks at the Bilateral Immunity Agreement which Romania signed with the US in August 2002. It constitutes a controversial episode that prefigured Romania’s reflexive Atlantic rather than European international orientation. A lot of attention has been given to Romania’s evolving position on the Iraq war, as it was a time of key re-articulations. At first, Romania attempted to maintain a neutral stance on Iraq, but in the end Romanian elites across the political spectrum configured a vocal Atlantic response and full military involvement in the US-led coalition against Iraq.

**The Romanian Context and Foreign Policy Imaginary**

By late 2000, under the mandate of President Emil Constantinescu, the heterogeneous governing coalition had proved its inconsistent nature and inability to handle serious national macroeconomic issues. The coalition was made up of political parties with different ideological affiliations: the Democratic Convention of Romania (CDR – centre-right), the Social Democratic Union (USD – centre-left) and the ethnic Hungarian party (UDMR – centre-right). CDR in turn included two prominent parties - the National Peasant and Christian Democratic Party (PNŢCD) and the National Liberal Party (PNL). All these parties could not decide on a coherent approach to Romania’s socio-economic reforms, which caused substantial losses of popular support and limited progress including in the areas of EU and NATO accession criteria. Constantinescu had been supported by CDR in the previous presidential elections. However, CDR’s unsuccessful management of the governmental coalition prompted Constantinescu not to run for a second term. Opinion polls also indicated that the Social Democratic Party of Romania (PDSR) and the Great Romania Party (PRM) clearly surpassed CDR in terms of popularity. CDR was disbanded and its two parties – PNŢCD and PNL – competed separately in the general elections. In November 2000, Romania’s parliamentary elections removed the mostly centre-right administration, replacing it with a centre-left government led by PDSR which

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gained almost an absolute majority of seats (44.93%). PRM ranked second with 24.35% of seats, followed by the Democrat Party (PD) with 8.99%, PNL with 8.7%, UDMR with 7.83% and the other ethnic minorities were allocated 5.22%. PNŢCD had been perceived by the Romanian population as the unofficial leader of CDR and the 1996 governing coalition. But in November 2000 PNŢCD did not have enough votes to pass the electoral threshold; hence it had no members in the Romanian Parliament. This massive collapse for PNŢCD was a result of the public opinion’s dissatisfaction with the pace of domestic reforms, high corruption levels within the governmental coalition and the still unachieved goals of NATO and EU membership.

On 26 November, Ion Iliescu (the former President of Romania and PDSR leader) won the first round of presidential elections with 36.35% of votes. His next competitor had 28.34% and was Corneliu V. Tudor, PRM leader and controversial figure whose discourse had contained xenophobic and anti-Semitic elements. The 2000 elections suggested a polarisation of Romanian politics. The nationalist and populist PRM quadrupled its previous electoral results (from 5.59% to 24.35%), while the historic pre-communist PNŢCD was not admitted into Parliament. This increased popularity of PRM and Tudor was the product of unique circumstances, such as the accumulated disappointment of certain Romanians towards three consecutive political administrations (1990-1992; 1992-1996 and 1996-2000). It was a singular success for PRM and Tudor, as their popularity would significantly decrease after 2004. Even though Tudor ranked second in the initial round of presidential elections, his electoral performance would not be confirmed in December 2000. It was an important episode for Romanian democracy. Society as a whole needed to demonstrate its alignment with Western or

593 Ibid.
liberal democratic values. Neither of the two remaining presidential candidates was a good option. Tudor’s rhetoric of the early 1990s was prolific in xenophobic and anti-Semitic connotations. He was a central promoter of Marshal Ion Antonescu’s rehabilitation and refused to acknowledge Romania’s complicity in the Holocaust, even going so far as to deny the very existence of the Holocaust in Europe. As for Iliescu, he was not at all an inspiring candidate or former President. His political background had several problematic issues: Iliescu’s communist past, how he and the National Salvation Front negatively marked Romania’s transition to democratic rule, how they exhibited undemocratic attitudes towards opposition groups, Iliescu’s role in bringing the Jiu Valley miners to Bucharest and their subsequent violent actions (June 1990). These aspects and the Romanian turbulent post-revolutionary context were discussed in chapter I. Iliescu had a much more stable mandate and configured a clear Euro-Atlantic direction for the state in 1992-1996; but the events of 1990 and 1991, including his endorsement of the controversial Romanian-Soviet ‘Friendship Treaty’, were not easy to forget. So the new President of Romania would either have questionable democratic credentials or lack them entirely. Who fitted better a state aspiring to be accepted as a Euro-Atlantic democracy? Romanians overwhelmingly chose the lesser of two evils, when two thirds of the electorate voted against Tudor becoming the next President in the second round of elections – Iliescu 66.83% and Tudor 33.17%.\textsuperscript{596} Liberal democratic values, or at least the hope for a Euro-Atlantic future, influenced the outcome of December 2000.

Considering the rather poor records of Iliescu and PDSR on necessary domestic reforms in 1990-1996, some observers feared that Romania would not adequately meet its obligations for NATO and EU integration, which would make the state lag even further behind most of the other post-communist candidates.\textsuperscript{597} PDSR appointed Adrian Năstase as the new Prime Minister and formed a legislative majority with the help of UDMR. President

\textsuperscript{596} Ibid.
Iliescu’s electoral programme defined Euro-Atlantic accession as a ‘major priority’ and indicated that Romanian foreign policy would play ‘an essential role in promoting the new European destiny of our country, in affirming our identity in the context of accelerated European integration, in consolidating relations with neighbours, as well as other states’. On 31 March 2001, Prime Minister Năstase reinforced that Romania’s Euro-Atlantic orientation was ‘firm and irreversible’. At the end of May 2001, he also stated quite confidently that:

‘[f]rom our point of view, Romania will fulfil all [Alliance] accession criteria in 2002. Romania’s importance in the region, the relations built with NATO countries over the years represent a guarantee that Romania will continue to be an island of stability in this agitated area of Europe’.

After the shocking terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, Romania gradually shifted its arguments for NATO membership to stress the ability of contributing to the ‘War on Terror’, which also incorporated the state’s self-images and related articulations of national identity (‘European’, ‘liberal democratic’ and ‘security provider’).

During its first post-communist decade, the fluid nature of Romanian identity displayed a series of key re-definitions. The years 1990-1996 configured a foreign policy imaginary that contained three main self-images: ‘European’, ‘non-Balkan’ and ‘security provider’. As discussed in chapter II, these self-images can be seen as identities in their own right, yet they also subsume hierarchically to a larger identity. All three self-images feed into Romania’s overarching ‘Euro-Atlantic’ national identity. Romania’s ‘European’ identity basically meant becoming a consolidated liberal democracy and being recognised as such in the international realm, including in the context of NATO and EU requirements. That is why the ‘European’ and ‘liberal

democratic’ self-image referred to the same representation. If the period 1990-1996 was about choosing the ‘European’ course and what ‘European’ identity entailed in terms of foreign policy, post-1996 the liberal democratic facet began to appear more frequently than the ‘European’ one in the domestic discourse. Romania’s evolving reactions to the Kosovo crisis encapsulated the inherent dilemmas of acting as a ‘European’ liberal democracy. The two self-images (‘European’/‘liberal democratic’ and ‘security provider’) and Balkan affinity competed for precedence in the collective mindset of state officials. Critical events like the Kosovo conflict facilitated the re-articulation of international discourses. In early 1999, the international ideational context changed towards the endorsement of urgent humanitarian intervention in Kosovo. Normative Euro-Atlantic expectations demanded that any self-respecting liberal democracy would act to save Kosovo from a totalitarian regime. Such an ideational shift enabled a hierarchy inside Romanian national identity, where the ‘European’/‘liberal democratic’ and ‘security provider’ self-images prevailed over Balkan ties. This point was very significant in the trajectory of Romanian identity and foreign policy, influencing the state’s stance on the Iraq war in particular and its external conduct in general after 2000. Here national identity underwent two fundamental re-definitions. First, as the international discourses advocated the notion of humanitarian and democratic intervention in 1999, Romania’s ‘European’/‘liberal democratic’ self-image moved towards representing the state as a pro-active liberal democracy that should help those suffering under dictatorships. Romania’s painful communist past made it understand too well the difficulties of people going through similar totalitarian plights. Until now, the ‘European’ and ‘liberal democratic’ facets constituted the same self-image. From this point, the Romanian ‘liberal democratic’ self-image was discursively separated from ‘European’ identity. Second, after the national identity tensions were settled regarding the Kosovo case, the ‘non-Balkan’ self-image gradually disappeared from the foreign policy imaginary; the ‘European’, ‘liberal democratic’ and ‘security provider’ self-images became the dominant ones. Consequently, two fundamental re-definitions of Romanian national identity occurred between 1990 and 2000: the ‘non-Balkan’ self-image faded away and Romania was articulated as a pro-active liberal democracy that
could have a primary ‘European’ or ‘Atlantic’ vocation. These elements will be particularly relevant when analysing Romania’s position on the Iraq war.

The post-2000 internal discourse highlighted variations on the ‘security provider’ and liberal democratic themes, the kinds of meanings which would appeal to Euro-Atlantic audiences. This was visible in the Romanian Parliament’s decision adopted on 19 September 2001, with only one abstention -

‘Romania, as strategic partner of the United States of America and member of the Partnership for Peace, will take part as a de facto NATO ally (...) in the fight against international terrorism through all means, including military’.601

The resolution offered the use of ‘facilities on Romanian air, land and maritime territory’ to support ‘potential counter-terrorist operations’ at NATO’s request.602 In December 2001, the political administration published the new National Security Strategy, a document which reflected the state’s perspective on the changing international realm in the aftermath of 9/11. Although unconventional threats or risks featured quite prominently in almost all sections of the text, it was interesting to note that they were not discursively associated with the state’s interests. Romanian national interests were defined around building a democratic and stable country and were listed as follows:

‘the maintenance of the integrity, unity, sovereignty and independence of the Romanian state; the guarantee of fundamental democratic freedoms, and ensuring the welfare, security and safety of Romania’s citizens; the economic and social development of the country, in accordance with the world’s contemporary development (...) ; meeting the conditions for Romania’s integration as a NATO and EU member (...); asserting the national identity and pursuing it as a democratic value, making best use of and developing the national cultural heritage and the creative abilities of the Romanian people; protection of the environment, natural resources, the quality of the environmental factors at international standards’.603

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602 Ibid.
603 The Parliament of Romania, ‘Romania’s National Security Strategy. Guaranteeing Democracy and Fundamental Liberties, Sustained and Lasting Economic and Social
While it has been argued that the document was primarily based on an underlying neo-realist logic, both the national interests and security objectives were mostly inward-looking and focused on ‘the modernisation of Romanian society’. At different points in the text’s content, Romania was articulated as a state embracing liberal democratic values, ‘pillar of stability in the area’, ‘defender of democracy’, ‘important provider of regional and international security’. Despite adapting the 2001 National Security Strategy to the post-9/11 context, the Romanian narrative did not modify the two main self-images of national identity – ‘liberal democracy’ and ‘security provider’. What did change was the higher profile of Romanian participation in multinational peace-keeping and stabilisation efforts (Bosnia and Kosovo), as well as the later involvement in Afghanistan operations (October 2001). As part of the missions conducted within Enduring Freedom (joint American-British-Afghan) and International Security Assistance Force (NATO), Romania aimed to prove that it possessed the military capability – personnel, transport and logistic support - to act as a NATO allied state. The Defence Minister, Ioan Paşcu, framed these foreign policy initiatives as a way of ‘substantiating the security provider role’ and counteracting some accusations that Romania was contributing too little in this sense. The last part of the Romanian road to NATO membership was paved with a rash decision in August 2002, which to some extent prefigured the state’s reflexive pro-American or Atlantic vocation of foreign policy on Iraq.

606 Ibid.
Romania and the American Bilateral Immunity Agreement

Romania’s most controversial foreign policy action in 2002 was signing a Bilateral Immunity (or ‘Article 98’) Agreement with the US, which related to the recently founded International Criminal Court (ICC). In 1998 an international criminal justice system was established through the Rome conference and Statute. The ICC was the first permanent international legal body created to bring individuals to trial for accusations of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. American hostility towards the Rome Statute and ICC focused on the fear of Court politicisation; hence it noted that ‘in addition to exposing members of the Armed Forces of the United States to the risk of international criminal prosecution, the Rome Statute creates a risk that the President and other senior elected and appointed officials of the United States Government may be prosecuted by the International Criminal Court’. Despite American concerns about the ICC, President William Clinton suggested that the US intended to become a state party to the Rome Statute by signing it in 2000. Nevertheless, on 1 July 2002, his successor - George W. Bush - notified the UN of his administration’s intention to basically ‘unsign’ the treaty. In doing so, the US announced the removal from any further obligations stipulated in the Rome Statute and that there was no intention of ratifying it. The invoked reason was that the ICC ‘undermined the role of the UN Security Council in maintaining international peace and security, it created a prosecutorial system that is an unchecked power, it purports to assert jurisdiction over nationals of states that have not ratified the treaty, and it is therefore built on a “flawed foundation”’. Consequently, the Americans launched a campaign to withdraw their citizens from ICC jurisdiction via bilateral treaties with other states, which were based on article 98.1 of the Rome Statute:

609 United States Department of State, Title II: American Service-Members’ Protection Act (August 2002); http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/pm/rls/othr/misc/23425.htm (June 2014).
'the Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of that third State for the waiver of the immunity'.

On 1 August 2002, Romania was the first to sign this type of treaty with the US and among the very few European states to do so. To mark the occasion, the Romanian Foreign Affairs Secretary of State said the following -

‘[w]e express our hope that, after considering the conclusions of this Agreement, the opening of a new perspective will be encouraged regarding a larger cooperation with the International Criminal Court, which would contribute to its increased efficiency and prestige and consolidate its representative nature (...) Romania has adhered to its obligations towards the International Criminal Court and promoted a conduct in accordance with the European Union’s common foreign and security policy’.

The quote above seemed very odd as such a Bilateral Immunity Agreement (BIA) was interpreted as both obstructing the ICC and contradicting the EU stance. Firstly, the document was problematic because it prevented Romania from transferring or extraditing American ‘persons’ to the ICC without US consent; these ‘persons’ were defined as ‘current or former Government officials, employees (including contractors), or military personnel or other nationals of the United States of America’. BIA caused much controversy within the international community, since they were not only blocking the ICC jurisdiction over any American national, but also undermining the Court and architecture of ideals behind it. Secondly, the EU did not have a clear attitude towards BIA in August 2002, but EU officials were generally disappointed by Romanian actions. As the European Commission’s spokesperson put it, ‘we regret this decision of Romania (...) and we deplore

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613 Cristian Diaconescu – Secretary of State in the Foreign Affairs Ministry, ‘Speech after signing the Agreement with the United States concerning the International Criminal Court’ (Bucharest, 1 August 2002) in The Archives of Romania’s Government; http://www.gov.ro/declaratie__11a11943.html (February 2013).
that a candidate country has not waited until the European Union established its position’.\textsuperscript{615} In September 2002, Prime Minister Năstase tried to downplay the situation and somewhat excuse Romania’s overzealous foreign policy move:

‘[i]n some respects, the ICC issue connected to our relationship with the European Union pertains to the past. It is clear that we need to have better consultations and a more efficient system of communication so as to avoid such tensions. Yet there is obviously the pending matter which will be discussed between the European Union and the United States, and in my opinion, the document signed by Romania will be incorporated within their agreed solution’.\textsuperscript{616}

Interestingly, Năstase still did not find the BIA implications controversial and did not seem to regret signing it. He only blamed the faulty Romanian communication with the EU and left things to be arranged in the American-EU diplomacy. The Prime Minister also mentioned that the bilateral treaty had not been ratified yet by the Romanian Parliament.\textsuperscript{617} To a certain degree, Romania signing the BIA and not sending it for legislative ratification brings to mind another controversial document - the 1991 Romanian-Soviet ‘Friendship Treaty’, which had never been finalised either. On 30 September 2002, the European Council reached its conclusions on the ICC and BIAs signed with the US:

‘[t]he Rome Statute provides all necessary safeguards against the use of the Court for politically motivated purposes. It should be recalled that the jurisdiction of the Court is complementary to national criminal jurisdictions and is limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole’.\textsuperscript{618}

The Council also gave guidelines to member and candidate states about only entering BIAs that relate to immunity for diplomats, military personnel and


extradited persons, excluding other categories of American nationals. In that respect, the Commission’s subsequent report specified as follows –

‘Romania has ratified the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court. In August 2002 Romania signed a bilateral agreement with the USA on the non-surrender of each others’ nationals to the International Criminal Court. Regrettably, this decision was taken without adequate prior consultation with the EU. It does not comply with the guiding principles laid down by the Council’.

In the end, the American BIA was not submitted to the Romanian Parliament’s agenda and thus not ratified, due to its incompatibility with the EU viewpoints.

This episode of Romanian foreign policy shows that various elements were impacting on the state’s international responses. Rationalism would say that Romania was trying to please the US - the most powerful Alliance member, in order to obtain support for NATO accession. But, similarly to the 1991 Soviet ‘Friendship Treaty’, Romanian elites did not make the BIA official and legally binding in Parliament because of the opposing ‘European’/EU position regarding the ICC. So the possible rational motive of currying favour with the US was not finalised. The American BIA indicated Romania’s uncomfortable position between ‘Europe’ and the US, which would be intensified in the case of Iraq. Here Romania backtracked on its pro-American attitude and eventually aligned with ‘Europe’ in October 2002. Even so, the BIA was a sign that Romania could prefer an ‘Atlantic’ rather than ‘European’ orientation on Iraq, depending on what ideational factors shaped its foreign policy. The American BIA also proved not to play a great role in issuing Romania’s invitation to become a NATO member. Unlike the Madrid summit in 1997, the US as a key decision-maker of NATO agreed with the other European allies that Romania should be admitted into the Alliance.

Romania was invited to join NATO at the Prague summit on 21 November 2002. President Iliescu described it as ‘a historical moment which

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619 Ibid, p. 10.
symbolises the total and radical separation from the [communist] past, as well as Romania's permanent inclusion in the Euro-Atlantic area. After the Alliance summit, President Bush visited Bucharest where he addressed a large and enthusiastic crowd on 23 November:

‘[y]our effort has been recognized by an offer to NATO membership. We welcome Romania into NATO (...) The promises of our alliance are sacred and we will keep our pledges to all the nations that join us. Should any danger threaten Romania, should any nation threaten Romania, the United States of America and NATO will be by your side. As a NATO ally, you can have this confidence - no one will be able to take away the freedom of your country (...) For centuries Romania’s geography was a source of dangers. Now you can help our alliance to extend the hand of cooperation across the Black Sea.’

The American President’s speech suggested the representation of Romania as already being a NATO member or allied state. This articulation was also adopted by Iliescu, who remembered that day as a ‘celebration of Romania’s accession into NATO’. Bush’s words were interpreted by the Defence Minister to be an ‘unambiguous security guarantee’ which fulfilled ‘the dream of generation after generation of Romanians to live securely in peace and prosperity’. The idea was reinforced by Foreign Affairs Minister Mircea Geoană – ‘a security guarantee unique in the history of Romania’. Throughout the rest of 2002, President Iliescu continued to depict his state as an Alliance member - ‘[o]ur accession into NATO is the most concrete evidence for the radical changes we started during the Revolution of December 1989’. He further stressed that:

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626 Ion Iliescu, ‘Speech in the Romanian Parliament’ (Bucharest, 25 November 2002) in The Archives of Romania’s Presidency; available at
‘[a]s a central-southern European country, as NATO member and future member of the European Union, Romania must undertake more commitments in its geographical area, to honour its role as stabilising factor and security provider’, 627

The natural enthusiasm of the occasion could have led national foreign policy decision-makers to temporarily forget a key aspect. Romania’s NATO membership was not completely guaranteed. The individual Alliance members were still supposed to ratify the Romanian accession protocol. Only then would the state finalise one of the major goals of its post-communist foreign policy. This point will be significant when examining the complex context surrounding Romania’s decision to take part and specific involvement in the coalition against Iraq.

**Romania and the Iraq War**

A crucial ‘formative moment’ that encapsulated the fundamental re-definitions of Romanian identity and foreign policy was the 2003 invasion of Iraq. There were two contrasting approaches to disarming Iraq – France and Germany preferred peaceful methods, whereas the US wanted to use armed force. Romania initially refused to choose between the two sides, yet in the end national elites across the political spectrum settled on a vocal Atlantic position and full military involvement in the coalition against Iraq. The international context was complicated and Romania could have had external costs either by aligning with ‘Europe’ (France and Germany) or with the US. Rationalism would affirm that Romania sided with the Americans to gain their help in finalising the NATO integration process. But France was very displeased with Romania’s pro-American attitude and indirectly threatened the state’s EU candidacy. Romanian accession into the EU was much more problematic than NATO membership, since the state had already been invited to join NATO in November 2002. France and Germany were key EU members


and would each have a decisive say on Romania eventually entering the EU. Military participation in the Iraq war was not an advantageous option for Romania in the wider rational equation. That is why national identity comes in to shed light on the Romanian international orientation. The state became fully involved in the coalition against Iraq because this decision was consistent with both the fundamentally re-defined national identity (‘pro-active liberal democracy’) and the emerging Atlantic vocation of its foreign policy. After intervening in Kosovo for humanitarian and democratic reasons, Romania as a liberal democracy seeking external acceptance could not have double standards and decline to support the US in the Iraq war.

a. The International Context and Romania’s Neutral Views on Iraq

The year 2003 brought the culmination of growing tensions between prominent NATO members over the issue of whether to invade Iraq. The US argued for an Alliance mission in Iraq, while France and Germany were against it. On 29 January 2002, President Bush used his State of the Union address to announce a fundamental shift in American foreign policy:

‘Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror. The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear weapons for over a decade (...) States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world (...) I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons’.

Apart from demonising the Iraqi dictatorship and constructing it as the most dangerous ‘other’, this speech prefigured the American willingness to take unilateral action against those it perceived as a threat. The Bush doctrine of

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pre-emption was formalised in the new National Security Strategy, which mentioned the following in September 2002 –

‘[w]hile the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country’.630

The American foreign policy stance indicated that Iraq would be the first theatre where such a pre-emptive strike would be operationalised. This led to persistent international disagreements – on the one hand, between the US and France and Germany and on the other hand, within Europe itself.

On 22 January 2003, the French President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder issued a common anti-war declaration after the 40th anniversary of the Elysée Treaty, which celebrated their historical reconciliation:

‘[o]bviously thinking about Iraq, Germany and France have an identical judgement about the crisis. Only the United Nations Security Council can make a legitimate decision (...) for us, war is always an acknowledgment of defeat and the worst solution, and therefore, everything must be done to prevent it’.631

Compared to the Bush doctrine of pre-emption, the French-German position regarded war or the use of military force as the worst and final option. While the US considered a UN mandate to be desirable but ultimately optional for Iraq, France and Germany insisted on obtaining the approval of the UN Security Council. The American reply came swiftly on the same day during the press conference held by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who introduced and defined the dichotomy of ‘old’ versus ‘new’ Europe -

‘[n]ow, you’re thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I don’t. I think that’s old Europe. If you look at the entire NATO Europe today, the center of gravity is shifting to the east (...) And if you just take the list of all the members of NATO and all of those who have been invited in recently (...) Germany has been a problem, and France has

been a problem (...) But you look at vast numbers of other countries in Europe. They're not with France and Germany (...) they're with the United States’.

Rumsfeld’s comments underlined the fact that the European allies of NATO were divided on how to deal with the Iraq situation.

On 27 January 2003, the EU gave a neutral statement which essentially reinforced the UN prerogative of authorising military actions:

‘[t]he Council underlines the fundamental importance of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in accordance with the relevant international instruments. The Security Council has a key role to play in these endeavours (...) The responsibility of the UNSC in maintaining international peace and security must be respected’.

However, only three days later, eight European NATO members (the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Denmark, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic) nuanced their stance and signed an open letter of support towards efforts of disarming Iraq -

‘[t]he real bond between the United States and Europe is the values we share: democracy, individual freedom, human rights and the Rule of Law (...) Today more than ever, the transatlantic bond is a guarantee of our freedom. We in Europe have a relationship with the United States which has stood the test of time (...) The transatlantic relationship must not become a casualty of the current Iraqi regime’s persistent attempts to threaten world security. In today’s world, more than ever before, it is vital that we preserve that unity and cohesion (...) The Iraqi regime and its weapons of mass destruction represent a clear threat to world security (...) Resolution 1441 is Saddam Hussein’s last chance to disarm using peaceful means. The opportunity to avoid greater confrontation rests with him’.

Resolution 1441 of the UN Security Council had been adopted on 8 November 2002. This resolution stated that ‘Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations’ and granted the state ‘a final opportunity to comply

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with its disarmament obligations’. The letter of the eight European NATO allies came at a sensitive time in the French-German and American dispute on Iraq. It highlighted UN authority, while adding that ‘Resolution 1441 is Saddam Hussein’s last chance to disarm using peaceful means’. As the permanent members of the Security Council were divided over Iraq, Resolution 1441 did not explicitly mention that it was the final opportunity for Iraq to disarm peacefully. The letter of the eight was also an opportunity to make a stand for a certain kind of Europe. The signatory states used the text to express their own Atlantic vision of Europe vis-à-vis the one put forward by Paris and Berlin on 22 January 2003. The eight European members of NATO subtly conveyed that they would be willing to back the US, if Iraq did not quickly comply with Resolution 1441.

Throughout January 2003, Romania maintained a neutral view on the possibility of an Iraq intervention, refusing to choose between the ‘European’ and ‘Atlantic’ dimensions of its national identity. Romanian foreign policy elites denied the notion of a Euro-Atlantic rift, which translated into the need to opt for either the Europeans or the Americans. Instead, Romania insisted on the common values which had bound the allied states together for such a long time. These shared ideas and principles made it impossible or, at least, very difficult for Romania to select one side over the other. President Iliescu summarised this dilemma of national identity –

‘[h]ow could we make such distinctions between being European and non-European, pro-American and anti-American? (...) We have always underlined our preoccupation to act in the spirit of both European and Euro-Atlantic unity’.

When answering a question about Rumsfeld and the US reliance on ‘new’ Europe, Prime Minister Năstase declared the following in January 2003:

‘[i]t is difficult for me to judge US relations with other countries in Europe (...) For us, for Romania, it is important to maintain complementary relationships with both NATO and the European Union. Naturally, it is important for us to have close ties with all

European states as well as the US. We are unable to separate the two and do not wish to do so.\(^\text{638}\)

Năstase had conveyed a similar message to that of the pro-Atlantic letter of the eight, even before the document was made public. On 28 January 2003 in Paris, he cautioned against letting the ‘heated debates on the best course of action in Iraq’ lead to ‘a rift between EU and NATO allies’; otherwise, this would play into ‘Saddam Hussein’s real agenda – the division of the West’.\(^\text{639}\)

In a Washington speech on 4 February 2003, Foreign Affairs Minister Geoană emphasised that the Euro-Atlantic link needed to be stronger than the controversial topics that strained it:

’[t]he Trans-Atlantic relationship cannot be reduced to the differences that exist even within the happiest of families. Whether we are talking about Kyoto, or the International Criminal Court, international trade or policy toward Iraq, these differences are much more about approach and tactics than about substance and strategic vision (...) We all agree on the essentials. What we need to work harder is on managing, not magnifying, bridging, not broadening our differences. From Seattle to Brest to Constanţa on the Black Sea shore of Romania, we belong to the same community of shared values and ideas’.\(^\text{640}\)

Since the three significant actors (the US, France and Germany) had already made clear their contrasting opinions on an Iraq invasion, Romania’s reluctance to acknowledge the emerging state of affairs and insistence on the Euro-Atlantic bond or ‘united front’ could appear out of sync with reality. Yet this attitude in the face of Euro-Atlantic divergences should be seen as trying to avoid an identity crisis within Romania’s liberal democratic self-image. National leaders had to answer a key existential question: should Romania act as a ‘European’ or ‘Atlantic’ liberal democracy? According to Stephen Larrabee, Central-Eastern European states did ‘not want to be forced to


choose between the United States and western Europe'; they were ‘uncomfortable’ with the Bush administration’s attempt ‘to differentiate between “old” and “new” Europe’.  

Throughout a range of interviews given to the French press in late January 2003, Prime Minister Năstase was required to elaborate almost exclusively upon Romania’s international responses to the opposing American and French-German stances on Iraq. From the beginning, he rejected Rumsfeld’s distinction by saying that Romania was ‘without a doubt part of “old” Europe’ due to its long history and Latin ancestry. Năstase voiced his disbelief in such a ‘Manichean device’ of ‘good versus bad’ because ultimately Europe and the US held the same values. The Foreign Affairs Minister echoed similar meanings in Washington:

‘[s]peaking for Romanians, we have always considered ourselves part of the traditions, culture and history of “old Europe”. After overcoming half a century of forced exile under communism, we are now a proud part of “new Europe”. A strong Europe, a vibrant NATO, a credible West. This is our vision, this is our drive’.  

When asked quite frankly if Romania was attempting ‘to seduce’ the US in order to ‘get closer’ to NATO membership, at the same time distancing itself from Europe, the Prime Minister framed his answer in the following terms -

‘[i]t is a false perception (...) We are a country that owes a great deal to its French and European friends in general, but also to the Americans, particularly concerning the formation of the unified Romanian state after the First World War. So we are deeply indebted to our friends and, consequently, cannot encourage a rift between them’.

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It was a diplomatic reply that did not give any indication how Romania would react when forced to handle its identity dilemma, whether the state would eventually adopt a ‘European’ or ‘Atlantic’ foreign policy.

b. Romania as a Pro-active Liberal Democracy with an Atlantic Vocation

On 5 February 2003, Romania shifted its balanced Euro-Atlantic position towards a clearer solidarity with the US view, by signing the statement of the Vilnius 10. The latter was a group formed of already invited NATO entrants and some aspirants. Their statement tried to use a neutral language, which stressed the importance of a collective approach to counter-act threats against democratic principles:

‘[o]ur countries understand the dangers posed by tyranny and the special responsibility of democracies to defend our shared values. The trans-Atlantic community, of which we are a part, must stand together to face the threat posed by the nexus of terrorism and dictators with weapons of mass destruction’.  

Two elements in the text clearly suggested alignment with the American stance. First, the Vilnius 10 group agreed that the US ‘presented compelling evidence’ to the UN Security Council ‘detailing Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs, its active efforts to deceive UN inspectors, and its links to international terrorism’.  

Second, they drew the same main conclusion as the Americans and declared that ‘it has now become clear that Iraq is in material breach of U.N. Security Council Resolutions, including U.N. Resolution 1441’. The Vilnius 10 were therefore ‘prepared to contribute to an international coalition to enforce its provisions and the disarmament of Iraq’. The statement ended on a more conciliatory tone and insisted on the necessity of a democratic united front under UN authority:

‘[t]he clear and present danger posed by Saddam Hussein’s regime requires a united response from the community of democracies. We call upon the U.N. Security Council

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647 Ibid.
648 Ibid.
649 Ibid.
to take the necessary and appropriate action in response to Iraq’s continuing threat to international peace and security’. 650

This strongly worded but somewhat moderate content of the Vilnius 10 letter still referred to a UN approved Iraqi operation.

In the Romanian case, the Vilnius 10 document became irrelevant only a week later, when domestic elites ‘provided facilities for US troops in the Iraq crisis and committed forces to the post-conflict stabilization effort’. 651 On 12 February 2003, Romania adopted an unequivocal pro-American orientation when Parliament approved the state’s non-combatant contribution to a coalition against Iraq, if military actions were initiated. At US request, the Supreme Council of National Defence (CSAT) led by President Iliescu initially analysed the situation and then decided to actively take part in a possible Iraqi mission. 652 Iliescu sent an official letter in which he asked Parliament to sanction Romania offering ‘4 major state officers in the coalition command central, an NBC [joint nuclear-biological-chemical] regiment for defence purposes formed of 70 soldiers, a military police platoon formed of 25 soldiers, a medical unit of 30 agents and 149 bomb disposal experts’, along with ‘re-confirming access to airspace and necessary infrastructure’. 653 The President hoped for a favourable vote from the legislative body because it would ‘constitute Romania’s commitment to promoting and defending democratic values’. 654 Considering the state’s previously balanced or neutral position on Iraq which refused to choose between the US and ‘Europe’ (most powerful EU members – France and Germany), why did Romanian national identity and foreign policy suddenly change towards overt Atlanticism?

650 Ibid.
653 Ibid.
654 Ibid.
From a wider analytical perspective, the shift was not actually sudden as Romania signing the American Bilateral Immunity Agreement in 2002 prefigured the state’s emerging Atlantic vocation. The most accessible explanation for Romanian behaviour is the usual rational calculation, whose aim was to irrevocably secure NATO membership. Realists have also invoked the ‘bandwagoning’ and ‘balancing’ phenomena which basically say that Central-Eastern Europe in general and Romania in particular sided with the most powerful entity (the US) to solve their various security dilemmas. However, there is much more to the story of Romanian foreign policy and it derives from the influence of national identity on how elites interpreted the Iraq episode. A re-definition of national identity started during the Kosovo conflict, when international discourses intensely promoted the notion of humanitarian intervention. This impacted on Romania’s ‘liberal democratic’ self-image, which was gradually constituted as a more pro-active liberal democracy that should help to defend those suffering under totalitarian regimes. Similarly to Kosovo, the Iraq war was a ‘formative moment’ which favoured significant re-articulations of both identity and foreign policy. The fact that French-German and US views were persistently divided on Iraq forced Central-Eastern European states to make a firm choice. Against such a background, Romania’s national identity underwent a crisis within its liberal democratic self-image and had to decide whether to be ‘European’ or become an ‘Atlantic’ democracy.

The CSAT meeting on 10 February 2003 established the main guidelines of Romanian involvement in the coalition against Iraq. The related motion was sent to Parliament, where the normal expectation was for it to be passed by the legislative majority. Unlike the Kosovo conflict, the topic

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of Iraq was met with widespread agreement across the political spectrum. Only the Great Romania Party (PRM) voiced dissent towards the project. Its representative, Senator Ilie Ilaşcu, reminded his audience about Romania’s close ties to Western Europe and advanced the following argument:

‘[t]he duplicitous attitude of Romanian authorities in the Iraqi crisis will have great negative impact on the population (...) the political sphere will be affected by Western European countries with whom we have close relations (...) I ask myself: why has the situation come to such a point that the government is ready to unforgivably defy the rules of global democracy, UN authorities, in exchange for an unclear military coalition with the United States of America, a country that has openly and firmly declared that it will attack Iraq with or without the consent of the UN Security Council?’

He concluded by saying that PRM would abstain from the vote and remain opposed to any military action against Iraq in general and Romanian participation in particular, unless legally approved by the UN Security Council. The above quote indirectly appeals to the state’s liberal democratic self-image which identified with ‘Western Europe’ and should have shaped a foreign policy aligned with that of close friends like France. Taking the argument further, a consolidated liberal democracy should not act outside the boundaries of international law (lack of UN mandate), or at least not engage in a unilateral American mission that has not been agreed upon within the authoritative Euro-Atlantic club (NATO). So how should a partially recognised liberal democracy such as Romania respond, when the previously united dimensions of its Euro-Atlantic national identity pull it in opposing directions? Should it act as a ‘European’ liberal democracy or become an ‘Atlantic’-oriented one?

Another representative from the parliamentary opposition, Deputy Gheorghe Negoiţă, spoke on behalf of the Democrat Party - PD and described Romania’s contribution to a coalition against Iraq as the ‘natural continuity of a coherent foreign policy conducted by our country since removing

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659 Ibid.
Ceaușescu’s dictatorship’.\textsuperscript{660} He stressed that such an endeavour was part of the state’s duty and responsibility as a NATO member:

‘Romania must respect its international commitments to the defence of democracy and the fundamental values of humanity. We wanted our country to be part of NATO. We wanted this integration as the only alternative capable of confirming our democratic future. That is why Romania now needs to undertake both the benefits and the obligations of its status as member of the North-Atlantic Alliance (...) The Democrat Party has insisted and insists for the peaceful disarmament of Iraq. But when the political and diplomatic arguments have been exhausted, a dictatorial regime has to be disarmed through a military intervention (...) The Democrat Party has supported NATO’s intervention in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and other areas where democracy was endangered (...) Now in 2003 Saddam Hussein is just as democratic as Slobodan Milosevic was in 1999’,\textsuperscript{661}

In the Kosovo case, two self-images of Romanian identity (‘European’/‘liberal democratic’ and ‘security provider’) eventually prevailed over the state’s Balkan affinity. Iraq brought about national identity tensions concerning the kind of liberal democracy Romania aspired to be. Kosovo had already set a precedent for democratic intervention, which prompted the question – how should Romania distinguish between dictators and decide to stand or not against them? Is a ‘European’ liberal democracy only preoccupied with the near abroad (former Yugoslavia)? That is a very selective understanding on how an established liberal democracy would be expected to act. If the authoritative Euro-Atlantic community advocates respect for human rights, geographical proximity should not be a deciding factor in humanitarian and democratic intervention.

The third opposition speaker, Deputy Ovidiu Drăgănescu, expressed a slight variation on the same themes of championing democracy and not appeasing totalitarianism -

‘[t]he National Liberal Party agrees with Romania joining the countries who wish to support the United States in Iraq’s disarmament. Our party cannot ignore the solid arguments in favour of such an action – here I refer especially to the 18 UN resolutions which Iraq did not obey. Moreover, we take into account the strong support conveyed by the Romanian public opinion with regards to a potential military intervention in Iraq (...) Looking back with pride to the 1989 Revolution, we,

\textsuperscript{660} Gheorghe Liviu Negoiță – PD Deputy, ibid.
\textsuperscript{661} Ibid.
Romanians, paid the highest price to conquer our freedom and democracy, we paid with the blood of our young people killed in the streets of Timișoara, București, Cluj (…) So today, after seeing what dictatorship and totalitarianism mean, we, Romanians, can only stand with those who love, cherish and defend freedom and democracy’.

The quote suggests more explicitly how Romanian national identity has drawn from the collective memory-myths of its totalitarian past, which partially accounts for why the state felt responsible to promote and protect democratic values. This argument will be analysed later in the chapter, as part of the wider ideational underpinnings of Romanian national identity and foreign policy. The different parliamentary opinions show that ‘democracy’ and ‘democratic values’ have become profoundly contested terms. The two concepts can be used either to support US actions despite the lack of a UN mandate, or to insist on not participating in military interventions without UN approval.

Drăgănescu also inquired why the government had not properly explained Romania’s position to its EU partners, ‘particularly those who have reservations about the American policy’. In this respect, Foreign Affairs Minister Geoană gave reassurances that the Romanian diplomacy had consulted with French, German and EU officials. Geoană also remarked upon the state’s ‘balance in international action’, wishing to see ‘a European Union with a coherent voice, a North-Atlantic Alliance with the same cohesion and security guarantees which work for the newly joined like Romania, and equally a United Nations and Security Council that preserve their full relevance’. During the final parliamentary discussions, Defence Minister Pașcu gave an interesting reply to Teodor Meleşcanu’s (PNL member and former Foreign Affairs Minister) public recommendation to support the coalition against Iraq without sending troops. Pașcu had a more pragmatic vocal opinion on the possibility of a balanced foreign policy – ‘solidarity with the USA, while taking Europe into account; I agree, it’s perfect, just let us

662 Ovidiu Virgil Drăgănescu – PNL Deputy, ibid.
663 Ibid.
664 Mircea Geoană, ibid.
know how to put it in practice this time’. He was the only one who explicitly acknowledged that the time for a middle ground had passed. Romania could no longer simultaneously appease both dimensions of its Euro-Atlantic national identity and opted for an Atlantic vocation. In the end, the decision to grant infrastructure and airspace access and prepare forces for potential post-conflict stabilisation was adopted with 351 votes in favour, 2 against and 74 abstentions.

Therefore, the parliamentary debates on whether or not Romania had to be involved in the US military operations against Iraq encapsulated an evocative snapshot for the re-definition of Romanian national identity – preferably Euro-Atlantic yet, when forced to choose between the two dimensions, almost unhesitatingly Atlantic. The discourse indicated that both PD (opposition party) and Minister Geoană already considered their state to have achieved NATO accession – e.g. use of past tense in terms of seeking membership (‘wanted’), ‘its status as member of the North-Atlantic Alliance’, ‘newly joined like Romania’. Government and opposition alike framed the contribution in Iraq as the responsibility of a state that had painfully experienced life under dictatorship and ‘paid the highest price for freedom’. As the Foreign Affairs Minister said elsewhere,

‘[w]e in Romania have first-hand experience of living under dictatorship, without freedom, without choice, waiting for the opportunity to rejoin the West. We know that life lived in these circumstances is not life. It is merely survival (...) The Iraqi people, like the Germans under Hitler, the Baltics under Stalin and the Romanians under Ceauşescu deserve the opportunity for freedom’.

The Defence Minister highlighted that, ‘having lived a similar experience, Romania was able and wanted to directly support the domestic stabilisation effort and institutional consolidation of post-Saddam Iraq’. On 20 March

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665 Ioan Mircea Paşcu, ibid.
2003, President Iliescu issued the following statement covering Romanian participation in the Iraq war:

‘Romania hopes that the military intervention will not take long and civilian casualties will be as low as possible. The Iraqi people have suffered enough and have the right to live in a peaceful democracy from now on. Romania is acting in a responsible manner, respecting its commitments and obligations in the international scene. Its position benefits from a large popular support, since Romanian citizens have lived the horrors of a totalitarian regime and are aware of the price for freedom. Depending on the available means, our country will contribute to the post-conflict operations, to help the civilian population and the political, economic and social reconstruction of Iraq’.669

During the parliamentary debate, PD mentioned the ‘Western European partners’ but just in terms of informing them about Romania’s Atlantic orientation, not questioning if perhaps the state should further deliberate its stance. Ironically, the only contestation about legality and acting against the French-German side came from PRM – a nationalistic party with extremist tendencies and regarded as undemocratic.670 Although the Foreign Affairs Minister continued to rhetorically emphasise the balanced nature of Romanian foreign policy, officially approving in Parliament the use of airspace and other required infrastructure by the anti-Iraq coalition was undoubtedly a pro-Atlantic move. This was very problematic as it placed Romania in opposition to the French, who had been a historical long-standing ally and friend. After all, France through its President Chirac had been Romania’s most firm advocate for NATO accession at the 1997 summit in Madrid, while the US had refused to include it in that enlargement wave.671 So it is important to note that foreign policy is not determined by either material interests or memory; rather different collective memory-myths or

interpretations of history can be selected by elites from the foreign policy imaginary to support various views.

The diplomatic tensions with France arose very soon after the Romanian Parliament adopted the motion to support a potential coalition against Iraq, under the American flag. On 17 February 2003, the European Council held a special meeting that aimed to produce a common EU view on Iraq. Yet the result did not contain a substantially different message from previous ones -

‘[w]e are committed to the United Nations remaining at the centre of the international order. We recognise that the primary responsibility for dealing with Iraqi disarmament lies with the Security Council (...) The Union’s objective for Iraq remains full and effective disarmament in accordance with the relevant UNSC resolutions (...) We want to achieve this peacefully. It is clear that this is what the people of Europe want. War is not inevitable. Force should be used only as a last resort. It is for the Iraqi regime to end this crisis by complying with the demands of the Security Council’.

This statement did not address the underlying disagreement among the European and EU allied partners of NATO. France and Germany continued to oppose a military operation in Iraq, while eight other members (the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Denmark, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic) were willing to help an American initiative to disarm Iraq, possibly without UN approval. The more interesting development happened after the European Council’s meeting, when President Chirac held a press conference where he admonished, criticised and arguably threatened the EU applicants who supported the US:

‘[c]oncerning the candidate states (...) to be honest, I believe they have acted a bit superficially. Because accession to the European Union essentially involves a minimum of consideration for the other [members], a minimum of policy consultation. If, upon the first difficult subject, one gives a point of view independently from any discussion with the group which one actually wants to join, then that is not responsible behaviour (...) Therefore, I think they missed a good opportunity to keep silent. Beyond the somewhat amusing or childish aspects of the matter, it is a dangerous course of action (...) All it takes is one country not to ratify by referendum for [EU] enlargement not to move forward. So, frankly, I would say that these

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countries have been both not very well brought up and rather careless about the dangers that too quick an alignment with the American position could have for them’.\footnote{\textit{Jacques Chirac, \textit{Press Conference after the Extraordinary Informal Meeting of the European Council} (Brussels, 17 February 2003); French version at http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/cahier/europe/conf-chirac} (June 2014).}

He also purposefully singled out Romania from a reporter’s general question, underlining that Romania and Bulgaria ‘were particularly superficial’ considering ‘their already delicate position with regards to Europe’; if the two states ‘wanted to diminish their chances for European membership, they could not find a better way to do so’.\footnote{Ibid.} The French President gave the impression of speaking for the Union as a whole, when in fact that was not the case. The EU officials had mixed reactions to Chirac’s remarks. Romano Prodi (President of the European Commission) was disappointed by the candidates’ conduct, since they failed to understand that the EU was not just about an economic union but also about shared political values and consensus.\footnote{Romano Prodi cited in ‘Chirac Lashes out at “New Europe”’, \textit{CNN World} (18 February 2003); http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/02/18/sprj.irq.chirac/} Chris Patten, the Commissioner for External Relations, insisted the EU was not the Warsaw Pact and added that – ‘\textit{a}ll of us have our different ways of expressing ourselves, but the European Union is a club for equals, and everybody has got to be listened to’.\footnote{Chris Patten cited in ‘Candidates Sign up to EU Position on Iraq, Hit Back at Chirac’, \textit{EurActiv} (19 February 2003); http://www.euractiv.com/enlargement/candidates-sign-eu-position-iraq-hit-back-chirac/article-114605} Pat Cox (President of the European Parliament) ‘blamed France for creating divisions in Europe by issuing unilateral foreign policy declarations’.\footnote{Pat Cox in ibid.}

Moreover, Romanian foreign policy decision-makers (who were present in Brussels) had to immediately formulate a response. Prime Minister Năstase opted for a more diplomatic approach, stressing the state’s uncomfortable international stance:

\begin{quote}
‘\textit{i}t is very odd for us (...) to feel that were pushed to choose between Europe and the United States, instead of having to choose between Saddam Hussein’s regime and the Euro-Atlantic countries (...) In my opinion, some issues need to be settled within an EU-US dialogue (...) However, it is difficult for us to accept being placed in an area of
\end{quote}
supplementary conditionality and (...) to understand why [EU] candidates like Romania have more obligations than member states and fewer rights. It would be a paradoxical situation'.

President Iliescu went for a more direct phrasing and declared that the French President should regret his choice of words, concluding with –

‘I find inappropriate such a way of framing things, as if some are more equal than others, some have fewer rights than others and, therefore, should be more prudent about what they think and say. I believe we are entering a democratic community in which mutual respect must govern everyone’.

When tempers calmed down, Năstase introduced a firmer note to his discourse, which suggested some resentment towards a paternalistic France:

‘France was disappointed by certain developments of the Iraqi crisis. I do not wish to comment on the language used, we must understand the French position because of our past (...) Yet I continue to believe that Romania, just like any other European country, has the right to decide its foreign policy actions and we do not appreciate someone else telling us what to do’.

Among the Romanian public opinion, France’s negative attitude caused concern that it would render the state’s course for EU integration much more difficult or even impossible to achieve. Günter Verheugen (the European Commissioner for Enlargement) offered reassurances that EU gates were still open for Romania and it would not be subject to supplementary criteria compared to other applicants:

‘[t]he political trajectory defined at Copenhagen, aiming towards Romania’s integration in 2007 is the principle underlying our [the Commission’s] activity. I would like to point out that this process of EU enlargement will not end until Romania has become a member and we will apply the same set of EU accession conditions to Romania as with all the other candidate states. That is why achieving the membership objective in 2007 depends on Romania’s ability to fulfil the accession criteria’.

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681 Günter Verheugen cited in ibid.
The crucial question of this story is why Romania had a pro-active foreign policy on Iraq when it could have got away with a limited or neutral viewpoint on the invasion. Much of the literature on Central-Eastern European participation in the Iraq war gravitates around the neo-realist assumptions about ‘small state’ conduct. Though most works concede that these states had many reasons to side with the US, they tend to underline causal factors like power and material interests. Yet the logic of rationalism does not fully explain why Romania became wholeheartedly involved in the ‘coalition of the willing’. In this respect, the notion of rational decision-making must be examined further. Romania’s situation in the process of NATO integration was complicated. In November 2002, it had received the invitation to join the Alliance and was scheduled to be granted official membership in 2004. The still pending issue was the fact that NATO allies had to individually ratify the accession protocol. Neither the US nor France had ratified it by the time of the Iraqi intervention. The US approved the accession protocol on 8 May 2003, while France was the last member to ratify it at the end of January 2004.\(^\text{682}\) So the rational interest of pleaseing the Americans to finalise NATO integration can account for why Romanian leaders backed the Bush administration, although the context is not clear-cut. France is not the most powerful Alliance member, but it has a veto at its disposal and is certainly a highly influential member in the EU, where Romania’s accession was much more problematic. In the European arena, the more or less threatening remarks from Paris, Brussels and Berlin conveyed the worrying message that the upcoming EU integration could be jeopardised. EU Enlargement Commissioner Verheugen was convinced that Central-Eastern Europe would learn their lessons from Iraq because they ‘know only too well where their markets are and where their money’s coming from’.\(^\text{683}\) According to a purely rational calculation, a vocal Atlantic response to Iraq could potentially bring political and economic losses that would outweigh the ultimate benefit. Pragmatically speaking, Romania was already with one foot inside NATO and


a limited form of support (airspace access without military troops) would have probably appeased the Americans, without antagonising the French and Germans. This foreign policy scenario would have brought Romania a maximum gain with the least amount of costs.

Whichever way one looks at the rational equation, the narrative of Romania’s position on Iraq would be incomplete without the influence of national identity. The divergent European (French-German) and Atlantic conceptions on how to approach the disarming of Iraq facilitated an identity crisis within Romania’s liberal democratic self-image. The tensions in national identity were settled by drawing from collective memory-myths and Romania opted to act like an ‘Atlantic’ liberal democracy. Specific collective memory-myths or interpretations of history were particularly relevant at this point, since a certain set of conditions had been met. Thus, after the Kosovo conflict, Romanian national identity went through two fundamental redefinitions. First, the ‘non-Balkan’ self-image faded away from the foreign policy imaginary. The second fundamental re-definition of national identity was essential to the emergence of Romanian solidarity with the US on Iraq. As the international ideational context of 1999 advocated the notion of humanitarian and democratic intervention, the ‘European’/‘liberal democratic’ self-image was re-articulated to depict Romania as a pro-active liberal democracy that assisted the victims of totalitarian regimes. Memories of their painful communist dictatorship rendered Romanians keenly aware of how invaluable democracy was. From 1990 to mid-1999, the ‘European’ and ‘liberal democratic’ self-images referred to the same representation. The Kosovo ‘formative moment’ enabled Romania’s ‘liberal democratic’ self-image to be differentiated from ‘European’ identity. Romania was re-defined as a pro-active liberal democracy that could have a primary ‘European’ or ‘Atlantic’ vocation. This shift helped to clarify Romania’s choice between the ‘European’ and ‘Atlantic’ dimensions of its national identity. A pro-active liberal democracy that wants to gain external validation for its self-image cannot be selective about where to promote democratic values. How should Romania distinguish between totalitarian regimes and decide to stand or not against them? The state decided to participate in the coalition against Iraq because
this foreign policy option was consistent with the fundamentally re-defined national identity of 1999 – a pro-active liberal democracy. At the same time, Romanian identity resonated with the American interventionist vision of liberal democracy. As all these factors combined, certain Cold War collective memory-myths became meaningful since they reinforced both Romania’s re-articulation as a pro-active liberal democracy and the emerging Atlantic vocation of its foreign policy.

Romanian foreign policy decision-makers felt an emotional solidarity with the American initiative, because the US had been discursively constructed as ‘the liberator’, ‘the rescuer’, ‘the guarantor of freedom and democracy’ since the end of World War II and especially during the communist dictatorship. This theme was reflected in the elite discourse before and after the Iraq invasion. On 8 January 2003, when asked if the state would be part of a potential American intervention in Iraq, the Prime Minister avoided a yes or no answer but did provide an idea of how priorities ranked in his thinking: ‘Romania must do its duty as ally of the United States of America, as member of the North-Atlantic Alliance’.684 In the event of a unilateral US action against Iraq, President Iliescu declared in early February 2003 – ‘[w]e have a special relationship and strategic partnership with the USA. So, from this point of view, we have the moral obligation to stand by them until the end’.685 Talking in 2004 about Romania and the Iraqi crisis, the Defence Minister advanced the following arguments:

‘[s]ome have openly questioned the reasons for our support of the United States. The answer is simple. If, today, we are free and democratic once again, it is due to the huge effort undertaken by the West under American leadership, which defeated dictatorship in this part of the world and eliminated the rigid division between the spheres of influence of the Cold War’.686

This quote explained that Romanians felt an emotional solidarity with the US, even at the expense of Europe and France.

Romania and Central-Eastern Europe’s Atlantic predispositions are culturally and historically motivated. Ronald Asmus and Alexandr Vondra think that such reactions ‘spring from a very specific set of historical experiences these countries have had with the United States over the past century, the Central and East European encounter with both Nazi and communist totalitarian regimes, a recognition of the leading role the US played in toppling communism and in facilitating the integration of these countries into Euro-Atlantic institutions’.687 They also argue that the US is the only great Western power that ‘has never constituted a threat’ in the region, a largely positive record that contrasts sharply to the ‘disappointing historical experiences with other leading Western powers’ like France, Germany and the United Kingdom.688 In Marcin Zaborowski’s opinion, the origins of this ‘reflexive Atlanticism’ date back to the traumatic ‘legacy of the Second World War and the post-war division of Europe’; at the time Central and Eastern European countries were abandoned by France and the United Kingdom to their fate of Nazi and later Soviet invasions, engendering an acute sense of betrayal.689 The historical collective memory-myths of these states shaped their perspective on European appeasement and pacifism, the policies for which they had been sacrificed by Western brothers in the past.690 Interestingly, although the US had an equal role in leaving Central-Eastern Europe to the Soviet sphere of influence, it continued to be regarded as a mostly ‘benign albeit at times inconsistent and somewhat naive’ power.691

Consenting to the post-1945 separation of Europe could not outweigh the fact

688 Ibid.
that American idealism made possible the independence and even existence of many Central-Eastern states.\textsuperscript{692} For example, the vision promoted by President Woodrow Wilson after the end of World War I contributed to the Great Unification of Romania (1918), when the majority of elites in Transilvania, Basarabia and Bucovina individually declared their independence from various ruling empires and chose to join the Romanian Kingdom.

Furthermore, in communist dictatorships, the domestic populations saw the US as an idealised alternative to the autocratic USSR and as the only possible source of help for their plight.\textsuperscript{693} As Andrei Markovits notes, Central-Eastern Europeans’ ‘overwhelmingly positive views of America stem largely from their having perceived the United States as their sole ally against the much-despised Soviet Union’.\textsuperscript{694} Jacques Rupnik agrees that American moral support offered to communist states during the Cold War has impacted on their present solidarity with US causes. Western European states like France may interpret the American hyper-power as a potential threat or imbalance in global security. Yet Central-Eastern Europe predominantly embraces US unilateralism as a necessary factor for maintaining international security and not allowing Russia (in its various incarnations) to become as powerful as it used to be pre-1990:

‘[t]he two Europes are out of sync in their attitudes toward the implications of the end of the Cold War. In West European eyes, the Eastern Americanophilia is, at best, an anachronism. In East-Central Europe, Franco-German challenge to American leadership is seen as a reckless undermining of their security. They closely associate their security with NATO and the U.S. presence on the continent. The French may be concerned about a unipolar world; the East Europeans have no nostalgia for a bipolar one’.\textsuperscript{695}

\textsuperscript{692} Ibid.
Stephen Brooks reinforces that post-communist Europe’s Atlanticism is rooted in Cold War perceptions; at the same time, he adds that pro-American feelings in Central-Eastern Europe are ‘fueled by skepticism and mistrust of the European Union, which most of [these] countries have joined in recent years, or at least by a certain idea of the EU that critics associate with domination by France and Germany’.

In the Romanian collective imaginary, the US was articulated during the Cold War as ‘the liberator’, ‘the rescuer’, ‘the guarantor of freedom and democracy’. This process and symbolic presence was perhaps best encapsulated by a famous Romanian phrase – ‘the Americans are coming!’ – very influential in the 1940s-1950s and repeated until the present. The historian Florin Constantinescu defined it as:

‘[a] strange phenomenon of collective psychology (...) the strong and enduring belief that the West and above all the USA would pull Romania from beneath the Soviet boot. “The Americans are coming!” was an expression that summarised a political attitude but also a state of mind. These resisted all proof of disinterest in Western capitals towards the countries left behind the “Iron Curtain”’.

Mircea Cărtărescu depicts the Romanians’ fervent waiting for their rescuer, in the face of communist brutality and violence –

‘[m]y grand-father used to tell me how in that atrocious period, when forced collectivisation was introduced, when all the peasants’ horses were taken away and shot by the communist activists, each peasant used to look at the sky at least once a day. They were not looking for signs of rain or good weather, but rather madly and desperately hoping for a historical miracle: the appearance of American airplanes which would deliver us from the Russians and finally bring us freedom’.

Even if the US had also agreed to the ‘Yalta order and betrayal’, or at least tacitly approved it, their symbolic presence in Romania and Central-Eastern Europe during the Cold War kept the hope for democratic freedom alive. Such

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698 Florin Constantiniiu, O istorie sinceră a poporului român/ A Sincere History of the Romanian People (Bucharest: Univers Enciclopedic, 1997), p. 450.
an imaginary was primarily configured through a network of radio stations (Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, Voice of America), which broadcast in the different native languages of Europeans under communist regimes. They promoted the US agenda, widely spreading the conviction that Central-Eastern European countries had not been completely abandoned by the Americans.\textsuperscript{700}

In February 2003, the EU Commissioner for Enlargement translated this feeling into contemporary terms:

‘[t]he new candidate states have an emotional connection to the USA (...) Because if you ask a middle-aged Romanian citizen who contributed to the USSR’s dissolution, he will not answer the EU but rather Reagan (...) basically the Americans. Consequently, we see a feeling of gratitude and solidarity for the role which the Americans played in the past. We should not criticise it, on the contrary, we should understand it since [that feeling] could be a basis for the new Euro-Atlantic relations’.\textsuperscript{701}

After the initial operations in Iraq had been declared accomplished, the Prime Minister was asked why Romania had so decisively supported the US, taking into account that no weapons of mass destruction had been found there. Năstase replied to German-speaking audiences that the endeavour was meant to ‘affirm a set of values’ which ‘represented the expression of past frustrations’ lived under Ceauşescu’s communism.\textsuperscript{702} During a BBC interview in July 2003, he reinforced the same idea -

‘Saddam Hussein’s regime was, for Romanians, the most important factor when they formed a moral judgement about supporting an intervention there (...) Romanians,
due to their own painful experience, the difficult road towards democracy, understood better than others that we should help improve the Iraqi people’s situation’.  

Ultimately, Romania’s full support and contribution to the ‘coalition of the willing’ was a way of seeking acceptance for the state’s ‘liberal democratic’ self-image.

For the rest of 2003 and most of 2004, government officials from the foreign affairs and defence departments worked on contouring the ‘strategic profile of Romania inside the Alliance’.  

On 9 December 2003, in a lengthy speech on this very topic, the Prime Minister defined the state’s foreign policy trajectory in the context of NATO membership. He discussed five interconnected themes: ‘1) promoting security and stability in the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, the Black Sea region, Caucasus and Central Asia; 2) contributing to NATO’s new role and missions; 3) strengthening the transatlantic link; 4) building a stronger Europe; 5) consolidating the United Nations’ role in maintaining international security’.  

Moreover, on 26 February 2004, Năstase said the following in the Romanian Parliament -

‘[t]o fulfil its obligations as an Alliance member state and contribute to [NATO’s] transformation in the new security environment, Romania will continue to consolidate its strategic profile (...) by broadening our relations with neighbours, Western Balkan states, the EU’s Eastern vicinity and the Extended Middle East. We will remain active in the fight against terrorism, including thorough a substantial contribution to the stabilisation and reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan’.  

By February 2004, all the NATO allies had ratified the accession protocol and in a month’s time the state would officially gain NATO membership. The Prime Minister still offering ‘a substantial contribution’ to Iraq and Afghanistan suggests that there was indeed more than mere rational interest at stake in Romanian reactions throughout 2003. Under Năstase’s governmental coordination, Romania significantly increased and diversified

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its involvement abroad. The state also apparently wanted to continue being active both in NATO and other international missions. As another Romanian official noted in January 2004,

‘Romania is prepared to contribute to Allied land, air and maritime forces. Some of these capabilities have already been used in multinational operations, together with troops belonging to NATO nations. We provide 116 troops for KFOR, 119 troops for SFOR, one infantry battalion as a SFOR/KFOR reserve, 49 military personnel and one transport aircraft C-130 B for ISAF, one infantry battalion (405 military personnel) for the operation Enduring Freedom, 804 military personnel to the Operational International Force in Iraq (one infantry battalion one engineer detachment one military police company one NBC company one special detachment). We will also continue to provide military observers and monitors for UN or OSCE missions’.707

On 29 March 2004, Romania and six other states formally became members of NATO. The Foreign Affairs Minister’s speech on 2 April marked the occasion while expressing a statement of intent:

‘[a]s a NATO member, Romania has both the moral obligation and a strategic interest in the continuation of Europe’s reunification process - in the Western Balkans and across the Black Sea, in the Caucasus and Central Asia, as well as to the East, to the Republic of Moldova, to Ukraine and indeed Belarus (...) Romania is a European country with a Trans-Atlantic vocation. We believe in a solid and effective NATO, a strong EU with enhanced and complementary military and security roles, and in a dynamic and robust Trans-Atlantic partnership. We believe these goals are complementary not contradictory, and we pledge our support to all three. We look forward to our journey with NATO, to promote and protect our shared values of security, freedom and democracy to the frontiers of Europe -- and beyond’.708

The message conveyed was that Romania aimed for an active regional role, which included democratising the Black Sea area. Geoană also introduced a re-defined articulation of national identity (‘European country with a Trans-Atlantic vocation’). For the first time the two dimensions of Romania’s Euro-Atlantic identity were rhetoricly separated. On 13 May 2004, the Secretary

708 Mircea Geoană, Address at the Ceremonial North Atlantic Council on the Occasion of Romania’s Accesison to NATO (Brussels, 2 April 2004); available at http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s040402d.htm (June 2014).
General of NATO validated these emerging understandings related to Romanian national identity and foreign policy:

‘Romania has an important role to play. Before you entered NATO you were among our most active Partners. Now that you are in NATO, countries all around you continue to long for a greater sense of security – a closer connection to the Europe in which you are now making your way. Whether it is Moldova or Ukraine, the countries of the Western Balkans or those of the South Caucasus – Romania can be an example to them, an invaluable source of inspiration and practical assistance’. 709

The state’s NATO accession in 2004 accomplished one of the two major objectives of Romanian post-communist foreign policy. This event prefigured the beginning of another formative period of national identity and foreign policy, as Romania’s Euro-Atlantic identity was internationally recognised by one of the authoritative selves – NATO.

**Concluding Remarks**

In conclusion, the years 2000-2004 represented the culmination of a series of ‘formative moments’ for Romanian identity and foreign policy. The first post-communist decade brought a rich palette of re-articulated meanings. The overarching ‘Euro-Atlantic’ national identity of Romania included three main self-images: ‘European’/‘liberal democratic’, ‘non-Balkan’ and ‘security provider’. These self-images and key themes of the foreign policy imaginary were configured in 1990-1996, forming an ideational foundation that impacted on Romanian international relations until 2007. Romania’s ‘European’ identity meant that the state was an aspiring liberal democracy that needed to be recognised as such by external audiences, especially by the authoritative Euro-Atlantic community (NATO and EU states). Otherwise, the self-images internally constructed by Romania would not be accepted in the international realm. The post-1996 national discourses circulated the ‘liberal democratic’ self-image more often than the ‘European’ one. Regarding the Kosovo crisis, Romania’s evolving responses exhibited the inherent dilemmas

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of acting as a ‘European’ liberal democracy with a ‘security provider’ role that also retains Balkan ties. The ‘European’/‘liberal democratic’ and ‘security provider’ self-images competed with Balkan affinity for prevalence on Romanian foreign policy. But the critical nature of the Kosovo conflict enabled the re-articulation of international discourses. In early 1999, the international context shifted towards the idea of urgent humanitarian intervention in Kosovo. This ideational change facilitated a hierarchical process within Romanian identity, in which the two self-images (‘European’/‘liberal democratic’ and ‘security provider’) preceded the traditional relationship with the Balkans. At this crucial point in 1999, the fluid nature of national identity made it subject to two fundamental re-definitions. First, the ‘non-Balkan’ self-image began to gradually disappear from the foreign policy imaginary, leaving the other self-images to be dominant. Second, the ‘European’/‘liberal democratic’ self-image was substantially re-articulated. Until 1999, the ‘European’ and ‘liberal democratic’ self-images constituted the same representation. The Kosovo ‘formative moment’ enabled Romania’s ‘liberal democratic’ self-image to be separated from its ‘European’ identity. As the international narratives of 1999 advocated the concepts of humanitarian and democratic intervention, Romania was re-defined as a pro-active liberal democracy that helped to spread democratic values; being a liberal democracy was not necessarily associated with ‘Europe’. This shift in national identity was central in clarifying Romania’s foreign policy on Iraq, whether it should opt for a ‘European’ or ‘Atlantic’ orientation. To some extent, the emerging Atlantic vocation of national identity and international conduct was prefigured by Romania signing the American Bilateral Immunity Agreement in August 2002. Romania was uncomfortable between the opposing views of the US and EU on the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. The Romanian state eventually adopted the ‘European’ (EU) viewpoint and did not ratify the document signed with the US. Yet the American Bilateral Immunity Agreement signalled that Romania could prefer an Atlantic orientation on Iraq, depending on the ideas shaping its external reactions.

The year 2003 forced Romania to choose between two contrasting approaches to disarming Iraq. France and Germany wanted to continue using
peaceful means, whereas the US was firmly in favour of invading Iraq and removing Saddam Hussein’s regime through military force. At first, Romania attempted to maintain a neutral stance, but in the end decided to support the US and participate in the coalition against Iraq. The state was again placed in an uncomfortable situation and could have incurred losses either way. Rationalism would argue that Romania was simply trying to please the powerful US, in order to finalise the NATO integration process. However, the context was much more complicated than that. France had very harshly reprimanded Romanian solidarity with the Americans and indirectly threatened that such a position could jeopardise the state’s EU candidacy. Romania had already been invited to join NATO in November 2002, yet its possible EU accession was much more problematic. According to a rational calculation, Romania was halfway in NATO and could lose much more by antagonising France and Germany, who were both key EU decision-makers. Romania could have formulated a type of limited backing for the US (e.g. airspace access), a middle ground that minimised potential costs and did not include sending armed forces. Instead, Romanian elites across the political spectrum agreed on a vocal Atlantic response to Iraq and full military involvement. Here national identity comes in to explain the state’s foreign policy on Iraq. The opposing European (French-German) and Atlantic views on Iraq prompted an identity crisis within Romania’s ‘liberal democratic’ self-image. An aspiring pro-active liberal democracy that seeks to be recognised in the international arena cannot have double standards about the promotion of democratic values. The state’s painful communist past made Romanians more aware of how invaluable democracy was. How was Romania supposed to differentiate between dictatorships? It intervened in Kosovo for humanitarian and democratic reasons, and then could not decline to do so in Iraq due to material considerations.

Romania became fully involved in the coalition against Iraq because this action was consistent with the fundamentally re-defined national identity (‘pro-active liberal democracy’) and the emerging Atlantic vocation of its foreign policy. Romanian identity was more compatible with the US and UK interventionist vision of liberal democracy. As all these elements combined,
specific Cold War collective memory-myths were particularly relevant for national elites since they reinforced Romania’s re-articulation as a pro-active liberal democracy and its Atlantic-oriented foreign policy. Romania felt an emotional solidarity with American causes, because the US was constructed as ‘the liberator’ and ‘the guarantor of freedom and democracy’ during the communist dictatorship. The pro-American attitudes of Romania and Central-Eastern European states originate in certain interpretations about the Cold War, which convey the essential contribution of the US in defeating communism. Although Western Europe and the US had an equal role in the post-1945 settlement and leaving Central-Eastern Europe to Soviet domination, post-communist states mostly blame Western Europe for the ‘Yalta order and betrayal’. The symbolic presence of the US in the Cold War imaginary of Central-Eastern Europe kept the hope for democratic freedom alive, especially through a network of radio stations that broadcast in the native languages of Europeans under communist regimes. The US had not completely abandoned Central-Eastern Europe between 1945 and 1989, and many post-communist states including Romania felt a moral duty to support the American democratic ideal on Iraq in 2003, even through force and at the expense of Western European appeasement and pacifism. After having re-defined Romanian identity as a pro-active liberal democracy with an Atlantic vocation, the state’s story of national identity and foreign policy moves on to the last formative period of 2004-2007 and its intensified Atlanticism.

As the final formative time frame of Romania’s post-communist national identity and foreign policy, the years 2004-2007 brought the consolidation and intensification of the state’s Atlantic vocation. This chapter aims to show how the post-2004 foreign policy imaginary was re-defined and internally contested, as well as how the re-articulated Romanian identity shaped the state’s international actions towards the ‘East’. After 2005, the new President systematically extended his de facto prerogatives in the foreign policy domain, hence reducing the Government and Parliament’s decision-making input. The presidential administration also promoted an intensified Atlanticism of Romanian national identity and international behaviour. Although Romania was already part of NATO and was expected to finalise the EU accession process, the self-images of ‘security provider’ and ‘pro-active liberal democracy’ continued to be particularly meaningful for its foreign policy. The state intended to have an active involvement abroad, in more distant theatres of operation (Iraq and Afghanistan) and in the neighbouring region of the Black Sea. The Presidency’s international vision shifted the Romanian outlook from the ‘West’ to the ‘East’, where the state could play an important role in democratising and stabilising the Euro-Atlantic community’s vicinity. Still, these meanings were not accepted by all Romanian leaders, especially the Prime Minister who tried to re-balance the ‘European’ self-image and Atlantic vocation of national identity, which in turn would affect the state’s international affairs. In June 2006, the debates around Romania’s potential military withdrawal from Iraq were an interesting case of contestation among domestic elites, where the Premier and President had contrasting views and competed for legitimacy over foreign policy. The Prime Minister attempted to infuse a more balanced ‘European’ dimension to Romanian international stances, but was unsuccessful in front of the Atlantic-minded President.
The intensified Atlanticism of national identity, along with the self-images of ‘liberal democratic’ and ‘security provider’, impacted on Romania’s Eastern foreign policy and Black Sea projects. The latter illustrated the manner in which international goals were undermined from within. Any Black Sea cooperation arrangement needs a good working dialogue with Russia who remains a key actor in the area. The Romanian President’s antagonistic rhetoric towards Russia was not rational, but rather consistent with the representations advocated by the re-defined foreign policy imaginary which depicted a confrontational relationship between the Euro-Atlantic community and its non-Euro-Atlantic others. The quite hostile Romanian discourses offended Russia who ignored or sabotaged Romania's Black Sea initiatives. Another component of Romania’s Eastern foreign policy was building good relations with the Republic of Moldova and bringing it closer to the EU. The Romanian-Moldovan rapport was marked by an initial tentative progress that eventually transformed into a diplomatic crisis. With regards to structure, this chapter begins with a section on Romania’s re-defined foreign policy imaginary, followed by the debates on maintaining Romanian military presence in Iraq and the state’s post-2005 Eastern foreign policy.

**Romania’s Re-defined Foreign Policy Imaginary**

The legislative elections of late November 2004 did not produce a clear majority in Parliament, since the two main political forces obtained very similar shares of the vote: the centre-left coalition between the Social Democrats (PSD) and the Humanist Party (PUR) won 36.8%, the centre-right ‘Justice and Truth’ – DA alliance between the Democrat Party (PD) and the National Liberal Party (PNL) had 31.49%, the right-wing Great Romania Party (PRM) 12.99% and the ethnic Hungarian party UDMR 6.2%.\(^7\) The nature of the major two coalitions differed in that the DA alliance had the juridical

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status of ‘political alliance’, while the National Union PSD+PUR was only an ‘electoral alliance’.

This semantic distinction turned into a significant argument when interpreting the parliamentary results. Among the political parties, PSD emerged as the uncontested winner with a total of 159 seats or mandates. But, in terms of registered political unions, the DA alliance (PD and PNL) had the upper hand with 161 mandates.

The situation became so volatile that, within a month, Romania went through three coalitions in Parliament which all competed for the right to form the Government.

During the second ballot of presidential elections held on 12 December 2004, voters favoured the PD-PNL candidate Traian Băsescu (51.23%) over the former Premier and PSD leader Adrian Năstase (48.77%). Băsescu’s ‘top priority’ as the new President was to establish a stable majority in Parliament, explicitly inviting UDMR and PUR to consider governing alongside the DA alliance.

Although PSD+PUR had obtained a higher number of parliamentary seats, one of Băsescu’s first decisions was to appoint Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu (PNL co-leader of the DA alliance) as Prime Minister.

On the 15 December 2004, President Băsescu increased the pressure over the entire political spectrum by declaring that:

I will appoint Călin Popescu Tăriceanu as Prime Minister. If I cannot fulfil the mandate I was given by the people, I will return to the people (...) If the Government of the [DA] Alliance does not pass, we will certainly go back to early elections. I think that the President, who is elected by direct vote, has a right to decide the party he

712 OSCE, ‘Annex – Election Results’, p. 34.
716 Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu – Prime Minister of Romania (December 2004 – December 2008).
wants to work with, so that his own programme promoted during the election campaign will become reality'.

To support this unprecedented action, he invoked article 103.1 in the Romanian Constitution which said that - ‘[t]he President of Romania designates a candidate for the prime minister position, after consultations with the party holding a clear majority in Parliament or, if such a majority does not exist, after [consulting] the parties represented in Parliament’. The Prime Minister would then have ten days to decide on a cabinet, outline the governmental plan and gain the legislators’ vote of confidence. Until 2004, the normal expectation was for the President to appoint a Prime Minister proposed by the party or coalition that had the largest number of seats, whether or not the party or coalition in question had a parliamentary majority as well. That winning party or coalition had the informal right of being the first to form a cabinet and try to find a stable majority. This happened in 1992 with the Social Democratic Party of Romania (PDSR now PSD), in 1996 with the governing coalition led by the Democratic Convention of Romania (CDR) and in 2000 again with PDSR. Both CDR in 1996 and PDSR in 2000 had the greatest number of parliamentary mandates; they proposed a Premier during consultations with the President, but still had to co-opt other parties to create a legislative majority for the new Prime Minister and cabinet. Following the 2004 elections, the National Union PSD+PUR would have normally proposed a Premier who would then be designated by President Băsescu.

These arrangements, and especially which party or coalition was given the first chance to configure the Government, were an informal rule of the Romanian political system. Article 103.1 of the Constitution was vague and did not explicitly say that the President needed to appoint a Prime Minister from the party or coalition with the most seats in Parliament. Băsescu interpreted article 103.1 to mean that, without a self-evident parliamentary majority, the President had the constitutional prerogative to choose which of

the interested coalitions would eventually form the Government.\textsuperscript{719} He opted for Tăriceanu to be the new Premier from the DA alliance, instead of a candidate from PSD. This decision was unusual for Romania and signalled that Băsescu would be a President highly involved in domestic politics and international relations. The above presidential statement also contained a warning or even an indirect threat that Parliament would be dissolved, if it rejected the cabinet designated by Băsescu. According to article 89 of the Constitution, ‘[t]he President of Romania can dissolve Parliament, if the latter has not given a vote of confidence to the Government within 60 days of the first request and only after [Parliament] has rejected the Government at least twice’.\textsuperscript{720} In the end, a fragile governing coalition was formed with 51.4\% and 241 seats - ‘a patchwork’ consisting of the DA alliance, PUR and UDMR; PUR had unexpectedly abandoned PSD to be part of the governmental coalition supporting Premier Tăriceanu and his cabinet.\textsuperscript{721} As Cristian Preda noted, the Romanian multi-party system of late 2004 lacked a dominant political force and led to ‘the fabrication’ of a majority.\textsuperscript{722}  

From the beginning of his electoral campaign, Băsescu declared that he would be a new type of political leader, unlike any presidential predecessor. He aimed to be a ‘president-player’, heavily involved in Romanian politics and policies, rather than just a detached ‘spectator’ of internal and external affairs. His unique view of the Presidency as a state institution was boldly mentioned in November 2004:

‘[t]he power granted by the Constitution to the President is to be an active and efficient player in the public life of Romania, not just a well meaning spectator. I have never been a person who remains uninvolved. I do not want to be a President-spectator, who occupies the best seat on the official stage; what I want is to be a

\textsuperscript{720} The Parliament of Romania, \textit{The Constitution of Romania}.  
President-player, who works shoulder to shoulder with the other responsible agencies and the whole society'.\textsuperscript{723}

This was another personalised interpretation of article 80.2 in the Constitution, which described a more neutral role for the President -

'[t]he President safeguards the respect for the Constitution and the good functioning of public authorities. To this end, the President exercises mediation between state powers, as well as between state and society'.\textsuperscript{724}

As a former Navy commander, Băsescu never concealed the fact that he liked to be the ultimate decision-maker and was used to being obeyed.\textsuperscript{725} The general context of Băsescu’s rhetoric and actions during the presidential campaign and immediately after his election indicated an emerging personalisation of Romanian politics. The new President expertly manipulated a Parliament with no obvious majority and was apparently willing to go to extreme lengths (even dissolving the legislative body), in order to ensure that his preferred DA alliance would form the next Government of Romania. True to his word, Băsescu was a determined and quite forceful ‘president-player’, very different from his predecessors. The situation was bound to turn at least somewhat problematic in the foreign policy arena, because the Romanian semi-presidential system featured dual authority and democratic legitimacy with two prominent leaders of the executive branch. Băsescu had been elected as President of Romania via direct vote, while the designated Prime Minister Tăriceanu and his cabinet succeeded in passing the Parliament’s vote of investiture.

Although they were initially considered a good team, the working relationship between the two actors gradually deteriorated from tensions to public disputes and even conflict. By 2006, the Romanian Presidency and


\textsuperscript{724} The Parliament of Romania, The Constitution of Romania.

Premiership were facing an uneasy cohabitation.\footnote{Cosmin Dima, ‘Conflictul intraexecutiv in regimul semiprezidenţial românesc. Primul-Ministru Călin Popescu Tăriceanu versus Președintele Traian Băsescu’/ ‘The Intra-executive Conflict in the Romanian Semi-presidential Regime. Prime Minister Tăriceanu versus President Traian Băsescu’, Sfera Politicii, issue 139, 2009; http://www.sferapoliticii.ro/sfera/139/art05-dimac.html (July 2014).} The intra-executive divergences also appeared in the area of foreign policy decision-making, where the President as head of state and the Prime Minister as head of the Government had unclear and potentially overlapping prerogatives. Alina Mungiu-Pippidi has underlined the inherent problems of the Romanian Constitution, where in practice there is no clear separation of powers between and within state institutions. She considers Romania’s semi-presidentialism to be ‘overloaded with checks and balances to the point of deadlock’ and prone to institutional conflict in areas of joint responsibility.\footnote{Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, Politica după comunism: structură, cultură şi psihologie politică /Politics after Communism: Structure, Culture and Political Psychology (Bucharest: Humanitas, 2002), pp. 42-46.} In the case of foreign policy, the Romanian President’s constitutional prerogatives were substantially limited and depended on the counter-signature and approval of either the Government or Parliament or both of them.\footnote{The Parliament of Romania, The Constitution of Romania; available at http://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?id=339 (July 2014); see Articles 91 and 102.1.} So the Constitution ensured that, at least formally, decisions had to be agreed by the President and Prime Minister and sometimes ratified by Parliament. Romanian semi-presidentialism lacks a clear delineation between the powers of the Presidency and Government, which makes it very difficult to identify who is the primary authority with respect to the state’s international stances.

Early on in his mandate, Băsescu did everything possible within constitutional limits and sometimes beyond them to grasp full control over Romania’s international affairs. He started to systematically extend the President’s conventional role in the foreign policy domain, hence diminishing the influence of Parliament and that of the Government.\footnote{The ‘Ovidiu Șincai’ Social-Democrat Institute, Raport - Efectele ‘ Doctrinei Băsescu’: izolarea internaţională a României/ Report – The Effects of the ‘Băsescu Doctrine’: Romania’s International Isolation (Bucharest, 7 March 2008), p. 3; http://www.fisd.ro/PDF/mater_noi/Raport%20pol%20externa%202008.pdf (July 2014).} The ambiguous semi-presidential system, combined with a rather weak Prime Minister and
cabinet, led to the Government being compelled to accept foreign affairs as Băsescu’s sole de facto prerogative.\textsuperscript{730} Premier Tăriceanu’s cabinet had a fragile majority in Parliament (51.4%), which was also undermined from within the governing coalition by PD - the party loyal to its former leader, Traian Băsescu. Thus, from having joint power over Romania’s external relations, the Government was reduced to simply implementing the President’s directives. Taking these aspects into account, President Băsescu was the main foreign policy decision-maker and had the greatest impact on the national imaginary between 2005 and 2008. Nevertheless, while other domestic agents were not as influential as the presidential administration, they did at times offer discursive contestation and competed for dominance in directing Romania’s international affairs.

With regard to the reconfiguration of the foreign policy imaginary, the 2006 National Security Strategy (NSS) was an essential expression of the new administration’s vision for Romanian international and security relations. Its initial drafted form had been revealed in February 2006. Compared to previous similar papers, this document was the most controversial among internal audiences because it prefigured an intensified Atlantic vocation for the state to the point of neglecting everything else. The ‘liberal democratic’ self-image of Romanian national identity had already been re-defined as pro-active and Atlantic-oriented during the Iraq invasion. The ‘European’ self-image had always been a key component of Romanian identity, but in the 2006 NSS it was marginalised or subordinated to the other two self-images: ‘liberal democratic’ and ‘security provider’. Public opinion was particularly interested since it was the first NSS draft published by Romania’s Presidency prior to Parliament deliberations and final vote. The text confirmed the foreign policy meanings that were re-articulated in 2003, moving from Romania’s traditional defensive position towards a more pro-active one; counteracting or responding to dangers shifted to preventing and even pre-empting threats. Throughout its proposed material, the 2006 NSS was permeated by the

‘global war on terror’, which went substantially beyond depicting terrorism as a major risk:

‘[t]he active commitment to achieving security by promoting democracy, fighting international terrorism and countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a must for Romania’s security policy. It is the fundamental condition for us to enjoy the benefits of globalization, seize the opportunities offered by the international environment and effectively counter major risks and threats’. 731

National security strategies and other relevant papers were often shaped by the international discourse on terrorism, which emerged and gained influence post-9/11. The Romanian NSS had some distinctive traits because the war on terrorism was ‘insinuated into the document’s narrative’, from the usual ‘security environment and identification of threats’ to the ‘formulation of policy directions that obviously pre-date 9/11’. 732 For example, principles and policies that had been characteristic of ‘Europe’ were ‘affected by the superimposition of the global dynamic and security logic’ of the global war on terrorism. 733 Everything seemed to be discursively subordinated to the ‘War on Terror’. Previous foreign policy concerns remained valid: deepening NATO and EU integration, developing closer relations with Western states, strengthening the strategic partnership with the US, continuing the reform and modernisation of the army in order to create interoperability with NATO forces. Issues like Euro-Atlantic identity and integration were re-defined according to the logic of the war on terrorism, even though Romania had already obtained NATO membership in March 2004 and would officially accede into the EU in January 2007. Rationally speaking, the state was not required any more to prove its ‘security provider’ self-image or necessarily fulfil the perceived duties of a partially accepted liberal democracy. NATO was the first crucial Euro-Atlantic audience or authoritative self to irrevocably legitimate Romanian national identity and

733 Ibid.
self-images, while the EU was expected to do the same soon. Yet identity has a fluid nature and the story of Romanian national identity continued even after its international recognition.

As suggested by its prominent place in the title of the NSS, Romania’s ‘European and Euro-Atlantic identity’ became a key element for the Băsescu administration’s foreign policy perspective. Romania was finally included in the ‘Euro-Atlantic community’, which had been depicted to be ‘a security domain based on common values, interests and goals’. Having already achieved one of its major post-1990 foreign policy goals (NATO membership) and being close to the second one (EU entrance), Romania was in search of a new international purpose. The NSS represented this purpose as a new geostrategic profile:

‘Romania’s integration in NATO and EU triggers substantial changes in its status and strategic identity. From this viewpoint, the dynamics of the development of Romania’s European and Euro-Atlantic identity, as well as that pertaining to the shaping of a profile matching its geostrategic potential, will be structurally re-designed and promoted at a high pace. Membership involves the gradual configuration of a specific and active role for Romania within the two organizations and providing the necessary resources to fulfil it’.

Felix Ciuta pointed out that the ‘strategic hybridity’ of Romania’s identity was present together with ‘the tension between its being and becoming European’, which had dominated the discourse of the return to Europe. The Romanian ‘specific and active role’ focused on the familiar assumption that democracy was the most effective shield and weapon against terrorism. The Romanian state pledged to ‘actively’ participate via political, diplomatic, economic, intelligence and military means in spreading democratic values, security and prosperity to countries ‘neighbouring Romania and other areas of strategic interest’.

The insistent repetition of variations on the ‘being pro-active’ theme attempted to describe a more ‘dynamic strategic profile’, while also conveying the veiled critique that previous Romanian administrations had

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735 Ibid, p. 17.
opted for a more passive approach to regional and international affairs.\footnote{Şerban F. Cioculescu, \textit{România postcomunistă în ‘ecuaţia’ strategică a vecinătăţilor: Balcanii, Marea Neagră şi Orientul Mijlociu Extins/ Postcommunist Romania in the Neighbouring Strategic ‘Equation’: The Balkans, Black Sea and Greater Middle East} (Bucharest: Editura Universităţii din Bucureşti, 2009), p. 285.} Such pro-active endeavours would be carried out through institutionalised channels, as responsibilities deriving from NATO and EU commitments. They would also be part of collective efforts alongside allied, partner and friendly states, according to the decisions adopted by the international community.\footnote{‘The National Security Strategy of Romania’ (2006), pp. 14-15.}

The 2006 NSS portrayed a very pessimistic and conflictual imaginary. It featured proliferating conflicts at global level (‘clashing world’), in which ‘the main battle’ was ‘waged between fundamentally different values’ – ‘democracy and totalitarianism’.\footnote{Ibid, p. 7.} In the context of Romania’s foreign policy, President Băsescu often indirectly dismissed a ‘unifying logic’ based on European integration and advocated ‘a logic of exclusion and confrontation’ – where the good Euro-Atlantic self fights to defeat the evil non-Euro-Atlantic other.\footnote{The ‘Ovidiu Şincai’ Social-Democrat Institute, \textit{Analiza Strategiei de Securitate Naţională a României/ The Analysis of Romania’s National Security Strategy} (Bucharest, 9 March 2006), p. 8; available at http://www.fisd.ro/PDF/mater_noi/Raport_SSNR.pdf (July 2014).} So it was not surprising that the 2006 NSS was built on similar identity premises. Moreover, the document tried to coherently combine the European and Atlantic dimensions of Romania’s national identity by differentiating between two sets of goals. On the one hand, the Atlantic dimension would endeavour to ensure security via democracy promotion, the war on international terrorism, eliminating illegal trafficking. On the other hand, the European dimension would deal with prosperity through solidarity and development, Eastern enlargement and the European Neighbourhood Policy, stability via the encouragement of democratic values.\footnote{‘The National Security Strategy of Romania’ (2006), pp. 16-18.} This tidy compartmentalisation failed to be convincing since the NSS title and content articulated two distinct identities – ‘European’ and ‘Euro-Atlantic’. They were also not constructed to exert equal impact over the state’s foreign policy. Unlike previous strategies, the relationship was explicitly hierarchical with
the Atlantic dimension dominating the European one in terms of ideological influence. President Băsescu declared early on in his mandate an overt Atlantic orientation, when arguing for a special relationship or privileged partnership between the US, UK and Romania. More than ideological preference, the 2006 Strategy indicated both an alignment with the US position and a re-definition of Romania’s identity. While the threat of terrorism could not be denied in an international security environment, Romania did not have a history of such dangers and had been fortunately overlooked as a target, even after its involvement in the conflicts of Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet the Romanian NSS transferred from the American one the US ‘missionary vocation’, where the latter adopted this role globally and Romania was constructed as a civilising state in the Black Sea region.\footnote{The ‘Ovidiu Şincai’ Social-Democrat Institute, \textit{Analiza Strategiei de Securitate Naţională a României/ The Analysis of Romania’s National Security Strategy}, p. 16.} This re-conceptualisation of national identity affected directly Romania’s ‘European’ self-image, given that the 2006 Strategy configured American priorities to be more important than European ones.\footnote{Ion Stan, ‘The Political Strategy of National Insecurity’ in \textit{Transcripts of Parliamentary Debates} (Bucharest, 23 October 2007); available at http://www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/steno.stenograma?ids=6383&idm=1,54&idl=1 (July 2014).} Significant EU foreign policy topics were marginalised or secondary at best. For instance, Romania wanted to participate in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, but only ‘to develop and consolidate trans-Atlantic cooperation’.\footnote{‘The National Security Strategy of Romania’ (2006), p. 16.} The European Neighbourhood Policy was mostly a means to ‘boost’ Romania’s ‘contribution to promoting democracy, peace and security’ in the Black Sea region.\footnote{Ibid, p. 17.}

Apart from the underlying discursive influence of the ‘War on Terror’, the text confirmed that Romania’s ‘non-Balkan’ self-image had faded from the foreign policy imaginary. Romania had been traditionally preoccupied with the democratic stability of the Balkans, but the matter was only briefly discussed in the 2006 NSS. Romania supported the democratisation efforts, economic development and European integration of the Balkan states. It
would also continue to act as a ‘security provider’ in the Balkans. Another representation often circulated by the NSS was that of Romania having a special role and responsibility in ‘non-Western’ Europe, especially in the extended Black Sea region. The document contained a chapter specifically dedicated to the Black Sea, where Romania portrayed itself as a ‘dynamic vector of democratic security and stability, as well as economic prosperity’. As part of a more general interest, the text explicitly mentioned the Romanian objective of ensuring a European and Euro-Atlantic engagement in the area. The Strategy described the extended Black Sea region as the place of intersection for two strategic flows: one connecting the ‘energy producer’ (Near East, Caucasus and Caspian Sea) with its ‘energy consumer’ (the West); the other symbolising a link between the ‘security provider’ (Euro-Atlantic community) and its ‘security consumer’ (Near East, Caucasus). From such a perspective, Romania was associated with meanings like European frontier or periphery, a state bordering or bridging the gap between the ‘the West and the Rest’. As shown in chapter III, starting with the period 1990-1996, Romania’s foreign policy discourse persistently shaped a ‘Central European’ subjectivity to differentiate the state from two negative representations: ‘Eastern European’ with its Cold War connotations and ‘Balkan’ with an image of instability. Post-2004 the articulation of national identity abandoned the ‘Central European’ subjectivity and insistently re-defined Romania as a ‘border state’.

More so, dissociating the state from a ‘Central European’ image was counter-productive, if one paid attention to the regional context where Ukraine advocated in a quite credible manner its bonded role as both a Pontic (Black Sea) and Central European state. Unlike Ukraine’s approach, the Romanian foreign policy discourse (generated by the presidential

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747 Ibid, p. 18.
751 The ‘Ovidiu Şincai’ Social-Democrat Institute, Analiza Strategiei de Securitate Naţională a României/ The Analysis of Romania’s National Security Strategy, p. 9.
administration) operated with exclusive meanings when referring to the two areas, pushing to promote one at the expense of the other. Since Romania obtained NATO membership and was close to finalising EU accession, the presidential administration as a key foreign policy decision-maker saw the state like a bridge to the outside. Romania’s post-2005 international purpose would be to act as a ‘border state’, connecting the Euro-Atlantic community with its non-Euro-Atlantic others. The ‘Central European’ subjectivity had expressed Romania’s inextricable link to Western Europe. Having gained international validation for the main themes of its post-communist national identity, Romania was looking from the West to the East. An internationally accepted pro-active liberal democracy with a security provider role could exert a meaningful influence by democratising and stabilising the neighbouring non-Euro-Atlantic states, as well as by participating in other more geographically distant military operations. Yet these Romanian foreign policy articulations were not endorsed by all domestic elites. June 2006 brought an episode of internal contestation and debates regarding the withdrawal of Romanian soldiers from Iraq. It was part of a wider attempt to re-define Romanian identity and foreign policy, by re-balancing the state’s ‘European’ self-image and Atlantic vocation.

*Debating Romania’s Military Presence in Iraq*

From August 2003 until their final withdrawal in June 2009, more than 5,200 Romanian troops were deployed to support the US-led multi-national mission ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’. Their responsibilities included intelligence gathering, reconnaissance and surveillance, providing rapid response forces, conducting training and monitoring of local army units.\(^{752}\) Being one of the newest NATO members, Romania’s continued contribution to American efforts in Iraq brought a series of challenges. Unlike the case of Afghanistan, the Alliance did not eventually take over operations and Iraq remained a purely US-driven endeavour, opposed by several NATO and EU partners.  

Romania maintaining its military presence in Iraq post-2004 entailed not only costs like risking soldiers’ lives, but also further antagonised France and Germany by closely aligning with the American stance. Throughout his electoral campaign and subsequent mandate, President Băsescu clearly favoured an Atlantic orientation for Romanian foreign policy. He envisioned an extended ‘special relationship’ between the US, UK and Romania, which was articulated through a somewhat uninspired phrase - ‘the Washington-London-Bucharest Axis’. On 13 December 2004, shortly after his election, Băsescu declared that:

'[b]eyond our NATO membership, the strategic relation with the US and Great Britain will remain of utmost importance for the state’s foreign policy. The Washington-London-Bucharest Axis will be a strategic axis for the President of Romania'. This Atlantic construction appeared to be a one-sided initiative, considering that neither the Americans nor the British publicly recognised it. After Băsescu’s official visit to the US in March 2005, President Bush was asked about a potential ‘special partnership’ between Washington, London and Bucharest. He avoided giving any concrete confirmation and depicted Romania as a ‘special ally’ among many other special liberal democratic partners:

'I view Romania as a special ally because Romania shares the same values that we share (...) we all long for peace, and we understand the world will be more peaceful as freedom spreads (...) And so this is a special relationship because of the shared values, and I am honored to call the President my friend, and I’m honored to call Romania a strong ally'.

As in the case of Iraq’s invasion, France was much more opinionated about Romania’s continued Atlantic-oriented external agenda. The French Foreign Affairs Minister - Michel Barnier - visited Bucharest in February 2005. He candidly admitted to having ‘some difficulty in understanding the significance of this rather unusual axis’\(^\text{757}\), then went on to add:

‘Romania’s need for security is the same as that of France, Germany and Greece who isn’t far away and is already in the European Union (...) So, I think that the right reflex when you want to join the European Union, the legitimate, necessary reflex is a European one. And that doesn’t stop one being friends with America or others’.\(^\text{758}\)

France had not changed its viewpoint from January 2003, when President Jacques Chirac admonished, criticised and somewhat threatened the EU candidates (especially Romania) who sided with the US on invading Iraq. Despite the more diplomatic language of Minister Barnier in 2005, France persisted in politically pressurising Romania who, as an EU applicant state, was expected to instinctively embrace a ‘European’ (preferably French) foreign policy perspective. Regardless of the international audience, President Băsescu’s message on Romania’s Atlantic vocation and involvement in Iraq was consistent. During an interview for ‘Le Monde’ in March 2005, the question of whether Romania risked being caught once again between the US and EU arose. The President’s reply was firm and very clear:

‘I am not sure if the word “axis” is the most appropriate, but we will consolidate our partnership with the United States and Great Britain (...) Romania is willing to host American bases on its territory (...) We are an ally of the United States and Great Britain in Iraq and will remain a partner in this coalition (...) I will not admit any ambiguity on this topic’.\(^\text{759}\)

Băsescu’s vehement stance was surprising and quite insular, as domestic public opinion in both the US and many European states tended to exercise pressure towards gradual yet accelerated military withdrawal from Iraq. His


attitude prompted ‘Le Monde’ to describe Romania as ‘America’s Trojan horse in Europe’\textsuperscript{760}, a representation that had been first associated with Poland.

By contrast, the DA alliance PNL-PD as leader of the Romanian governing coalition seemed to prefer a more neutral external position for the state. The electoral programme of the DA alliance contained a chapter on national security, which combined the views regarding foreign policy and national defence. A lot of attention was given to deepening internal reforms for Alliance interoperability and future EU accession.\textsuperscript{761} Under EU and NATO flags, Romania would help to ensure stability in the Balkan and Black Sea areas; an equally brief mention was devoted to how the state would take part in the European Security and Defence Policy and the battle against terrorism.\textsuperscript{762} Interestingly, according to the DA alliance, one of the main Romanian foreign policy objectives was to ‘actively participate in the institutional and cultural construction of Great Europe’.\textsuperscript{763} The DA alliance transferred the above principles of its electoral campaign to the Government Programme for 2005-2008, issued in late December 2004.\textsuperscript{764} Concerning the state’s external relations, the electoral and Government programmes suggested that Prime Minister Tăriceanu and his cabinet would focus first on achieving EU integration, followed by other commitments deriving from NATO membership. Fighting international terrorism and contributing to the EU Foreign and Security Policy were portrayed as equally important to the Government of Romania.\textsuperscript{765} The presidential administration’s emphasis on building an intensified Atlantic vocation and being involved in the global war on terrorism, which had been underlined by the 2006 National Security Strategy, were notably absent. This is a significant point because it indicates

\textsuperscript{762} Ibid, p. 115.
\textsuperscript{763} Ibid, p. 116.
\textsuperscript{765} Ibid.
that the Government had different priorities from the President, where the EU and Romania’s ‘European’ self-image featured much more prominently or, at the very least, was not secondary to the Atlantic vocation of national identity.

The specific topic of Romanian withdrawal from Iraq triggered mixed reactions inside the government and parliamentary majority, being intrinsically linked to the state’s intensified Atlanticism. In late April 2005, the first to request Iraq withdrawal was PUR (re-named as the Conservative Party – PC), a small parliamentary group which had tipped the governmental majority scale in favour of the Tăriceanu cabinet after the 2004 elections.\(^\text{766}\) A month later, Deputy Eugen Nicolaescu (spokesperson for PNL) said that ‘the removal of our Iraqi troops should be debated within the governing coalition’; as a personal point of view, he argued against continuing any military presence in Iraq since ‘Romania could use those expenses to modernise the army and make it more compatible with NATO’.\(^\text{767}\) On 24 May 2005, Prime Minister Tăriceanu was reluctant to express a clear position, declaring that Iraq withdrawal ‘could have serious implications on Romania’s assumed commitments and credibility as a NATO state and future member of the European Union’.\(^\text{768}\) Almost a year later (April 2006), he appeared to support maintaining Romanian forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, both theatres being associated with the responsibilities of NATO membership:

> ‘I do not think withdrawing our troops is a relevant issue right now. On the contrary, Romania has stated at an official level that it is determined to continue participating with military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, as long as those countries require it. The recently begun process of democratising Iraq needs to be consolidated (...) Of course this entails extremely costly efforts, in terms of human resources and the very painful


loss of lives, as well as financially. Still, I do believe Romania should prove itself capable of being a reliable partner for NATO’.\textsuperscript{769}

The end of June 2006 highlighted a sudden but intense contestation in the national discourse, which showed divergent perspectives on Romania’s national identity and the consequences of long-term military involvement in Iraq. The question of whether to withdraw or not the forces deployed there escalated into an open conflict between the two heads of the executive - the Prime Minister wanted a timetable of withdrawal and the President was firmly against such a prospect. Tăriceanu’s opinion of April 2006 changed under the impact of a shifting international context, rationalism and the ‘European’ self-image of national identity. These aspects will be analysed in detail later on in this section, after discussing the debates that surrounded Romanian military withdrawal from Iraq. The initial announcement was made by Premier Tăriceanu and his Defence Minister Teodor Atanasiu, who advanced together the PNL idea of removing approximately 890 Romanian soldiers from Iraq starting with 1 January 2007. The proposal was meant to be next presented to the Supreme Council of National Defence (CSAT), which needed to analyse the state’s military planning for the following year. The two government members invoked a range of reasons to substantiate their party’s view. Tăriceanu began with the human dimension (past casualties and high risk of losing more lives), moving on to the widespread behaviour manifested by EU member states –

‘[w]e have taken into account the [human] impact of incidents in Iraq [...] France and Germany never participated, Spain has resolved for quite some time to withdraw, the same with Bulgaria and Italy. This decision subscribes to a clear tendency at the EU level. Right now the only two countries with [military] involvement are Poland and Romania’.\textsuperscript{770}

Arguably, what affected Romanian forces the most was the imminent complete withdrawal of Italy. They operated together with the Garibaldi


\textsuperscript{770} Călin Popescu Tăriceanu (Bucharest, 29 June 2006) cited in \textit{ibid.}
brigade in Nassyria and the latter’s absence would leave Romania’s troops without logistical support by the end of 2006. Stressing Italy’s revised viewpoint on Iraq was not coincidental and it played an important role in the context surrounding Prime Minister Tăriceanu and PNL’s proposal.

In March 2005, the Italian Premier Silvio Berlusconi had made public that the country intended a ‘progressive reduction’ of its Iraq soldiers, due to the growing opposition from domestic public opinion. Italy was an EU state that had long displayed a predominantly Atlantic external orientation, which translated into aligning with the US intervention in Iraq and offering a substantial military force. If a devoted Atlantic state had already implemented gradual withdrawal, Romania deciding on a similar course for a smaller contribution would hopefully not be regarded as a betrayal of its Atlantic affiliation. According to Defence Minister Atanasiu on 29 June 2006, ‘[t]here is no country present in Iraq that does not have a timetable of withdrawal, especially considering that the Iraqi army has become much better trained and capable of taking over the missions we have been developing in this theatre of operations’. He further mentioned that annual expenses for Iraq had risen to 200 million US dollars, which amounted to 11.8% of the defence budget. Tăriceanu concluded his party’s proposal by

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775 Teodor Atanasiu (Bucharest, 29 June 2006) cited in ‘Ministrul Apărării propune retragerea soldaţilor români din Irak’/ ‘Defence Minister Proposes Withdrawing Romanian Soldiers from Iraq’.
saying that Romania would maintain the military obligations which stemmed from its NATO, EU and UN membership.776

Following this rather unexpected announcement, the governing coalition was torn between mild support and strong opposition. The UDMR representatives favoured the general ‘European’ way of doing things:

‘[i]t is a PNL decision and we support it. This does not mean that tomorrow the soldiers deployed there start packing and are coming home. Time is necessary to prepare a calendar, as all the European countries have done. I assume the Prime Minister has consulted with our international partners before making the announcement’.777

PC was glad to see PNL agreeing with an opinion it had already advanced in mid-2005.778 The PD leader Emil Boc described the PNL statements to be a ‘serious political mistake’ that lacked responsibility and ‘could affect Romania’s international credibility’.779 The most critical response came from the presidential administration, which characterised as ‘unacceptable’ the unilateral position expressed by the Premier and Defence Minister on Iraq withdrawal, bypassing prior consultations with other internal institutions and external partners.780 During the evening of 29 June 2006, President Băsescu made his stance perfectly clear:

‘I am not a partisan of sending troops abroad; nevertheless, I do support respecting our commitments. Romania has a partnership with the United States and Great Britain [...] It must have a credible and predictable foreign policy behaviour’.781

If Romanian elites suggested that they were divided on continuing a military presence in Iraq, those mixed signals confused both the American and British

779 Emil Boc (Bucharest, 29 June 2006) cited in Cristian Oprea et al.
sides. After being informed of Prime Minister Tăriceanu’s initiative, the US ambassador Nicholas Taubman opted for a cautious reaction at first – ‘[m]y impression is that not all relevant parties inside Romania or outside of it have been consulted before making this announcement’. Then he put some diplomatic pressure on Romanian authorities:

‘Romania is one of the United States’ most highly appreciated and trustworthy allies. We believe that Romania will continue to work together with us on common issues, including Iraq and the global war on terrorism’. The UK embassy conveyed its gratitude for the Romanian state’s help in southern Iraq, but ambassador Robin Barnett ended his statement on a more cutting note - ‘[w]e have not been notified about the proposal advanced today by the Defence Minister and await urgent clarifications about future plans’.

Looking at the story thus far, it could be argued that the divergences between Premier Tăriceanu and President Băsescu were about whether to prioritise human and material aspects or to persevere with Romania’s role as a credible international partner despite the burdens. In this respect, two sets of contrasting values could have been competing for dominance: efficiency versus loyalty, adjustment versus predictability, benefits versus solidarity. However, the potential withdrawal from Iraq is part of a larger attempt to re-define national identity, by re-introducing the ‘European’ self-image as an equally important element to the Atlantic vocation of Romanian foreign policy. The President’s foreign policy attitude was consistent with two self-images of Romanian national identity - ‘pro-active liberal democracy’ and ‘security provider’. Until 2004, the ‘European’ self-image was a key theme of the Romanian foreign policy imaginary. After an episode of internal contestation among political elites in 1991, ‘Europe’ emerged as Romania’s international

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783 Ibid.

784 Robin Barnett cited in ‘Președintele dezaprobă inițiativa PNL’/‘President Disapproves of PNL Initiative’.

785 Şerban F. Cioculescu, România postcomunistă în „ecuația” strategică a vecinătăților: Balcanii, Marea Neagră și Orientul Mijlociu Extins/ Postcommunist Romania in the Neighbouring Strategic ‘Equation’: The Balkans, Black Sea and Greater Middle East, p. 268.
direction. Having opted for ‘Europe’, the ‘European’ self-image was particularly relevant between 1990 and 1996; it shaped Romanian relations with Hungary, which rendered both states to be active agents in defining what ‘European’ identity meant in terms of minority rights. Romania’s ‘European’ self-image was also meaningful in 1996-2000, especially when formulating the state’s evolving international responses to the Kosovo crisis. Throughout the first post-communist decade, Romania’s ‘European’ identity was a constant feature of its external affairs. During the Iraq invasion of 2003, Romania was fundamentally re-articulated as a pro-active liberal democracy with an Atlantic vocation and chose to be part of the US-led coalition against Iraq. Post-2004 the ‘liberal democratic’ self-image was re-defined, since the Băsescu administration continued to intensify the Atlantic vocation of national identity and foreign policy.

This intensified Atlanticism and marginalisation of the ‘European’ dimension were perplexing from a rational point of view. Romania became an official NATO member in 2004, but maintained its military forces in Iraq and other theatres of operations. In contrast to these aspects, the context of EU integration was more problematic. In February 2005, the French Foreign Affairs Minister reminded that the Romanian state should be wearier of promoting a ‘Washington-London-Bucharest Axis’ instead of supporting the ‘European’ (EU) stance. The still pending situation of Romania’s EU accession was implied in the subtext. Romania signed the EU accession protocol on 25 April 2005, yet membership would not be guaranteed until all EU member states ratified the protocol via referendum. As President Chirac told Romania in 2003, ‘[a]ll it takes is one country not to ratify by referendum for [EU] enlargement not to move forward’. Against such an international background, Romania led by President Băsescu did not exhibit a rational conduct. The state not only consolidated the Atlantic vocation of its national

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identity and foreign policy, but also intensified it and further displeased France. The timeline indicated that the Prime Minister modified his perspective around May-June 2006. His declaration in April the same year literally subordinated human and other costs to Romania being perceived as a reliable ally internationally; hence a standpoint similarly shaped by the ‘liberal democratic’ and ‘security provider’ self-images, which prevailed over the ‘European’ one since 2003. While certainly a topic worthy of public debate, the idea of Iraq withdrawal was simply launched by Tăriceanu without notifying any other implicated parties. There were slim to no chances for the steadfastly Atlantic-minded Băsescu to agree, yet the American and British sides - who commanded Romanian soldiers in Iraq - should have been given some warning. Tăriceanu’s impulsive gesture undermined what was otherwise a legitimate national concern. Due to his change of opinion, the Premier was accused of carelessly antagonising the President and moving their domestic institutional struggle to the sensitive arena of external affairs. Using the words of the PSD (largest opposition party) leader and former Foreign Minister Mircea Geoană,

‘[a] foreign policy issue like the presence of Romanian troops in Iraq cannot become the object of political games (...) it is something which needs to be negotiated beforehand. We are not dealing with individual ambitions, what lies at stake is Romania’s credibility’.788

However, Tăriceanu’s agenda went beyond material interests or occasionally winning the upper hand over Băsescu. A combination of factors explains his shift in views on Romanian military presence in Iraq – a changing international context, rationalism and the ‘European’ self-image of national identity. First, the international context was substantially different in June 2006 than mid-2005. Other European states were withdrawing from Iraq or had already done so, including Italy who had displayed a long-term Atlantic affiliation in terms of foreign relations. In such circumstances, it was hoped that Romania would not be perceived as betraying its Atlantic vocation. More significantly, Romania signed the EU accession protocol in April 2005. But

the ratification process of Romania’s future EU membership was going slowly in the individual member states. At the end of March 2006, Foreign Affairs Minister Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu expressed his disappointment that certain EU states had not adopted a ‘speedier pace’ for ratifying the Romanian accession treaty and gave the example of France. Premier Tăriceanu’s reply of April 2006 was a reflexive reference to Romania’s self-image of ‘security provider’ and reliable NATO partner. His answer also began with the idea that Iraq withdrawal was not a relevant topic ‘right now’ (April 2006). Tăriceanu needed more time to internalise the shifting international context and the potential implications of key EU members like France delaying the ratification of Romania’s EU accession. His change of stance from April to June 2006 suggests that the Prime Minister aimed to quickly re-balance the ‘European’ and ‘Atlantic’ dimensions of national identity and foreign policy. This re-balancing shift had been prefigured by the official Government Programme for 2005-2008 issued in December 2004, where the EU and Romania’s ‘European’ self-image featured quite prominently and were not secondary to the Atlantic vocation of national identity. So June 2006 was a favourable time for domestic elites to re-consider the Iraq situation and even attempt to modify the state’s approach.

Second, rational interests also played a role here because Tăriceanu did not change his mind at random in two months. He saw the opportunity to stand out compared to a highly visible Băsescu (the ‘president-player’) and pursued a series of possible advantages. The Premier’s motivations included an increase in the Government’s national popularity, allocating Iraq resources elsewhere and, most of all, showing that he had the ability to offer a ‘European’ alternative to the Presidency’s long-standing views. This is where the impact of national identity comes in as a third element. Tăriceanu and some cabinet members wanted a more nuanced Romanian foreign policy that would be equally influenced by the ‘European’ and ‘Atlantic’ dimensions of national identity. The prevalent ‘European’ (understood as EU) model of

conduct regarding Iraq was the main ideational basis of Tăriceanu’s rhetoric. He contested Băsescu’s de facto exclusive prerogative to decide Romania’s actions on Iraq, by invoking democratic arguments. Opinion polls at the time suggested that Romanians’ attitudes towards their state’s military presence in Iraq had shifted from the 2003 intervention: 50-52% did not support it and only 40-42% were in favour of it.\textsuperscript{790} The Prime Minister and President were ultimately competing for legitimacy over foreign policy decision-making, which would feed into the hierarchy of self-images inside national identity.

In the end, the Prime Minister’s initiative was submitted to deliberations within the Supreme Council of National Defence (CSAT) on 30 June 2006. It resulted in a majority of votes against withdrawing Romanian forces deployed in Iraq (10 versus 2).\textsuperscript{791} Surprisingly, only the Premier and Defence Minister voted for it. The other two PNL representatives – Foreign Affairs Minister Ungureanu and Finance Minister Sebastian Vlădescu\textsuperscript{792} - chose to align with the presidential position.\textsuperscript{793} The remaining members of CSAT were expected to support the Presidency, because they were either cabinet members from PD (Băsescu’s former political party), officials previously appointed by the President or his institutional advisers. It is clear evidence that the Government itself was torn between the two heads of the executive branch. Party allegiance, which tends to be very strong in Romanian politics, did not affect the Foreign Affairs and Finance Ministers’ option to a decisive degree. Both went against their cabinet and PNL leader, which jeopardised their respective situations in the Government and political party. Two votes would not have changed the final CSAT resolution. Even so, the fact that they agreed with Romania maintaining the same contribution to Iraq, and thus sided with Băsescu’s Atlantic priorities, indicates that the

\textsuperscript{792} Sebastian Vlădescu – Romanian Minister of Public Finances (December 2004 – April 2007).
\textsuperscript{793} Traian Băsescu, ‘Press Release’ (Bucharest, 30 June 2006).
‘security provider’ and ‘pro-active liberal democracy’ self-images of national identity were influential among the main foreign policy decision-makers. The Presidency issued an ample press release, in which Băsescu heavily criticised and dismissed re-thinking a timetable of withdrawal for Iraq:

‘[s]ince a mandate for negotiating the reconfiguration of forces had already been in place, since the parties involved – Romanian, British, Italian and Australian – jointly agreed on the future dimensions of our Iraqi forces [March-June 2006], the proposal of withdrawal made by the Prime Minister and Defence Minister is difficult to justify and only creates the impression of an incoherent military and foreign policy’.

Premier Tăriceanu’s unsuccessful attempt at contestation was described as a confusing episode to internal and external audiences. Foreign Affairs Minister Ungureanu said that an ‘unfortunate confusion’ occurred between what was essentially a political proposal and not a final governmental decision. A better thought-out and organised action by Prime Minister Tăriceanu could have become a more significant challenge to President Băsescu’s Atlantic vision for Romanian international relations. With regards to the intensified Atlanticism of the presidential administration, the Romanian self-images of ‘pro-active liberal democracy’ and ‘security provider’ were emblematically embodied in the state’s post-2005 international focus – Romania’s Eastern foreign policy.

Romania’s Eastern Foreign Policy

Post-2005 emerged as another formative period suitable for re-defining national identity and revising international priorities. As the end of chapter V suggested, the re-articulation process was prompted by the formal NATO accession in March 2004. At that time, Foreign Affairs Minister Geoană outlined in front of the North Atlantic Council the idea of Romania having an active regional role whose primary objective was to democratise the Black Sea area. The state’s upcoming entrance into the EU did not prefigure a different

794 Ibid.
set of discursive meanings. In December 2004, the newly elected President Băsescu enumerated the principles which would govern Romania’s relations with the EU - an irreproachable conduct to guarantee successful integration and fulfilling the remaining conditions required to gain membership (i.e. reform of the judicial system, reducing levels of corruption, increasing administrative performance and adjusting the features of internal economic competition to fit with EU norms). These principles were related strictly to domestic affairs and indicated a limited concern regarding how the Romanian external agenda would fit within the EU.

At the end of 2004, the status of Romania’s EU candidacy was promising but it was still unclear whether or not it would join the organisation in 2007. Thus, Băsescu’s hesitancy in configuring an international vocation for his state as a future EU member was understandable. The negotiations eventually led to Romania being invited to sign its EU Accession Treaty on 25 April 2005, which scheduled official membership for January 2007. The state’s journey towards EU entrance had reached a final stage yet the outcome was not completely guaranteed, because the European Council could decide to postpone the accession date for another year (1 January 2008), depending on how Romania continued to achieve the required progress. Romania’s EU membership also needed to be approved and ratified by each of the member states through referendum. Following the Accession Treaty signing, the President expressed how Romania envisaged its ‘European’ self-image and foreign policy after 2007:

‘[o]ur objective is not to simply be a new member of the European Union (...) We take our role in securing a large part of the Union’s eastern border very seriously (...) As a priority, we have set to actively contribute towards an Eastern neighbourhood characterised by stability and security’.

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798 Traian Băsescu, ‘Speech on the Accession Treaty to the EU’ (Luxembourg, 25 April 2005) in The Archives of Romania’s Presidency; available at
In a post-ceremony interview, Băsescu clarified his interpretation of Romania’s ‘European’ identity and associated it with the other main self-images of ‘security provider’ and ‘liberal democratic’:

‘I would like to add that, if it wishes to have a respectable position [within the EU], Romania must contribute not only by enlarging the internal market, by providing a skilled work force, by offering its unique culture. Romania needs to make an essential contribution towards the security of the European Union and NATO (...) We are probably the country that has the most extensive border with an area outside the EU. There is Ukraine in the North, Moldova with a frozen conflict in Transnistria to the East, the countries of former Yugoslavia to the South. In all of these regions Romania can contribute to the consolidation of democracies and the creation of a secure area.\(^{799}\)

The discourse articulated the state’s national identity along the lines of an actor who could primarily distinguish itself in the EU context as ‘gate keeper’ or ‘bridge’ to the outside. Such a member could not add value just by constituting a functional element of the EU whole. By adopting the representation of ‘border state’ in an exclusive manner, Romania preferred to be less involved in the debates concerning the EU’s internal structure and future course. This rather passive attitude could be justified by the fact that EU accession would be confirmed and rendered official only on 1 January 2007. Yet things did not change after that date, even though Romanian elites had a series of important instruments at their disposal. As a new member state, Romania benefited from both a medium-sized territory and a population that ranked in third place among EU members’ voting power. Consequently, its number of votes in the EU Council of Ministers was surpassed only by the ‘big four’ (Germany, France, Italy and the UK), Spain and Poland.\(^{800}\) An analysis of material interests would have expected Romania to make use of its voting power and seek to maximise any


advantages; or at least to render its presence quite visible within the EU via multilateral and bilateral cooperation with fellow members. The year 2007 had plenty of opportunities for exerting influence, with four issues of great significance firmly placed on the EU’s agenda: institutional reform, energy policy, security and defence policy. The topics were intensely discussed both in the European Parliament’s sessions and at the Council of Ministers’ level. Still, the Romanian state and its foreign affairs representatives continued showing a rather passive attitude to inside deliberations, looking instead towards the outside.\footnote{The ‘Ovidiu Şincai’ Social-Democrat Institute, \textit{Raport - Efectele ‘ Doctrinei Băsescu’: izolarerea internaţională a României/ Report – The Effects of the ‘Băsescu Doctrine’: Romania’s International Isolation} (Bucharest, 7 March 2008), p. 6; http://www.fisd.ro/PDF/mater_noi/Raport\%20pol\%20externa\%202008.pdf (July 2014).}

Romania was mostly preoccupied with the EU mechanisms that were meaningful for the other two self-images of national identity - ‘pro-active liberal democracy’ and ‘security provider’. And those policies referred to the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood and potential future enlargement.

Furthermore, according to the words of Foreign Affairs Minister Ungureanu in August 2006, Romania would use its ‘European’ self-image to connect the ‘West’ (NATO and EU) with its non-Euro-Atlantic vicinity:

\textit{[o]n the international front, post-2007 Romania will be a European state with the potential to specialise in specific issues and geographical regions of foreign policy, and it can play the part of a link between the West and certain regions located in strategic proximity to the Euro-Atlantic area. A European Romania with a selective global vocation is the country we have all been dreaming of and one we have the historical duty to make a reality}.\footnote{Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu, ‘Romania after 1 January 2007: New Realities, New Responsibilities, New Perspectives’ (Bucharest, 30 August 2006) in \textit{Întotdeauna loial: note diplomatice pentru o Românie modernă 2005-2007/ Always Loyal: Diplomatic Notes for a Modern Romania 2005-2007} (Iaşi: Polirom, 2008), p. 118.}

Taking into account President Băsescu’s naval affinity, Romania was seen as ‘an ideal transatlantic port to the Black Sea’.\footnote{Iulia Motoc and Şerban F. Cioculescu, \textit{Manual de Analiză a Politicii Externe/ Manual of Foreign Policy Analysis} (Iaşi: Polirom, 2010), p. 57.} In November 2006, foreign policy elites decided to ‘actively lobby the relevant institutions in Brussels’ to place the two neighbours – the Black Sea region and Moldova – on the EU’s agenda, especially since the EU lacked a specific policy for the Black Sea.
region.\textsuperscript{804} Romania’s potential influence in the Black Sea region resulted from controlling the Danube Delta and its channels (4,200 km), as well as ‘approximately 245 km of the sea shore and the corresponding territorial waters’.\textsuperscript{805} Post-2004 Romania had been trying to promote its own idea of a Black Sea initiative, in connection with the goals of NATO and the EU.\textsuperscript{806} Cooperation in the Black Sea area had substantially increased for the past decades, ranging from the Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation, the Process of Stability and Good Neighbourly Relations in South-Eastern Europe, the South-East European Cooperation Initiative and the Stability Pact for South-East Europe, to military endeavours like BLACK-SEAFOR.\textsuperscript{807} Yet the main bodies of regional dialogue in the Black Sea area had all been led by major actors like Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. In 2007, Romania – together with Bulgaria and Greece – advocated that the EU needed to create a separate special initiative for the region. This was called the Black Sea Synergy and officially launched in February 2008, being integrated into the European Neighbourhood Policy.\textsuperscript{808} The main objective of the Black Sea Synergy was ‘the strengthening of cooperation between the riparian states, through implementing sectoral partnerships’; the most visible activities of the Synergy were ‘environment and civil society development through the Romanian initiative of the Black Sea NGO Forum’.\textsuperscript{809} The notion of a ‘Black Sea Forum’ had first been mentioned by President Băsescu in his February 2005 visit to Moscow. He conceived it to be a ‘political forum’, which had the mission of ‘developing a political vision that would solve [Black Sea]
The Black Sea Forum was ‘meant to complement existing initiatives and forms of organization in the region by providing an informal platform for communication’. The one and only meeting of the Black Sea Forum was held in Bucharest in June 2006 and was not attended by Russia.

Regardless of what projects were undertaken in the extended Black Sea area, the Russian Federation remained a key player. The success of President Băsescu’s Eastern foreign policy inevitably depended upon establishing some sort of communication and working partnership with Russia. There were a few persuasive reasons to be considered in this respect. First, Russia was one of the states bordering on the Black Sea. Second, Russia’s role could impact positively or negatively on the frozen conflicts in the area. Third, the Russian state in all its historical incarnations had always held strong views regarding the evolution of its immediate and close vicinity, an aspect which had to be seriously taken into account. Romania’s diplomatic relations with Russia had been strained or difficult at best throughout the post-communist period, but they had never deteriorated to such an extent as after 2005. The main cause derived from the Romanian President’s somewhat aggressive foreign policy discourse, which started manifesting itself in the second half of 2005. During his first official visit to Russia in February 2005, things appeared stable and Băsescu asked for President Vladimir Putin’s involvement in a future multi-lateral arrangement of cooperation around the Black Sea – later known as the Black Sea Forum. This neutral language was short-lived and the Romanian presidential discourse soon began to consistently antagonise Russia. Although there was a grain of truth in most of Băsescu’s choice of

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words, the language of international diplomacy had rules that could not be ignored without consequences. In a speech delivered at Stanford University, President Băsescu declared that the Russian Federation treated ‘the Black Sea as a Russian lake’ because it did not want problems in the region to be ‘internationalised’.814 Consistent with the intensified Atlantic dimension of Romania’s national identity, in December 2005 an agreement was ratified granting permission to build US military bases on Romanian territory. It ensured American presence near the South-Eastern border and led to further Russian displeasure. On 25 January 2006, an opportunity to briefly discuss this issue arose during an address by President Băsescu in front of the Council of Europe. When replying to the Russian representative’s question about the American bases in Romania, he ended the answer with a cutting remark on the former Soviet military presence - ‘[y]ou stayed for thirty years in Romania, and we never asked you why you did so’.815

As a form of retaliation, in June 2006 Russia ostentatiously ignored the Black Sea Forum for Dialogue and Partnership organised in Bucharest. Late October 2006 brought another hostile reference in the context of European dependence on Russian gas supplies: ‘the promotion of reforms throughout the Black Sea region is burdened by Russia’s energy monopoly’.816 The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs - Serghei Lavrov - handed a letter to his Romanian counterpart after an OSCE meeting, where he expressed Russian concern for President Băsescu’s ‘unfriendly statements’; according to the language of diplomacy, the word ‘unfriendly’ symbolised a very serious deterioration of the states’ bilateral relations.817 Băsescu’s rhetoric vis-à-vis

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Russia was persistently antagonistic, often with an undiplomatic and hostile tone. Rationally speaking, there is no plausible reason for it because his attitude clearly undermined any initiative the Romanian Presidency wanted to promote in the Black Sea region. Russia remains too powerful an actor to ignore or, worse, openly insult and expect it not to sabotage Romanian projects. Băsescu’s extremely blunt words, to the point of being offensive, can be explained by the kinds of understandings which circulated in the foreign policy imaginary post-2004. As reflected by the 2006 National Security Strategy, the presidential discourse operated with negative representations of the ‘non-Euro-Atlantic’ others. The ‘main battle’ was ‘waged between fundamentally different values’ – ‘democracy and totalitarianism’. In such a global context, the ‘logic of exclusion and confrontation’ was applied and it became particularly relevant in Russia’s case. Romania had a traditionally uneasy relationship with Russia and many collective memories of past wrongs, especially the National Treasure (given to Tsarist custody during World War I and never returned) or the Soviet Union being blamed for imposing communism in Central-Eastern Europe. Compared to the Balkans, Romania’s foreign policy imaginary had not articulated Russia as a ‘friendly other’. President Băsescu also considered Russia to be the root of all problems in the Black Sea area, which enabled the ‘logic of exclusion’ to move on to that of ‘confrontation’. His intensified Atlantic vocation for the Romanian self-images of ‘security provider’ and ‘pro-active liberal democracy’ shaped an antagonistic behaviour towards the ‘undemocratic’ Russian other. The latter was held responsible for not allowing Romania and the Euro-Atlantic community to stabilise and democratisethe Black Sea states, for undermining Băsescu’s Eastern policies and the regional role he envisioned. As another key component of the state’s Eastern foreign policy, Romania tried to bring the Republic of Moldova (historically known as Basarabia) closer to ‘Europe’ and EU integration. It was a promisingendeavour that produced mixed results.

819 The ‘Ovidiu Şincai’ Social-Democrat Institute, Analiza Strategiei de Securitate Națională a României/ The Analysis of Romania’s National Security Strategy, p. 8.
Relations with the Republic of Moldova

Among Romania’s neighbours, Moldova is the one state with whom it shares the greatest affinity and, to a certain degree, the most complicated relationship. Immediately after the Cold War, the dialogue between Romania and Moldova was marked by the possible reunification of two states with similar historical origins, languages and cultures. Since 1989, the evolution of their relations has been characterised by rapprochement interspersed with tensions or even periods of conflict. Irina Angelescu has summarised the long-standing and complex background of the Moldovan-Romanian historical rapport:

‘[t]he territory of the contemporary independent state of Moldova had been an integral part of the Romanian Moldovan Principality, roughly from the fourteenth to the nineteenth century. It was conquered by the Russian Empire for five decades in the nineteenth century, and then it was an integral part of the Romanian independent state (...) until 1944, when it became part of the Soviet Union’.  

These historical changes contributed to Moldova having a ‘regional’ rather than a ‘national’ identity; Moldovan politics was dominated by multiple discourses about identity. Dan Dungaciu has identified three types of domestic discourses that tell different stories about Moldova’s identity – the Romanian discourse, the discourse of Soviet Moldovanism and the multi-ethnic and multicultural discourse. The question of identity remains very sensitive in Moldova, where people basically disagree on whether they are actually Romanians or have a distinct ‘Moldovan’ national identity. This divisive debate partly accounts for the ups and downs of Romania’s engagement with Moldova since 1991, when Moldova declared itself an independent state from the USSR. Although the reunification of Moldova and Romania did not occur, the possibility of that outcome ‘made Moldova’s national minorities very uncomfortable and led to the “hot” war of

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Transnistria at the beginning of the 1990s’. The resulting ‘frozen conflict’ has slim chances of being resolved while local ethnic and nationalist sentiments continue to be manipulated. As V.G. Baleanu has noted, ‘the Transnistrian leaders expertly play the card of their opposition to Moldova’s possible unification with Romania’.

While presenting his foreign policy coordinates to the ambassadors accredited in Bucharest, President Băsescu said in January 2005 that:

‘[t]he relationship with the Republic of Moldova will be a priority for my mandate as president of Romania. The Republic of Moldova’s European future must be a moral obligation of the entire Romanian society. Our identical language, culture and traditions are historical gifts. Protecting this identity is our duty’.

The statement was followed by an official visit to Moldova during the same month, whose administration was probably surprised by the sudden change of its neighbour’s rhetoric. After all, six years had passed since the last visit of a Romanian President to Chisinau. Moldova’s response was initially quite welcoming and showed its willingness to use the Romanian experience concerning EU accession. The exchanges during the visit were friendly and Băsescu offered his guarantee that Romania would be the Republic of Moldova’s ‘advocate of progress towards the West and the European Union’. He also stressed the Romanian commitment to treat Moldova as an independent and sovereign state, at the same time mentioning the ‘shared history’ and the ‘binding common future within the EU’. An interesting detail appeared in the joint declaration with President Vladimir Voronin at the end of their consultations, where a substantial amount of attention was dedicated to regional cooperation in South-East Europe. The text explained

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827 Ibid.
how Romania would support Moldova’s wish to join various economic and political organisations in that area, as part of the broader EU accession efforts.828

Regarding the matter of Transnistria, on the occasion of his official visit to Russia in February 2005, Băsescu had already informed President Putin that Romania wanted to become involved in addressing the Transnistrian conflict. He proposed ‘to enlarge the format of negotiation’ (Republic of Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, Transnistria and the OSCE) by including the Romanian side.829 Băsescu had often called for the withdrawal of Russia’s military presence from Transnistria. For instance, he believed the ‘first step to a solution requires both withdrawing foreign troops and dissolving the military and paramilitary forces of the separatist regime, according to a clear timetable and with multilateral guarantees’.830 This international stance differed to an important extent from the EU’s approach to the conflict, although the supranational institution had assigned a special representative for the Transnistrian issue. Ultimately, the EU did not insist on the withdrawal of foreign military forces and gave the impression of accepting as legitimate Russia’s viewpoint - that its troops had a purely peace-keeping purpose.831 Despite saying that it had a concrete plan to solve the ‘frozen conflict’, Romania’s proposal to be included in the negotiations on Transnistria was met with refusal by most participant states – the Republic of Moldova, Russia and Ukraine.832

After July 2006, Romania’s membership in the EU brought to the surface another sensitive issue in the relations with Moldova – dual citizenship. Romanian elites had a foreign policy initiative that was intended to bring Moldovans much closer to ‘Europe’:

‘Romania’s accession to the EU meant that it had to introduce visas for Moldovan citizens – who until then did not even need a passport to travel to the country. To make the situation easier for Moldovans, the dual citizenship law made it possible for qualified Moldovans to obtain Romanian citizenship, but it also meant that Moldovans could now travel visa-free in the Schengen [and EU] space’.833 Yet the implementation of this foreign policy idea triggered several negative interpretations. Some EU members were not pleased by the influx of new and indirectly acquired EU citizens that originated from Moldova. The Russian speaking media in Chisinau depicted it as ‘the tacit assimilation of Moldova by Romania’.834 Throughout the autumn of 2006, President Voronin frequently criticised Romania and eventually accused it of trying to ‘push’ his state inside the EU.835 Romania’s foreign policy imaginary operated on the belief of a shared European identity with the Republic of Moldova. That would be the reason why it assumed ‘European’ (EU) integration to constitute the natural Moldovan future course. The Romanian administration was still mindful not to insist on NATO membership, which remained problematic due to Moldova’s ties with Russia. Instead, President Băsescu wanted to bring the neighbouring state closer to the EU’s influence and eventually facilitate its accession. Nevertheless, it would seem that Bucharest and Chisinau did not have a sufficiently similar identity; or at least the latter had not yet internalised a ‘European’ self-image. Although the Moldovan administration welcomed at first its neighbour’s foreign policy efforts, Romania’s eager persistence was negatively perceived by President Voronin as paternalistic and aiming to destabilise the state’s regime. The situation degenerated into a

834 V.G. Baleanu, In the Shadow of Russia: Romania’s Relations with Moldova and Ukraine, p. 18.
full-blown political and diplomatic crisis throughout 2006 and 2007, whose severity was atypical for democracies.\textsuperscript{836} Therefore, the relationship with Moldova as an essential component of Romania’s Eastern foreign policy proved to be a partial success at best. The exclusively Romanian initiative of the Black Sea Forum was also a failure. The overall achievements of the Băsescu administration’s Eastern focus were rather disappointing. In the words of Armand Goşu, ‘neither at a theoretical level has a coherent vision for Romania’s Eastern policy been formulated, nor at a practical level can one notice a consistent endeavour in this respect’.\textsuperscript{837} Even if the foreign policy embodiment of Romania’s two externally accepted self-images – ‘liberal democratic’ and ‘security provider’ – was unsuccessful in 2005-2006, a great accomplishment awaited state elites and public opinion on 1 January 2007.

Romania’s Euro-Atlantic integration had been a long-standing foreign policy goal and national aspiration during the post-communist years. Its symbolic importance for the state was constitutionally enshrined and included among the revisions to the Romanian Constitution in 2003.\textsuperscript{838} Minutes before the official EU accession (1 January 2007), in his New Year’s Eve address to the domestic population, President Băsescu emphasised the collective will and sacrifice of all Romanians that led to the much desired achievement of NATO and EU membership.\textsuperscript{839} The prevalent message invoked the state’s long awaited ‘return to Europe’:

‘[w]e have not entered but returned [to Europe] after 60 years, during which no one asked us if we wanted to be absent. We have come back home, to our Europe!’\textsuperscript{840}

\textsuperscript{836} Ruxandra Ivan, \textit{La Politique Étrangère Roumaine (1990-2006)/ Romanian Foreign Policy (1990-2006)}, p. 141.
Romania finally obtained full and incontestable international recognition for its Euro-Atlantic national identity and all three related self-images: ‘liberal democratic’, ‘security provider’ and ‘European’. This was the eagerly anticipated last stop in Romania’s journey of national identity re-definitions that had shaped its foreign policy between 1990 and 2007.

Concluding Remarks

In conclusion, the years 2004-2007 consolidated and intensified the Atlantic dimension of Romania’s national identity and foreign policy. Domestic politics was dominated by the new ‘president-player’ Băsescu, who became the main de facto decision-maker concerning the state’s international affairs. This was problematic in the Romanian semi-presidential system, which featured two heads of the executive branch – the President and Prime Minister. President Băsescu and Premier Tăriceanu entered an uneasy political cohabitation, although they had initially been co-leaders of the same coalition. The presidential administration shaped to a great extent the post-2005 foreign policy imaginary. The Presidency’s discourses, reflected in the 2006 National Security Strategy, re-articulated Romania as a ‘pro-active liberal democracy’ and ‘security provider’ with an intensified Atlantic vocation. This intensified Atlanticism subordinated or rendered secondary the other key facet of national identity – the ‘European’ self-image. Early in his mandate, President Băsescu showed an overt Atlantic preference and argued for a special relationship between the US, UK and Romania. Unlike previous documents, the 2006 National Security Strategy conveyed that the Atlantic dimension of national identity prevailed over the European one. ‘European’ identity had been a constant theme of Romania’s foreign policy imaginary throughout the first post-communist decade. Following an episode of internal contestation in 1991, ‘Europe’ emerged as Romania’s unquestioned international course. Having chosen ‘Europe’, the ‘European’ self-image of national identity was intensely promoted between 1990 and 1996, affecting Romanian relations with Hungary. The ‘European’ self-image also influenced Romania’s evolving international reactions to the Kosovo crisis in 1998-1999.
And during the Iraq invasion of 2003, Romania’s ‘liberal democratic’ self-image was fundamentally re-defined as pro-active and Atlantic-oriented, without explicitly neglecting its ‘European’ identity.

However, since Romania had gained NATO membership in 2004, the Presidency as a key foreign policy agent viewed the state like a bridge to the outside or to the ‘East’. After 2005, the Romanian international purpose was to act as a ‘border state’ and ‘gate keeper’ that connected the Euro-Atlantic community (NATO and EU) with its non-Euro-Atlantic others. The ‘European’ self-image of Romanian identity represented its inextricable link to Western Europe. Having obtained international recognition for two main themes of national identity – ‘liberal democratic’ and ‘security provider’ – via NATO integration, Romania started to look from the West to the East. An externally validated pro-active liberal democracy with a security provider role needed to spread democratic values and stabilise the neighbouring non-Euro-Atlantic states. It also had to keep participating in nearer or more distant military missions as a component of the global war on terrorism. Yet such foreign policy understandings were not accepted by all Romanian elites, especially the Prime Minister as chief of the Government. June 2006 configured an episode of domestic contestation regarding the withdrawal of Romanian armed forces from Iraq. These debates were part of a wider attempt to re-balance the state’s Atlantic vocation and ‘European’ self-image, which would in turn impact on Romanian identity and international stances. The governmental programme adopted in December 2004 outlined that the foreign policy priority of the Tăriceanu cabinet would be achieving EU accession, followed by other obligations stemming from NATO membership. The Government saw the fight against international terrorism and the involvement in the EU Foreign and Security Policy as equally important. The Presidency’s intensified Atlanticism for Romanian identity and foreign policy was absent. For Premier Tăriceanu’s cabinet, the EU and ‘European’ self-image were very significant and not secondary to the Atlantic vocation of Romanian national identity. In June 2006, the Prime Minister tried to contest the President’s sole de facto right to decide the maintaining of soldiers in Iraq, as well as re-balance the ‘European’ and ‘Atlantic’ dimension of Romanian identity and
foreign policy. Tăriceanu’s challenge to Băsescu’s Atlanticist vision failed because it was not well planned and the ‘pro-active liberal democracy’ and ‘security provider’ self-images were more influential on national elites.

Post-2005 the Presidency’s intensified Atlanticism also configured Romania’s Eastern foreign policy. The state was less involved in the internal ‘European’ deliberations and much more preoccupied with the EU mechanisms that were relevant to the dominant Romanian self-images (‘liberal democratic’ and ‘security provider’). Those EU policies pertained to the Eastern neighbourhood and the organisation’s possible future expansion. As a ‘border state’, Romania was looking to the East and connected the Euro-Atlantic community with its non-Euro-Atlantic vicinity. The state’s Eastern projects were meant to democratise and stabilise the Black Sea region, but yielded mixed results. Romania promoted its own idea of a Black Sea initiative among multilateral cooperation arrangements directed by major actors like Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. Romania’s ‘Black Sea Forum for Dialogue and Partnership’ was ignored by Russia and organised only one meeting in June 2006. The potential success of the ‘Black Sea Forum’ in particular and Romania’s Eastern foreign policy in general depended on a good working relationship with Russia. Nevertheless, President Băsescu consistently antagonised Russia via a somewhat aggressive and hostile rhetoric throughout late 2005 and 2006. It was not a rational attitude and rather one influenced by the negative representations of the ‘non-Euro-Atlantic’ others circulated by the presidential discourses. As the logic of exclusion moved on to confrontation, the intensified Atlantic vocation of Romanian national identity shaped an antagonistic conduct towards the ‘undemocratic’ Russian other. Another component of Romania’s Eastern foreign policy referred to relations with the Republic of Moldova and the latter’s EU prospects. Romanian-Moldovan dialogue had a promising beginning that eventually ended in a diplomatic crisis. Moldova had not internalised a ‘European’ international course and did not want to be ‘pushed’ by Romania in the EU. The Romanian state had also aimed to be included in the format of negotiations to solve the ‘frozen conflict’ of Transnistria, yet was refused by most participant states – the Republic of Moldova, Russia and
Ukraine. Overall, Romania’s Eastern foreign policy in 2005-2006 was marked by tentative progress which in the end proved to be a failure. This disappointment was assuaged by the state becoming an official EU member on 1 January 2007, which internationally validated all the three main themes of Romania’s post-communist national identity and foreign policy: ‘European’, ‘liberal democratic’ and ‘security provider’.
Conclusions regarding Romania’s National Identity and Foreign Policy (1990-2007)

This thesis has explored the significance of national identity in shaping the trajectory of Romania’s foreign policy between 1990 and 2007. To accomplish its aims, the project has employed a multi-dimensional framework of national identity, which draws from four literatures related to constructivism, nationalism scholarship, collective memory and self-esteem and international recognition. The framework has applied the following general constructivist ideas: the changing nature and ideational foundation of national identity; how it influences state action without imposing causality; the external and domestic dimensions at work in identity formation; the way identity is constituted via difference and entails a variety of possible representations on the self-other nexus; inter-subjectivity as a feature of identity creation. The thesis has used nationalism and memory studies to identify the internal sources of national identity. A fairly obvious first domestic factor is the nation. The debates in the field of nationalism shed light on the imagined essence of the nation, which does not imply that nations are fictitious. They have a stable ethno-cultural core based on ethnic ancestry, language, territory and collective memories like internalised historical narratives and symbols. The second internal source of national identity refers to collective memory-myths, which are subjective interpretations of the nation’s remembered past that give meaning to the self-images feeding into national identity and convey future aspirations. Apart from the two domestic factors of national identity, there is the external dimension of self-esteem and international recognition. Self-images and national identity require validation by others from the international realm. Identity verification is intertwined with self-esteem, which illustrates an important motivator in a state’s social survival and foreign policy. Self-images and national identity are negotiated between the self (the state) and its salient others. If self-images are not internationally recognised, the state appeals to different strategies such as identity re-definitions to convince external
audiences of their validity. The multi-dimensional view of national identity has provided some very interesting and unique insights in the case of Romanian post-communist foreign policy.

Thus, the years 1990-1996 featured a rich palette of re-emerging meanings and three key ‘formative moments’ for Romania’s national identity and foreign policy. The first ‘formative moment’ configured the state’s international orientation towards ‘Europe’. Political leaders had to answer an existential question for the newly democratic Romania – to be or not to be ‘European’? The 1991 Romanian-Soviet ‘Friendship Treaty’ was a crucial episode of domestic contestation about the state’s future identity and international course. The President’s endorsement of the Soviet ‘Friendship Treaty’, which created a controversial security relationship with the USSR, was not shared by the majority of elites who wanted a Euro-Atlantic course for Romania. Although signed by the President, the treaty was not ratified by the Romanian Parliament and never became legally binding. Having chosen the European direction, a second ‘formative moment’ of 1990-1996 underlined how Romania’s ‘European’ self-image was contested by and negotiated with external audiences. Despite internally constructing the state’s European identity, the Hungarian-Romanian basic treaty showed the problematic aspects of gaining only partial recognition from the authoritative European self. Romania and Hungary had opposing conceptions of what European identity meant in terms of ethnic minority rights. For Romania, European identity entailed a democratic Constitution, individual rights and native language provisions as appropriate protection for minorities. By contrast, Hungary and the UDMR considered collective rights and a form of ethnic autonomy to be the adequate standards for European identity. As these issues were still in flux at the ‘European’ level, Romania and Hungary were active participants in defining what European identity meant with respect to minority rights. Once the international community clarified its perspective, the two states reached a mutually acceptable compromise for the treaty text in 1996.
The period 1990-1996 also contained a third ‘formative moment’ that brought forward the main self-images of Romanian national identity: ‘European’, ‘non-Balkan’ and ‘security provider’. The ‘European’ self-image was more intensely circulated at this time, yet the others were articulated as well. All three self-images formed an ideational foundation that shaped Romania’s foreign policy between 1990 and 2007. The state’s relationship with the Balkans has been marked by rejection and acceptance. Romanian officials persistently tried to convince external audiences that their state was ‘non-Balkan’. Even so, the ‘Balkan other’ was not constructed as a threat. The area was often represented as ‘our friends to the South’, with Yugoslavia described as ‘traditional partner’ and ‘best neighbour’. These articulations configured a ‘non-Balkan’ Romania that retained an affinity and friendly rapport with the Balkans. The ‘security provider’ self-image of Romanian identity presented a range of meanings like ‘reliable partner’ and ‘source of stability’. It had a discursive connection with NATO membership because Romania had to prove that it could contribute to allied military capabilities. But the self-image of ‘security provider’ was not simply a response to NATO discourses and accession criteria, since it was rooted in a long-standing collective memory-myth about Romania being a defender of Europe and the West. The ‘non-Balkan’ and ‘security provider’ self-images were particularly relevant in influencing Romanian positions on the Kosovo intervention and Iraq war.

After Romania opted for a European orientation and discursively negotiated what European identity meant for its international affairs, the state’s journey of national identity and foreign policy in 1996-1999 emphasised the inherent dilemmas of a European liberal democracy and security provider that has Balkan ties. Confronted with an escalating inter-ethnic conflict in Kosovo, Romanian leaders needed to decide what would be the suitable stance for an aspiring liberal democracy with a security provider role, which had a traditional friendship and affinity with the Balkans too. The post-1996 discourses had consolidated the key themes of Romania’s foreign policy imaginary - ‘European’, ‘non-Balkan’ and ‘security provider’, while articulating an ideational shift towards the role of democracy in the state’s
evolution. Elites mentioned the ‘liberal democratic’ self-image of Romanian identity more often than the ‘European’ one, yet they were facets of the same representation. The Kosovo crisis was a ‘formative moment’ for national identity and international reactions. Romania had an evolving position on Kosovo which started with partial support for NATO in October 1998 and later changed to unconditional assistance for the Alliance’s air campaign in March-April 1999. The initial response of October 1998 was a middle ground with a dual objective. Partial support for NATO actions (airspace access in emergencies) did not explicitly oppose the Alliance or contradict Romania’s self-proclaimed Euro-Atlantic identity. It also accommodated the dilemmas within national identity - whether to act as a ‘European’ liberal democracy and ‘security provider’ or choose the traditional Balkan ties.

This foreign policy decision was re-defined under the impact of three factors: national identity, rationalism and shifting international context. Rational interests were a component of Romania’s Euro-Atlantic goal and contributed to its Kosovo stance, but they cannot explain why the state did not fully endorse and assist NATO operations from the beginning. Here national identity shows the tensions between the two Romanian self-images - ‘European’/‘liberal democratic’ and ‘security provider’ – and Balkan affinity, which shaped Romanian foreign policy. Critical events like the Kosovo conflict facilitate the re-articulation of international ideational contexts. In early 1999, the international discourses conveyed the urgency of a humanitarian intervention in Kosovo and NATO states were ready to use force without a mandate from the UN Security Council. Prominent Euro-Atlantic voices talked about the negative implications of appeasing dictators and advocated a certain interpretation of Kosovo as a fight between the civilised values of liberal democracy and barbaric authoritarianism. This shifting ideational context enabled a hierarchy within Romanian identity, as the ‘European’/‘liberal democratic’ and ‘security provider’ self-images became more relevant than traditional relations and affinity with the Balkans. Romania’s presidential and parliamentary discourses resonated with the idea of the state acting like an established liberal democracy. Once the tensions and dilemmas of national identity were solved in March-April 1999, Romania
supported NATO’s Operation ‘Allied Force’ in Kosovo by granting unrestricted airspace access without military troops.

Having decided to behave like a credible ‘European’ liberal democratic state and security provider, the journey of Romania’s national identity and foreign policy in 2000-2004 moved on to another existential question – to be or not to be an ‘Atlantic’ liberal democracy? The years 2000-2004 featured the culmination of several ‘formative moments’ for Romanian identity and international politics. During the first post-communist decade, the state’s Euro-Atlantic national identity included three main self-images: ‘European’/‘liberal democratic’, ‘non-Balkan’ and ‘security provider’. The ‘European’ self-image meant that Romania was an aspiring liberal democracy that required international recognition from the authoritative Euro-Atlantic community - NATO and EU states. At the crucial point of the 1999 Kosovo intervention, national identity underwent two fundamental re-definitions. Firstly, the ‘non-Balkan’ self-image started to gradually disappear from the foreign policy imaginary, which made the ‘European’/‘liberal democratic’ and ‘security provider’ ones to be dominant. Secondly, the ‘European’/‘liberal democratic’ self-image was re-articulated to a substantial extent. From 1990 to 1999, the ‘European’ and ‘liberal democratic’ self-images constituted the same representation. The Kosovo ‘formative moment’ encouraged Romania’s ‘liberal democratic’ self-image to be separated from its ‘European’ identity. As the international narratives of 1999 promoted the notions of humanitarian and democratic intervention, Romanian identity was re-defined as a pro-active liberal democracy that helped to spread democratic principles; being a liberal democracy was not necessarily associated with ‘Europe’. This re-articulation of national identity was central in clarifying Romania’s foreign policy on Iraq, whether it should opt for a ‘European’ or ‘Atlantic’ orientation.

During 2002-2003, France and Germany persisted in disarming Iraq via peaceful methods, while the US wanted to invade the country and remove its totalitarian regime through military force. NATO states were also divided on how to approach the Iraq situation. Romania initially attempted to remain neutral but decided to support the US and take part in the coalition against
Iraq in February 2003. Rationalism would say that Romania was merely currying favour with the US to finalise the NATO integration process. The state had been invited to join the Alliance in 2002 and its accession had to be ratified by each member. Yet the context was not straightforward, considering that France had a NATO veto at its disposal and both Germany and France were highly influential EU decision-makers. France had been very displeased by Romanian solidarity with the US on Iraq and threatened the state’s EU candidacy. According to a rational calculation, Romania was halfway in NATO and could lose much more by antagonising France and Germany. Romania could have formulated a limited backing for the US that did not entail sending armed forces. Instead, Romanian elites across the political spectrum agreed on a vocal Atlantic response to Iraq and full military participation. National identity can explain the state’s choice of foreign policy actions. The contradictory European (French-German) and Atlantic views on Iraq prompted an identity crisis within Romania’s ‘liberal democratic’ self-image. After intervening in Kosovo for humanitarian and democratic reasons, Romania as a pro-active liberal democracy seeking international validation could not entertain double standards and distinguish between dictatorships. Romania opted to become fully involved in the coalition against Iraq since this course of action was consistent with the fundamentally re-defined national identity - ‘pro-active liberal democracy’ - and the emerging Atlantic vocation of its foreign policy. At the time, specific Cold War memory-myths were particularly meaningful for Romanian leaders as they reinforced the state’s identity re-articulations and its Atlantic perspective. Romania and Central-Eastern European states felt an emotional solidarity with American causes, because the US was collectively perceived and remembered as not having completely abandoned the region during communism. That is why many post-communist states like Romania interpreted their support for the American democratic ideal as a moral duty, even at the expense of traditional relations with France and potential material costs.

After re-defining national identity as a pro-active liberal democracy with an Atlantic vocation, Romania’s foreign policy story entered its final post-communist formative period. The years 2004-2007 consolidated and
intensified the Atlanticism of Romanian identity and international politics. The post-2005 foreign policy imaginary was significantly shaped by the Băsescu presidential administration. President Băsescu promoted an overt Atlantic orientation and aimed to build a special relationship between the US, UK and Romania. For the first time, the Presidency’s intensified Atlanticism depicted as secondary the other key facet of Romanian national identity – the ‘European’ self-image. Throughout the initial post-1990 decade, ‘European’ identity was a constant theme of the state’s foreign policy imaginary. In 1991, following the contested Soviet ‘Friendship Treaty’, ‘Europe’ became the clear international direction of Romania. After choosing ‘Europe’, the ‘European’ self-image of national identity was intensely re-articulated between 1990 and 1996, impacting on Romania’s relations with Hungary. It influenced the state’s evolving stances on the Kosovo intervention during 1998-1999 as well. And the Iraq war of 2003 facilitated the fundamental re-definition of Romania’s ‘liberal democratic’ self-image as pro-active and Atlantic, without explicitly marginalising its ‘European’ identity. Nevertheless, as Romania had obtained NATO membership in 2004 and was close to EU accession, the presidential administration as a main foreign policy decision-maker had a specific view of the state’s international purpose. Romania intended to act like a ‘border state’ or bridge that linked the Euro-Atlantic community (NATO and EU) with its non-Euro-Atlantic others. Since Romania had received international recognition for two self-images of its national identity – ‘liberal democratic’ and ‘security provider’ – through NATO integration, the state focused more on the ‘East’. Romania as an externally accepted pro-active liberal democracy with a security provider role wanted to democratise and stabilise the non-Euro-Atlantic neighbourhood. It also needed to maintain the contributions to military operations abroad as part of the international war on terrorism. These foreign policy meanings were not endorsed by all Romanian elites and especially the Prime Minister. He attempted to re-balance the ‘European’ self-image and Atlantic dimension of national identity, which would affect Romanian international affairs. The Premier’s discursive efforts culminated in the June 2006 episode of internal contestation about withdrawing Romanian soldiers from Iraq. The Prime Minister’s challenge to the President’s Atlantic option was unsuccessful, because it was not well
planned and the ‘pro-active liberal democracy’ and ‘security provider’ self-images had a greater impact on state officials.

Post-2005 Romania’s intensified Atlanticism and ‘border state’ representation configured its Eastern foreign policy. Romania’s Eastern projects were supposed to spread democratic values and stabilise the non-Euro-Atlantic vicinity, particularly the Black Sea area, yet produced mixed results. The state’s version of a Black Sea initiative had a very short activity as it was mostly ignored by Russia. The possible success of Romania’s Eastern policies depended on a reasonably good working relationship with Russia. However, in 2005-2006, the Romanian Presidency consistently antagonised Russia via a quite aggressive and hostile rhetoric. This was not a rational behaviour, but rather one shaped by the negative articulations of the non-Euro-Atlantic others advocated by the presidential discourses. The intensified Atlantic vocation of Romanian identity influenced the antagonistic attitude towards the ‘undemocratic’ Russian other. Romania’s Eastern foreign policy also included improving relations with the Republic of Moldova and the latter’s EU prospects. The inter-state communication showed a promising potential that unfortunately deteriorated into a diplomatic crisis. Moldova decided that it did not wish to be ‘pushed’ by Romania in acceding to the EU. Consequently, Romania’s Eastern foreign policy was characterised by tentative progress and ultimately failure in 2005-2006. Such a disappointing outcome was sweetened by Romania becoming an official EU member on 1 January 2007, which granted international validation to all the three main themes of Romania’s post-communist national identity and foreign policy: ‘European’, ‘liberal democratic’ and ‘security provider’.

The trajectory of Romania’s national identity and foreign policy has been difficult at times, yet the discursive dialogue with the authoritative Euro-Atlantic self has re-defined the state into a credible European and Atlantic liberal democracy that plays a security provider role in the neighbouring regions.
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