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Making citizens governable? The Crick Report as governmental technology

Abstract
This paper considers the recent introduction of Citizenship Education in England from a governmental perspective, drawing on the later work of Foucault to offer a detailed account of the political rationalities, technologies and subjectivities implicated in contemporary education policy in the formation and governance of citizen-subjects. This is understood in terms of making citizens ‘governable’, but importantly not unproblematically ‘governed’. I illustrate my account with interviews with members of the Crick Advisory Group and an analysis of the Crick Report, in order to explore the discourses and practices of educational policy-making. Trends are identified in education policy research which serve to de-politicise the policy realm and narrow the scope of ethical and political consideration. I therefore make use of Derrida’s poststructuralism to argue for an expanded conceptualisation of education and politics, and for further interrogation of the purpose, scope and temporal imperatives of education, in a theoretical-empirical approach which takes seriously the geography of power in education policy and practice.
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1. Introduction: A poststructural analysis of Citizenship Education

This paper employs an inter-disciplinary framework drawing on theoretical and practical resources ranging from Geography, Education, and political theory in order to better understand the connections between governance, education and the economy. This is achieved through an analysis of a new curriculum subject, Citizenship Education in England. I explore how the policy behind Citizenship Education, known as the ‘Crick Report’ (Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (QCA), 1998) was conceived, deliberated and delivered into the public sphere, within a specific social, cultural, political and economic context. I examine how Foucault’s concept of governmentality can be used in an educational context, following a number of recent accounts (Ball, 2003, Tickly, 2003, Olssen, 2003, Olssen et al., 2004). I analyse Citizenship Education itself as a technology by which central government exercises the ‘conduct of conduct’. Thus I consider the role of education in the control of behaviour, and demonstrate the political rationalities which can be illuminated though not unproblematically ‘read off’ from Citizenship Education. In this way, this paper is a departure from much critical education policy research which could benefit from a reinvigorated sense of human agency. Rarely does such research deliberate on the policy-making process in detail as a performative device – this necessitates qualitative empirical research, and to my knowledge, there is no such study of the Crick Committee responsible for devising Citizenship Education.
My approach brings together a Foucauldian analysis of the ‘conduct of conduct’ with an examination of the de-politicisation of educational policy research and the policy realm (Ball, 1995: 259). This uses Derridean notions of ethics and politics in order to open the scope of interrogation of Citizenship Education and the writing of the Crick Report. Education policy-making is considered a process by which discourse is translated into policy through a process which shapes the ‘conditions of possibility’ (Derrida, 1992a: 41) of the decisions and behaviours of young people. The Crick Report is discussed in light of an analysis of policy as a practice of ‘implementing the program’, and explores the opportunities for developing a more critical ‘democracy-to-come’ (Derrida, 1992a: 79). Such an approach widens the concept of the ‘political’, problematises the boundaries of nation-state based citizenship, and destabilises the notion that ‘there is no alternative’ – thus acknowledging the citizen’s ‘Other’. This takes into account Derrida’s (1992a: 41) contention that:

> When the path is clear and given, when a certain knowledge opens up the way in advance, the decision is already made, it might as well be said that there is none to make: irresponsibly, and in good conscience [on the basis of ‘common sense’], one simply applies or implements the program[…]one never escapes the program. In that case, one must acknowledge this and stop talking about moral and political responsibility.

These two theorizations of constraint and freedom inform the analysis of the Crick Report in this paper. Bringing the ideas of Foucault and Derrida together in this way allows me to scrutinize educational theory, policy and practice from two sides. Firstly, I am able to interrogate the claims of liberal political theory and liberal educational theory which suggest that the subject is free and pre-existing. Secondly, I can remain critical of Marxist and critical pedagogy accounts in which the subject is said to be
pre-determined and structured by the interplay between state and market. My analysis of the Crick Report should therefore be read in light of the view that the freedom of Citizenship Education lies in the action of Citizenship learning, as I will demonstrate in this paper.

I therefore show how a poststructural analysis can indicate the contingency of the assumptions made in liberal and Marxist accounts, and explore the notion of the performative as the basis for citizenship. Like Hannah Arendt (1961, in Bell, 1996: 90), I want to argue that political freedom is not proved by the ability to make individual free choices (since we never exist independently of each other, but in response to each other), but is an ability to ‘call something into being which did not exist before, which was not given, not even as an object of cognition or imagination’. The political subject, then, is one who recognises their performative nature, in the sense that it is only what a subject does which constitutes its being, not some innate ‘will or sovereignty’ (Bell, 1996: 91). So my conception of political freedom in this analysis is that which is exercised through public action in the present, oriented towards an open future, rather than a ‘relationship of self to self’ (Bell, 1996: 92).

These theoretical considerations form the analytical basis of a series of interviews I undertook with members of the Advisory Group on Citizenship in 2003, which I explore in light of debates on new forms of governance and changing practices of educational policy-making. This involves a critical analysis of education policy discourse, specifically the way in which key policy-makers talk about citizenship, education, young people, ethical and political responsibility. I show how ‘politics’ is erased from policy-making, in effect, putting the consequent policy document beyond
political critique. I conclude with some suggestions of the kind of politics that a poststructural approach may illuminate in terms of wider questions concerning the geography of power in educational policy and practice.

2. The political and social context of the Crick Report

This section puts the Crick Report in its political context, before going on to consider the wider social background to the Citizenship Education agenda. There is an interesting and long-running history of education for citizenship, especially in the school geography curriculum, which is the subject of another paper, but the principle point here is that looking at the Crick Report as a stand-alone policy is clearly methodologically inadequate. It is therefore instructive to consider the recent background of the Crick Report itself, as well as the political rationalities and technologies of some of New Labour’s recent educational and social policies, alluding to the kinds of subjectivities which they seek to produce.

Citizenship was first introduced as a cross-curricular theme, entitled Education for Citizenship in 1990, following the Education Reform Act of 1988 (National Curriculum Council (NCC), 1990). The establishment of a National Curriculum was arguably the most radical change in the education system of the twentieth century, and indicative of a new centralised technology of government. The political rationality here was an effort by the Conservative Government to transform education into a more efficient, uniform, standardised (and thus, measurable) system, by increasing the control of central government over local authorities. Moreover, any notion of
‘ideology’ or politics was excluded from the curriculum, diminishing gains made in peace education, anti-racist education and the socially egalitarian approaches of the 1960s and 70s (Lawton, 1992: 47). This was also partly achieved by the cross-party make-up of the Speaker’s Commission on Citizenship. It led to the introduction of Citizenship as a cross-curricular theme, but since it did not have statutory ‘bite’, and given that the curriculum was already full, the recommendations were largely ignored by most schools.

Another key policy text which must be considered in an analysis of the Crick Report is Excellence in Schools (DfEE, 1997); this first White Paper of the New Labour Government heralded a change in political emphasis – from the individualism of the Conservative years, to the rise of education as social panacea. The Government’s intention to introduce three core ‘Skills for Life’ (work-related learning, citizenship, and parenting) was the first indication of their commitment to Citizenship Education (DfEE, 1997: 63). However, most sections of the report are dominated by a political rationality of ‘standards’, with targets and managerial rationales being central to the surveillance of these standards. School management teams (SMTs), and individual teachers are called upon to become leaders and ‘change their behaviour’ (DfEE, 1997: 12), and must discipline themselves, driven by initiatives such as performance-related pay. Targets were to be more stringently measured, central government to have more powers (through OfSTED (Office for Standards in Education) and the DfEE (Department for Education and Employment)) to close ‘failing schools’, and LEAs be more strictly controlled.
If *Excellence in Schools* was the ‘standards’ White Paper, *Schools achieving Success* (DfES (Department for Education and Skills), 2001) was the ‘flexibility’ one. Again, the White Paper is concerned with markets, managerialism and performance (Ball, 2003: 215), but goes further to ‘remove the barriers’ to success, explicitly through its ‘modernising’ legislative proposals. Priorities included the tightening of control over LEAs and ‘failing schools’ (which are now considered ‘going into Special Measures’ (DfES, 2001: 49) – rather than ‘getting a Fresh Start’), ‘accountability’, ‘inspection’ and ‘intervention’, ‘devolution’, ‘innovation’ and the ‘needs of the individual citizen’ (managerialism); ‘greater choice for the consumer’ (marketisation); ‘better incentives for performance [performance-related pay]’ (performance) (DfES, 2001: 6). Taken together with the Crick Report, these initiatives form the back-drop of an agenda which is dominated by standards, flexibility and the behaviour of the whole child as citizen in order to maintain the ‘economic health and social cohesion of the country’ (DfES, 2001: 5).

Furthermore, the role of data, research and expertise within these White Papers is made central to the success of the ‘standards’ and ‘flexibility’ mantras, and exemplifies developments in the technologies of rule. The ‘supply of good data’ by which schools can compare themselves (DfEE, 1997: 3) is of central importance, and this can be achieved by the government encouraging ‘research and development’ (R&D) from ‘business, media and education’ (DfEE, 1997: 63, in this order!) on ‘leadership and management, operational research, new uses of ICT and high quality practice’. The contracting out of research on ‘implementation’, evaluation and ‘impact assessment’, for example, has become wide-spread. The primary objective is to monitor educational policies, identify ‘best practice’ and disseminate findings as
widely as possible within the research and practitioner communities, largely achieved through large-scale, technical research methods. The Citizenship Education Longitudinal Study (Kerr et al., 2003), undertaken on behalf of the National Foundation for Educational Research (NFER) to monitor the implementation of Citizenship Education is one such example. Another is one of the most controversial policy initiatives of the New Labour government; the establishment of City Academies and the proposals for 200 more. This has been evaluated not by university researchers but by the auditors, PriceWaterhouseCoopers (DfES, 2005), and its findings have been vigorously challenged within the educational research community (see Gorard, 2005).

Citizenship Education policy therefore exists within an existing and evolving discourse of education policy, and its social context is equally important. In addition to education policy, it is instructive to look at two other facets of New Labour political discourse which discuss the role of citizens in a wider political/social project.

The first is the ‘civil renewal’ agenda, and the second, ‘nationality, immigration and asylum’. These are of central importance to an analysis of Citizenship Education, given both David Blunkett and Sir Bernard Crick’s position in all three. Blunkett’s (2003: 5) civil renewal agenda has been concerned with ‘freedom, duty and obligation’, and gives a central importance to ‘participation’, ‘self-government’, ‘education for citizenship’, ‘civic virtues’ the ‘public realm’, ‘asset holding’ and ‘communities’ (Blunkett, 2003: 4-5). He states that these are based on the political ideas of Machiavelli, Rousseau (which incidentally, Foucault and Derrida both directly critique) and Blunkett’s ‘friend and mentor’, Bernard Crick (Blunkett, 2003:
5). There is an emphasis on the liberal political theory of Mill and Rawls, but he states that liberalism is characterised by a dismissal of duties and social order. He goes on to suggest that the state ought to be ‘embodied’ by the individual, and suggests that freedom can only be ensured by participative democracy and active engagement with communities and government. He is also very keen on the ‘basic issues of community life: crime, security, civility and decency’ (Blunkett, 2003: 13).

This can evoke a Foucauldian analysis of citizenship as one bound up with the governmentalisation of the nation-state; education as a technology by which security (previously the preserve of the police), and norms of civility and decency are ensured. We need only look at ‘extended schools’, ‘parenting orders’ ‘ASBO’s’ and Blair’s discourse of ‘respect’ for examples of the way which educational principles are being extended into wider society (the infantilization of society?); what Ian Hunter (1996: 149) terms ‘the pedagogical state’.

As for New Labour’s agenda on nationality, asylum and immigration, a less inclusive notion of citizenship is brought to mind. The ‘naturalisation’ initiatives of the requirement to speak English, take a citizenship test, and go through a ‘citizenship ceremony, oath and pledge’ (TSO, 2002: Chapters 1 and 3) are also informed by the political philosophy of Crick, who was also chairing the Advisory Group on the citizenship tests for immigrants. The practical barriers to people seeking refuge (political, economic or otherwise) could be considered at odds with the diverse and inclusive ideal of citizenship advocated by the Crick Report (QCA, 1998: 17), which seeks to ‘create common ground between different ethnic and religious identities’ – but it seems only if you’re ‘here’ already. This seems to conflict with the discourse of
diversity and multiculturalism of New Labour’s initiatives such as the Race Relations (Amendment) Act (2000, in Back et al., 2002: 445). Les Back and colleagues argue that such rhetoric is easily uncovered by the assimilationist agenda of the Nationality, Asylum and Immigration Act, and the White Paper Secure Borders, Safe Haven (Home Office, 2002) – exposing what they call ‘New Labour’s white heart’.

The Crick Report has similarly been criticised on such grounds. Osler and Starkey (2000: 7) state that the report ‘unwittingly reflect[s] racism’, when it states that ‘minorities must learn and respect the laws, codes and conventions as much as the majority’ (QCA, 1998: 17-18, in Osler and Starkey, 2000: 7), as if they must change their behaviour in order to be more British, and as if their entitlement to citizenship requires more work. They also highlight the ‘colonial flavour’ of the Crick Report when it states that ‘due regard [be] given to the homelands of our minority communities’ (QCA, 1998: 18, in Osler and Starkey, 2000: 7, their emphasis). For them, the report assumes a patronising tone, assuming that ethnic minorities are ‘ours’ and that they do not consider Britain as their homeland. Therefore the Crick Report itself can be seen to enact an erasure of difference couched in a discourse of diversity and tolerance (but who must tolerate whom?). I explore below how such concerns played out in discussions with members of the Crick Advisory Group.

3. The Crick Report as governmental technology

The Crick Report heralded a shift in emphasis to the explicit intervention of the Government in the behaviour of communities and individuals alike, aiming to re-engage young people with society and politics through a programme of education for
citizenship, and to address the perceived problems of youth crime and social disorder. It signified a break with past versions of Citizenship Education in the way in which it made manifest the reflexive practices of citizen-formation. But like the Encouraging Citizenship report before it (HMSO, 1990), this Report was written with the endorsement of the Speaker of the House of Commons (this time, Betty Boothroyd) in order to demonstrate its non-partisan remit and recommendations. So already, there is an imperative to erase any sense of political ideology within a report whose very topic is the future politics of the country, as if the kind of citizen you will be has nothing to do with your political philosophy or epistemological standpoint and any political party you belong to.

The Crick Advisory Group, as before, included members from community organisations, religious groups, the Government’s opposition (Lord Baker), and educationalists (more than in 1990), but this time also included representatives from the media and from a think-tank. The chairman, Professor (now Sir) Bernard Crick, was considered an expert in politics and had long advocated the introduction of political literacy in schools. The three main strands of citizenship recommended by the Crick Report (QCA, 1998: 11) are: (a) social and moral responsibility, (b) community involvement, and (c) political literacy. The other essential recommendations of the Crick Report are summarised by McLaughlin (2000). The report identifies a perceived apathy amongst voters in general, and young people in particular, so one of its political rationalities was to re-engage young people and ‘improve’ democracy.
This section explores the way in which the Crick Report was made, using information from a series of 11 semi-structured interviews undertaken between July and September 2003, seven of which were with members of the Advisory Group on Citizenship (in 1998). Three others had been consulted by the Advisory Group, and one was a Citizenship Initial Teacher Training (ITT) tutor. This methodological approach is intended to ‘re-humanise’ the policy realm and to explore discourse as human practice, which is material and constitutive of social reality. This avoids making generalisations of ‘policy-making’ and faceless ‘policy-makers’.

Indeed, the so-called policy-makers were human, and their political narratives included the personal standpoints and negotiations of any group decision-making. At first I thought they were saying the same thing, all recounting the same policy-making story, about how the Advisory Group was representative, impartial, non-partisan, and that there was absolutely nothing political about Citizenship Education, which seemed counter-intuitive. This strategy was difficult because most of the interviewees clearly didn’t want to ‘rock the boat’ in any way, and I really started thinking the whole thing was going to be incredibly boring; one interviewee’s wife actually fell asleep and started snoring during an interview. However, I concluded that the ‘boring’ factor was a crucial element in the process of de-politicisation of policy-making, the erasure of ideology, and the legitimization of common sense. In order to ‘think otherwise’, it was necessary to explore both the practicalities of Government committees, the production of ‘regimes of truth’ through ‘expertise’, and the serendipity of policy-making. By analysing how conflicts were resolved within the Advisory Group, and how the implementation of policy met members’ expectations, it is possible to expose
possibilities which may have otherwise been actualised through the policy-making process and realised in practice.

(a) ‘Ad hoc’ committees, task forces and policy networks

Writers such as Bache (2003), Rhodes (1997) and Richards and Smith (2002) have observed a change in the style of Government in the UK, and identify a shift from government to governance. On the one hand, policy is delivered more regionally and locally, by LEAs, head-teachers and school governing bodies, but control has been more centralised, through such policy initiatives outlined above. This leaves central government less accountable but more in control, and exemplifies a change in governance culture, to one of (people) management rather than government directly by the state. This kind of policy-making includes the involvement of more ‘outsiders’ in the process of governance and in the continual management of policy implementation, whilst appealing to openness, consultation and trust. Thus, a series of technical relations between social groups enabled the renewal of decentralised authority. So, as Rose (1993: 285) states,

political rule would not itself set out the norms of individual conduct, but would install and empower a variety of ‘professionals’ who would, investing them with authority to act as experts in the devices of social rule.

The policy networks which underpin the Crick Report provides one such example, notably the running of the Advisory Group by the QCA (an unelected agency commissioned by the Government, who nominated themselves for the job) and the way in which members were nominated onto the board. Some of my interviewees did not know who had nominated them, but others were clearly part of a closer circle of
‘the great and the good’, friendly with the New Labour government. Elizabeth Hoodless, for example, is a good friend of David Blunkett, and Tom Bently (another member of the Advisory Group) went to school with Margaret Hodges’ daughter. It is well known (and pointed out to me many times) that Bernard Crick was David Blunkett’s tutor at university, and they shared late-night meals throughout the duration of the Advisory Group. Crick also nominated people himself.

This perhaps is not so different from the past. What is different, however, is the role of ‘outsiders’ of official Government as ‘experts’, advisors and practitioners (Professor Bernard Crick, Dr. Alex Porter, David Kerr, for instance), and the need for the Committee to appear representative and trustworthy (one member believed that they wanted to ‘make up the numbers’ of women, and another believed that they were to bring an ethnic minority standpoint). Crick’s pivotal position as chairman is also indicative of a Government seeking academic kudos and the appearance of rigorous deliberation. Many interviewees commented on how Crick dominated the Advisory Group, and that it was clearly the realisation of a vision he and Blunkett shared. Hence, the introduction of Citizenship Education was something of a done deal, and the Advisory Group was more concerned with the practicalities of its introduction than its justification:

I mean, as I understand it, Crick had been promised by Blunkett that if he chaired this he would get exactly what he wanted, uh, and from what I see, he did get exactly what he wanted, and that was to a great extent, irrespective of what the others wanted (M. Talbot, 4th July 2003).

The Advisory board’s reliance on advice only went so far, and the process exemplified much of what Richards and Smith (2002: 246) identify as the
Government’s new policy-making approach. This is an apparently contradictory
denial of authority on the one hand — through the invitation of ‘outside’ and expert
committees, consultations, the curtailing of Departmental powers — and on the other
hand, the centralisation of power at the top, through the increasing of direct policy
advice to Number 10, albeit, as only one of a series of competing power centres:

…there was an anxiety and there’s still an anxiety in Number 10 that Citizenship Education
is going to breed a nation of…
Interviewer: radicals?
EH: yes, well, not even radical, active, but I think that’s all to the good, that’s show-business,
and if they can’t…
Interviewer: that seems strange that they want to go through the whole making of the report
and then
EH: they didn’t (E. Hoodless, 8th July 2003).

(b) Expertise, authorship and authority
This new form of governance and the importance of advice and expertise is
epitomised by the role of David Kerr, who had a secretarial role and was responsible –
along with Crick – for drafting the Report and writing the final document,

…because he had the knowledge, the research skills, the drafting skills, and Bernard was really
just looking for evidence to support his position (E. Hoodless, 8th July 2003).

This kind of evidence-based research, as suggested above, is one means by which
regimes of truth are produced. Kerr et al.’s Citizenship Education Longitudinal Study
(2003), funded by the DfES is a prime example. The study states that policy should
‘meet’ practice. This is not, however, a case of policy being sensitive to practices, but a contention that practices should be changed to fit policy, in order to ‘bridg[e] the gap between policy intentions and actual practice, including the gap between the Crick Report and the statutory Curriculum Order’ (Kerr et al., 2003: 7). The type of large-scale survey research undertaken by Kerr et al. is one way in which the implementation of policy is controlled, and ‘best practice’ identified, illustrating the kind of ‘new public management’ characteristic of the shift from government to governance (Rhodes, 1997: 15).

Applying a post-structuralist approach to the Crick Report, by contrast, exposes important presumptions present in these dominant forms of educational research, which according to Humes and Bryce (2003: 178) remain modernist and structural, relying on scientific and managerial methods which seek to provide evidence for policy and decision-making, as well as to retain control of implementation. This can problematise the ‘truth claims of expertise’ (Rose, 1993: 285), used in justification of the Citizenship Education policy.

This ‘biopower’ or ‘conduct of conduct’ is further enabled by the fierce power of the QCA (the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority) and OfSTED, which are organised to ensure standards (performance), manage practices (managerialism) and close the gap between policy and implementation. The power of the QCA and OfSTED is illustrated by the nickname – the ‘Quality and Control Authority’, and by the fear they instil in the professionals they control:

The people I noticed most, and I did actually, this was one of the few occasions I came into the argument, people who I thought behaved most parochially, without any doubt at all, were the
OfSTED people, and indeed when we were drafting the report, there were some paragraphs which told all sorts of people what they should be doing on citizenship, but OfSTED were not mentioned in any of those paragraphs, and I happened to notice, so I proposed an amendment, that they should be told that really, they should do inspections in these subjects, particularly in the early years, as it got off the ground. It seemed to me extremely sensible, but they wouldn’t have it! And afterwards, one of the school teachers on it…came up to me and said: ‘Donald, you’re a very brave man, no-one ever speaks to OfSTED like that, they will never be told what they are supposed to do’ (Sir D. Limon, 10th July 2003).

Furthermore, it was said that the effectiveness of the Report depended on having OfSTED behind it, exemplifying the interaction between governmental institutions and quangos. The QCA also had control over the National Curriculum guidelines, the ‘programs of study’ and many resources which would make it into classrooms. In this sense, the technologies of implementation and policy surveillance; the setting and maintenance of standards and the rolling out of ‘best practice’ are present in the educational infrastructure in which the Crick Report is embedded. Thus, power is exercised through the government of conduct and in this sense, education policy is as Rose suggests (1999: 47), ‘what makes government possible’, and provides a good example of how the policy of ‘men of government’ is translated into the practices of citizens (Rose, 1999: 48).

What distinguishes Citizenship Education, however, from the general ‘climate’ of educational and social policies outlined above, is the way in which it makes explicit the practices of citizen-formation. Citizenship Education is manifestly concerned with reflexive action and people’s capacity to act, and so it can encourage the inculcation of public doubt, as I shall demonstrate below.
(c) Conflicts of interest groups within the committee – narrowing possibilities

Though most of my interviewees claimed that the Advisory board was non-partisan, and that the final Crick Report was a unanimous effort which they would all put their names too, it was clear from other remarks, and from the tone of their discussions, that there were conflicts to be resolved in the drafting of the report – though as noted above, Crick and Kerr had most authority over the writing of the report due to their status as ‘experts’. People came to the Advisory Group with their own agendas, although it was frequently argued that these were only opinions on emphasis or mere practicalities. However, a number of conflicts were evident, most only implicitly ‘political’, and though many interviewees saw it as inevitable compromises in a democracy, or in the nature of advisory committees, I would argue that such ‘realpolitik’ exemplifies the ‘implementing the program’ which Derrida identifies as the foreclosing of political debate, and a failure to question conditions of possibility.

With hostility to Derrida amongst even proponents of poststructural education research, it may seem strange to invoke his seemingly abstract ideas in an empirical analysis of education policy of this kind. However, I want to suggest that the ethical and political implications of his work are far-reaching and often misunderstood (for notable exceptions, see Biesta, 1999, Biesta and Stams, 2001). I argue against the assertions of Olssen et al. (2004: 35) that Derrida rejects all moral systems, denies material culture, and results in a textualism that is ‘an infinite play of signifiers proliferating into infinity and any attempt to halt endless play and invokes a concept of reference to the real world is impossible’ (Olssen, 2003: 195).
Instead, I contest that Derrida’s ‘endless play of representation’, concept of ‘différance’, and ‘democracy-to-come’ open up political and ethical questions which are otherwise closed down. The means by which approaches to Citizenship Education attempt to lay claim to neutrality, for instance, may be a key example of what Derrida (1992b: 6) terms ‘originary violence’ – a failure to acknowledge Otherness, not in terms of a unified national identity but as essential difference. Policy-makers who deny that there is any politics in policy in order to assuage fears of indoctrination may be guilty of this. The resultant policy goes through a process of translation into ‘common sense’, which can serve to erase alternative political discourses, non-citizens, and (especially in this case) the voice of the ‘child’. This has further implications, as I will explore below, but is also a fundamental way in which political conflict is silenced in the policy-making process.

One such example of a conflict within the Crick Advisory Group is the strange dismissal or resignation of one member, who left the Group in June 1998:

We had one chap who didn’t feel he could stay as part of the group, who either resigned or was asked to leave…and this chap wrote a letter to, I forget which paper it was, uh, saying this was all a conspiracy, of OfSTED and all the rest of it, and it wasn’t (G. Robb, 4th August 2003).

Other areas of conflict included negotiations over the role of children – how much autonomy they should be granted in school councils; over teachers – about how much more policy change they can cope with; over the emphasis of the ‘three strands’ (social and moral responsibility, community involvement and political literacy). Some interviewees were very much in favour of a more experiential type of citizenship, through community service volunteering. Others were in favour of a
more formal curriculum subject teaching parliamentary systems and the law. Others still were more concerned with a change in educational culture to improve the behaviour and values of young people, or to develop schools into a community resource. Some members were informed by their own experiences of schooling – one noting that her commitment to education should be understood in the knowledge that she had been thrown out of school at 15, and another remarking that his teaching career had showed him the importance of re-engaging young people with society.

Few interviewees were willing to admit there was any conflict between the Crick Report and other government policies, suggesting that these were only policy tensions which ‘push and pull in different directions’ and that Citizenship Education was above such pedantry. There were also conflicts of opinion concerning scale – some believing that there should have been more emphasis on the global elements of citizenship, but that this could be readdressed by teachers’ interpretations of the programs of study.

More telling were the conversations on multiculturalism and diversity, some members thinking it was already overdone in school and others believing that it had not been adequately addressed. Many of the Group members I spoke to seemed reluctant to admit that the three strands of citizenship are each loaded with assumptions; social and moral responsibility, which fails to question to whom one is responsible; community involvement which fails to question the boundaries of community and the importance of belonging and identity; political literacy which fails to problematise the legitimacy of the nation-state and its political institutions. For instance, I asked one member what they thought of Osler and Starkey’s critique of the Crick Report
concerning its use of the phrase ‘due regard [be] given to the homelands of our ethnic minorities’ (QCA, 1998: 18, Osler and Starkey’s emphasis, 2000: 7). She denied that this had been written in the report, and was most put out by this suggestion, stating that’s not what they meant, saying three times that the phrase was not in the report (which it is).

The theoretical approach applied in this analysis of the Crick Report opens up new spaces of interrogation, allowing us to ask broader questions about the purpose, scope and temporal imperatives of education. These are precisely the kinds of questions which cause such consternation amongst many interviewees and discomfort in the interview situation. Most obviously, this involves questioning the borders narrated by a National Curriculum subject of Citizenship, the importance of which is indicated by debates in both the academic and public press over what ‘British’ citizenship is (for example Hackett, 2005), and the role of education in maintaining a sense of national unity – whether this be a monocultural or multicultural unity. The Crick Report, it can be argued, makes political assumptions about the unity and essence of the nation (in some senses erasing its violent past, see Benhabib, 2002) and of the coherence of the notion of ‘community’ (see Mitchell, 2001, Olssen, 2004), which its ‘authors’ would want to play down.

(d) Implementation – multiplying possibilities

Despite the technologies of control and the power of expertise and new public management which characterise governmentality, I have demonstrated that the Crick Report is not aligned with one particular political standpoint, but results from
practices of active negotiation involving reflexive people, who are all too aware of the potentially controversial role to which they have been appointed. Furthermore, the gap between policy and practice (which Kerr et al. (2003: 54) see as ‘challenges to implementation’) serves as a process by which policy comes into being, by which it is negotiated, contested, supported and practiced.

The governmental approach to Citizenship Education which I am advocating here is sensitive to a theory of power beyond the confines of the state, extending the notion of the political to take into account the personal experiences of embodied citizens as well as the global forces which shape our contexts. In fact, as Barnett (2003: 88) suggests, it does not denote the propensity for the state to extend it’s reach into more and more spheres of public and private life, as is often understood to be the case, but is a particular ‘art of government’ – emphasising the process rather than the form. In Foucault’s later work (1983, 1988), he goes on to outline how this governmentality allows power to be exercised and rationalised through the school and finally, by the subject him- or herself:

Take for example, an educational institution: the disposal of its space, the meticulous regulations which govern its internal life, the different activities which are organised there, the diverse persons which live there or meet one another […] - all these things constitute a block of capacity-communication-power. The activity which ensures apprenticeship and the acquisition of aptitudes or types of behaviour is developed there by means of a whole ensemble of regulated communications (lessons, questions and answers, orders, exhortations, coded signs of obedience, differentiation marks of the “value” of each person and of the levels of knowledge) and by means of a whole series of power processes (enclosure, surveillance, reward and punishment, the pyramidal hierarchy) (Foucault, 1988: 218-219).
Governmental power is thus exercised in the micro-locale of the school, not by force or coercion, but by the shaping and rationalisation of particular regimes in situ. It is therefore necessary to consider the role of classroom practices in the making of education policy. Creating the ‘learning environment’ is one example of the conduct of conduct – allowing particular behaviours and forbidding others. But this is far from a deterministic analysis of power; it is this interaction in the classroom which signifies the meeting ground ‘between the technologies of domination and those of the self’ (Foucault, 1988: 19), and which are also implicated in the formation of the subject.

Although Citizenship and its pastoral ‘ethos’ signify what for many is a kind of Foucauldian self-discipline; a very effective and, dare I say ‘ideological’ form of government, this conception does a great disservice to Foucault’s later work. I want to assert that Citizenship Education may make people governable, but it does not make them unproblematically governed in ways that they do not realise. There is indeed a difference between citizen-subjectivities and actual people (see also Larner, 2003: 511), which is important to preserve.

As Ball highlights (1994: 16), ‘[t]here is an ad hocery, negotiation and serendipity within the state, within the policy formulation process’. In this way, policy-making is not about agenda-setting nor implementing a dominant ideology, but about constructing certain agendas as legitimate (through the conventions and codes of policy-formation). On the one hand, this can include the ‘loss’ of meaning, echoing Kerr et al.’s concerns over the gap between policy and implementation:

…well I think clarity has been lost, but if you know anything about governments drafting things, clarity is almost always lost, because this was written by a group of people who were concerned
about young people’s re-engaging with the political process, the statutory instruments were written by civil servants who were concerned about the legalities of what they were writing, and the QCA guidance was written by people who are concerned about what people are teaching (M. Talbot, 4th July 2003).

On the other hand, implementation can mean supplementation and creative interpretation. Its reception may vary from largely compliant, apathetic, to strongly hostile. It is clear that the young people who are the target of the Crick Report do not always share the same sense of political reasoning as the Government, oftentimes being critical of the alliance with the US in the war in Iraq, of policing methods, and sceptical of the claims of government to represent diverse groups (particularly certain ethnic groups and young people) (observations from research diary, 5th and 19th November 2004). This is also true for their teachers, trainee-teachers in Citizenship Education, and some of the members of the committee itself (as I will illustrate below).

Interjections from young people themselves can exemplify a more critical conception of the political, much more so than the recommendations of the Crick Report. It shows how much adults have to learn from young people about exploring the possibilities of social change, being towards the Other, thinking critically, appreciating difference and looking beyond the nation-state. This is precisely the ‘thinking otherwise’ which constitutes politics as opposed to implementing the program. Such an approach has many implications for the policy-making process, including the involvement of young people in their own learning through a less imposed curriculum, as well as more radical implications concerning the citizen status of children, especially in formal politics and the justice system.
A more nuanced reading of the ‘tone’ of the interviews illuminates such ideas more thoroughly, including the erasure of politics through the practices of policy-making. There were continual reminders of how policy technologies were ‘passed off’ as practicalities, of how ‘political acumen’, and the ‘art of the achievable’ excused the dismissal of really political issues, and how ‘the reality effect’ was achieved through the discourse of common sense. One member, for example, suggests that there is very little politics within Westminster: ‘you’ll find that nearly all MPs…at base they hold their political views, um, in private, very lightly indeed’. Another highlights how policy depends on the political organisation of committees, departments and central government, and especially on the program which it is possible to implement:

KF: the big positive aspect of Crick in particular and the committee with him, was that they actually did produce something that had a realistic chance of happening, you know, if they hadn’t operated within the political realities, then it might not have got anywhere, so they had to accept some sort of assumptions that were in David Blunkett’s mind and so on, to get the thing through (K. Fogelman, 18th August 2003, my emphasis).

Some of my interviewees objected to the political implications of my questions, stating that I would only get ‘stream of consciousness sort of stuff’, and that I shouldn’t ask about ‘substantive political issue[s]’. In fact, streams of consciousness and substantive political issues were precisely what I was interested in, because this could tell me more about what people really think, rather than what is politically acceptable (i.e. not political) to say.
This saga illustrated some of the interviewees’ fears of taking a position on anything, and their use of ‘neutral’ language. I would suggest this is because, like the Crick Report, ‘taking a position’ was deemed too political, and most people and government reports are not willing to have their grounds for beliefs or agendas questioned. They often, therefore, appear not to have any underlying political rationale or agenda, or else they appeal to ‘evidence-based research’ ‘data’ or ‘expertise’ in order to justify their opinions as if they were hard ‘facts’. This discourse of neutrality is built into the Crick Report’s (QCA, 1998: 27) ‘guidance on the teaching of controversial issues’, and was reiterated by a member of the Advisory Group:

…the thing is to get young people discussing, so for example, education funding is the key controversial issue that should be discussed in Citizenship, and in accordance with the 1996 Education Act, it shouldn’t be discussed in such a way that the pupils are led in one way or the other, they should have a balanced view put to them, you know, these are the arguments for, um, tuition fees, for example, these are the arguments against, you know, make up your own mind, that was the whole idea (M. Talbot, 4th July 2003).

This denies the origins of a neutral, symmetrical, common sense position, and as Skeggs (1994: 74) highlights, serves to naturalise power inequalities and to re-inscribe them through supposedly neutral categories.

Few interviewees seemed to exemplify the kind of thinking that admitted an agenda, a position, or a politics, with some notable exceptions. With regards to my questions about the policy conflict – between the Crick Report and (a) other educational policies, e.g. performance-related pay, targets, special measures, etc. and (b) non-educational policies, e.g. immigration and asylum, civil renewal, the legal status of
the child concerning criminal justice – most interviewees were either dismissive of my interpretation, or claimed that Citizenship Education transcended such issues, suggesting that it was above politics.

However, one suggested that the Crick Report’s emphasis was misplaced; on being active and volunteering; on controlling behaviour rather than emphasising broader, more philosophical elements – the nature of democracy and the development of capacities for social critique. He argued that young people are undervalued and that they already practice citizenship, but this goes unrecognised by ‘adultist’ definitions. He identified a wider Government agenda concerned with criminalising young people; considering them a threat to social order, (this links with Blunkett’s commitment to ‘civil renewal’).

These more openly critical members were open to other ideas for social engagement, another suggesting the need to tackle social exclusion through economics rather than draconian measures on youth behaviour, and one member arguing for more ‘restorative’ justice that does not allow a child of 10 to be tried in a court of law but considers that a child’s sense of ‘right and wrong’ is derived from their own experiences of social injustice rather than from some absolute moral value. It was clear that these members had brought some critical reflection to the Crick advisory table, highlighting that the Crick Report was far from a univocal document. Rather, it was the contingent result of reflexive interactions between different thinking people in a particular time and place.
4. Conclusions: where is the politics in policy-making?

Through employing a governmental analysis, this paper has explored the policy technologies through which power is exercised, and by which citizens are made governable. It has also been inspired by Derrida to question the foundations on which politics and policies are based. This allows an exploration of the unrealised possibilities of politics, as opposed to narrowing them under the guise of political acumen or common sense (or conversely, economic determinism).

Perhaps the most important dimension to such an approach is to conceive of people’s citizenship-subjectivities as free insofar as it they are performed in practice, but to avoid either voluntaristic or deterministic notions of action. This takes seriously Ball’s (1994: 10) contention that:

[p]olicy is an ‘economy of power’, a set of technologies and practices which are realised and struggled over in local settings. Policy is both text and action, words and deeds, it is what is enacted as well as what is intended.

Therefore, the practice of translating policy into practice is not a simple case of manufacturing consent; of applying a political ideology to a group of people. The event and process of education involves the invention of new and alternative futures. Conceiving of the Crick Report as a performative device allows us to think of the way in which democracy becomes Other through the policy-making process and opens up education policy-making to a politics and ethics of implementation and eventfulness. To make the claim that in the event of education, people are free to different extents, in different ways, is not to say that policy texts have no material effects. It suggests a
constant need to justify forms of freedom, question exclusions and base decisions on a more open and consistently ‘learning politics’ – a politics which learns from the Other.

This highlights the need to further explore the practices of Citizenship Education and citizen-formation in light of such an account. Whilst policy and regulation create tendencies, these are not always realised, and alternative possibilities can be actualised in the event. I would therefore suggest the need for further ethnographic research in schools in order to understand how young people negotiate their citizenship and to explore the contingencies of policy technologies exercised in situ. The remit of such research should not be to monitor best practice nor measure the efficiency of Citizenship Education by some pre-determined criteria. It should instead endeavour to interrogate the meanings of concepts such as citizenship, education, learning and democracy.

I also want to suggest here that further research on Citizenship Education needs to question claims to ‘freedom’ in liberal democracy and in liberal educational theory. In scrutinizing the very foundations of the liberal democratic theory of the state and national education, we open up our conceptualisation of politics beyond the implementation of a programme and towards notions of ethics and justice, as Derrida has done (2000, 2001) in advocating a non-state based form of political intervention in the question of citizenship and borders. This is precisely because Citizenship Education is not a ‘done deal’, and requires people to think reflexively on the manifest ways in which their subjectivities are constituted.
I am proposing that education is precisely an openness to difference, to the new, to the Other. This is because it is about learning that which we do not know, learning about the bounds of our knowledge, and learning how to learn. Education, in these terms, must consider the ‘otherness of time’ (as opposed to space, scale, nation) which Derrida terms a ‘democracy-to-come’ (Derrida, 1992a: 79). This idea asserts that politics is only democratic if it is open to change, that is, if it is open to question; if it will take into account the unknowable futurity of time. This ‘learning politics’ is an intergenerational conversation (education) whereby citizens are performed and the new invented, through an openness to learning from each other (see Vanderstraeten and Biesta, 2006 for a development of this idea). This is all too absent from an education system predicated on answers, not questions.

The insights of a governmental approach and Derrida’s ‘democracy-to-come’ have therefore helped us to understand how government policy operates, and to interrogate differentials of power which exacerbate social inequalities and lead to unequal experiences of freedom. It allows us to ask how one person’s citizenship is another’s exclusion, and how de jure freedoms within liberal democracies do not translate automatically into practical citizenship rights (see also Young, 1989, Yuval-Davies, 1997). This can expose the paradoxes of the teaching of citizenship and peaceful ‘conflict resolution’ during the fighting of a war in Iraq, of teaching ‘respect’ where government has failed to tackle the causes of poverty and ‘disrespectful’ behaviour; to question the commitment to ‘opportunities for all’ and social mobility where it is not matched by regulations or interventions which would ensure more comprehensive education, but instead by the increasing segmentation of the education system. These are the kinds of considerations that an approach sensitive to the geographies of power
can illuminate, including the way in which differentials in citizenship are experienced, whether through axes of gender, ethnicity, class, neighbourhood, sexuality, age or nationality – all of which have important spatial dimensions.

Education is certainly the prime space within which to explore such ideas, but it is important to continue to question the legitimacy of fostering an education for citizenship amongst the very children and working teachers whose own entitlements to citizenship could be considered to be considerably lacking. It suggests a need for policy-makers and researchers to consider the ‘conditions of possibility’ of citizens, and to question the so-called given political ‘realities’ within which they intervene.

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