Abstract:
This thesis examines the effect American human rights conduct during the war on terror had
on three international human rights norms: torture, habeas corpus, and rendition for the
purposes of torture. It does so by analysing a large-n sample of public legitimation strategies
of both the United States and other members of international society during the
administration of President George W. Bush. The thesis asks three questions: First, has the
defection of the United States from these human rights norms led to a ―norm cascade‖ that
delegitimized the norms? Second, did the United States run an exemptionalist argument for
each, and was this successful? Third, did the material preponderance of the United States
help it to legitimate its preferences in international society? The thesis argues that the United
States was unsuccessful at overtly legitimating its preferences in the habeas corpus case
study. In the torture case study the United States had some early success using a strategy of
norm justification, but most international legitimation strategies were subsequently
abandoned. It was relatively successful in the rendition case study where it pursued very few
legitimation strategies, relying instead on secrecy and denial. Furthermore, there is no overt
evidence that the United States either attempted or was successful in an exemptionalist
strategy, though some of the conduct by the United States and other members of international
society might imply that a covert strategy was in effect. Lastly, though the material
preponderance of the United States allowed it to absorb the costs associated with its
illegitimate behaviour, there was no evidence that it was useful in transforming international
human rights norms.
