The Joint Intelligence Bureau: Economic, Topographic, and Scientific Intelligence for Britain’s Cold War, 1946-1964

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Summary

This thesis examines the British Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB), which, between its creation in 1946 and its end in 1964, gathered, collated and processed topographic, economic, scientific, and atomic intelligence. It did so on an inter-service, national level. The thesis examines the creation of the organisation, in the aftermath of the Second World War, exploring what factors and which people supported the creation of the new agency. It then moves on to examine the work of the JIB in several of its key fields of work, namely topography, economics and monitoring the threat from Soviet nuclear forces, before examining some of the JIB’s international connections and how these contributed to its work. It concludes with an examination of how the JIB begat the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS). It argues that the creation of the JIB was an appropriate response to the need to centralise and retrench in the intelligence machinery after the War, but that the organisation, in essence, represented a compromise between those who wanted to fully centralise military (and military-relevant) intelligence and those who wished to preserve service independence. Over the course of its existence it made important contributions to several key areas of policy – including mapping the Soviet Union for nuclear strike planning, the economic containment of the USSR, as well as China and North Korea during the Korean War, and in monitoring the production of Soviet bombers and missiles – before becoming a central component of the new DIS.
DECLARATION

This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not being concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.

Signed .................................................................

Date ........................................................................

This thesis is the result of my own investigations, except where otherwise stated. Other sources are acknowledged by footnotes giving explicit references. A bibliography is appended.

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Date ........................................................................

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Date ........................................................................
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Finally, my family, whose support has been steadfast throughout, I thank will all my heart.

Needless to say, despite the help, input and guidance of everyone, all errors are mine alone.
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# Acronyms and Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A2</td>
<td>Air intelligence Section</td>
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<tr>
<td>AEIU</td>
<td>Atomic Energy intelligence Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATB</td>
<td>Advisory Committee on Trade Questions in Time of War</td>
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**Basic-descriptive**

Intelligence reporting on the ‘facts’ of a situation, such as a state’s order of battle.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BEF</td>
<td>British Expeditionary Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>BJSM</td>
<td>British Joint Services Mission</td>
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<td>BNE</td>
<td>Board of National Estimates</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>Chief of the Air Staff</td>
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</table>

**Centralisation**

Non-departmental organisations collecting, analysing, and disseminating intelligence of inter-departmental or national value.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CEP</td>
<td>Circle Error Probable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>Chief of the Defence Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIGS</td>
<td>Chief of the Imperial General Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIU</td>
<td>Central interpretation Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CII</td>
<td>Coordinator of Joint Intelligence (Australia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoCom</td>
<td>Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoS</td>
<td>Chiefs of Staff</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Current-reportorial**

Intelligence reports dealing with current events or the very near future.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DAEI</td>
<td>Division of Atomic Energy Intelligence</td>
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<td>DCDSI</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Defence Staff Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>---------</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCI</td>
<td>Director of Central Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>DGI</td>
<td>Director General of Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIS</td>
<td>Defence Intelligence Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMI</td>
<td>Director of Military Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMO</td>
<td>Director of Military Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNI</td>
<td>Director of Naval Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRPC</td>
<td>Defence Requirements Policy Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSI</td>
<td>Division of Scientific Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAB</td>
<td>Economic Advisory Branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elint</td>
<td>Electronic Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERP</td>
<td>European Recovery Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESTC</td>
<td>European Strategic Targets Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCI</td>
<td>Industrial Intelligence in Foreign Countries Sub-Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCHQ</td>
<td>Government Communications Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GX</td>
<td>Code-name for captured Second World War German Imint</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>Inter-continental Ballistic Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICI</td>
<td>Imperial Chemical Industries</td>
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<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>Intelligence Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>IIC</td>
<td>Industrial Intelligence Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imint</td>
<td>Imagery intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRBM</td>
<td>Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIC</td>
<td>Inter Services Intelligence Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>IS(O)</td>
<td>Intelligence Section (Operations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISTD</td>
<td>Inter-Service Topographical Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>JAPIB</td>
<td>Joint Air Photographic intelligence Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>JARIC</td>
<td>Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIB</td>
<td>Joint Intelligence Bureau</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIC</td>
<td>Joint Intelligence Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIS</td>
<td>Joint Intelligence Staff</td>
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</table>
Jointery: The process of cooperation between the three services and other departments through committees

JPS: Joint Planning Staff
JS/JTIC: Joint Scientific/Technical Intelligence Committee
JTWC: Joint Technical Warfare Committee
KGB: Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti, Committee for State Security, USSR
LRAF: Long Range Air Force
MAC: Mutual Aid Committee
MEW: Ministry of Economic Warfare
MIS: Security Service

Military Geography
A term that incorporates geographical features of military significance: static defences, offshore defences, beach defences, shore defences, lines of defence and fortified areas, anti-aircraft artillery defence, the positioning of radar, telecommunications, and so on.

MoD: Ministry of Defence
MoS: Ministry of Supply
MRBM: Medium Range Ballistic Missile
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NID: Naval Intelligence Division
NM: Nautical Mile
NSC: National Security Council
OEEC: Organization for European Economic Cooperation
ONE: Office of National Estimates
Operational Intelligence: Factual intelligence necessary for the conduct of military operations.
Osint: Open Source Intelligence
OSS: Office of Strategic Services (US)
RAF: Royal Air Force
RCMP: Royal Canadian Mounted Police
SECWP: Security Export Controls Working Party
SHAEF  Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force
SHAPE  Supreme Headquarters Powers Europe
SIS/MI6  Secret Intelligence Service

Speculative Evaluative

Intelligence reporting analysing the likelihood of future events or the developments of situations.

SOE  Special Operations Executive
STIB  Scientific and Technical Intelligence Branch
TAB  Targets Analysis Branch

Topographic Intelligence

Intelligence on all aspects of a target’s geography. Monitoring developments related to military, social, and economic issues. Intelligence to provide planners with enough knowledge of a target to make all calculations on its attributes as a zone of combat.

TRU  Technical Research Unit
TNA  The National Archive
USAF  United States Air Force
USIB  United States Intelligence Board
VCAS  Vice Chief of the Air Staff
VCAS(I)  Vice Chief of the Air Staff for Intelligence
The Joint Intelligence Bureau: Economic, Topographic, and Scientific Intelligence for Britain’s Cold War, 1946-1964

Introduction

Historians of British intelligence are enjoying an age of plenty. Facilitated by the Waldegrave open government initiative and the Freedom of information Act (2000), they can examine and exploit a wider range of documentary evidence than ever before.¹ Both the Security Service (MI5) and the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) have marked their centenaries by granting selected historians access to their archives to produce ‘authorised’ histories.² The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) has followed suit; a twin-volume history is to be published. Other authors, such as Gill Bennett, formerly the Chief Historian at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and Alan Judd, a former intelligence officer, gained access to restricted files to complete their works on Desmond Morton and Mansfield Cumming.³ The fallout from Iraq and the 7 July bombings has produced a spate of reports that deal with the contemporary intelligence machinery. Public, official and academic discussion of intelligence matters is in robust health. Yet certain matters remain largely unaddressed in the literature. One of them is the Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB). This organisation

was formed in 1946; it collected and collated economic, topographic, scientific, and, later, atomic intelligence; it merged with the service intelligence agencies in 1964, forming the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS). This thesis aims to redress this neglect, and to give an account of the JIB, its creation, its work, and its end.4

The neglect of the JIB stands, in some respects, in contrast to the limited public exposure the agency enjoyed during its existence. Successive governments sought to prohibit, or at the very least control, publicity regarding Britain’s secret intelligence agencies after the Second World War. Michael Howard could still lament in 1985 that ‘so far as official government policy is concerned, the British security and intelligence services do not exist. Enemy agents are found under gooseberry bushes and intelligence is brought in by the storks.’5 The existence of SIS was officially denied until 1992. But the JIB was not so secret; its creation, as well as that of its dominion counterparts, was a publicised affair: there was a notice in The Times.6 Kenneth Strong, its Director, gave a brief account of the creation of the agency in his autobiography, Intelligence at the Top, published in 1968.7 And the JIB features in another 1968 publication, The Organisation of British Central Government, 1914-1956.8 Therefore, historians faced no more challenges from official secrecy in researching and writing the JIB than they would had they focused on the Security Service or SIS during the same time frame; indeed, they may have faced fewer. Yet studies of SIS and MIS abound, whereas

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4 Aldrich noted the dearth of writing about British military intelligence in 1998. Little has been produced on the subject since then. Aldrich, Espionage, Security and Intelligence in Britain, 1945-1970 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), p.87. The other thoroughly ‘understudied’ aspect of British intelligence is, of course, the work of GCHQ, although Aldrich has set out to rectify this with GCHQ (London: Harper Press, 2010).
7 See Major-General Sir Kenneth Strong, Intelligence at the Top: The Recollections of an Intelligence Officer (London: Cassell, 1968).
analysis of JIB does not. One must therefore conclude that the lack of close historical scrutiny of JIB has been more to do with interest than access - intentions, rather than capabilities.

It is a significant omission. Firstly, as the vignettes offered in the literature demonstrate, the JIB dealt with subjects of vital importance as Britain moved from World War, to Cold War, to high-Cold War: topographic intelligence; economic intelligence; industrial and scientific intelligence; and, later, atomic intelligence. The omission of the JIB means that, with the exception of atomic intelligence, these subjects remain undeservedly under-studied. Secondly, the JIB was an integral part of the struggle between those who wanted to centralise military intelligence and those who wanted to preserve Service independence, in intelligence and in general. The debates surrounding the creation of the JIB, its battle to expand its responsibilities, and the manner in which it eventually came to form the nucleus of the DIS, reveal much about the prevailing balance of power between ‘centralisers’ and their opponents, and how the agency garnered political support. These debates remain largely absent from the literature but are crucial if we are to understand why military intelligence was reformed in 1964.

Thirdly, the JIB was a very international agency. It maintained significant links with various American intelligence agencies. These links merit investigation, as they bear on British-American cooperation in several key areas – including economic warfare and nuclear targeting. Also, JIB London was at the centre of a network of Dominion JIB’s, each established at London’s urging.

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which pooled their expertise, and functioned cooperatively by dividing the globe into spheres of responsibility. Even as Britain declined from a ‘first’ to a ‘second-tier’ global power it endeavoured to maintain a first-rate intelligence capability; the JIB’s international links appear to have been an important component of maintaining British ‘intelligence power.’

Scope and focus

This thesis seeks to fill several gaps in the literature. It seeks to answer three key research questions. Firstly, why was the JIB created? Secondly, what work did it conduct and how did this affect British policy? And thirdly, why, after eighteen years, was it merged with the service intelligence agencies to form the DIS?

Answering these questions inevitably leads to the discussion of several other issues, including inter-service rivalry and the competition over responsibilities; the importance of Osint in British intelligence; the building and maintenance of liaison relationships; the importance of individuals in driving the development of British intelligence; as well as the centralisation of the national intelligence machinery. Each of these themes features prominently in the thesis. But the goal is to fill the gap in the intelligence historiography and to write the JIB into the history of Britain’s Cold War.

Centralisation and National Intelligence

Centralisation is a thread that links most aspects of the thesis. The following chapters are something of an evolutionary tale, describing a particular era in the centralisation of the British intelligence community. Centralisation – non-departmental organisations collecting, analysing, and disseminating intelligence of inter-departmental or national value – had progressed at a relatively leisurely pace since the creation of Britain’s first intelligence organisations in the 19th Century.
Organisations like the Security Service and later the Industrial Intelligence Centre (IIC) were early examples of centralised organisations.\textsuperscript{13} Later, in 1936, in response to the growing German threat and the need to coordinate the diffuse service intelligence assessments with a political dimension, the Joint Intelligence sub-Committee was established, under the Chiefs of Staff. After a shaky start, the JIC grew in stature during World War Two and became the keystone of the British intelligence community.\textsuperscript{14}

Centralisation in military and military-relevant intelligence progressed slower. Indeed, it required the pressure of war. Several non-departmental, or joint, agencies were established to deal with matters such as photographic reconnaissance and prisoner interrogation. And because, as Michael Herman notes, ‘tri-service warfare, especially the amphibious invasions of Europe, could not be planned on a single service basis and needed similarly integrated intelligence support’ national intelligence agencies were established to collect topographic and operational intelligence.\textsuperscript{15} The Inter-service Topographical Department (ISTD) and the Intelligence Section Operations (IS(O)) begat the JIB. But the services resisted further centralisation in the immediate aftermath of the War. Instead of centralising all military intelligence in a single, tri-service organisation, ‘“jointery” – cooperation between the three services and other departments through committees – became the standard British solution in intelligence.’\textsuperscript{16} Between 1946 and 1964 the JIB worked within this model, and quite successfully so, it appears. But it and its supporters also rocked the boat by pushing for more responsibilities and a move from ‘jointery’ to centralisation in military intelligence.

The experience of the war was crucial in persuading many that military intelligence should be transferred to a non-departmental organisation. Indeed, centralisation became something of an

\textsuperscript{14} For the development of JIC see Goodman, ‘Learning to Walk: The Origins of the UK’s Joint Intelligence Committee’ \textit{International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence} 21 (1)(2008).
\textsuperscript{15} Herman, \textit{Intelligence Power}, p.260.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid, p.262.
international trend, with the British, Australians, Canadians and the Americans developing central, national intelligence gathering and assessment organisations over a similar timeframe. The manner in which Britain and its allies were grappling with similar issues and developing different solutions is an interesting area of study. Particularly interesting is the manner in which the Americans dealt with the problems of military-relevant intelligence organisations, creating the Central intelligence Agency (CIA) and later the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) at roughly the same time as Britain created the JIB and the DIS. As will be illustrated, the Americans developed more centralised organisations but did not develop centralised national intelligence machinery to the same extent as Britain; the central agencies’ work continued to be duplicated by the services and State Department.

The central intelligence zeitgeist was a consequence of the war, when centralised organisations had proven effective and cheaper than maintaining individual service sections. And, crucially, intelligence for the Cold War needed to be more scientific and professional. Men like Kenneth Strong did not believe that the service agencies were best equipped to operate in such a manner. He noted how some of his intelligence reports on German use of anti-aircraft weaponry in anti-tank roles before the war had been discounted, as senior officers did not believe that such adaptation was possible. Military intelligence agencies were conservative institutions and prone to the so-called ‘not invented here syndrome’. Also, ambitious officers in the military did not aspire to a career in intelligence, and intelligence postings were relatively short. Therefore, intelligence did not attract real talent nor did it nurture expertise. Indeed, in their 1945 report on the future of the intelligence machine, JIC Secretary and JIC Chair, Dennis Capel-Dunn and Victor Cavendish-Bentinck’s noted the Services’ general failure to pay appropriate heed to intelligence. Centralising was perceived as crucial to save money, increase professionalism, and improve performance.

17 Strong, Intelligence, p.17.
This development, as well as being a process to improve efficiency and save money, was indicative of the fact that military intelligence, other than in a strictly tactical sense, did not really exist. Rather, agencies, even military ones, had to collect intelligence which would have to be collated and analysed in tandem with every other agency’s product to produce national intelligence. As Strong put it in his autobiography,

the speed and complexity with which military, political, scientific, and social factors can interact, and the rapidity of social and political change make completely anachronistic the type of intelligence estimating machinery that leans heavily on elaborately insulated departments studying specialist fields of human activity.\(^\text{19}\)

Or, put another way, intelligence could no longer be viewed as a single department’s prerogative and property; departments had to cooperate. The age of total and nuclear war had also to be the age of total intelligence. Fighting wars and gauging threats was more than a matter of understanding an adversary’s military strength. Its economic, scientific, technical, topographic, and political characteristics had to be studied with the military: they were two sides of the same coin. And, because they were relevant to service and political departments, they were best collated and studied centrally at the national level.

The JIB was an important step in the direction of central, national politico-military relevant structures. But, as Strong noted, at the time of its establishment it was impractical to centralise military intelligence further, as the military intelligence organisation had to match the structure of command, which was still fragmented. There was also strong opposition from the services, who believed the JIB undermined their independence. Overcoming this resistance was a gradual process. The following chapters will demonstrate how the JIB absorbed significant extra responsibilities over the course of its existence and also how the issue of centralising military intelligence in a national agency gathered enough political support to become a reality.

\(^{19}\) Strong, Intelligence, p.224.
Several authors have highlighted the importance of individuals in shaping the British intelligence community, one of them was Kenneth Strong, in his book *Men of Intelligence*.\(^2^0\) Ironically, however, nobody has examined the importance of Kenneth Strong, who enjoyed a lengthy career in British intelligence before becoming the first Director of JIB, and then Director of DIS. Strong fought an unrelenting battle for centralisation throughout his tenure at the JIB; he was ultimately successful. He was instrumental in forming the Dominion JIB network, to exploit for the UK the benefits of the ‘residual Empire’. He was a man with vision and, equally importantly, connections. He maintained excellent relations with senior American political and intelligence figures, having served in Europe as Eisenhower’s General Staff Level Officer for military intelligence, or G2. Indeed, he got on ‘famously’ with the General, who, when promoted to SHAEF in 1944 and split from Strong, appealed over the head of Allan Brooke directly to Churchill to have him continue as his intelligence man.\(^2^1\) ‘As President, Ike never found the replacement for General Strong he was looking for.’\(^2^2\) These relationships facilitated Strong’s access to the American corridors of power, and doubtlessly boosted the prestige of the JIB on both sides of the Atlantic. His life in British intelligence is worth examining.

Strong was the key figure in the development of the JIB but there were other equally important personalities involved in creating and ultimately ending the JIB. The wartime Chairman of the JIC, Victor Cavendish-Bentinck, and Dennis Capel-Dunn were the brains behind the new organisation. Even as the war raged they considered the shape of the post-war intelligence


\(^2^2\) Ibid, p.243.
machinery; it was they who proposed a ‘Central Intelligence Bureau’ which developed into the JIB. Their influence on the retrenchment of the British intelligence machinery will be examined in the first chapter. And, just as there were key figures in the agency’s establishment, during the early 1960s, Lord Mountbatten and Denis Healey were extremely influential in merging the service intelligence agencies and the JIB in the Defence Intelligence Staff in the face of determined opposition by the services. It is unlikely that those intelligence officials who favoured and strove for centralisation, like Strong, would have succeeded without their support. In examining their efforts and significance this thesis will add to the body of literature which presents key individuals as being decisive in driving the development of British intelligence.

Organisation and structure

Achieving the goals of the thesis in the available space is, in some senses, ambitious. The JIB was an agency with a relatively long pre-history. It was created as part of Dennis Capel-Dunn and Victor Cavendish-Bentinck’s drive to retrench Britain’s intelligence machinery for peace and the Cold War. It absorbed the responsibilities, and some of the staff, of several wartime agencies. These agencies were the ISTD, which gathered and distributed topographical intelligence on an inter-service basis, the Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW), which gathered and collated economic intelligence; and the IS(O), which gathered and collated ‘factual’ intelligence that was outside ISTD’s remit but relevant to military operations. Therefore there is an extensive pre-history that could be explored, one that would focus on economic and topographic intelligence in the inter-war years and during the War, the successes and failures, and how these culminated in the JIB.

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24 CAB 81/130, JIC (45) 226 (Final), ‘Joint Intelligence Bureau’, July 24 1945.
As well as having a ‘long history’, the JIB carried extensive responsibilities. Its original charter determined that it would ‘collect, assess, and where appropriate appreciate intelligence material of inter-departmental significance.’\textsuperscript{25} It would undertake responsibility for intelligence on the ‘economic resources of foreign countries in relation to any probable war condition,’ and all the duties of the ISTD.\textsuperscript{26} But this original charter was soon superseded. The JIB came to absorb the Division of Scientific Intelligence (DSI) in 1954, and later became responsible for atomic intelligence. Its brief was dynamic, and a study of its operations could be approached in several different ways. One could, for instance, focus solely on its economic intelligence analyses. This, however, is clearly limiting. Nevertheless, it is impracticable to study the full scope of its activities over the whole period of its existence.

Moreover, each addition in its responsibilities was accompanied by debate and disagreement over the role of the agency vis-à-vis the service intelligence agencies – who, in Kenneth Strong’s words, ‘never really liked’ the JIB.\textsuperscript{27} This was most visible in the early 1960s, as the project to centralise defence intelligence in a more powerful Ministry of Defence gathered steam. Kenneth Strong offers a brief insight of the debates in his autobiography, as does Philip Zeigler in his biography of Lord Mountbatten, an ardent supporter of centralisation.\textsuperscript{28} But nowhere is the story narrated or analysed in detail. There is therefore scope to approach the subject ‘structurally’, to study the development of the organisation as a bureaucratic and political entity, as Davies does in his study of the SIS, \textit{MI6 and the Machinery of Spying}.\textsuperscript{29}

Given the multitude of possible approaches, structuring the thesis was something of an exercise in circle-squaring. To follow any one of the approaches outlined above would have been

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{26} This would include economic mobilisation planning and preparations, and economic warfare planning in foreign countries; effects of technical developments on economic war potential; and the vulnerabilities of potential enemies’ economies to attack, among other subjects.
\textsuperscript{27} Strong, \textit{Intelligence}, p.191.
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid; Zeigler, \textit{Mountbatten}, p.632.
\textsuperscript{29} Philip H. J. Davies, \textit{MI6 and the Machinery of Spying} (London: Frank Cass, 2003).
problematic for two reasons. Firstly, this is the first dedicated history of the JIB. It was therefore judged that a broader study – incorporating the pre-history, the creation, an investigation of the JIB’s work in various fields, the development of the organisation, and the political wrangling over consolidation and centralisation – was most appropriate. Secondly, there is the matter of sources. As is outlined in greater detail below, the literature offers glimpses into the JIB but little of substance. There is however a great deal of material on the JIB and its activities available in The National Archives. But it is poorly catalogued, spread throughout various departments’ files, and is in no way comprehensive. Additionally, some important subjects, such as the JIB’s role in intelligence for nuclear targeting, remain thoroughly obscured by official secrecy. Thus, whilst constructing a more general history is feasible, conducting a sustained analysis into any one aspect is more problematic. Therefore, the thesis is not an organisational history, nor is it strictly focused on the JIB’s work in any one particular field. It is a broader, more general history that encompasses the entire period of the JIB’s existence, 1946 to 1964, and it examines a range of the JIB’s most important activities. The approach is similar to that utilised by former JIC Chairman Percy Cradock in his book, *Know Your Enemy*.30

The introduction outlines where and how the thesis fits in the literature and the sources available to the historian of the JIB. The first chapter focuses on the debates surrounding the organisation of British intelligence for the post-war world, and the creation of the JIB. The following chapters, 2-7, examine various aspects of the JIB’s work during the following 18 years. Chapter 2 examines the JIB’s work in gathering and processing topographic intelligence to 1953, the effect this had on the perception of the Soviet threat, and how it contributed to British nuclear targeting in the early Cold War. Chapter 3 examines the JIB’s economic intelligence, first in peace and then during the Korean War. It examines how the JIB’s intelligence supported the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) regime and how intelligence influenced British

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policy on trade with the Communist world up to 1954. Chapters 4 and 5 are focused on the JIB’s assessments of the Soviet bomber and missile threat, first during the atomic age, and then in the age of the hydrogen bomb. They delve into the JIB’s role in understanding the threat and the sources it had at its disposal; they compare British and American estimates during the bomber and missile ‘gaps;’ and they engage with the organisational development of the JIB, how it absorbed scientific intelligence in 1954 and atomic intelligence in 1957, and how the JIB’s growing influence in the area of missile and bomber analysis led to conflict with the Air Ministry.\(^31\) Chapter 6 examines the structure and nature of the JIB’s international liaison relationships. It focuses on the relationship with the Americans, the networks of Dominion JIBs, and some of the JIB’s contacts in the business world. Finally, chapter 7 examines the end of the JIB and the creation of the DIS. This chapter delves into the arguments deployed by the services to retain their individual intelligence prerogatives; and how key individuals like Kenneth Strong and Lord Mountbatten were instrumental in the drive to centralise military intelligence.

This structure is clearly somewhat ‘artificial’ in its focus. The JIB did not cease to gather topographical intelligence in 1953, nor did its work in analysing the Soviet economy pause in 1954. The approach is, however, valid. The structure is designed to introduce the JIB as comprehensively as possible in a limited space. Also, the nature of the subject imposes genuine limits on the amount of documentary evidence that can be accessed for any particular aspect of the JIBs work, or for certain periods. For example, studying the impact of JIB intelligence on targeting plans during the late 1950s is not feasible. The structure is partly a reflection of this limitation.

Moreover, the structure is a reflection – albeit an imperfect one – of the evolution of the JIB’s priorities and its development as an organisation, from one focused on topography and economics, to one with responsibility for scientific intelligence, to nuclear intelligence, to the DIS in 1964. Britain’s knowledge of Soviet topography was very limited in 1946. Consolidating and

improving it was a key task for the nascent JIB. Planners required analyses of the new enemy, an enemy that had only recently re-emerged as an intelligence target. In particular they required intelligence for targeting, both conventional and nuclear. The JIB had to devote significant energy to this task during its formative years, and it is an aspect that merits examination. This is particularly so, as a significant amount of the JIB’s mapping of the USSR appears to have been conducted during the early years of the Cold War. British and American intelligence agencies benefitted enormously from topographic material gathered during the occupation of Germany; as the chapter will illustrate, without this bounty Western understanding of Soviet topography would have been dire. The JIB noted in 1957 that stocks of native Soviet maps were ‘substantially unchanged’ since its last survey in 1950.32

Another of the JIB’s key functions, indeed, probably the most important during the early Cold War, was economic intelligence. As one Foreign Office official noted in 1949, ‘I think I can say that the main energy of JIB is devoted to a study of Soviet war potential and Soviet economic weaknesses about which Strong claims they know a great deal.’33 Monitoring the Soviet economy was a major preoccupation for British intelligence throughout the Cold War, but the subject held particular resonance between 1948 and 1954 as this was a period of considerable British-American disagreement over trade with the USSR, and the Communist world in general. Britain favoured more trade; the Americans favoured restrictions. Both sides deployed their intelligence analyses in support of their policy preferences – policies that were maintained unilaterally, and multilaterally, through CoCom and its list of prohibited goods. However, once the Korean War ended, and the Cold War cooled again, the west agreed on a consolidated list of items prohibited for trade and the intensity of the debate was moderated. Clearly, economic intelligence continued, but 1954 offers a tidy point to move on, having demonstrated how JIB intelligence influenced British policy in peace and war.

33 FO 371/77639, G. W. Harrison to Sir David Kelly, 21 November, 1949.
Linked to the JIB’s economic intelligence were its analyses of Soviet military output, in particular its analyses of bomber and missile production. These analyses bore on some of the most complicated questions of the Cold War: when could the Soviet Union deliver an atomic bomb, and later a hydrogen bomb, to British and American soil? And how large an attack could they deliver? Chapter 5 overlaps temporally with previous chapters to illustrate the JIB’s legacy in this field, and the sources it could exploit. Chapter 6 examines these assessments and associated issues after 1954, which was a significant year for the JIB as it absorbed the Division of Scientific Intelligence (DSI) and became more involved in the scientific analyses of missiles and bombers, having previously focused on analysing production. This was finalised a short while before the Soviets tested their first true H-bomb, which held dire implications for British survival in any future war. In its wake, assessments of the bomber and missile threat acquired a new resonance. Moreover, 1954 witnessed the beginning of the American intelligence community’s ‘bomber gap’, which later developed into the ‘missile gap.’ Recent literature has outlined how Britain did not agree with inflated American estimates, and it is instructive to examine the JIB’s assessments to gain further insights into why such close allies disagreed.34

Both chapters engage with the growth of the JIB’s responsibilities. In 1954 the JIB became responsible for scientific intelligence and in 1957 it became responsible for the collation and presentation of all atomic intelligence. This thesis is not focused on atomic intelligence and assessments per se. The development of British atomic intelligence encompasses far more than the JIB – involving multiple collection agencies, several assessment bodies, particular transatlantic relations, and key personalities. The JIB is, in several respects, peripheral to the subject for most of the 1950s, and engaging with the subject in the limited space of a chapter can do it little justice; other authors have produced impressive studies of British intelligence on the Soviet nuclear

programme and there is little need to retrace their steps. There is also the question of limited sources, which restrict analyses of the impact of JIB on the field. However the JIB’s adoption of atomic intelligence made it the most important collating and assessment body with regards the Soviet strategic threat. This was indicative of its development as an organisation, and brought it into bureaucratic conflict with the Air Ministry, which sensed that the JIB was infringing upon its prerogatives. Indeed it was clear that the principle of centralisation was gaining ground by the early 1960s. Therefore, the thesis will engage with the issue from the perspective of centralisation.

The examination of the JIB’s liaison with various international partners breaks from the chronological flow of the previous chapters. Two reasons account for this. Firstly, it is a significant issue that is touched upon in each preceding chapter but not explored in depth. Secondly, the documentary evidence outlining this cooperation is very limited. Therefore, the chapter depends to an extent on the accumulated weight of the examples presented throughout the thesis to first outline the mechanics of the liaisons, and then to characterise them more conceptually.

Culminating with the end of the JIB affords us the opportunity to examine many issues. Foremost among them is the relationship between the supporters of increased centralisation in military intelligence and their adversaries. In 1946 the centralisers failed to achieve their aspiration of a central military intelligence service; by 1964 they succeeded. Efficiency and financial savings were central factors in the creation of DIS; numerous reviews had noted that despite the creation of JIB duplication was still prevalent in military intelligence. People like Strong had long argued that centralisation was necessary to get better intelligence, more efficiently. But, equally, a coalition of influential military and political figures had come to see the centralisation of defence planning and administration under an expanded Ministry of Defence as a way to rationalise defence procurement, spending, and planning. Earl Mountbatten, for instance, believed that centralising

intelligence would demonstrate that the benefits of centralising in general outweighed any potential costs. They supported Strong, and were central drivers in the creation of the DIS. Thus, the creation of DIS was, in a sense, the result of a long-term pincer movement, with intelligence figures like Strong pushing from the shadows, and people like Mountbatten and Minister of Defence Peter Thorneycroft leading the charge on the more illuminated, political sphere. This chapter will explore the process and the resistance to the DIS.

Building the JIB archive

To research the subject, two basic principles were followed: start with what is known, and cast your net wide. These applied both to the literature and to the documentary evidence, both of which have their particular limitations.

It has long since been noted that many major studies of the Cold War neglect the role of intelligence. 36 It was the missing dimension. But much has changed since 1984 when Christopher Andrew and David Dilks noted this.37 Many studies of British intelligence touch upon the work of the JIB; they offer insights and leads to archival sources. But the limited coverage raises more questions than answers. There are many studies of economic warfare, technology, and strategy in the Cold War. But few have systematically engaged with intelligence, fewer refer to the JIB (although the odd reference features occasionally). They do however offer vital context, and raise questions about the role of intelligence in general and the JIB in particular.

37 Andrew and David Dilks (eds), The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century (London: Macmillan, 1984).
There is an extensive literature on intelligence in the Second World War and the post-war period. This material engages in some detail with the JIB’s antecedents, the MEW, the ISTD, and the IS(O). Hinsley’s volumes on *British Intelligence in the Second World War* are most significant, but his work is by no means alone in this regard. Wesley Wark, and others, offers a detailed examination of the evolution and role of economic intelligence and the MEW during the inter-war and wartime years. They outline the importance of economic intelligence in monitoring the growth of German military potential, and how, once war was declared, economic intelligence contributed both to the blockade and to drawing analyses for direct economic warfare. They clearly illustrate both the importance of economic intelligence and how difficult it was to collect good economic intelligence from a police state. In terms of topography, the Second World War literature presents some of the weaknesses in British topographic intelligence during the early stages of the War; how, for example, Britain was slow to utilise aircraft to aid with mapping, and how various operations, including Operation Menace, the allies’ 1940 operation to capture the port of Dakar, were hampered by poor topographic intelligence. The literature also outlines the necessity of a central clearing house for factual intelligence, and how the IS(O) supported the Joint Intelligence Staff (JIS), the services and the ISTD by collating and making accessible the mass of basic factual information required for military operations. It was of these organisations, their responsibilities, strengths and shortcomings, the JIC was thinking when it established the JIB.

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38 See for example, Bennet, *Churchill’s*.
There is also a relatively considerable literature on the shift from war to peace. Several authors offer a perspective on the reorganisation of British intelligence more broadly; many consider the most important development to be the cementing of the position of the JIC. Cradock, Aldrich, Goodman, Davies outline how the JIC developed from being ‘very much a peripheral organisation’ in 1936 to being something of an executive body by the end of the war – one that coordinated the various intelligence organisations, evaluated intelligence, advised the Chiefs of Staff and managed intelligence priorities.\(^{43}\) In 1945, there was no question of downgrading the position of the JIC, at the head of the intelligence apparatus. Cavendish-Bentinck had persuaded the COS of the need to maintain the managerial structures.\(^{44}\) And the war had ‘given the concept of the intelligence organisation as a whole, civilian and military, a new reality.’\(^{45}\)

As Aldrich illustrates, the major reorganisation took place below the level of the JIC.\(^{46}\) The JIB was part of this reorganisation, and several authors engage with its creation. Indeed, the JIB’s creation is the best-documented aspect of the organisation’s existence; the literature offers answers to several key questions. Cradock, Davies, Aldrich, Twigge and Scott, and Strong outline that Cavendish-Bentinck was instrumental in forming the agency in 1946.\(^{47}\) The War had demonstrated the value of centralising some vital inter-service intelligence functions; there was a definite need for topographic and economic intelligence for the post-war world; many people believed that the service intelligence divisions were prone to duplication and inefficiency. These were problems that could be alleviated by centralisation.\(^{48}\) They also identify the significance of the new organisation. Twigge and Scott describe it as the ‘major’ organisational change in the

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\(^{46}\) See Aldrich, ‘Secret Intelligence.
\(^{47}\) Ibid; Strong, \textit{Men of Intelligence} p.121; Dorrill, \textit{MI6}, p.126.
intelligence machinery, and note that the appointment of Strong held ‘significant implications’ for transatlantic intelligence relations.\textsuperscript{49}

This thesis will build upon the foundation established by these authors, who offer concise answers to several key questions, but little sustained analysis. We know little about the process of establishing the JIB, how the Bureau was shaped, or who worked for it.\textsuperscript{50} There is also little analysis of two further issues. Firstly, there is the significance of the Bureau in terms of centralising British military intelligence. In his autobiography, Strong notes that he believed that military intelligence would need to be centralised further, over time. The Bureau was the first step. This development merits further analysis. Secondly, there is the matter of institutionalising Osint in the new agency. The JIC believed that Osint had been an under-utilised source during the inter-war period and wartime, and that the JIB should focus on gathering and collating Osint for the Cold War.\textsuperscript{51} Thus, the thesis will expand upon the work of the aforementioned authors, and engage with these under-examined themes. It aims to add a hitherto missing Cold War dimension to the work on British military and military-relevant intelligence conducted by several scholars and to widen our understanding of this under-studied subject.\textsuperscript{52}

\textit{Topography and targeting}

Some of the earliest British intelligence work was topographic. In 1803, the Victorian War Office had established the Depot of Military Knowledge ‘to collect, mostly from overt sources, maps and information on the military resources and topography of foreign powers’. The fortunes of this

\textsuperscript{50} Strong, \textit{Intelligence}, p.223.
\textsuperscript{51} CAB 81/131, JIC (45) 181(), ‘Post-War Organisation of Intelligence’, 1 June 1945
\textsuperscript{52} On British military intelligence see Thomas G. Fergusson, \textit{British Military Intelligence, 1870-1914: The development of a modern Intelligence Organization} (Frederick: University Publications of America, 1984); and John Ferris’ corpus of work, \textit{inter alia} John Ferris, \textit{Intelligence and Strategy: Selected Essays} (Oxford: Routledge, 2005).
department waxed and waned, and it morphed into the Topographic and Statistical Department, and then the Intelligence Bureau in 1873. Similarly, the Naval hydrographer’s department was active in gathering intelligence on enemy topography. According to Andrew, the Russian threat convinced the Admiralty that a more dedicated intelligence office was needed, and the rumblings of discontent eventually led to the establishment of the Naval Intelligence Division (NID). Being a trading nation and an imperial power, it is natural that mapping the world was a priority for Britain. And there is a body of literature that examines the organisation and significance of topographic intelligence from the Eighteenth-Century to the Second World War.

We have only fleeting glimpses of British topographic intelligence after 1945 – Aldrich, for instance, outlines a JIB study of the flammability of Soviet cities and the importance of intelligence gathered in occupied Germany. Other studies that touch upon the issue include Maddrell’s *Spying on Science*, which outlines how Western intelligence agencies used returning German prisoners of war and scientists to discover the geographical spread to the Soviet industrial and military-industrial complex. But generally, topographic intelligence is absent from the literature.

However, understanding the topography of its new potential enemies was of vital importance to Britain and its allies during the Cold War. The JIC understood this, noting in 1945 that there would ‘certainly be a need in peace time for the work of the ISTD.’

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56 CAB 81/129, JIC(45) 181 (0) (Final), ‘Post War Organisation of Intelligence’, 1 June, 1945.
Intelligence for American World Policy, to the question of topographic intelligence. He notes that nations should be aware of the geography of their adversaries, and keep abreast of developments in geography as it related to military, social, and economic issues.\textsuperscript{57} Their basic aim was to provide the strategic planners with enough knowledge of the country in question to make his over-all calculations on its attributes as a zone of combat.\textsuperscript{58} This was as important when facing the Soviet enemy as it had been for the Nazi menace.

Topographic intelligence was crucial for war planning: it outlined the extent of Soviet expansion, in terms of roads and railways, and thus part of their capability to wage and sustain war; it was vital to plan for targeting, conventional and atomic. But the role of the intelligence in targeting is surprisingly absent from the nuclear history literature.\textsuperscript{59} Rather, the focus is on subjects including target systems, counter-force or counter-value, and the controversy over securing access to the American strategic plan, which was denied to Britain due to the restrictions of the McMahon act until 1958.\textsuperscript{60} It is not the aim of this thesis to engage in the debates over British target priorities.\textsuperscript{61} But intelligence exists to support policy; therefore it will investigate how the JIB supported targeting policy by providing analyses of various target systems and by cooperating with

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid, p.11.
\textsuperscript{61} For a discussion of the differing views on British strategic targeting see \textit{inter alia} Baylis, \textit{Ambiguity}; Clark and Wheeler, \textit{The British Origins}; Twigge and Scott, \textit{Armageddon}; Lawrence Freedman, ‘British Nuclear Targeting’, in Ball and Richelson (eds) \textit{Strategic Nuclear Targeting}. 
American partners. In so doing the aim is to begin to fill a gap in the literature on British nuclear strategy.

Economic intelligence

The economic Cold War is understudied in most major analyses of the conflict.\(^{62}\) For example, offensive, or proactive, economic containment does not feature prominently in Gaddis’ work.\(^{63}\) Similarly the biographies and autobiographies of the major politicians reveal little of the economic Cold War and the intelligence support it received. Alan Bullock’s biography of Bevin and Attlee’s autobiography, *As it Happened*, for instance, shed little light on intelligence. Nor do biographies of Hugh Dalton and Stafford Cripps.\(^{64}\) An exception to this general rule in the literature is John Young’s study of Churchill’s second premiership, which offers an insight into the creation of the international trade control regime and British attitude towards it, but again neglects the intelligence angle.\(^{65}\) Much of the American literature is similarly sparse in its engagement with the economic Cold War.\(^{66}\)

The literature on the economic Cold War generally focuses on the establishment, politics, and operation of CoCom – the primary mechanism for controlling and harmonising allied export control policy. Known in British circles as ‘The Paris Group’, it began to function on 1 January 1950


and operated by debating and monitoring three categories or lists of trade – one of strategic goods generally prohibited for export to the USSR (list 1); goods of indirect strategic value, to be exported only in limited quantities (list 2); and goods to be monitored (list 3).\textsuperscript{67}

The most significant study of CoCom is Mastanduno's \textit{Economic Containment}. This, and his associated work, highlights the difficulties the US faced, and its ultimate failure, in imposing its will regarding trade policy on its European allies. It explores the evolution of the US’s belief that its interests would be best served if the USSR was excluded from the liberal economic order, and how this led to a policy of economic warfare: ‘weakening an adversary’s economic potential in order, ultimately, to weaken its military capabilities or potential.’\textsuperscript{68}

This was largely a bureaucratic war and two lists of restricted goods were the primary American cannon, list 1-A and 1-B – the former including goods of high strategic significance, and the latter goods of secondary significance. Unilaterally, however, this policy would be of little practical value as European manufacturers could fill the void. Gaining Western European cooperation was vital, but Western Europe only accepted a tighter export control regime with the outbreak of the Korean War and the altogether more threatening strategic environment, and then only briefly, abandoning economic warfare with the thawing of tensions in 1954.\textsuperscript{69}

Because of the international nature of CoCom, Mastanduno’s work offers an insight into British policy. However, it is generally subsumed into a wider narrative focused upon Western Europe. Britain and France restricted trade of certain goods on the grounds of national security, drawing their own lists in 1948 and operating bilaterally by 1949. But Britain and France did not agree with the US lists. Initially, Britain only barred 121 of 163 items on the 1-A list of strategic goods. Nevertheless, a consensus of sorts emerged and with it an institutional mechanism to


\textsuperscript{68} Mastanduno, \textit{Economic Containment}, p.40 and pp.64-71.

enforce it. This led to the establishment of the multilateral system of CoCom and the Consultative Group (CG), the latter operating as a forum of senior representatives from the participating governments who would meet to resolve policy disputes and set general guidelines for the Western embargo.\textsuperscript{70}

Britain played a significant role in the politics of export control, in particular with regard to the general Western retreat from economic warfare in 1954.\textsuperscript{71} The recent literature on Britain’s economic Cold War makes a valuable contribution to our understanding of this episode of alliance politics and containment policy. Two authors have made the most significant additions to the literature, Ian Jackson and Frank Cain. Others, such as Young, have focused on specific instances of the trade war.

These authors illustrate the multiple pressures on British policy: its need for economic recovery, desire to contain the Soviet Union, and urgent need to placate a consistently hostile American legislative branch.\textsuperscript{72} It was this combination of factors that led to Britain’s adoption of what Jackson describes as a ‘double-edged trade policy towards the Soviet Union’, that of trade and embargo.\textsuperscript{73} There is, after all, no doubt that British policymakers and departments were acutely aware of the Soviet threat. But it was considered that an economic warfare approach would adversely affect Britain’s economy, and lessen its capability to contribute to the defence of the West.\textsuperscript{74} Therefore, early British policy focused upon only controlling goods of a direct military value.

This policy was controversial. American Congressmen refused to accept that the European nations that were being underwritten through the European Recovery Programme were

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid, pp.75-80.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid, p.93.
simultaneously selling goods to the Soviet Union. Congressman Karl E. Mundt tabled an amendment to the Marshal Plan with a view to preventing this trade. Passed as section 117(d) of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, it threatened the withdrawal of Marshal aid to transgressing states. Britain stood relatively firm; ‘senior civil servants seriously considered the suggestion that London should accept a reduced allocation of Marshall aid rather than sacrifice non-strategic East-West trade.’ Instead Britain sought to alter the international export control regime to accommodate both US and Western Europe’s economic interests. With close cooperation from the French, an alternative, shorter list was drawn as the basis for a selective strategic embargo. But, in a capitulation of sorts, Britain unilaterally introduced wider export controls on strategic items in April 1949.

This development led to closer cooperation with the French, which yielded a jointly agreed list of restricted items. The Anglo-French list eventually formed the basis of the CoCom lists, but Anglo-American policies and views did not converge. Britain still refused to adopt the American 1-B list. Its objection was based on the fact that ‘these items were a valuable source of income for the British economy.’ This continued until the Korean War, which precipitated a new set of pressures upon Britain and its European CoCom partners, who capitulated and embargoed a broad range of goods to China and all trade with North Korea.

From initial stubbornness to awkward compliance, the literature demonstrates that Britain followed a relatively independent course with regards its trade policy. Indeed, it occupied a powerful position in the Western alliance, bridging the demands of the Americans with the needs of the Europeans. Its influence was similarly felt in the negotiations regarding the nature of CoCom

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75 Ibid, p.17.
76 Ibid, p.30.
77 Ibid, pp.31-32
78 Ibid, p.35.
79 Ibid, p.41.
80 Ibid, p.54.
81 Ibid, pp.54-55.
controls after the Korean War. Churchill, who had reoccupied Number 10 in 1951, was, by then, an ardent supporter of relaxing restrictions on East-West trade.\textsuperscript{82} This passion led to further clashes with the Americans as both parties reviewed the trade regime late in 1953. The issue was resolved to neither party’s satisfaction, although Mastanduno believes that on balance it represented a victory for the British position. The international list was cut from 474 to 252 categories of items, and the emphasis was shifted to those items which were of primarily military value.\textsuperscript{83}

However the literature barely touches upon the role of intelligence in supporting policy. There are references to the CIA’s analyses of the vulnerability of the Soviet Economy in Mastanduno’s work; Cain’s work on British policy mentions that CIA sat on the American steering committee convened to establish which commodities were of value to the USSR.\textsuperscript{84} But they do not offer an in depth analysis.

Only one chapter, thus far, has focused on intelligence and the trade war. Cain’s study of US intelligence and the problem of French trade with the Eastern Bloc introduces us to American intelligence and the embargo. The CIA and the military establishment drew up lists of barred items. But the intelligence effort was a broad one: serving State Department officials gathered trade intelligence; additional material was supplied by the Department of Commerce, the US Munitions Department, and the service intelligence agencies.\textsuperscript{85} Participating countries’ compliance with the embargo was monitored, and although the CIA could not necessarily prevent suspect transactions it could provide necessary intelligence to raise the matter in CoCom. This occurred when the US detected France selling Junkers Ju-52 aircraft to Bulgaria.\textsuperscript{86} American intelligence also monitored

\textsuperscript{83} Mastanduno, Economic Containment, p.94.
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid, p.72; Cain, ‘Exporting the Cold War’, p.505.
\textsuperscript{86} Cain, ‘US Intelligence’, p.100.
the effectiveness of the trade embargo, concluding in 1949 that the trade embargo was ‘having the
desirable effect of hampering the USSR’s war potential.’

This raises questions about the role British intelligence played in British trade policy. There
is a rare and cursory reference to the JIB, to be found in Cain’s work, in the context of discussions
between the US and UK on the composition of the 1-A lists. And Maddrell, in his study of scientific
intelligence in occupied Germany, goes furthest in demonstrating the significance of intelligence to
the process of trade control, highlighting that intelligence was crucial to the CoCom process. What
is missing, however, is a thorough engagement with collection and analysis, or the transatlantic
intelligence dialogue. As is demonstrated in the literature, economic concerns were a crucial
determining factor in British policy, but it would surely have not followed the path of trade if it
believed it to be detrimental to its own security. The thesis will explore this issue, examining JIB
analyses and how they influenced British economic containment and economic warfare policy
during peace and war.

Missiles and bombers

The literature engaging with British intelligence on the Soviet bomber and missile programmes is
limited. This is in contrast to the research that has been conducted on British intelligence and the
Soviet atomic weaponry programme, most notably Spying on the Nuclear Bear by Goodman. It is
in marked contrast with the literature on the American intelligence community’s collection and
assessment of the Soviet airborne threat. However, several authors do engage with aspects of the

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87 Ibid, p.103.
88 Cain, ‘Exporting the Cold War’, p.513.
90 See Goodman, Spying.
91 Studies of note include Lawrence Freedman, US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (Stanford:
subject, offering interesting insights into four key themes: the issue of sources, inter-agency rivalry, the differing views of the British and American intelligence communities on the scale, and imminence of the bomber and missile threat facing the US and UK.\(^{92}\)

This thesis intends to build upon these researchers’ work. However, there are several obstacles to a comprehensive analysis. Firstly, whereas the American literature examines various American agencies’ estimates of the numbers of bombers and missiles the Soviets possessed or could produce, the British literature does not. Rather, nuclear history literature utilises a slightly broader brush stroke to examine the question of British vulnerability, but does not outline the process of determining the threat. Authors such as Clark and Wheeler, and Baylis examine developing British vulnerability to the Soviet strategic forces – indeed, Clark and Wheeler highlight that ‘British strategy was rooted in vulnerability.’\(^{93}\) However, intelligence assessment, agencies, and processes rarely feature in their analyses. For example, Clark and Wheeler offer no real insight into the process of how or why Britain was unimpressed by Eisenhower’s belief that the US was threatened by the Soviet Air Force in the mid-1950s.\(^{94}\) Similarly, Baylis highlights the significance of intelligence appreciations of the growing strength of the Soviets’ IRBM force and the threat they posed to Britain’s V-bombers, but does not engage in depth with the process of gathering and processing the intelligence.\(^{95}\) For the intelligence historian, the nuclear history literature often offers more questions than answers.

The intelligence studies literature highlights Britain’s vulnerability but sheds little light on process. Cole, for example, is the exception as well as the rule in this case. His study examines British estimates of the Soviet IRBM threat and their influence in the cancellation of Blue Streak,

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\(^{92}\) See for example, Maddrell, *Spying*; Twigge and Scott, *Planning Armageddon*.


\(^{94}\) Ibid, p.181.

\(^{95}\) Baylis, *Ambiguity* (, p. 348.)
and presents intelligence assessments of the readiness and production of various Soviet missiles. He demonstrates that the rationale behind the Blue Streak missile, as a land-based fixed system, was undercut as the intelligence assessments demonstrated a higher state of Soviet readiness. His article is almost alone in engaging with British assessments of the IRBM threat - but exemplifies the broader literature in engaging more with the outcome rather than the process and not mentioning the role of the JIB.

From the late 1940s to the mid-to-late 1950s the scale of the Soviets’ bomber programme was key to British security. The vulnerability of Britain was intimately tied to the development of the Soviet bomber on two ways: firstly, monitoring the development of the Soviet bomber force illustrated the immediate threat Britain would face from the air; and secondly, monitoring the development of the Soviet intercontinental bomber provided an indication of when the Soviets might be ready to launch an attack on the US, and therefore how safe Britain was under the American nuclear umbrella. As the Air Defence Committee stated, ‘when New York is vulnerable to eradication, the USA will not use her strategic weapon in defence of London.’

Nevertheless, the Soviet intercontinental bomber force would only ever be able to start a war with the US, who would have sufficient warning to launch a counter-strike. Unlike the UK the US did not face annihilation. However, should the Soviets develop a sufficiently large ICBM force there was a danger that the US’ retaliatory capacity could be pre-empted, and that a substantial number of its cities could be struck. Twigge and Scott delve deepest in to the JIB’s missile intelligence. The key insight they offer surrounds the differing nature of British and American estimates of the Soviet missile threat. They present evidence that in 1955 the chief scientific adviser to the Ministry of Defence advised the government that the Soviet ICBM would not be operational until 1965, and that this advice was based on JIB assessments. Moreover, this more

96 Goodman offers one of the most detailed accounts, *Spying*, pp. 160-164.
97 Cradock, *Know*, p.62.
98 Twigge and Scott, *Planning Armageddon*, p.244.
optimistic attitude towards the development of the Soviet missile threat, compared with American estimates, was a relatively consistent feature in British reporting in the 1950s. Kenneth Strong informed the Chiefs of Staff in 1958 that ‘logistical and operational factors’ would delay the development of the Soviet missile threat.99 Aldrich concurs, showing how British analysts disagreed with their American counterparts over the lag between testing and deployment: the British believed there would be a gap whereas sections of the US intelligence community believed one would immediately follow the other.100

These authors state that, essentially, Britain saw no ‘missile gap’. What the British view of the politics of the missile gap was remains to be discovered. Solly Zuckerman, Chief Scientist to the Ministry of Defence, provides a fleeting glimpse into the disfavour certain members of the defence establishment may have felt for the politicised nature of the issue in America. In February 1961, during a visit to Washington, he had become aware that President Kennedy had backed away from his campaign claims of Soviet supremacy in intercontinental missiles. He was later invited to meet Kennedy, and, as he recounted, ‘the President asked, “what do you think of my missile gap?” I could only answer, “What missile Gap, Mr President?” at which he laughed as though the whole thing had been a vast joke.’101

As Reynolds wrote, the ‘intelligence relationship is at the heart of what makes the Anglo-American tie different from other alliances.’102 Despite the restrictions on the transfer and discussion of atomic and atomic-related intelligence imposed by the McMahon act of 1946, Andrew believes the relationship was characterised by an ‘unprecedented level of intimacy.’103 And according to Prados, ‘missile intelligence was perhaps one area where Anglo-American cooperation

99 Ibid, p.245.
103 Andrew, ‘Intelligence and International Relations’, p.322.
The intelligence communities pooled and discussed their intelligence and conclusions during a series of conferences, which continued throughout the 1950s, and often became a forum for the airing of dissatisfaction with the other community’s assessments. Given this level of cooperation it must be assumed that trans-Atlantic disagreements were based on interpretation rather than on information, and this thesis will investigate these different interpretations.

Debates over missile and bomber assessments were internal as well as transatlantic. There was a relatively fierce battle between the Air Ministry and the JIB over leadership in guided weapon intelligence. Indeed, this was the biggest bone of contention in the JIB’s relationship with any of the services; according to Assistant Chief of the Air Staff for Intelligence, S. O. Bufton, relations between JIB and the Air Ministry had been excellent before the development of the guided weapon threat. Twigge and Scott note the Air Ministry believed that any aspect of the airborne threat was the prerogative of air intelligence, as only airmen would have the necessary ‘feel’ for the issues. These issues prompted a report by Sir Gerald Templer who examined the division of responsibility for missile intelligence. His report, to the dismay of the Air Ministry, recommended that JIB take the lead in analysing the guided missile threat. The insights into this episode that Twigge and Scott, and Aldrich provide prompt several interesting questions about the growing power of the JIB.

None of the authors alluded to above provide an exhaustive analysis of Britain’s estimates of the Soviets’ bomber and missile capabilities. Nor do autobiographies and biographies of key

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105 For example, see CAB 158/26, JIC (56)23 ‘US/UK Guided Weapons Conference’, 2nd February, 1956.
political and military personalities from the period provide much in the way of detail.\(^{110}\) Harold Macmillan, is perhaps most revealing about Britain’s vulnerability and understanding of the Soviet Union’s striking prowess. He was clear in his mind that Britain faced complete destruction in the age of the long-range bomber and missile: ‘...there is no defence possible to us, except as members and partners in a great alliance.’\(^{111}\) Britain could deter the Soviets only through possession of a guarantee from the US’ Strategic Air Command. But, in 1956, when the Soviets threatened Britain with missiles during the Suez crisis Macmillan believed ‘the British government rated them at their true value’, suggesting firstly, that he was aware of Khrushchev’s tendency towards bluff and exaggeration; and secondly, that he was confident that the Soviets did not have the capability to strike the US decisively and massively.\(^{112}\) The intelligence assessments that gave him such confidence will be examined below.

*Liaison*

Given its imperial heritage, British intelligence has historically maintained an international focus and developed valuable liaison relationships. Many aspects of this legacy are well covered in the intelligence literature, in particular Britain’s early intrigues on India’s north-west frontier. The adventurous British officers and British-controlled Indian agents who secretly mapped the


\(^{112}\) Ibid, p.288.
mountain passes that could serve as invasion points for the Russians or the Afghans are, in a sense, the JIB’s antecedents.\textsuperscript{113}

But the most significant developments in Britain’s liaison relationships occurred in the Twentieth Century, during and after the Second World War, and with the Americans. Indeed, students of British-American relations note that intelligence is one of the areas where the relationship can justifiably be labelled ‘special.’\textsuperscript{114} There is a significant literature devoted to the subject. The key wartime and post-war treaties concerning intelligence sharing, the UKUSA agreements, have recently been released to the archives.\textsuperscript{115} The mechanics of liaison have also been set-out by Richelson and Ball, and many authors have engaged with specific aspects of transatlantic cooperation;\textsuperscript{116} cooperation in gathering intelligence in occupied Germany, in aerial intelligence gathering and covert operations, in monitoring the development of the Soviet atomic threat, and during the Cuban Missile Crisis, to name but a limited number.\textsuperscript{117}


\textsuperscript{115} See The National Archives <http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukusa/>.


The transatlantic relationship was the most significant for Britain after the war. And the Americans also benefited: Britain’s imperial legacy meant that it could provide assets in areas of the globe where the US lacked capability, in the Middle East, for example. And Britain still controlled territories that were of immense value in targeting the USSR with technical assets: the ‘residual empire’.118 But, although the role of Australian and Canadian intelligence agencies in the UKUSA framework have been noted, the development of these countries’ intelligence communities and the mechanics of cooperation has received comparatively little attention. The post-war reorganisation has, of course, been studied. Andrew and Wark outline how JIBs were created in both countries, mirroring developments in London.119 But there is little examination of the significance of Dominion organisations in Western intelligence cooperation. This leaves a considerable gap in our understanding of the relationship between Britain and the Dominions after the Second World War.

The literature demonstrates that the JIB was very active internationally. Ambrose, for instance, highlights the importance of Kenneth Strong’s relationship with Eisenhower; Ball alludes to the JIB’s role in liaison with the Americans over targeting; Hershberg outlines the JIB’s role in supplying the Americans with intelligence from Cuba; Twigge and Scott suggest that JIB-CIA relations were probably as close as SIS-CIA ties.120 But none deals systematically with the JIB’s liaison relationships in its varied fields of activity. The most thorough engagement is to be found in R. H. Mathams’ memoirs Sub Rosa.121 He recalls how after his training in Australia he was seconded to JIB London, where he worked on intelligence issues of the highest sensitivity; how JIB Australia’s

121 R. H. Mathams, Sub Rosa (London: George Allan and Unwin, 1982).
analyses of China and China’s nuclear development were transferred to London; and how the Australian JIB developed relations with the American intelligence community. His work highlights the important contribution of the Australian JIB on subjects of crucial importance, and the closeness of international JIB cooperation. Building upon his work, and the authors above, this thesis will argue that the cooperation was institutionalised, indeed networked, and that the system was designed to be so from the outset. It will examine the JIB’s relationship with the Dominions, the US, and with businesses, from which JIB gathered valuable Osint.

The End of the JIB

Aldrich noted that military intelligence in the years following the Second World War is among the most under-studied aspects of British intelligence.\(^{122}\) A survey of the literature engaging with the reorganisation of the higher machinery of British defence, the developments which yielded the DIS, bears out his point; intelligence does not feature prominently in any major analysis. Michael Howard’s paper, *The Central Organisation of Defence*, is illustrative of this trend. He provides a thorough analysis of Secretary of Defence Thorneycroft’s and Chief of the Defence Staff Mountbatten’s reforms of the higher machinery of defence, which includes an examination of the machinery for procurement, administration, and policy. But his engagement with the matter of intelligence is extremely limited.\(^{123}\)

Similarly fleeting references are to be found in Johnson’s *Defence by Ministry*. He, however, includes an extra dimension by noting that Lord Mountbatten, then Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), enthusiastically advocated reform of defence intelligence, arguing that it would deliver extra

\(^{122}\) Aldrich, *Espionage, Intelligence and Security in Britain*, p.87.
economy and higher quality intelligence. Johnson does not develop this detail. This silence is largely unbroken by other significant texts on British defence organisation in the period.

Of course, it is plausible to contend that the absence of sustained engagement with intelligence in the broader literature on defence reorganisation is a reflection of the relative absence of intelligence from the higher-level political debates leading to the reorganisation. This view has a certain merit, but it should not be given too much credence. Should the contention be framed as a question the short answer would be ‘yes and no’.

It was acknowledged by Strong in 1950 that it was ‘impracticable to carry the centralisation of intelligence further and faster that the centralisation of defence as a whole.’ Therefore, one might argue that the organisation of military intelligence would necessarily be subordinate to the more prominent debates of national defence, explaining its relative absence from the literature. Indeed, the major issues facing policy makers and planners during this period concerned the economy and efficiency of the entire armed services.

The matter of economy – financial savings – was always present in post-war debates about national defence. But in the 1950s and early 1960s British strategic vulnerability increased with developments in Soviet military technology; policy makers realised that in order to meet it and achieve economies the defence machine would have to be reformed. In 1957 Harold Macmillan appointed Duncan Sandys as his Defence Minister with a brief to restructure Britain’s armed forces, ‘to rely in future on nuclear deterrence as the basis of Britain’s defence posture and to secure “a

126 Twigge and Scott, Planning Armageddon, p.27.
substantial reduction in expenditure and manpower.”[128] His reforms included phasing out of conscription by 1960, the reduction of the British Army on the Rhine, cuts in tactical air power, and the authorisation of the intermediate-range ballistic nuclear missile, Blue Streak, and the air-delivered ‘stand-off’ missile, Blue Steel.[129] These reforms did not cut costs to a significant enough degree; according to Dockrill, one of the factors that drove Peter Thorneycroft’s drive for centralisation in 1963 was an awareness of the possible economies to be gained from a reorganised and modernised defence establishment.[130]

The question of economy was supplemented by matters of efficiency. This was the major concern of Mountbatten. His believed that effective warfighting was a matter of joint operations that could best be controlled by a centralised command structure. Such views were developed during his tenure as Chief of Combined Operations in 1942 and later during his time at NATO command in Malta.[131] He distanced himself from army and air force resistance to the Sandys reforms in 1957-8, before being appointed as CDS in 1959 and creating unified commands in overseas theatres of war.[132] Howard believes that such a move was ‘in terms of both tactics and of organisation, an almost essential preliminary to any fundamental change at the centre.’[133] Supported by Mountbatten, Thorneycroft tasked Lord Ismay, who had recently retired from being First Secretary to NATO, and Sir Ian Jacob, formerly Military Assistant Secretary to Churchill’s War Cabinet, to propose reforms to the higher organisation of defence.[134]

In their report, Ismay and Jacob made no recommendations regarding the organisation of intelligence; nor is the matter mentioned in Lord Ismay’s memoirs.[135] This could account for the absence of references to intelligence in the literature. However, policymakers certainly considered

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[133] Ibid.
matter of intelligence organisation. The lack of engagement with the topic is probably more related to access to documents than significance. Many of the key texts on defence reorganisation were written in the 1970s and 1980s, roughly coinciding with the birth of significant academic literature on British intelligence and its influence on policy and decision.\textsuperscript{136} The majority of academics’ focus was elsewhere, and given the rarity of released documentary material relating to intelligence the lack of interest was reinforced by lack of access.

Recent literature offers more details about the creation of the DIS. It demonstrates that intelligence was included in the deliberations of senior policymakers and Chiefs of Staff on the organisation of British defence. Indeed, since the reorganisation of British intelligence following the Second World War, there had been an almost rolling review of the intelligence machinery and its effectiveness.

Cavendish-Bentinck, the wartime Chairman of the JIC, reviewed the wartime organisation of the intelligence machinery early in 1945, and a JIC paper on the ‘Post War Organisation of Intelligence’ followed his review.\textsuperscript{137} These reviews led to the creation of the JIB. Soon after came Air Chief Marshal Sir Douglas Evill’s report into the organisation of the intelligence machinery, which led to the redefining of the JIC and its charter.\textsuperscript{138} In 1950 Kenneth Strong’s pressure for the centralisation of all operational intelligence staffs in one building drew the matter of intelligence organisation to the attention of the Minister of Defence, Emanuel Shinwell. Shinwell supported the plan and made his case to Attlee, but the CoS successfully resisted the move arguing that the present system was working well.\textsuperscript{139} Upon his re-election, Winston Churchill was reportedly

\textsuperscript{136} For example, F. W. Winterbotham’s \textit{Ultra Secret} was published in 1974 and J. C. Maasterman’s \textit{Double-cross System in the War in 1939 to 1945}, was published in 1973.

\textsuperscript{137} The Director of Military Intelligence recommended that the post war organisation of intelligence be examined as early as 27 June, 1944, see CAB 81/92, JIC (44) 30\textsuperscript{th} Meeting, 27 June, 1944. For the post war reviews see, Goodman, ‘Learning to Walk’, p.52; CAB 81/130, JIC (45) 265 (0), ‘Post War Organisation of Intelligence’, September 7, 1945.

\textsuperscript{138} Goodman, ‘Learning to Walk’, p.53.

\textsuperscript{139} Aldrich, ‘British Intelligence and the Anglo-American “Special Relationship” During the Cold War’, p.337; Aldrich, \textit{The Hidden}, p.418.
‘dismayed’ to discover an unruly and inefficient organisation responsible for dealing with scientific intelligence and set about righting the matter. R. V. Jones, the head of wartime scientific intelligence, was recalled to government service but failed to rectify the situation. He retired in 1954. During the upheaval Sir Frederick Brundrett conducted an investigation into service intelligence and concluded that greater centralisation was necessary. As a result the Directorate of Scientific Intelligence (DSI) was absorbed by the JIB in September 1954.  

Concurrently, another high-level investigation into the machinery of intelligence was conducted, this one examining the machinery of atomic intelligence. The Daniel Report set out to evaluate the ‘performance of the UK atomic intelligence organisation to date’ and offer recommendations as to its future. In its wake, Churchill ‘approved the transfer’ of the Atomic Energy Intelligence Unit to the JIB. In addition to these significant investigations there were, according to Aldrich, several Treasury-led investigations into the intelligence organisation throughout the 1950s. And the 1960s saw a continuation of the investigative trend with the Templer review of service intelligence, which suggested deeper centralising of intelligence in certain areas of inter service significance. These reviews, their readership and instigators, confirm that the intelligence machinery was indeed a high profile issue amongst senior defence and political figures.

Integration and centralisation were prominent themes in these reviews, and they demonstrate that that the establishment of the DIS was the culmination of a lengthy battle between those who argued for the centralisation of intelligence and those who favoured the service agencies retaining their spheres of responsibility. Indeed, the centralisers had argued their case since the end of the Second World War. As Michael Herman states, from 1945 there existed a

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141 Goodman, ‘Research Note’, p.156.
143 Aldrich, ‘British Intelligence and the Anglo-American, p.336.
144 Ibid, p.337.
vision of a ‘total all source intelligence institution, studying and understanding foreign situations as a whole.’\textsuperscript{145} But, as Twigge and Scott highlight, whereas the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) fulfilled such a role in the US, the service agencies in the UK guarded their prerogatives and successfully prevented the establishment of an analogous organisation.\textsuperscript{146}

Despite being ‘the only genuinely inter-service organisation in Whitehall,’ the JIB was not designed to infringe on the existing prerogatives of the service intelligence agencies.\textsuperscript{147} However, over time, as it grew, the JIB inevitably infringed on service intelligence territory. Those advocating central intelligence were biding their time and gathering support. Former JIC Chairman Percy Cradock views JIB’s establishment as a ‘first step in the direction of full integration of defence intelligence.’\textsuperscript{148} Kenneth Strong – an ‘evangelist’ of centralisation – was aware of the fact that the organisation of intelligence must conform with the wider organisation of defence and that it was ‘impracticable to carry the centralisation of intelligence further and faster than the centralisation of defence as a whole.’\textsuperscript{149} Instead he pursued centralisation incrementally, expanding the JIB’s remit to include scientific, technical, and atomic intelligence.\textsuperscript{150} According to Cradock, when the DIS was established with the JIB as its ‘nucleus,’ and with Strong as its Director, his ‘victory’ over the CoS was finally achieved.\textsuperscript{151} However, the details of Strong’s victory, and the debates and analyses on the system as it stood before the integration are not revealed in the literature.

There exists, however, a short, but detailed, analysis of the aftermath to the reorganisation of defence intelligence. Davies examines how the creation of the DIS affected relation and communication with his focus institution.\textsuperscript{152} He describes the initial change as being ‘fairly chaotic,’ and notes that issues such as re-naming the amalgamated service departments led to confusion.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{145} Herman, \textit{Intelligence Services}, p.64.
\item \textsuperscript{146} Twigge and Scott, \textit{Planning Armageddon}, p.27.
\item \textsuperscript{147} Aldrich, ‘The UK-US intelligence Alliance in 1975,’ p.561.
\item \textsuperscript{148} Cradock, \textit{Know}, p.261.
\item \textsuperscript{149} Twigge and Scott, \textit{Planning Armageddon}, p.27.
\item \textsuperscript{150} Aldrich, ‘The UK-US intelligence Alliance in 1975,’ p.562.
\item \textsuperscript{151} Cradock, \textit{Know}, pp.3-4; Aldrich, ‘British Intelligence and the Anglo-American’, p.337.
\item \textsuperscript{152} Davies, \textit{MI6}, pp.270-273.
\end{itemize}
Moreover, he highlights that the process of reorganisation was protracted; the DIS did not adopt its longer term form until 1966 when the former service elements were merged in ‘functional’ sections. This thesis will expand upon these details.

The Archives

It was not so long ago that the retention of intelligence material from The National Archives, and consequently the absence of intelligence from diplomatic and military history, led to Andrew and Dilks labelling it as ‘the Missing Dimension.’ Much has changed since then, and a significant amount of intelligence material is available in Kew. However, this has brought with it its own set of problems. As Aldrich highlights, only a small proportion of government material is retained; and, given its incomplete state, it should be treated with caution.

But dependence on the archive cannot be avoided. The historian of the JIB faces a particular set of challenges. The main issue is the poor cataloguing of JIB papers. Despite its broad remit, many divisions, and extensive liaison links, there is no TNA class-mark for the JIB (unlike MI5 and GCHQ, which are stored in KV and HW); its papers are part of its parent department, the Ministry of Defence, catalogue (DEFE). Its internal memoranda, correspondence, notes and so on – the material stored in the so-called ‘registered files’, like DEFE 21, for example – have not been systematically collated and filed. And the main stores of JIB papers, in DEFE 44 and DEFE 60, are almost exclusively finished reports of the ‘data warehousing’ kind. Therefore, whilst it is possible to study the scale and scope of the JIB’s ‘data warehousing’ output, it is difficult to examine the organisation’s day-to-day activities, what demands other departments made of it, and how it

\[153\] Ibid.
\[155\] Aldrich, The Hidden, p.6. (See his introduction, ‘Historians of Secret Service and their Enemies.’)
fulfilled these requirements. Indeed, the bulk of the material in DEFE 44 and 60 is of marginal value, as there is no indication of who, if anyone, made use of it.

The second challenge is, paradoxically, related to the solution to the first, and is related to the volume of files that must be searched to uncover JIB material. A significant amount of JIB material is available in the files of its customer departments. Therefore, to research the JIB one must examine a wide range of file series (using JIB as a basic keyword search on the TNA catalogue yields results stored across 12 departments). The researcher must essentially build his or her own JIB archive. This is neither original nor surprising. Many historians of British intelligence have utilised this approach to cast light on several aspects of British intelligence. Indeed, given the limited release of intelligence material, this has been the only way to gain insights into certain topics. In the case of the JIB, a significant amount of papers can be uncovered in the files of the Cabinet Office, the Air Ministry, the Ministry of Defence, and the Foreign Office.

The issue that arises from this situation is that many sections of this thesis will refer to JIB figures, opinions and arguments but will not refer to specific JIB documents. This is because JIB material is in other departments’ documents, or in committee reports. For example, chapter three draws on many reports from the DEFE 10 series, which was a particularly rich seam for JIB material relating to economic intelligence. However, these documents are the product of the Security Exports Control Working Party (SECWP), not the JIB, and are referred to accordingly. But, although operating through other departments’ files poses problems in terms of the volume of material to sift, it is also advantageous in several respects. The advantages include: demonstrating how its customer departments used the JIB; how intelligence was used to support policy; and the breadth of the JIB’s activities. Gaining such insights is immensely valuable in demonstrating the significance of the JIB.

156 Based on searching for ‘JIB’ at <http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/catalogue/search.asp>
Of course, The National Archives in Kew is but one repository of relevant evidence. The material therein is supplemented by materials in numerous other official archives and collections of private papers. The usefulness of foreign archives, particularly the American archives, to researchers of British intelligence has long been noted.\textsuperscript{158} Materials unavailable in Kew are often available in College Park. And given the international nature of the JIB, it is not surprising that valuable material was available in foreign archives: American, Canadian, and Australian. For example, the most comprehensive outline of the JIB’s organisation, circa 1949, is to be found in College Park.\textsuperscript{159} Similarly, following in the footsteps of Andrew, and others, this thesis has sought to exploit some private collections for intelligence related material.\textsuperscript{160} Kenneth Strong destroyed his papers, but material has been uncovered in numerous locations.\textsuperscript{161} This has been useful in several areas: Eisenhower’s papers provided details on the former President’s relationship with Strong; Earl Mountbatten’s papers offered many insights into the creation of the DIS. All were a valuable supplement to The National Archives.

The third challenge is official secrecy. Many JIB documents on key subjects are retained.\textsuperscript{162} These include materials on intelligence and targeting, materials on bomber and missile production, atomic intelligence, and materials pertaining to the creation of DIS.

The Freedom of Information Act, which is intended to provide historians and researchers with a form of recourse in the face of unreasonable secrecy, has been rendered useless in many cases. Two issues stand out in this respect. Several files have been retained as they are subject to ‘absolute exemption under the [Freedom of Information] Act’ -that is, under section 2.3,

\textsuperscript{159} US TNA, Box 2143, RG 319, Records of the Army Staff, ‘Origins and Functions of the Joint Intelligence Bureau’.
\textsuperscript{160} Andrew, \textit{Secret Service}, for example.
'information supplied by, or relating to, bodies dealing with security matters.'\textsuperscript{163} Some files, for example DEFE 60/198 ‘Aircraft Factory and Ulan-Ude’ will remain closed until their next review in 2018. Secondly, according to the Ministry of Defence, many files have been stored in a central London facility which was ‘very close to where asbestos was discovered in the Spring of 2003.’\textsuperscript{164} The affected records were taken to a ‘facility on the outskirts of London, pending a decision on how best to regain access to the information they hold without risk to those handling them.’\textsuperscript{165} The process of recovering the documents has seriously slowed the review process; little can be done to expedite it; many files have been lost to mould and damp.

There are precious few weapons available to fight the neutralisation of the Freedom of Information Act. The reluctance to release files in the specific case of the JIB’s estimates on the Soviet missile threat suggests that although the rhetoric of freedom of information has altered practice has not. Christopher Andrew’s 1977 statement that ‘the cult of secrecy which still surrounds the British intelligence services goes far beyond what is desirable, what is necessary, far beyond even what is justifiable,’ seems to be applicable today, to a degree.\textsuperscript{166} After all, it is absurd to state that releasing 55 year-old files detailing estimates of the production of TU-4 bombers will compromise national security. The Americans have revealed their NIEs outlining the influence of the U2, Penkovsky, and more detailed Elint, so withholding British analyses to protect sources and

\textsuperscript{163} Quoted from correspondence between the Ministry of Defence and the Author, 4 November, 2008.
\textsuperscript{164} Writes at the Guardian newspaper, for instance, have chosen to present a more conspiratorial picture, see ‘MoD cites Asbestos Fears in rejecting Information Pleas’, accessed on November 14 2009 at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2005/dec/28/uk.freedomofinformation.
\textsuperscript{165} Writes at the Guardian newspaper, for instance, have chosen to present a more conspiratorial picture, see ‘MoD cites Asbestos Fears in rejecting Information Pleas’, accessed on November 14 2009 at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2005/dec/28/uk.freedomofinformation> Quoted from correspondence between the Ministry of Defence and the Author, 20 June, 2008
One cannot but draw parallels with the classic 1980s comedy ‘Yes Minister’, where Humphrey, the Permanent Secretary to the Department for Administrative Affairs, discusses the release of documents with Jim Hacker, the Minister. Hacker reads that ‘some correspondence was lost in the great floods of 1967’ and therefore cannot be released. He then asks, Humphrey, ‘Was 1967 a particularly bad winter?’ To which Humphrey replies, ‘No, a marvellous winter. We lost no end of embarrassing files.’ See, ‘Yes Minister’, episode ‘The Skeleton in the Cupboard’.
methods is unnecessary. The blanket refusal to release the JIB’s missile intelligence is a blunt instrument with which to silence the historian. Indeed, this episode is a far cry from the more ‘sophisticated “information control”’ that Aldrich feared would prevail in the post Waldegrave era.¹⁶⁷ Rather, it is the same locked door, but with a note that reads ‘try again later’ rather than ‘closed for business.’

Both the literature and the documentary evidence have their limitations. The literature does not offer a comprehensive enough account of the JIB’s creation, its work, or its end. It is a largely unknown agency. The documentary evidence is poorly catalogued, diffuse, and often unavailable. Nevertheless, the need for a study of the JIB is clear and this thesis aims to expand our understanding of the agency and its operations significantly.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid, p.111.
The student has requested that this electronic version of the thesis does not include the main body of the work - i.e. the chapters and conclusion. The other sections of the thesis are available as a research resource.
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