A Comparison of offensive realist, defensive realist, and constructivist perspectives on the US-North Korean Security Dilemma 1992-2001

Abstract

The view that uncertainty resulting from the condition of anarchy causes defensively-motivated entities to engage in self-defeating security competition has been explored in various periods of history. This introductory chapter will explore the implications of such security competition for international politics in five sections, beginning with a brief literature review on the security dilemma. This literature review indicates the presence of an academic debate between offensive realism, defensive realism and constructivism in explaining how states interpret and respond to uncertainty in the anarchic world of international politics. This debate points to three differing explanations as to how the paradoxical security competition between defensive states may arise; by extension, it also indicates three distinct perspectives on the ability of policymakers to rein in such security competition. This academic debate leads to the second section and develops the research question of this thesis, namely, a comparative assessment of the explanatory strength of offensive realism, defensive realism, and constructivism as theoretical approaches to mitigating security dilemma dynamics. This second section will also outline the overall structure of this thesis. In the third section, I will justify the case for analytical eclecticism as a methodological approach for this research project. In the fourth section, I will put forward the case for adopting the process of US-North Korean interaction from 1992 to 2001 as a case study for testing offensive realist, defensive realist, and constructivist approaches to mitigation of security dilemma dynamics. In the fifth section, I will address the controversies that may arise in this research project with a series of qualifications.