| dc.description.abstract |
This thesis provides a detailed account of the friction between Britain and the United
States, over trade and shipping policy towards Cuba. It demonstrates that Britain's
continuing trade with Cuba in the years immediately after Castro's revolution in 1959
caused difficulties for Anglo-American relations. This was particularly the case after
the imposition of US economic sanctions. But Cuba was a manifestation of a basic
difference of approach towards relations with the countries of the Soviet bloc as a
whole. Tberefore, the British trading principles connected to freedom of the sew and
free trade became major obstacles for the maintenance of a unified Anglo-American
front against the Soviet bloc in general, and, specifically, as this thesis will examine,
in relations with Cuba. In fact, it will be shown that despite close co-operation
between Britain and the United States during the Cuban missile crisis of October
1962, such solidarity was short lived. The general trend, and therefore the thrust of
this thesis, pulls in the opposite direction. Indeed, by the end of 1963, such were the
disagreements over trade with the bloc, that it was described by one senior British
official as being one of the major irritants in the 'special relationship. ' This thesis
provides a new context within which to understand Macmillan's actions during the
Cuban missile crisis, and the role that the British government played in October 1962,
and will present an interpretation of Britain's attitude towards trade relations with
Cuba, which will challenge popular conceptions about the state of relations during the
Macmillan-Kennedy era - an era held high in the past as a golden age of Anglo-
American co-operation. It concludes that the 'special relationship' was full of
contradictions, and supports the contention that it was, in fact, an extremely complex
phenomenon. |
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