http://hdl.handle.net/2160/820 Sun, 19 May 2013 04:51:19 GMT 2013-05-19T04:51:19Z http://hdl.handle.net/2160/909 History repeats itself: The failure of rational choice models in corporate governance Marnet, Oliver Conventional proposals to reform corporate governance based on the rational model of decision making may be insufficient in preventing future corporate debacles. Typically underestimated are the pressures from conflicts of interest and bias on reputational intermediaries. Judgements and choices made by auditors during professional engagements may not strictly adhere to the rational model of decision making. This is of significance with regard to the gatekeeper function of auditors and relevant legislation. A discussion on earnings management elaborates by suggesting that strictly numerical measures are not a reliable guide to the quality of corporate governance. It is suggested that our understanding of monitor behaviour in corporate governance would be improved by placing it on psychologically more realistic foundations. Some of these foundations are introduced. Marnet, Oliver, 'History repeats itself: The failure of rational choice models in corporate governance', Critical Perspectives on Accounting (2005) 18(2) pp.191-210 RAE2008 Sat, 01 Jan 2005 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/2160/909 2005-01-01T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/2160/908 Behaviour and rationality in corporate governance Marnet, Oliver The agency view of corporate governance requires effective monitors and gatekeepers to align the interests of the agent with those of the principal. One common denominator in recent corporate debacles appears to be the collective failure of gatekeepers and monitors. This paper suggests that conventional proposals to reform corporate governance through legislation, codes of best practice, and the like, are necessary, but underestimate the pressures from conflicts of interest and bias which reputation intermediaries face in their interaction with colleagues and clients. The aim of this paper is to integrate various strands of the literature on corporate governance, cognitive research and behavioural economics to shed light on questions regarding the independence of boards of directors and external auditors. Marnet, Oliver, 'Behaviour and rationality in corporate governance', Journal of Economic Issues (2005) 39(3) pp.613-632 RAE2008 Thu, 01 Sep 2005 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/2160/908 2005-09-01T00:00:00Z