THE PRODUCTION OF MEXICAN SPACE
HENRI LEFEBVRE, GLOBALIZATION, AND STATE

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth

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30 September 2001
Declaration

This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not being concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree

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Huw Robert Evans
30 September 2001

Statement 1

This thesis is the result of my own investigations, except where otherwise stated. Other sources are acknowledged by footnotes giving explicit references. A bibliography is appended

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This thesis uses Henri Lefebvre’s production of space thesis to illustrate the globalization of Mexican space, with particular emphasis on the period 1982-1994. Attention to Lefebvre’s work suggests an important contribution to the ongoing debate concerning the relationship between the nation-state and globalization. This contribution is demonstrated in three main ways. First, Lefebvre maintains a central role for the state in the production of a relatively stable socio-spatial grounding for capital. This is examined via changes in the territoriality of the Mexican state with the advent of neoliberal restructuring. Second, Lefebvre highlights the importance of the state in constituting a hegemonic narrative of ‘the global’ for a political community (‘the nation’). This is necessary to contain participation and structure political identity, with state-led production of such representations fundamental to the entrenchment of capital and the legitimation of both political and geographical uneven development. This aspect is examined by focusing on the manipulation of national culture to visualise a ‘spectacle of Mexican modernity’ during the presidency of Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994). Third, Lefebvre’s recognition of the importance of such representations to globalization situates the nation-state as an important terrain of resistance. This aspect is examined via the Zapatista movement’s 1994 interruption of the smooth unfolding of the globalization process, through contestation of elite representations of national space. The thesis positions itself between those literatures that continue to reify the state, and those that maintain that globalization has rendered the nation-state effectively irrelevant to the understanding of contemporary processes. Henri Lefebvre furnishes a possible way to negotiate this impasse, and provides some clear insights on the possibilities of progressive political practice in a world replete with insistence that there is ‘no alternative’ to globalization.
It was not
an overcoming
Not even
a tearing apart
She simply told
me to go
Far
Very far

– Efrain Huerta, “Lo sentí”
For Albert Price
# Contents

Abstract ....................................................................................... iii  
Acknowledgements .......................................................................... viii  
Abbreviations and glossary ................................................................. ix  

Introduction ........................................................................................ 1  

1 Henri Lefebvre: The terrain of progressive political practice ................. 13  
   Introduction .................................................................................... 14  
   Sociality and spatiality .................................................................... 19  
   The globalization of social space ................................................. 25  
   The state mode of production .................................................... 33  
   Centrality and the violence of decorporealization ...................... 45  
   The spatialisation of the dialectic ............................................... 53  
   Conclusion .................................................................................... 65  

2 Space, knowledge, and power in the Mexican transition ...................... 68  
   Introduction .................................................................................... 69  
   Mexican statism (1934-1982) ...................................................... 77  
   Technocratic revolution and the consolidation of neoliberalism .... 95  
   Abstracting space and political centrality ................................. 101  
   Redefining the state ..................................................................... 109  
   Territoriality and uneven development ..................................... 122  
   Conclusion .................................................................................... 132  

3 The production of spectacle: Representing Mexican modernity............. 138  
   Introduction .................................................................................... 139  
   National/International ................................................................... 142  
   National culture .......................................................................... 148  
   The production of Mestizo identity ........................................... 155  
   To a second revolution .................................................................. 174  
   Projecting the rural ‘outside’ ....................................................... 184  
   Conclusion .................................................................................... 191  

4 Interrupting spectacle: Zapatismo and spaces of representation ............. 196  
   Introduction .................................................................................... 197  
   Lefebvre and resistance ............................................................... 200  
   Chiapas and place: Constructing a space of representation ......... 206  
   The emergence of the EZLN ....................................................... 212
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disputing 'the nation'</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interrupted modernity</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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H.E.
Abbreviations and glossary

ALADI  Association for Latin American Integration
ALALC  Latin American Free Trade Association
CCE  Business Co-ordinating Council. Formed in 1973 by the conservative industrial association COPARMEX, in response to Echeverria's populism. First time that Mexican business-people had organised themselves self-consciously as a capitalist class
CCRI  Clandestine Revolutionary Indigenous Committee. Central command of the EZLN
CEPES  Centre for Political, Economic, and Social Studies. PRI
CIEPEC  Centro de Investigaciones Económicas y Políticas de Acción Comunitaria – Centre of Economic and Political Investigations of Community Action. Nongovernmental and non-profit think-tank based in San Cristóbal de las Casas in Chiapas
CIOAC  Independent Centre for Farm Workers and Peasants. Representative of Mexican migrant workers, most of whom are indigenous of southern origin. Organised Baja California mass rally in support of EZLN in early 1994. Founded 1975
CNC  Confederación Nacional de campesinos – National Confederation of Peasants. Formed 1938. One of the three pillars of state corporatism (along with unionised labour (CTM) and the popular sector (CNOP))
CND  National Democratic Convention. Convened in August 1994 by the EZLN, and attended by 6000 delegates. Held in Aguascalientes, a 'new town' carved out of the jungle by the EZLN. The choice of name for the venue is a direct homage to the town in which Pancho Villa and Emiliano Zapata held the historic October 1914 convention in which Villa and others pledged support for Zapata's Plan de Ayala
CNOP  National Confederation of Popular Organisations. Corporate body representing the middle classes One of the three pillars of state corporatism (along with the peasants (CNC) and unionised labour (CTM))
COPARMEX  Confederation of Employers of the Mexican Republic. Conservative industrial association, who in 1973 formed CCE in response to Echeverria's populism (as manifested in government support for land seizures and industrial strike action). Remain (economically speaking) strongly anti-statist
CTM  Confederación Mexicana de Trabajadores – Confederation of Mexican Workers. Formed 1936. One of the three pillars of state corporatism (along with the peasants (CNC) and popular sector (CNOP)). Dominated
for 60 years by Fidel Velázquez – widely considered one of the most influential figures in modern Mexican politics – until his death in late 90s. Without question the most powerful 20th century Mexican labour organisation

**DC** Democratic Current. Founded by Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas on August 22, 1986. Internal PRI democratisation pressure group. Forerunner of the FND (National Democratic Front)

**DF** Federal District

**ECLA** Economic Commission for Latin America. UN body that expounded the policy of ISI influential in Mexico pre 1980s

**EZLN** Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional – Zapatista Army of National Liberation

**FDN** National Democratic Front. Also referred to as FND. Electoral coalition formed to support Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas’ 1988 bid for the presidency, whilst allowing various parties to maintain their own identities. Outgrowth of the PRI’s DC (Democratic Tendency). The FDN was institutionalised in the form of the PRD following defeat at the 1988 election

**FIL** Foreign Investment Law. 1973 legislation instituted (in concert with LFI) to restrict foreign investment. Intimately linked to the populist and anti-imperialist stance that characterised the Echeverría sexenio, though also paralleled international developments

**FLN** Front for National Liberation. Maoist guerrilla group emerging from 1968 unrest. Marcos claims to originate from this group. Also known as FALN (Armed Forces of National Liberation)

**FZLN** Frente Zapatista de Liberación Nacional – Zapatista National Liberation Front. Also known as Frente. Formed and described by the EZLN as a peaceful political movement outside the conventional political system. Formed 1996, January 1. Has been marginalised by the pro-democracy struggle

**GDP** gross domestic product

**GNP** gross national product

**Icap** Institute for Political Training. PRI

**IEPES** Institute of Political, Economic and Social Studies. PRI think-tank. During Echeverría’s sexenio produced ‘global’ economic plans, and became incubator (along with the SPP) of new technocratic elite. Half of the de la Madrid and Salinas cabinets had spent time in the IEPES

**IFIs** International Financial Institutions

**ISI** Import substitution industrialisation. Dominated modern Mexican economic policy until the 1982 crisis. Associated with populist state led development in general, and the structuralists and underconsumption schools of economic development in particular

**LFOPPE** Federal Law of Political Organisations and Elections
LFI  *Limits to Foreign Investment.* Legislation passed in 1973 (in concert with FIL). Intimately linked to the populist and anti-imperialist stance that characterised the Echeverría sexenio (though also paralleled international developments)

NAFTA  *North American Free Trade Agreement*

Nafinsa  *National Development Bank*

NDPs  *National Development Plans*

NGOs  *Gubernamentales – Nongovernmental organisations*

NICs  *Newly Industrialising Countries*

NIT  *(Nacional de Industrias de Transformación)* 1930s institute. Home to the underconsumption school influential during Cardenismo (1934-1940)

OAS  *Organisation of American States*

OECD  *Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.* In 1993 bestowed upon Mexico the title of full member – the first developing country welcomed into the First World club (Rochlin, 25)

PAN  *Partido Acción Nacional - National Action Party.* Right leaning party formed 1939 in opposition to Cardenismo. Gradual increase in influence and significance, becoming the party of choice for private business. Currently forms the government of Mexico following historic unseating of the PRI in the 2000 elections, under leadership of ex Coca Cola executive Vicente Fox

PARM  *Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution.* Formed 1954 by disillusioned revolutionary generals who had left the PRI following the rise of new professional elites. Revolutionary nationalist ideology, in the centre of the Mexican political spectrum. Cárdenas launched his 1988 bid for the presidency after persuading the PARM leadership to allow him to run on its ballot line

Pemex  *Petróleos Mexicanos.* State oil company

PFCRN  *Cardenist Front of National Reconstruction Party.* See PST


PIRE  *Immediate Program for Economic Reorganisation.* Plan implemented immediately by Miguel de la Madrid administration (1982-1988), focusing on monetary control and austerity


PNR  *Partido Nacional Revolucionario – National Revolutionary Party.* Former name of the PRI, 1929-1938

PPS  *People's Socialist Party.* Formerly led by influential Marxist Lombardo Toledano, who started in the CGOCM. In 1980s was one of the puppet Left parties (together with PST) controlled by the PRI
PRD  Partido Revolución Democrática – Party of the Democratic Revolution. Left leaning party formed in aftermath of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas’ failed presidential campaign


PRM  Partido de la Revolución Mexicana – Party of the Mexican Revolution. Successor to PNR and forerunner of the PRI. Founded under direction of Lázaro Cárdenas, and instituted the corporate structure and bureaucratisation of the state-party (1938-1946)

PRONASOL National Solidarity Program. Launched by Salinas, ostensibly to promote social justice. Amounted (at most) to 1% of GDP, with that devoted to improving the opportunities of the most disadvantaged (Solidaridad) representing only 3% of this

SD  Stabilising Development – Desarrollo Estabilizador. Dominated Mexican economic policy from the early 1940s to the 1970s. Closely associated with ISI. Focused on providing a stable political environment and exchange rate, and the cultivation of a favourable fiscal climate. Generally characterised by a pull away from the radical redistribution policies of the Cárdenas sexenio (1934-1940), and a stress on urban industrialisation over agrarian development

Sepafin  Ministry of National Patrimony and Industrial Development

SHCP  Ministry of the Treasury

SPP  Ministry of Programming and Budget. Created in 1976, and initially headed by social democrat Carlos Tello. Taken over by Miguel de la Madrid in 1979, who brought on board Carlos Salinas de Gortari to create National Planning System (intended to produce plans for economic and social development). Hotbed (along with IEPES) of the monetarists and tecnócratas who rose to ascendancy in the 1980s and 1990s

TNCs  transnational corporations

UNAM  National Autonomous University of Mexico. Pre-1970s training ground for elites, superseded by Ivy League universities. Site of major, broadly anti neoliberal strikes (particularly as they impacted the state education system) in 1999, led by loose network leadership of CGH (General Strike Council)

US  United States

WEF  World Economic Forum

WTO  World Trade Organisation
INTRODUCTION

The conquest of the earth, which mostly means the taking it away from those who have a slightly different complexion or slightly flatter noses than ourselves, is not a pretty thing when you look into it too much. What redeems it is the idea only. An idea at the back of it; not a sentimental pretence but an idea; and an unselfish belief in the idea – something you can set up, and bow down before, and offer a sacrifice to...

– Joseph Conrad

Can I just clarify that what to me is problematic about the understanding of the 'fundamentalist' position in the Rushdie case is that it is represented as archaic, almost medieval. It may sound very strange to us, it may sound absolutely absurd to some people, but the point is that the demands over The Satanic Verses are being made now, out of a particular political state that is functioning very much in our time...

– Homi Bhabha

For this and other reasons which do not fit into the space of this text, it is necessary to make a new world. A world where many worlds fit, where all worlds fit...

– Subcomandante Marcos

We are in an era of globalization. Not that there is any firm consensus on what this means, beyond generalisations that globalization matters and there is a certain inevitability to its unfolding. Within the social sciences, the awareness that globalization matters has brought in its wake an increasing concern with issues of spatiality and, relatedly, mobility. That is, the sense that currently unfolding transformations have made the previously static notions of those spaces 'underlying' social processes increasingly

problematic. Within the International Relations literature, this concern is expressed most clearly by the gradual acceptance that the spatial assumptions embodied in the ‘territorial trap’ are inadequate. In a world in which supposedly ‘everything solid melts into air,’ there is an increasing sense that stable political arrangements rooted firmly in the state are dissolving, unravelling. At its most extreme, this vision suggests a world in which, as Manuel Castells has put it, a ‘space of flows’ is replacing a ‘space of places.’ In this imagery, space simply does not matter. It would seem that space has simply ceased to exist: space has ‘collapsed,’ boundaries and borders come tumbling down, and there is increasing freedom of movement for capital, for people and for ideas. Or put more suggestively, space simply is not matter: it is rather some medium made increasingly irrelevant by networks of wires and money. As this celebratory vision is generalised and proliferated, movement is considered increasingly unfettered as time and space are subjected to “time-space compression.” Most significantly, capital itself is viewed as increasingly freed from the constraints of space, enacting an acceleration of the process Marx once figured as the “annihilation of space by time.” Within this image, one form of space particularly subject to collapse is state space. It is being superseded, left behind — its territory, its culture, its politics and economics unravelling before our eyes. The nation-state, it would seem, is globalization’s scalp.

4 Agnew, John (1994) ‘The territorial trap: The geographic assumptions of international relations theory.’ Review of International Political Economy, 1:1, pp. 53-80. The ‘territorial trap’ consists of three interrelated assumptions. Firstly, it is assumed that states exercise exclusive power within their territory, as expressed in the principle of sovereignty; secondly, that the domestic and the foreign may be securely demarcated; and thirdly, that society and culture are ‘bounded’ by state borders


6 Harvey, David (1989a) The condition of postmodernity (Oxford: Blackwell)

INTRODUCTION

In fact, this 'collapse of space' is simply represented by those classes it serves best, particularly those managerial elites who govern and play markets, and those Western (and Westernised) social groups with the material resources to take full advantage. Obscured by this image is the profound unevenness of these processes, and indeed, the profound necessity of unevenness for unfolding transformations. If there is one thing that is clear in the contemporary era it is that inequality has accelerated, and that this inequality is geographically defined. What is also clear is that globalization – defined most simply as the expansion and circulation of capital at a world scale – uses this unevenness. Unevenness facilitates the mobility of capital, not least because it always has somewhere new to go, some new opportunity. Capital uses and stimulates unevenness because one place over another is at any one time more attractive – each place has more or less distinct qualities that set it apart from others and that either repel or attract capital. A world of vaporous chaos would be useless to capital, and in this sense globalization depends on the continual reproduction of spatial unevenness. It depends, that is, on the continual reproduction of spatial fixity and difference at the same time as spatial mobility and flow.

The central concern of this thesis is to engage with the writings of Henri Lefebvre and put them to work with a concrete situation – namely, the production of Mexican space. The aim of this exercise is to develop a theoretical perspective on the possibilities of progressive political practice in an era of what is commonly known as globalization. Put more concretely, what clues does a Lefebvrian perspective provide as to the efficacy of resistance in a world where we are relentlessly informed that there is 'no alternative' to globalization? This thesis turns on the assertion that the nation-state is central to currently unfolding transformations, and that a transformative politics that ignores, or rather, fails to exploit this situation, is impoverished.

Lefebvre has been largely ignored in the Anglo-American International Relations literature. One reason is that Lefebvre is primarily a Marxist, and such analysis has until relatively recently been unfashionable within a discipline whose view of political economy is structured by the neo-neo debate. A second reason is that Lefebvre’s most
important work – The production of space – was only translated into English in 1991, whilst many other central other works remain untranslated. This suggests that Lefebvre’s impact has only begun to filter into the consciousness of International Relations scholars, with his work not yet subject to wide debate. Perhaps the most important reason for Lefebvre’s marginalisation, however, is that it was only with the end of the Cold War and the acceleration of globalization that theorists of International Relations have begun to seriously engage with the inherent spatiality of their discipline.

The central exception to Lefebvre’s marginalisation is Neil Brenner’s ‘Global, fragmented, hierarchical: Henri Lefebvre’s geographies of globalization.’ Brenner is primarily a geographer rather than an International Relations theorist, though one of the few to seriously consider the possible implications of Lefebvre’s understanding of the relationship between the state and globalization. This thesis is indebted to Brenner’s extremely clear exposition of Lefebvre’s theorisation of this relationship. However, this thesis also seeks to extend Brenner’s analysis in three main ways: first, by applying Lefebvre’s understanding of globalization to a concrete situation, namely the production of Mexican space; second, by demonstrating that the production of reductive narratives pertaining to the ‘nation’ are an integral aspect of securing a ‘spatial fix’ for capital, and the natural outcome of Lefebvre’s insistence on globalization’s ‘decorporealization’ of social space; and third, through demonstration of Lefebvre’s contention that the production of space does not and cannot take place without resistance, and that the intensified globalization of social relations provides specific opportunities and limitations for progressive political practice.

Lefebvre’s theorisation of the relationship between globalization and the state constitutes an important contribution to consideration of the spatiality of the International Relations discipline. This is primarily because Lefebvre’s analysis resides in a productive state of tension between the assumptions of the ‘territorial trap’ and reactive inversion of a ‘space of flows.’ There are obviously manifold understandings of

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globalization — attesting to its status as a much cited but vaguely understood concept — yet Henri Lefebvre provides a perspective that offers many signposts in the recovery of space in the wake of its (supposed) annihilation. Within this theoretical perspective, the role of the nation-state continues to be of crucial importance. Globalization for Lefebvre is not some recent, unique, or unprecedented development. Lefebvre insists that the extension of capitalist accumulation to a planetary level is immanent within the logic of accumulation as a totalising dynamic. ‘The global’ in this sense is both a ‘thing’ (a planetary wide scale) and a ‘tendency’ or ‘process’ (a logic of extension immanent within the circulation of commodities). Importantly, other scales within this global ‘whole’ such as transnational trading and political blocs, regions or institutions (supra-state scales), states themselves, and local regions or sites including the human subject (sub-state scales), are not conceived as independent or ‘outside’ the global, or indeed, any other scale. Rather, they are encompassed within this global whole, central to its overall meaning and organisation. ‘The state’ is a relatively stable spatial configuration that functions as a ‘geographical scaffolding of scales’ organised so as establish a contingent fixing of relations. With the latest round of globalization, this continues to be the case. However, what has changed is the specific relation between the state and the other scales that make up this ‘geographical scaffolding.’

In this formulation, it is recognised that capital must become grounded in place. This implies purposeful action to construct particular places in way that are attractive to capital, so that capital sites in this place rather than elsewhere. For capital to be free, it must also be fixed in place. In this context, stability of image becomes everything. When capital is seen to have no need for any particular place, then elites do what they can to present their place as so attractive that capital will want to locate there. If there has been a collapse of space, then there has also simultaneously been a reinvestment in place — a reinvestment of fixed capital and of imagery. Suggested here is the production of certain kinds of spaces through territorial restructuring, and a ‘politics of representation’ that re-imagines the complex realities of actual places. In particular, because stability is so valued for capital investment, images of place are produced in which contradictions, social struggles and contestations are flattened and aestheticised. Central to Lefebvre’s
understanding, then, is the assertion that globalization is predicated on the constant production and reproduction of certain kinds of space by the purposeful action of political elites. As Neil Smith has put the matter, the supposedly placeless "spaces of flows" are always paralleled by a "deepening spatial fixity" linked to strategic sites around the globe.  

Contestation within diverse relations of power is a key concept here, for both globalization and reconstruction of the meaning of places (such as the nation-state) are happening in a world that is already subject to pervasive unevenness because of previous waves of capitalist accumulation strategy. Importantly, Lefebvre insists that the relations which construct uneven development compose the set of forces within which spatial meanings are produced, and it is only in this context that they can be evaluated. Places – their character and the differences between them – continue to matter. They matter because capital exploits the fact of uneven development between places and they matter because of human subjects sense of belonging, identification and ultimate dependence upon concretely experienced space. This is an argument then, not about the erasure of place by the onset of globalization, but rather the tension between and mutual construction of the local and the global, and the way this is structured and mediated by the purposeful actions of actors embedded within the nation-state.

This is precisely where the rhetoric of globalization as a 'space of flows' is so powerful. By effectively masking the degree to which capital must be located, appeals to an abstract global allow elites to argue that there is 'no alternative' to accommodation with capital and thus proceed with the restructuring and reimaging of nation-state space largely unopposed. Implied here is the understanding that globalization is an ideology. That is, it depends on the elevation of certain forms of knowledge above others, and the elevation of some social classes over others insofar as their construction of legitimate knowledge becomes hegemonic and delegitimises others. The supposed 'inevitability' of

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9 Smith, Neil (1996) 'Spaces of vulnerability: The space of flows and the politics of scale.' Critique of Anthropology, 16:1, p. 69 [pp. 63-77]
globalization is thus dependent upon a whole range of assumptions that are rarely questioned precisely because they have come to appear such 'common-sense.'

Lefebvre figures the development of particular forms of knowledge as central to the operation of capitalism and its ever more pervasive expansion both outwards to a planetary level, and inwards, to ever more intimate areas of human relations. He terms these 'representations of space,' by which he means space as it is conceived in expert knowledge on space, at the level of the discursive, the numerical, and the disembodied mental. Representations of space generate specific forms of knowledge connected to formal and institutional apparatuses of power. Such forms of knowledge are technical and instrumentally rational, and for Lefebvre represent the increasing hegemony of a 'logic of visualisation' that serves to represent space as seemingly unproblematic, 'natural' and 'transparent.' Lefebvre argues that, with the development of capitalism, such forms of knowledge have increasingly supplanted other forms of knowledge connected to the human uses of space, that is, space as it is lived and experienced (spaces of representation). This means that space becomes increasingly 'decorporealized' or 'emptied out' of social relations. In the process, social relations become 'reterritorialised' by the commodity form and valued solely to the extent that they facilitate further capital accumulation.

Following from this, a central premise of chapter two is that judgements upon the 'modernity' and 'development' of the nation-state vis-à-vis the global economy are bound up with the acceptance and implementation of forms of rational economic knowledge well described by Henri Lefebvre's understanding of 'representations of space' and the 'decorporealization' of social relations. In the case of Mexico, as chapter two demonstrates, this is clearly evidenced by the rise of the tecnócratas (technocrats) to political ascendancy following the 1982 debt crisis. The tecnócratas are best regarded as an elite who regarded Mexican space through the lens of neoliberal economic rationality, not least because the majority of this group received their economics training in the
American Ivy League. In this sense, these elites were relatively disengaged\(^\text{10}\) from the historic commitments manifested in the traditions of the Mexican Revolution — traditions that were populist, anti-imperialist, and fiercely nationalist. Diagnosing Mexico’s problems as solely financial, the new elite sought to impose the discipline of the global economy and thus promote a ‘new realism’ that dispensed with ‘outdated’ concepts such as redistribution, nationally oriented development, and hostility to outside influence. The purpose of these elites was to establish Mexico as a ‘modern,’ ‘First-world’ nation, which by definition included embrace of the economic orthodoxy propagated by international institutions.

This suggests that globalization is the latest and perhaps most powerful of those modernist understandings of the world concerned with ‘development’ and ‘progress.’ Countries, regions, and specific social classes of people are considered either less or more ‘advanced,’ precisely to the extent that they are exposed to and subsequently embrace globalization and the forms of spatial knowledge and praxis there embodied. Implied here is an extremely reductive conception of time and space, and of the relationship between them. Most significant is the tendency to convene space in temporal terms. The use of terms such as ‘advanced’ and ‘backward,’ ‘developed’ and ‘developing,’ imply the effective imagining of spatial differences (differences between places, countries, peoples etc.) as arranged into historical sequence. Such a move implies that places are not genuinely different but simply ‘behind’ or ‘advanced’ within the same overarching narrative. Those places ‘less globalized’ are not therefore considered different places with their own story to tell and their own specific historical trajectory. Rather, they are rendered simply as slow and relatively ‘backward’ versions of the ‘most globalized.’ Such a narrative relies not only on a reductive understanding of the spatial, but also on an extremely narrow conception of time. It is historical in the sense that it implies change

\(^{10}\) Nevertheless, the tendency to the abstraction or ‘decorporealization’ of space is a messy and frequently contradictory process, as emphasised in chapter two. This is because global processes must, by necessity, work through the ‘particularisms’ that define a place, including its political traditions, institutions and histories. Elites that seek to impose the logic of the global economy upon a place are themselves embedded in this place, and must therefore reconcile their commitment to an abstract economic dogma with those tendencies in their political culture that run counter to this commitment.
INTRODUCTION

and movement. Yet, it is also a story in which time is uni-directional and the future already given.

A central premise of chapter three is thus that claims to modernity vis-à-vis integration into the global economy have as their necessary correlate the production of a thematics of inside and outside, of inclusion in and exclusion from, a positively valued modernity. The implication here is that only certain kinds of citizens count when it comes to politics. Political centrality is a core Lefebvrian concept and is intimately tied up with his theorisation of presence and absence. Lefebvre insists that with the increasing abstraction of space occasioned by the spread of capitalist market relations, 'presence' as an agent with a 'right to politics' is defined primarily by exclusion, that is, by whom is first relegated to 'absence.' This process rests on the identification of some other as lacking the necessary qualities for inclusion, and their subsequent 'peripheralisation' from political centrality. Lefebvre's point here is that the establishment of a 'modern' sense of self fundamentally depends on disassociation from and negation of some other marked by an absence of the modern. This issue is examined particularly in chapter three. Here, the construction of stereotypical categories pertaining to the 'backwardness' of the peasant indigenous subjects and the 'static' rural spaces they inhabit, is shown to be fundamental to the construction of a spectacle of Mexican modernity and the restriction of the 'right to politics' to an ever narrower and more specialised social class. It is suggested that this implies that the political transformation of the world economy occasioned by globalization relies on the curtailment of transnational political possibilities insofar as they do not contribute to the accumulation of capital. In other words, globalization remains fundamentally dependent on both the confinement of political and social relationships to the space of national social formations and on the capacity of states to structure political participation.

This centrality of the nation-state in the orderly unfolding of globalization, suggests in turn that contestations orientated to the disruption of subordinating relationships ignore the nation-state at their peril. A central premise of chapter four, then, is that political action is not exhausted by state actions, and that the possibilities for effective resistance
have been reduced by an overestimation of the efficacy of elite mappings of space. This thesis argues that it is necessary to combine a focus on the visualisation of space by elite projections, with enquiry into the uses to which spaces are put by consumers, often in ways quite contrary to the projections of power. Because cultural formulations of 'the nation' assume such central importance to the deepening and unfolding of economic globalization, the disruption of such narratives presents itself as a precarious space of opportunity for the empowerment of non-hegemonic actors. In other words, because power is increasingly bound by its visibility, struggles must themselves be orientated to achieving visibility, so disrupting the state's ability to monopolise representation of 'the nation' as a 'selling point' for capital. Central to this endeavour are strategies oriented to disrupting the thematics of modernity/backwardness, inclusion/exclusion, presence/absence that characterise the abstract production of globalized nation-state space and the restrictive capacity of power.

The structure of the text is in four parts. The first chapter develops the Lefebvrian perspective used in the thesis. The second chapter applies this perspective to the Mexican transition from the broadly Fordist-Keynesian Mexican statism of the pre-1982 period, to increasing accommodation with neoliberal principles. Stressed here is the restructuring of state space to generate new forms of territorial fixity (as opposed to 'collapse') and the advance of forms of knowledge orientated towards the abstraction of space. The third chapter addresses the way that Mexican national culture was reimagined in order to reconcile the self-image of a country defined by revolutionary nationalism, with government policies that increasingly seemed to contradict this self-image. Fuelled by the production of a spectacle of a 'modern' and 'progressive' Mexicanness, the ultimate effect was the increasing removal from political centrality of large sectors of the population, and the presentation to international capital and the 'international family of nations' of a conflict free space welcoming investment and united behind reform. The fourth chapter examines the emergence of the Zapatista movement in 1994. Emphasised in this chapter is the way that this movement conducted a strategy orientated to the interruption of the spectacularisation of 'the nation.' In so doing, hegemonic conceptions of Mexican modernity and 'the global' were opened up for widespread political debate,
so rendering the 'spectator' state's capacity for integration into the global economy problematic.

The thesis restricts its attention primarily to the period of neoliberal hegemony (1982-1994) and the initial stage of the Zapatista revolt (roughly until the end of 1994). However, a significant part of chapter two offers a discussion of the 'statist' period of economic policy (1934-1982) in order to contextualise the emergence of Mexican neoliberalism, while chapter three includes discussion of the historical construction of the peasant indigenous in national culture. These discussions are necessary to maintain sensitivity to the historical specificity of the Mexican case. Mexico is used as a case study for three reasons that closely mirror the three case-study chapters. Firstly, because it presents a clear example of restructuring from a national economy with centralised state control to the 'self expanding globally while self-fragmenting' state form Lefebvre identifies as emergent with globalization. In the period 1982-1994 Mexico also had a widely recognised political class - the tecnócratas - leading this restructuring. Significantly, this group exhibited a demonstrable embrace of the forms of knowledge Lefebvre argues as necessary to both legitimate and facilitate this process. Secondly, one of the most noticeable dimensions of technocratic hegemony in the production of Mexican space was the investment in a politics of representation that sought to define and visualise a distinct image of national space. This cultural dimension of economic restructuring was explicitly exclusionary of specific social classes, and highlights Lefebvre's contention that globalization entails the reduction of political centrality to an ever narrower and specialised political class through the production of narratives relating to 'modernity' and 'backwardness.' Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, beginning in 1994 Mexico was the site of sustained resistance to these processes with the emergence of the Zapatistas. While Zapatismo is a complex movement encompassing contradictory tendencies and open to multiple interpretations, this thesis argues that aspects of its discourse and practice may fruitfully be interpreted as demonstrating keen awareness of Lefebvre's insistence of the centrality of nation-state to globalization, and the potential this insight holds for informing transformative political practice.
INTRODUCTION

The thesis thus addresses three central questions. First, what does a Lefebvrian perspective tell us about the social space of Mexican territoriality, with the economic restructuring associated with globalization? Second, what does Lefebvrian analysis suggest about the consequences for the Mexican national imaginary during globalization? Third, what do the answers to the previous two questions imply for a transformative politics?

Finally, a note on sources. The sources used for this thesis are a mix of primary (government speeches and policy documents, popular media articles and advertisements, email lists and web postings) and secondary (books and journal articles). The World Wide Web has proved useful in gaining access to primary sources, especially since many important Mexican government sources (Presidential speeches etc.) are translated and gathered together in academic resource sites. In addition, the reality of Zapatismo as a meditated event in which the web has proved central in organising solidarity raises the web above the level of a simple resource, to an important dimension of that which is to be studied. Email lists have proved crucial in keeping abreast of unfolding developments, and providing access to a range of viewpoints both wider and deeper than available in the ‘mainstream press.’ A field trip was carried out in the summer of 1999, and included interviews with activists, anthropologists and journalists involved in the Zapatista movement, and a spell as a human rights observer in a Zapatista affiliated community. This field trip has proven fundamentally important for the thesis, though not because it provided explicit material such as quotes, results of surveys etc. In fact, this thesis has ended up using little of the extensive field diary compiled during the duration of the stay in Mexico. The field trip was important in a different way, disabusing of notions that I now recognise as hopelessly romantic, and forcing recognition of my privileged situatedness as a member of that class with greater access to ‘centrality’ than those observed. Certainly, without such recognition, this would be a very different and inferior thesis.
HENRI LEFEBVRE
THE TERRAIN OF PROGRESSIVE POLITICAL PRACTICE

Marx said, 'Transform the world'; Rimbaud said, 'Change life'; these two moments are for us one and the same

— Andre Breton

As for the frequently heard suggestion that a choice must be made between 'reductionism' and 'globalism,' between restricted and total action, this is the perfect example of a false problem

— Henri Lefebvre


CHAPTER ONE - HENRI LEFEBVRE

Introduction

Henri Lefebvre died in 1991. Throughout a long career that began in the 1920s and produced more than 60 books and several hundred articles, Lefebvre stands as an eclectic and innovative thinker who greatly expanded the Marxist tradition. The purpose of this chapter is not to chart Lefebvre’s career or address the full breadth of his writings. Obviously, such a task is hopelessly beyond the scope of a single chapter. It is also outside the remit of this thesis. Rather, this chapter is concerned with outlining the contribution Henri Lefebvre can make to thinking through the possibilities of progressive political practice in a globalized world. Implied here, obviously, is first an understanding of what a globalized world entails according to Lefebvre. Following from this, is an understanding of what a ‘progressive’ political practice might look like in such a world.

To address these very complex questions, it is necessary to draw out key themes from Lefebvre’s work. As a starting point, it is helpful that Lefebvre himself identifies three interlinked themes that run throughout his entire corpus. First, Lefebvre characterises himself primarily as a Marxist. However, Lefebvre’s exploration of a wide variety of issues is marked by the ‘cross-fertilisation’ of Marx with an eclectic array of thinkers. Lefebvre believes that these other thinkers offer important insights into the prospect of a

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4 Rob Shields provides a wide ranging and highly recommended introduction to Lefebvre’s oeuvre. See: Shields, Rob (1999) *Lefebvre, love and struggle: Spatial dialectics* (London and New York: Routledge)
progressive politics in a rapidly changing world. As Lefebvre put it: “Marxism should be treated as one moment in the development of theory, and not, dogmatically, as a definitive theory.” In this respect, Lefebvre may be considered as a precursor to a contemporary ‘post-Marxism,’ where Marxism appears in “all its fullness but also with all its limitations.”

Second, the ‘everyday’ is a concept that Lefebvre considers his major contribution to Marxism. This concern for the politics of ‘everyday life’ is most explicitly engaged in the three volume series Critique of everyday life (1947, 1968, 1981). Lefebvre’s central aim in this series is to argue the centrality of culture and subjectivity for the reproduction of capitalist hegemony, and thus the importance of changing everyday life as an integral aspect of any genuinely progressive political practice. For Lefebvre, changing the banal, repetitive, and alienating conditions of typical everyday existence in capitalist societies is not a by-product of a successful revolutionary upheaval – it is the revolution itself.

The third theme Lefebvre identifies as central to his concerns is the problematic of space. This theme is squarely addressed in The survival of capitalism (1973), the four volume series The state (1976, 1976, 1977, 1978), and most directly and systematically in

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5 Lefebvre’s dalliances were numerous. Indeed, it often appears that there is not a major intellectual figure in post-war France with whom Lefebvre did not have productive association. In this sense, Lefebvre is a synthesiser par excellence. This is not the place to paint out this promiscuity in detail. It suffices to present a short list of Lefebvre’s major influences as indicative of the breadth of his engagement. Most important to Lefebvre are, in no particular order: the Surrealists (spontaneity and everyday life); Nietzsche (The ‘Total Man,’ the eternal return, and the celebration of life [Anti-logos] over systematising thought [logos]); Lacan (the psychology of experience and its spatialisation); Heidegger (technology); the Situationists (the ‘urban’ and the creation of revolutionary ‘situations’); Einstein (the relativity of spacetime); and Bachelard (the qualitative aspect of time)


CHAPTER ONE - HENRI LEBEVRE

The production of space (1974). A central Lefebvrian tenet is that historical change in capitalism’s operation necessitates theoretical innovation rather than Marxist dogmatism. ‘How has capitalism endured?’ he rhetorically asks in The survival of capitalism. The answer is given most fully in The production of space. Chapter one opens with the words: “Not so many years ago, the word ‘space’ had a strictly geometrical meaning: the idea it evoked was simply that of an empty area ... to speak of ‘social space’ ... would have sounded strange.”

A few pages later, Lefebvre introduces the major theme of his book: “Few people today would reject the idea that capital and capitalism ‘influence’ practical matters relating to space, from the construction of buildings to the distribution of investments and the worldwide division of labour.” In a capitalist society, Lefebvre insists, space becomes part of the mode of production and dominant relations tend to the production and reproduction of an ‘abstract’ space:

Capitalism and neo-capitalism have produced abstract space, which includes the ‘world of commodities,’ its ‘logic’ and its worldwide strategies, as well as the power of money and that of the political state. This space is founded on the vast network of banks, business centres and major productive entities, as also on motorways, airports and information lattices.

Capitalism, insists Lefebvre, has laid “its imprint upon the total occupation of all pre-existing space and upon the production of new space.” Consequently, “the problematic of space ... has displaced the problematic of industrialisation.” This leads Lefebvre to the conclusion that “the renewal of Marx’s concepts is best effected by taking full account of space.”

Lefebvre’s guiding principle is thus that space is an issue of

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11 Lefebvre, Henri (1991b) op. cit. p. 1

12 ibid. pp. 9-10

13 ibid. p. 53

14 ibid. Respectively: pp. 325-326, 343, 89
increasing political importance. Space, and with it the socio-spatiality of the everyday life of subjects, is deeply implicated in the capitalist mode of production and the reproduction of the relations of production. Thus, changing everyday life implies changing space and visa versa - a revolution is not truly revolutionary unless it creates a new space through which the everyday lives of actual human subjects can be lived more fully, more spontaneously and more joyously.\footnote{Thus, ‘revolution’ requires, “if it is to avoid hopeless banality, the reappropriation of the body in association with the reappropriation of space [as] a non-negotiable part of its agenda.” Ibid. pp. 166-167. Similarly: “Any ‘social existence’ aspiring or claiming to be ‘real,’ but failing to produce its own space, would be a strange entity, a very peculiar kind of abstraction unable to escape from the ideological or even the ‘cultural’ realm.” Ibid. p. 53} Within this project, Lefebvre pays particular attention to the body, as the simultaneous victim of the history of the present and locus of a new history of the future: “The body, at the heart of space and of the discourse of power, is irreducible and subversive. It is the body which is the point of return.”\footnote{Lefebvre, Henri (1976b) [1973] The survival of capitalism: Reproduction of the relations of production. Bryant, Fred (trans.) (London: Allison and Busby) p. 89} All this suggests, argues Rob Shields, that Lefebvre makes “alienation the central problem for progressive thought. His critique of everyday life and the human condition under capitalism provides the foundation for a non-statist Marxism that concretely addresses problems of human existence rather than focusing on abstract macro-economics.”\footnote{Shields, Rob (1999) op. cit. p. 17}

However, to argue that Lefebvre’s theory is ‘non-statist’ does not imply that the importance of the state has diminished under conditions of globalization. Central to Lefebvre’s understanding is the realisation that the state is integral to the unfolding of globalization. Put differently, within Lefebvre’s formulation globalization cannot be understood apart from the state’s role in actively producing relatively stable spatial configurations through which accelerated globalization has taken place. Central here is awareness that the state retains a pivotal role structuring political participation and cultural identity, and that visualisations of a specific national identity (even when expressed through ‘multiculturalism’) have achieved immense importance in a globalized world of ever-greater capital mobility. Ultimately, this leads Lefebvre to argue for the
necessity of a 'planetary' scale of analysis. In *The production of space*, Lefebvre proposes grounding for this analysis that ties all scales of place, region, nation, and globe into a broadened conception of social production. In order to pursue this goal whilst at the same time taking his ethico-politico commitments seriously, Lefebvre moves analysis from the old synchronic order of discourses 'on' space, to the analysis of the process whereby discourses 'of' space are socially produced. It is thus not a question of 'what is the understanding of space present here?' but rather, 'how and for what purpose is this discourse and its associated practices, operationalised?' For Lefebvre, philosophical understandings of space have political implications. This involves, above all, the bringing to light of a 'lived' spatialisation within the 'logico-epistemological' theories of space promulgated by planners, geographers, and philosophers. In so doing, Lefebvre launches a radical assault against the denial of individuals' and communities' 'right to space' under the abstract spatialisation embodied in capitalist technocratic structures.\(^{18}\)

This chapter explores the implications of these issues. The purpose of this discussion is to furnish a theoretical grounding for the discussion of the production of Mexican space in the following three chapters. The first section provides a brief discussion of Lefebvre's understanding of the fundamental relationship between spatiality and sociality. The second section outlines Lefebvre's understanding of the instrumental aspects of capitalist social space. The purpose here is to argue that Lefebvre's three 'moments' of social space combine to present a distinctive understanding of 'globalization.' The third section addresses Lefebvre's theorisation of the role and emergent territorial form of the state within globalization, specifically via its central role in the construction of a 'spatial fix' for capital. The fourth section focuses on the way that the construction of a 'spatial fix' subjects everyday life to the increasing abstraction

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18 Lefebvre may be considered a philosophical romantic in the sense that whereas Marx rages in favour of humanity in the name of reason, Lefebvre conjoins Marx with a more Nietzschean celebration of spontaneity, 'joy,' and 'life.' Andrew Merrifield provides an excellent discussion of the influence of Nietzsche's intellectual struggle for 'Anti-logos' on the writings of Lefebvre. Anti-logos is exemplified in the space of the body, of desire, in art, poetry, and play; what Nietzsche terms the *Dionysian* side of existence. By contrast, Logos may be characterised as rational and technocratic knowledge that Lefebvre argues — following Nietzsche — is intimately tied to the domination and systematisation of difference. See: Merrifield, Andrew (1995) 'Lefebvre, Anti-Logos and Nietzsche: An alternative reading of *The Production of Space.*' *Antipode,* 27, pp. 294-303
and ‘decorporealization’ of the space of subjects, whilst centralising politics both to
particular issues and an increasingly specialised political class. The fifth section
examines Lefebvre’s three-part dialectic within spatialisation, arguing that Lefebvre’s
distinctive understanding implies a problematisation of modernist narratives of continuity
and progress, and hence insights on the potentialities of resistance. The chapter
concludes with some comments on what these insights imply for transformative politics
in a globalized world.

1.1 Spatiality and sociality

Space, particularly for those occupying it, often appears neutral and unambiguous.
Characterised simply as a passive background or setting for the playing out of social
relations, it appears empty of both normative imposition and importantly, struggles over
the meaning and uses of space. Lefebvre describes space as “the epitome of rational
abstraction ... because it has already been occupied and used, and has already been the
focus of past processes whose traces are not always evident in the landscape.”¹⁹ In
Human territoriality, Robert Sack provides the following insight into the instrumental
function of territoriality. It is “the attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence,
or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over
a geographic area [territory].”²⁰ In this sense, the root of territoriality is its association
with power rather than with biological inheritance. Under capitalism this translates into
the ‘abstraction’ of space, involving:

... repeated and conscious use of territory as an instrument to define, contain, and
mold a fluid people and dynamic events [which in turn] leads to a sense of an
abstract emptiable space. It makes community seem to be artificial; it makes the
future appear geographically as a dynamic relationship between people and events

33 [pp. 30-37]
on the one hand and territorial molds on the other. And it makes space seem to be only contingently related to events.\textsuperscript{21}

Lefebvre argues that the 'production' of this abstract social space is carried out via two central processes, each 'doubled.' First, the abstract space of capitalist modernity is produced by the increased commodification of space (which imposes a geometric grid of property relations and markets) and an increased commodification through space (which installs economic grids of capital circulation through which abstract space inscribes labour and the commodity form). Second, this abstract space is produced by a heightened bureaucratisation of space (whereby each administrative system "maps out its own territory, stakes it out, and signposts it") and a heightened bureaucratisation through space (the installation of juridico-political grids through which social life is subject to systematic surveillance by the state).\textsuperscript{22} These processes reinforce each other to constitute abstract space as the site of exchange value, in which capital and the state drive towards the 'pulverization' of the qualitative realm of everyday life where use values are consumed:

Capitalist and neocapitalist space is a space of quantification and growing homogeneity, a merchandized space where all the elements are exchangeable and thus interchangeable; a police state in which the state tolerates no resistance and no obstacles. Economic space and political space thus converge towards the elimination of all differences.\textsuperscript{23}

However, it would be misleading to take from this an overwhelming sense of economic determinism. For Lefebvre, capitalist economics and its associated abstraction of space do not unilaterally determine space, though it certainly tends in this direction: "Abstract space is not homogenous; it simply has homogeneity as its goal, its orientation, its

\textsuperscript{21} ibid. p. 78
Lefebvre's objection resides primarily in the fact that to say a space is "emptiable," is to speak only abstractly. As Sack puts it, the abstract space of capitalism is only ever "conceptually empty": in reality, it is always already filled and occupied "on the ground."

It is in this context that Lefebvre criticises social theory for conceiving space as a static 'container' or 'platform' of social relations. For Lefebvre, such an understanding is intimately bound up with the development of capitalist social relations and a central precondition of their 'naturalness,' 'self-evidence,' and continued dissemination. In order to combat this rendering of space as a passive 'theatre' for the historical unfolding of (capitalist) sociality, Lefebvre advances his thesis of the production of space.

This is a very complex and multifaceted intervention, with many potential openings. However, as a starting point it is helpful to consider the production of space thesis as a spatialised rendition of Marx's concept of the fetishism of commodities. Marx recognised that commodities as material 'things,' are the crystallisation of a labour process encompassing a specific set of social relations. That is, while a commodity may appear to be a static object, it is in fact a contingent 'fix' or 'moment' in the circulation and flow of capital and its attendant social processes: commodities are processes that appear in the form of material things. However, Marx argues that the 'thing' aspect of materiality tends to obscure the operation of those social relations implicated in the process of production. Marx terms this tendency toward obscuration the 'fetishism of commodities.' To the extent that this duality - that the material world is simultaneously...

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24 Lefebvre, Henri (1991b) op. cit. p. 287. Original emphasis. Similarly, while Lefebvre's 'long history of space' is parallel to a succession of modes of production, Lefebvre insists that one can and should not be collapsed directly into the other: "Each mode of production has its own space; but the characteristics of space do not amount to the general characteristics of the mode of production .... The reduction of the aesthetic, of the social and the mental to the economic was a disastrous error." Lefebvre, Henri (1978) De l'État, IV: Les contradictions de l'état moderne (Paris: UGE) p. 292. Cited in: Gregory, Derek (1994) op. cit. p. 382. Lefebvre is acutely conscious of the dangers of collapsing dominant forms of space directly into modes of production: "Nor do the growth of the forces of production give rise in any direct casual fashion to a particular space or a particular time." Lefebvre, Henri (1991b) op. cit. p. 77


26 The following characterisation draws on: Marx, Karl (1983) [1887] Capital: The process of production of capital, Book 1, Moore, Samuel and Aveling, Edward (trans.) (London: Lawrence and Wishart) pp. 76-87
both a thing and a process — is neglected, and we comprehend materiality merely as a naturalised and given ‘thing,’ then it becomes impossible to apprehend the underlying social processes, relations and struggles in the “hidden abode of production.”

The term ‘production of space’ may thus be read as a thesis intimating that space is at one at the same time a produced ‘thing,’ and the process whereby ‘things’ are produced. The ‘production of space’ is the totality of the ‘thing’ and ‘flow’ qualities of capitalist materialist geographical landscape. From this point of view, space is at the same time both a thing or achievement (a noun: ‘space’), and a process and ongoing practice (a verb: ‘to space’): “Thus production process and product present themselves as two inseparable aspects, not as two separable ideas.” While it may initially appear strange to talk of producing space, for Lefebvre this is largely because of the continued hegemony of a common-sense understanding rooted in Cartesian/Newtonian conceptions of reality. As Lefebvre puts it: “producing space sounds bizarre, so great is the sway still held by the idea that empty space is prior to whatever ends up filling it up.” In a passionate attack on Cartesian abstraction, Lefebvre argues in The production of space:

The ideologically dominant tendency divides space up into parts and parcels in accordance with the division of labour. It bases its image of the forces occupying space on the idea that space is a passive receptacle. Thus, instead of uncovering the social relationships (including class relationships) that are latent in spaces, instead of concentrating our attention on the production of space and the social relationships inherent to it — relationships which introduce specific contradictions into production, so echoing the contradiction between the private ownership of the means of production and the social character of productive forces — we fall into the trap of treating space as space ‘in itself,’ as space as such. We come to think in terms of spatiality, and so fetishise space in a way reminiscent of the old fetishism of commodities, where the trap lay in exchange, and the error was to consider ‘things’ in isolation, as ‘things in themselves’

27 ibid. p. 176
28 Lefebvre, Henri (1991b) op. cit. pp. 86-92
29 ibid. p. 37
30 ibid. p. 15
31 ibid. p. 90
Significant here is the understanding that material landscape as congealed capital is necessarily produced as an (apparent) thing in place, and only gains meaning as a result of everyday place-bound social practices. Lefebvre recognises that the production of space and place is a fundamentally political process or event; space internalises contradictory social forces in the process of its production, and social conflict is thereby inscribed in place. Such conflict arises from the tension between the social uses to which place is put, and the domination of place and space as a productive force through private ownership. This points to what Lefebvre insists is a fundamental contradiction within capitalist social space; between a drive for homogeneity and the formalisation of difference on the one hand, and its localised fragmentation on the other hand. Lefebvre characterises this feature as an irresolvable contradiction between abstract and concrete space:

Exchange with its circulatory systems and networks may occupy space worldwide, but consumption occurs only in this or that particular place ... Space thus understood is both abstract and concrete in character: abstract inasmuch as it has no existence save by virtue of the exchangeability of all its component parts, and concrete inasmuch as it is socially real and as such localized. This is a space, therefore, that is homogenous yet at the same time broken into fragments.

This implies two things. First, that abstract space as the domain of 'pure' exchange value must work through the identity of a place if it is to become 'concrete.' Second, this implies that interpretations of legitimate uses of space may be in contradiction with each other, lending ambivalence to spatial practice. While space is on one hand conceived 'from above' as embodying a particular meaning and proper use according to an abstract plan, space is made real as it is consumed by those human agents and social groups who are its users. Differences between users tend to tension and conflict concerning the uses of space: while some wish to treat space purely in terms of its abstract exchange value and produce concrete space in its image, others wish to live space according to culturally specific use value. As such, spaces embody the clash of social interests, where divergent interpretations enter into combat in an attempt to 'fix' the meaning of a space, and thus

\[32\] ibid. pp. 287

\[33\] ibid. pp. 341-342. Original emphasis. See also p. 355
seek to exclude uses informed by an alternative logic. This suggests practical competence, bound up with forms of knowledge invoked in the ongoing attempt to construct and maintain a particular sense of place. Importantly, this implies:

Socio-political contradictions are realised spatially. The contradictions of space thus makes the contradictions of social relations operative. In other words, spatial contradictions ‘express’ conflicts between socio-political interests and forces; it is only in space that such conflicts come effectively into play, and in so doing they become contradictions of space.

Contradictions draw on existing resources of space and produce new spatial configurations in the ongoing expression of social conflict. Space is thus not ‘outside’ social relations – space is continuously produced through the ongoing ‘working out’ of social contradiction, with this implying that social relations only take on a concrete form beyond the play of words when they transform a space, and become embodied in a space. That is, social relations possess an ‘ontological weight’ to the degree that they are spatial:

What exactly is the mode of existence of social relationships? Are they substantial? natural? or formally abstract? The study of space offers an answer according to which social relations of production have a social relation to the extent that they have a spatial existence; they project themselves onto a space, becoming inscribed there, and in the process producing the space itself. Failing this, these relations would remain in the realm of “pure” abstraction – that is to say, in the realm of representations and hence of ideology: the realm of verbalism, verbiage and empty words.

The message here is clear and unambiguous. Social relations become a part of our everyday social existence to the extent that they are spatially inscribed in the social production of space. Social relations on this reading are not coincidentally spatial; it is not the case that some social relations are spatial and others are not, or that social relation simply ‘takes place’ in space. “There is no unspatialized social reality,” as Soja
uncompromisingly puts it.36 This insight informs Lefebvre's clearest statement concerning the — if anything — increasing political importance of space:

Space is becoming the principal stake of goal-directed actions and struggles. It has of course always been the reservoir of resources, and the medium in which strategies are applied, but it has now become something more than the theatre, the disinterested stage or setting, of action. Space does not eliminate the other materials or resources that play a part in the socio-political arena, be they raw materials or the most finished of products, be they business or culture. Rather, it brings them all together and then in a strange sense substitutes itself for each factor separately by enveloping it. The result is a vast movement in terms of which space can no longer be thought upon as an 'essence,' as an object distinct from the point of view of (or as compared with) 'subjects,' as answering to a logic of its own. Nor can it be treated as a result or resultant, as an empirically verifiable effect of a past, a history, or a society. Is space indeed a medium? A milieu? An intermediary? It is doubtless all of these, but its role is less and less neutral, more and more active, both as an instrument and as a goal, as means and as end. Confining it to so narrow a category as that of 'medium' is consequently woefully inadequate37

1.2. The globalization of social space

Clearly, Lefebvre figures social space as an integral dimension of social relations under capitalism. Following from this, one of Lefebvre's main concerns is to understand how reformulations of social space have contributed to the persistence of capitalism. That is, the way mutations in historically specific configurations of 'abstract space' ensure that capitalism overcomes periodic crises, regrounds itself, and thus progressively deepens its domination of social relations. Within an overall scheme of spatiology,38 Lefebvre identifies three tightly intertwined aspects of capitalist social space. These are, respectively, the role of social space as a matrix of social action, as a socially produced second nature, and as a scaffolding of spatial scales. Neil Brenner has suggested that each of these 'moments' of social space furnishes a particular perspective on the nature of

37 Lefebvre, Henri (1991b) op. cit. pp. 410-411
38 ibid. pp. 404-405
globalization. This section will examine each in turn to unpack Lefebvre’s distinctive understanding of globalization.

Social space as a matrix of social action

As a matrix of social action, Lefebvre’s notion of the ‘production of space’ refers to the rationalisation of social relations according to a historically specific spatio-temporal dynamic of capital accumulation. It is within social space as a matrix of social action, that this dynamic unfolds:

(Social) space is not a thing among other things, nor a product among other products; rather, it subsumes things produced, and encompasses their interrelationships in their coexistence and simultaneity. ... Itself the outcome of past actions, social space is what permits fresh actions to occur, while suggesting others and prohibiting yet others.

The ‘production’ of capitalist social space thus operates according to a rationality, which “organizes a sequence of actions with a certain ‘objective’ (i.e. the object to be produced) in view. [This rationality] imposes a temporal and spatial order upon related operations whose results are coextensive.” The imposition of ‘order’ does not imply that the space of capitalism is ‘fixed’ and hence static. In fact, it is constantly reconfigured and transformed “less by invariable or constant factors, than by the incessant to-and-fro between temporality (succession, concatenation) and spatiality (simultaneity, synchronicity).” Accordingly, social space is not an empty container subject to ‘filling’ or ‘animation’ by social relations, but is itself an ensemble of social

39 This section (pp. 25-32) is essentially a restatement of Neil Brenner’s argument in pp. 140-145 of: Brenner, Neil (1997) ‘Global, fragmented, hierarchical: Henri Lefebvre’s geographies of globalization.’ Public Culture, 10:1, pp. 135-167. The argument of this section that Lefebvre’s understanding of social space presents a distinctive understanding of globalization is Brenner’s. Arguments pertaining to the unevenness of this process are mine, except where otherwise cited.

40 ‘Production’ cannot therefore be reduced to either an economistic (production as the capitalist labour process) or Hegelian idealist (production as a logical, atemporal abstraction) characterisation. See, respectively: Lefebvre, Henri (1991b) op. cit. pp. 68-73 and pp. 15-16

41 ibid. pp. 73

42 ibid. p. 71

43 ibid. p. 71
relations. Thus, the "space engendered is 'social' in the sense that it is not one thing among other things, but an ensemble of links, connections, networks and circuits."\(^{44}\)

From this perspective of social space as a matrix of social action, Brenner argues that a first dimension of Lefebvre's understanding of globalization is suggested. Globalization implies a tendency toward increased interdependence amongst dispersed social actors. Globalization is an increase, that is, in the density of those spatial networks and circuits through which social relations are intertwined and thus ensnared within the accelerated circulation of capital and expansion of commodity relations.\(^{45}\) This implies that as much as space conceived as 'friction of distance' is overcome by new technology (instantaneous communication for example), globalization also creates new spaces by binding the previously inaccessible or 'under-exploited' within new networks of exchange. At the same time, this general tendency toward increased spatial density of networks and circuits should not be mistaken for homogeneity. The flows of capital and commodities rarely simply produce homogeneity. Rather, these flows are increasingly marked by a radical geographical and social unevenness and fragmentation. Consider the following by David Birkett:

Jumbos have enabled Korean computer consultants to fly to Silicon Valley as if popping next door, and Singaporean entrepreneurs to reach Seattle in a day. The borders of the world's greatest ocean have been joined as never before ... But what about those they fly over, on their islands five miles below? How has the mighty 747 brought them greater communion with those whose shores are washed by the same water? It hasn't, of course. Air travel might enable businessmen to buzz across the ocean but the concurrent decline in shipping has only increased the isolation of many island communities ... Pitcairn, like many other Pacific islands, has never felt so far from its neighbours\(^{46}\)

As the previously inaccessible is opened up, other marginal areas are at the same time often delinked and made more inaccessible as older networks of exchange are


\(^{45}\) Brenner, Neil (1997) op. cit. p. 141

delegitimised. This points toward the unevenness of development; the way that some areas are simply bypassed and abandoned at the same time as others are bound ever more tightly within 'links, connections, networks and circuits.'

**Social space as 'second nature'**

The second aspect of social space is its role as a second nature of built environments and institutional infrastructures. Lefebvre’s key argument here is that the globalization of capital has entailed a radical transformation from the production of individual commodities in space (early competitive capitalism) to the production of space itself. In the Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels highlighted the way in which the drive to accumulation involves the erosion of spatial barriers to trade, markets, and resources at a global scale. In his later writings, Marx refined this theme, arguing that capitalists seek to annihilate space with time, reducing the time it takes to move materials, goods, people and investment across space:

> While capital must on the one side strive to tear down every spatial barrier to intercourse, i.e. to exchange and conquer the whole earth for its market, it strives on the other side to annihilate this space with time ... The more developed the capital ... the more does it strive simultaneously for an even greater extension of the market and for greater annihilation of space by time.

 Yet, as David Harvey has noted, the establishment of transportation and communication networks intended to reduce the ‘friction of distance’ tends to promote the concentration of capitalist development and urbanisation at key nodes in these networks:

Geographical expansion and geographical concentration are both to be regarded as the product of the same striving to create new opportunities for capital accumulation. In general, it appears that the imperative to accumulate produces a

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47 See: ibid. pp. 109-110, 228, 345, 348, 388, 409

concentration of production and of capital at the same time as it creates an expansion of the market for realization.\footnote{49}

It is in this context that Lefebvre represents industrialisation and urbanisation as a double movement in the course of which the second term in the couplet supplants the first. Lefebvre's account hinges on the emergence of two distinctive circuits of accumulation within capitalism. Marx was concerned with the first of these—the circuit of industrial capital—since he was living through nineteenth century industrial capitalism. As the configuration of capitalism changed, however, the outlines of other circuits became clearer. Lefebvre argues that a second circuit of "speculative capital," directed towards investment in the built environment, has assumed increasing importance as the twentieth century has progressed. This tendency is particularly manifest during crises:

As the proportion of global surplus value formed and realized in industry diminished, so the proportion formed and realized in speculation and in the construction of the built environment grows. The second circuit supplants the first. From being incidental, it becomes essential.\footnote{50}

This 'neo-capitalism' constitutes a 'second nature' of territorial infrastructures, spatial configurations and institutions through which capital is valorised and human subjects must increasingly live their lives.\footnote{51} It is in this context that social space is both a material process and force of production. This is so to the extent that social space simultaneously represents a network of exchange 'in' space, and a diffusive flow 'over' space (of commodities, communication, energy and resources). Consequently, social space is both a 'thing' (a particular 'fix' or 'moment' in the circulation process) and a process or flow. It is the apparently static material thing-form of the embodied process of capital...

\footnote{49} Harvey, David (1975) 'The geography of capitalist accumulation: A reconstruction of the Marxist theory.' \textit{Antipode}, 7, p. 12 [pp. 9-21]


\footnote{51} See: Lefebvre, Henri (1991b) \textit{op. cit.} pp. 38, 122-123, 412-413
circulation.\footnote{Marcus Doel puts this point well: “every ‘thing,’ ‘event,’ ‘moment,’ ‘system,’ ‘element,’ etc., is perpetually in process for the duration of its existence: nothing can endure without a life-giving flow from the ‘outside’ to sustain its turgidity.” Doel, Marcus (1999) Poststructuralist geographies: The diabolical art of spatial science (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press) p. 19} Capitalism’s dual nature as a circulatory process diffusive in space, and as a fixated ‘thing’ in place is, in accordance with a dialectical understanding, necessary for its functioning: (relative) fixity is necessary to permit flow, and flow is necessary to permit fixity. Capital fixity must take place somewhere, and thus place may be regarded as a specific ‘collapsing of possibilities’ that emerges from the congealing of the flow of capital into a socially apprehensible ‘moment’ in the dynamics of capitalist social space.\footnote{Implied here is the inextricably bound up relation between space and time. To the extent that time is conceived as ‘flow’ and space as a passive ‘thing,’ a Cartesian understanding represents space and time as separate dimensions and erects a reified barrier between them. However, once space and time are conceived in terms of a dialectical relational ontology, it becomes impossible to effectively distinguish them beyond the level of abstract conceptualisation. Space and time do not and cannot exist ‘in themselves,’ but rather must be thought of as two integral components in the functioning of a unity, both of which take on meaning only in their relation with the other, and in relation to ‘the whole.’ ‘Space’ is simultaneously both a ‘thing’ and a flow or process. Lefebvre defines his project at one point, thus: “It is to be hoped that, at the conclusion of an analytical and critical study as the one here envisioned, the relationship between time and space would no longer be one of abstract separation coupled with an equally abstract confusion between two different yet closely connected terms.” Lefebvre, Henri (1991b) op. cit. p. 351}

This implies that the accelerated circulation and flow of bodies, capital, information and commodities through space is dependent on a relatively stable infrastructure of territorial configurations including, for example, built environments, urban-regional agglomerations, political-regulatory institutions and organisational structures. Thus, the ability to overcome space is predicated on the production of certain kinds of spaces that remain substantially territorialised.\footnote{David Harvey puts it thus: “the ability to overcome space is predicated on the production of space.” Harvey, David (1985) The urbanization of capital (Oxford: Blackwell) p. 149} These twin processes of spatial extension and agglomeration are argued by Neil Smith to be the necessary outcomes of capitalist production, consumption, and exchange:

Deindustrialization and regional decline ... the industrialization of the Third World and a new international division of labour, intensified nationalism ... these are not separate developments but symptoms of a much deeper transformation in the geography of capitalism ... uneven development is the hallmark of capitalism. It is not just that capitalism fails to develop evenly, that due to accidental and random
factors the geographical development of capitalism represents some stochastic deviation from a generally even process. The uneven development of capitalism is structural rather than statistical ... uneven development is the systematic geographical expression of the contradictions inherent in the very constitution and structure of capital.\footnote{Smith, Neil (1984) Uneven development: Nature, capital and the production of space (Oxford: Blackwell) p. xi}

However, whilst this process has intensified since the unravelling of the Fordist-Keynesian configuration in the 1970s and again with the end of the Cold War, Lefebvre figures this second nature as attaining central importance as a geographical precondition for the worldwide circulation of capital since at least the late nineteenth century. From this point of view, globalization appears as a process through which forms of capitalist sociospatial organisation – capital, territorial states and urbanised built environments – have become increasingly superimposed and entangled within the global scale as the 20th century has progressed. As a ‘second nature’ then, social space suggests a second Lefebvrian interpretation of globalization as a contradictory dialectic in which spatial configurations are perpetually territorialised, deterritorialised and reterritorialised, in order to overcome recurrent crises and reduce the time taken for capital to gain its ‘spatial fix.’\footnote{Brenner, Neil (1997) op. cit. pp. 142-143}

Social space as ‘scaffolding of scales’

Brenner figures the third aspect of Lefebvre's understanding of social space as its role as a scaffolding of spatial scales (global, national, regional-urban), through which capitalism has been territorialised, deterritorialised, and reterritorialised throughout its history.\footnote{ibid. p. 143}

The concept of the global is already inherent to capital. Because spatial practices orientated to capital accumulation have today enframed the whole earth, Lefebvre insists that capitalism can only be understood on a global scale – the ultimate spatial frontier for
capital. Globality should be viewed dialectically as both a ‘thing’ (the world scale) and as a process or tendency (a totalising developmental dynamic), and is related to the nature of capital as a historically specific form of socio-spatial organisation. This importance accorded to the global should definitely not be taken to imply that globalization is a unilinear process of increasing ‘deterritorialisation’ within which sub-global scales are subsumed. Nor should it be understood that the global scale be accorded a priori methodological primacy. For Lefebvre, social relations remain substantially territorialised, or dependent for their ‘freedom’ on a simultaneous investment in relative immobility. Accordingly, ‘the global’ does not simply exist a priori, but has been, and continues to be constructed through social practice. Subglobal scales are intrinsic components of the globalization process: “We are confronted not by one social space but by many – indeed by an unlimited multiplicity or uncountable set of social spaces which we refer to generically as ‘social space.’ No space disappears in the course of growth and development: the worldwide does not abolish the local.” The global as Lefebvre uses it, then, is not some autonomous or reified essence that may be thought of independent of other scales. The global encompasses a range of sub-global scales, and is thus best thought of as a contradictory entanglement of multiple forms of socio-spatial organisation. On this reading, spatial scales such as the state are to be conceived not as mutually exclusive and reified ‘containers,’ but rather as ‘meeting places’ of superimposed and interpenetrating social forces:

[T]he places of social space are very different from those of natural space in that they are not simply juxtaposed; they may be intercalated, combined, superimposed – they may even sometimes collide. Consequently, the local (or “punctual,” in the sense of “determined by a particular ‘point’”) does not disappear, for it is never absorbed by the regional, national or even worldwide level. The national and regional levels take in innumerable “places”; national space embraces the regions; and world space does not merely subsume national spaces, but even (for the time being at least) precipitates the formation of new national spaces through a remarkable process of fission. ... The hypercomplexity of social space should now be apparent, embracing as it does individual entities and peculiarities, relatively

58 Lefebvre, Henri (1991b) op. cit. pp. 417-418
59 ibid. p. 86. Original emphasis. See also pp. 87-88, 412
60 ibid. pp. 85-88, 350-352
fixed points, movements, and flows and waves – some interpenetrating, others in conflict, and so on. The principle of the interpenetration and superimposition of social spaces ... [implies] each fragment of space subjected to analysis masks not just one social relationship but a host of them ... 61

According to Neil Brenner, this points to Lefebvre’s insistence that the development of capital and its ultimate expansion to a world scale must be understood as dependent upon a multi-layered scaffolding of intertwined spatial scales: “Spatial scales (global, national, urban) and their associated forms of sociospatial organization (capital, territorial states, cities) are conceived as levels of the hierarchical geographical scaffolding through which globalization has historically unfolded.”62 This scaffolding of scales has enabled relationships between processes of capital accumulation and forms of state territoriality to congeal in historically specific ways. Capital, territorial states, and the urban-regional are thus increasingly superimposed and entwined on a world scale. As Lefebvre puts it: “Today our concern must be with space on a world scale ... as well as with all the other spaces subsidiary to it, at every possible level. No single space has disappeared completely; and all places without exception have undergone metamorphosis.”63 This third aspect of social space as a scaffolding of scales thus points to a final interpretation of globalization. Globalization is a dynamic transformation of all scales within the framework of space on a global scale. This highlights the fact that social relations embedded within forms of sociospatial organisation (such as the territorial state) cannot be fetishised and reduced to static objects – they cannot be considered, that is, as distinct from social relations pertaining in other forms of sociospatial organisation.

1.3 The state mode of production

This understanding of social space as an amalgam of different scales and contradictory scaffolding of social relations also bears on Lefebvre’s conception of the changing

61 ibid. p. 88. Original emphasis
63 Lefebvre, Henri (1991b) op. cit. p. 412
function of the state in an era of accelerating globalization. Lefebvre insists that globalization cannot be grasped independent of the role of the state in producing and stabilising the spatial scales on which capital accumulation occurs; the state is the sociospatial forms through which the process of globalization has historically unfolded. While all states are by definition organised on the national territorial scale, enframed by mutually exclusive borders according to the principle of sovereignty, Lefebvre suggests that the form of the territorial state has been replicated throughout the world system. For Lefebvre, the global international order is not simply the outcome of interactions amongst pre-existing and self-constituting national entities, for the global international order itself serves to reproduce, naturalise and generate the 'nation form.' The 'state mode of production,' as Lefebvre terms it, has produced a global network of states through which the political space has been fragmented and territorialised. This globalization of the state territorialises the “capitalist trinity” of land, labour and capital within a global matrix of mutually exclusive national-state scales. Accordingly, the state mode of production constitutes one of the core organisational-territorial structures of late twentieth century capitalism.

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64 This section (pp. 32-43) draws upon Neil Brenner's exposition of Lefebvre's state theory, pp. 146-150, pp. 154-157 of Brenner, Neil (1997) op. cit.
65 ibid. p. 23
67 Perhaps Lefebvre's most important contribution to Marxism is to reinstate Marx's theorisation of land to a central role along with labour and capital, and develop it through his production of space thesis. The conclusion of the final volume of Capital adds a third term to the dialectical relationship between capital and labour, bourgeoisie and workers, and profits and wages. According to Lefebvre, Marx proposes his 'trinity formula' of “Earth (Madame la Terre), capital (Monsieur le capital), and labour (the Workers). In other words, rent, profit, wages. ... In speaking of the Earth, Marx did not simply mean agriculture. Underground resources were also part of the picture. So too was the nation state, confined within a specific territory. And hence, ultimately ... politics and political strategy.” Lefebvre, Henri (1991b) op. cit. p. 325. More generally, see pp. 323-327, 228, 282, and 335-338. For Marx's own formulation, see: Marx, Karl (1884) [1894] Capital: The process of capitalist production as a whole. Book III, Moore, Samuel and Aveling, Edward (trans.) and edited by Frederick Engels (London: Lawrence and Wishart) pp. 814-884. This insistence on land/earth/space constitutes one dimension of Lefebvre's attempt to redeem Marx's thought from its subsequent reduction to a crude economism.
68 See: Lefebvre, Henri (1991b) op. cit. pp. 36-37, 357-358, 377-379
Lefebvre’s recognition that state interventions in the capitalist economy must be conceived spatially as attempts to regulate and instrumentalise social space, has as its correlate the understanding that space is one of the privileged instruments of the state in its control of individuals and social groups. However, this notion of space as ‘instrument’ does not thereby imply that the state is ‘outside’ social space. For Lefebvre, the state is itself a form of socio-spatial architecture: a historically specific production of socio-spatial arrangements that lend relative stability and control to social relations. Importantly, this understanding highlights the absolute centrality of the production of space to any social arrangement that aspires to ‘concrete’ existence:

Without the concepts of space and its production, the framework of power ... simply cannot achieve concreteness. ... [T]he state as framework, cannot be conceived of without the instrumental space that they make use of. Indeed, each new form of state, each new form of political power, introduces its own way of portioning space, its own particular administrative classification of discourses about space and about things and people in space. Each such form commands space, as it were, to serve its purposes.69

Lefebvre argues that the spatial form of the state is composed of three mutually reinforcing elements – national territorial space; historically specific socio-spatial organisation; and the ‘mental space’ produced in the image of the state.70 First, Lefebvre conceives nation-state space as characterised by the domination of a centralised political apparatus over a bounded territorial extent. This aspect is inherently linked to violence, insofar as the monopoly of legitimate violence stimulates a principle of unification and standardisation of social relations.71:

... a space that is apparently ‘neutral’, objective’, fixed, transparent, innocent ... is a whole series of errors, a complex of illusions, which can even cause us to forget completely that there is a total subject which acts continually to maintain and reproduce its own conditions of existence, namely the state (along with its foundation in specific social classes and fractions of classes). We also forget that there is a total object, namely absolute political space – that strategic space which

69 ibid. p. 281
70 Brenner, Neil (1997) op. cit. p. 146
71 ibid. pp. 281-282
seeks to impose itself as reality despite the fact that it is an abstraction, albeit one endowed with enormous powers because it is the locus and the medium of Power\textsuperscript{72}

Obviously, this aspect is related to the principle of sovereignty, and the tendency of nation building to the eradication of ‘other’ allegiances (weaker nationalisms for example) in the name of a unified nation space coterminous with the state:

Sovereignty implies ‘space’: and what is more it implies a space against which violence, whether latent or overt, is directed – a space established and constituted by violence. ... We are speaking of a space where centralized power sets itself above other power and eliminates it; where a self proclaimed ‘sovereign’ nation pushes aside other any other nationality\textsuperscript{72}

In this regard, Lefebvre affirms the accuracy of Hegel’s observation that the state tends towards unifying territorial violence – “For Hegel space brought historical time to an end, and the master of space was the state”\textsuperscript{74}— whilst arguing that Hegel’s elevation of this aspect to supreme rationality rests upon a fundamental “misapprehension.”\textsuperscript{75} The second dimension of state space comprises historically variable patterns of socio-spatial organisation, and closely parallels the understanding of social space as a ‘second nature’ outlined previously. This dimension includes administrative-institutional configurations, built environments and symbolic/political monuments, all of which interlace national territory and are subject to periodic adjustment and modification. Thirdly, Lefebvre argues that state space occupies everyday consciousness, thereby generating a particular “mental space” through which political identities are validated and social consensus toward the legitimacy of the state established and legitimated. Of fundamental importance here, is the discourse of nationalism and the production of a distinct

\textsuperscript{72}ibid. p. 94
\textsuperscript{73}ibid. pp. 281-282
\textsuperscript{74}ibid. p. 279
\textsuperscript{75}ibid. pp. 279-281. The nature of this “misapprehension” will be explicated later in the section. For now, it is worth stating that Lefebvre affirms Marx’s and Engels’ insistence that “there could be no such thing as ‘pure’ and absolute violence existing apart from the class struggle.” Ibid. p. 279
‘spectacle’ of modes of subjectivity either ‘acceptable’ or ‘deviant’ within the national space.  

Central to Lefebvre’s understanding of these three aspects of state space is the insight that the abstract space of capitalism is riven by inherent contradictions that the state must manage and attenuate. Of fundamental importance in this regard is the contradiction between exchange and use value, and the whole range of distinctions that flow suggestively from this couplet. These include, for example, that between need and desire, abstract and concrete, dominated and appropriated, centre and periphery, and global spaces and fragmented spaces. The role of the state in the management of these contradictions is inherently contradictory, for the state seeks to repair and mitigate the abstraction and destruction of everyday social space occasioned by the accumulation process, while simultaneously producing and formatting social space in ways that encourage the intensification of this accumulation process. Given these contradictory imperatives, Lefebvre argues that the state adopts strategies orientated to the production of social space as relatively static, predictable, and open to strategies of control and surveillance. Implied here is a central role for the state constructing the relatively fixed territorial configurations upon which each round of capital accumulation is grounded. As Lefebvre’s late writings in the four volume series De l’état (‘The state’) make clear, there are firm connections between long term crises of capital accumulation and the increasing socialisation of capital. In the securing of these connections, the role of the state is central. Accordingly, it is necessary to move beyond consideration of the purely temporal dynamics of capitalist accumulation and circulation.

76 See, in particular, Lefebvre, Henri (1978) op. cit. pp. 61-62. On Lefebvre’s notion of state space more generally, see pp. 259-324, and Lefebvre, Henri (1991b) op. cit. pp. 255-282, 382-422

77 See, for example: Lefebvre, Henri (1991b) op. cit. pp. 292-356

In *The limits to capital*, Harvey wires the territorially of the state to a ‘third-cut’ theory of crisis that examines the possibility of providing a “spatial fix” for the convulsions of the capitalist economy. This scenario requires the surpluses of capital and labour power to be inscribed in the built environment or absorbed through the formation of new geopolitical configurations. Lefebvre agrees upon the need to provide a “spatial fix” for capital, though his analysis is centred more squarely upon the state than is Harvey’s. Lefebvre insists that the relatively stabilised organisational territorial form of the modern state is a crucial precondition for accelerated circulation of capital on a global scale. By producing relatively stable socio-spatial matrices that undergird increased mobility of labour, commodities and capital on supra-state scales (such as the global or economic-regional), the territorialisation and centralisation of political power is a necessary precondition for the state’s ability to regulate ‘flows’:

Political power as such harbours an immanent contradiction: it controls flows and it controls agglomerations. The mobility of the component parts and formants of social space is constantly on the increase, especially in the “economic” realm proper: flows of energy, of raw materials, of labour, and so on. But such control, to be effective, calls for permanent establishment, for permanent centres of decision and action .... A novel and quite specific contradiction thus arises between what is transient and what is durable

It is in this sense that the state plays a crucial role in constructing a ‘second nature’ of socio-spatial configurations. The state intervenes spatially, a task that under “modern” neocapitalism” at once entails: “(1) biological reproduction (the family); (2) the reproduction of labour power (the working class per se); and (3) the reproduction of the social relations of production – that is, of those relations that are constitutive of capitalism and are increasingly (and increasingly effectively) sought and imposed as such.” The ‘state mode of production’ – which Lefebvre views as coming to prominence since the late nineteenth century – thus plays a central role in securing the territorial preconditions within which both capital accumulation and urbanisation can

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80 Lefebvre, Henri (1991b) *op. cit.* p. 388. See also p. 383

81 ibid. p. 32
unfold. At the same time, Lefebvre insists that the state comes to depend ever more directly upon the continuation of both accumulation and urbanisation for its own survival. This implies that the state mode of production is defined by an increasingly dense interpenetration of its socio-spatial organisation with that of capital and urbanisation.

However, such a 'solution' to the contradictions of capitalism — the construction of a 'fix' for capital through purposeful spatial intervention by the state — can only be temporary. It 'buys time' through the production of relatively immobile space, but cannot permanently resolve the ever-present tension between “fixity and motion” — between the construction and deconstruction of successive landscapes of accumulation — inherent in the circulation of capital. Suggested here, is a contradictory relationship between territorialisation of surplus value in fixed capital investment and its deterritorialisation in global financial flows. It is in this sense that Lefebvre argues Hegel “misapprehends” the telos of the state as ‘the end of history’ (the dissolving of historicity into spatiality as the end point of world-historical evolution). While Lefebvre recognises that Hegel correctly identifies a tendency towards the state led unification, abstraction and homogenisation of social relations, he also insists that Hegel’s vision is erroneous insofar as it delinks the state from the spatio-temporal dynamism of global capital. Marx understood capitalism as a dynamic system, and so this dynamism leaves its mark on the geographical landscape as new centres of production and agglomeration come into being and old ones fall into decline. Previous rounds of investment become obstacles to the further development of capitalism, and as new markets are sought for more productive investment, existing nodes of accumulation lose their positions of strength:

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83 Harvey, David (1982) op. cit. pp. 316-329, 398, 422-431
84 Lefebvre, Henri (1991b) op. cit. pp. 21, 279
85 ibid. p. 282
The geographical landscape which fixed and immobile capital comprises is both a crowning glory of past capital development and a prison which inhibits the further progress of accumulation because the very building of this landscape is antithetical to the 'tearing down of spatial barriers' and ultimately even to the 'annihilation of space by time'.

Uneven development is thus inherent in the way in which capitalism develops, as opportunities for increased rates of accumulation through the exploitation of new markets, new labour pools, new technologies and advantageous trade roots, are exploited when existing sources of value decline. Moreover, this 'creative destruction' takes place at a variety of scales, from the urban, regional and national to the global. As Smith explains, in a global economy increasingly dominated by speculative investment capital without strong loyalty to any place in particular, capital 'see-saws' across the globe in pursuit of accumulative advantage:

If the accumulation of capital entails geographical development and if the direction of this development is guided by the rate of profit, then we can think of the world as a 'profit surface' produced by capital itself ... Capital moves to where the rate of profit is highest (or at least high), and these moves are synchronized with the rhythm of accumulation and crisis. The mobility of capital brings about the development of areas with a high rate of profit and the underdevelopment of those areas where a low rate of profit pertains.

That is, because capital is based on the continuous drive toward technological, social and spatial restructuring, the state's strategies for gaining some degree of control over its internal territorial space can only succeed for a limited period of time, until a new wave of crisis induced restructuring unfolds. In this sense, the apparent stability of state interventions in the production of socio-spatial configurations for the grounding of accumulation is inherently unstable. While the state strives to secure a spatial fix for capital, and different configurations of state socio-spatial organisation can manage the contradictions of capitalism more or less effectively, it is simply not possible to overcome these contradictions indefinitely. It is in this context that the state is best thought of as a

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86 Harvey, David (1975) *op. cit.* p. 13
kind of 'mobile strategy,' continuously modifying its interventions in order to respond to changing opportunities and constraints in the global economy, thus encouraging capital to site in a place of its choosing, rather than some other. In this specific sense, the interventions of the state constitute an 'accumulation strategy' – the purposeful construction of a relatively stable 'profit surface' for capital in the face of recurrent, and Lefebvre insists, intensifying crisis.

Globalization and the reorientation of state powers

While Lefebvre's writings were obviously undertaken before the acceleration of crisis induced restructuring of the 1980s and 1990s, his analysis is remarkably prescient. In the fourth volume of De l'état (1978), Lefebvre suggests that "contradiction between capital bound to a territory, controlled and directed by the state" and "nonterritorialized" capital, is becoming ever more obvious, and may lead to conflict. There are several implications of this statement, but perhaps the most telling is the sense that globalization of social space heralds greater homogenisation and fragmentation on all scales, and particularly that of the state:

The analysis of space envelopes may be expected to take markets (local, national, and hence also worldwide) as its starting-point, and eventually to link up with the theory of networks and flows. ... How and why is it that the advent of a world market, implying a degree of unity at the level of the planet, gives rise to a fractioning of space – to proliferating nation states, to regional differentiation and self-determination, as well as to multinational states and transnational corporations which, although they stem this strange tendency towards fission, also exploit it in order to reinforce their own autonomy? Toward what space and time will such interwoven contradictions lead us?

Lefebvre's analysis strongly supports the contention that state territoriality is not a static, unchanging feature of the world interstate system. Rather, state territoriality is a historically produced configuration of sociospatial organisation intimately linked to the

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89 Lefebvre, Henri (1991b) op. cit. p. 351
spatio-temporal dynamics of capital accumulation and the production of an urbanised ‘second nature.’ In the face of intensified globalization, Brenner suggests, Lefebvre’s analysis points to the way the abstract parcelised space of the interstate system has become increasingly closely entwined with contradictory logic of global capital accumulation.\(^90\) As Lefebvre puts it, this implies that state space has been rendered ever more “global,” “hierarchical” and “fragmented”:

In this way the capitalist ‘trinity’ is established in space — that trinity of land-capital-labour which cannot remain abstract and which is assembled only within an equally tri-faceted institutional space: a space that is first of all global, and maintained as such — the space of sovereignty, where constraints are implemented, and hence a fetishised space, reductive of differences; a space, secondly, that is fragmented, separating, disjunctive, a space that locates specificities, places and localities, both in order to control them and in order to make them negotiable; and a space, finally, that is hierarchical, ranging from the lowliest places to the noblest, from the tabooed to the sovereign\(^91\)

This contradiction between the simultaneous globalization and fragmentation of social space has acquired central importance: “Where then is the principal contradiction to be found? Between the capacity to conceive of an abstract space on a global (or worldwide) scale on the one hand, and its fragmentation by a multiplicity of procedures or processes, all fragmentary themselves, on the other.”\(^92\) The extensive globalization of capital circulation implies that the frontiers of crisis displacement to ‘new’ territories are exhausted, or at least, severely compromised. In these circumstances, the contradictory imperative between the need of the state to repair and attenuate the damage wrought upon everyday life by the accumulation process, and the simultaneous bid to accelerate this accumulation process, becomes more acute. Capital must recolonise the spaces it has already conquered in its search for new surplus value. Given this situation, the state’s role only intensifies, as it must increasingly mediate the tension between globalizing and localizing forces within its territorial boundaries, seeking (ideally) to ‘format’ the everyday life of subjects in ways that minimise this contradiction. All this implies that

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\(^{91}\) Lefebvre, Henri (1991b) *op. cit.* pp. 282  
\(^{92}\) ibid. p. 355
Lefebvre anticipated that the role of the state in producing relatively fixed socio-spatial configurations to accelerate accumulation strategies on the one hand, and the concomitant commodification of social relations on the other hand, has become more central to the operation of capitalism in recent decades. The relationship of the state to space:

... is becoming tighter: the spatial role of the state ... more patent. Administrative and political state apparatuses are no longer content (if they ever were) merely to intervene in an abstract manner in the investment of capital (in the properly economic sphere). So long as units of economic production and of social activity were scattered across the land, only the state was capable of binding them into a spatial unity - that of the nation.... Today the state and its bureaucratic and political apparatuses intervene continually, and make use of space in its instrumental aspect in order to intervene at all levels and through every agency of the economic realm93

The management of this contradictory bid to regulate both the abstract spaces of global capital accumulation and the localised spaces of everyday life stimulate the restructuring of the state's socio-spatial organisation. In an extremely concise formula, Lefebvre puts it thus: "The state self-expands globally while self-fragmenting."94 Lefebvre here points to a dual tendency more recent analyses have both confirmed and elaborated. In Sassen's 1996 formulation for example, the state has become increasingly "denationalised," implying that both supra-state and sub-state levels assume growing importance in socio-economic governance.95 On the one hand, states have responded to economic globalization by 'self-expanding globally' through the construction of supra-state

93 ibid. p. 378

Swyngedouw, Erik (1996) 'Reconstructing citizenship, the re-scaling of the state and the new authoritarianism: Closing the Belgium mines.' Urban Studies, 33:8, pp. 1499-1521
economic blocks (such as NAFTA), in order to harmonise economic regulation and thus accelerate capital turnover by overcoming spatial barriers. On the other hand, states have ‘self-fragmented,’ by devolving governance capacity and orientating national development strategies to those local regions judged to have special geographic or strategic advantage in relation to the global economy. This does not however imply that the state scale has become less important.\textsuperscript{96} As Lefebvre’s analysis suggests, the state remains both a fundamental structural feature of the world system, and crucial strategy for the promotion of competitive advantage on both supra and sub-state scales. Most obviously, institutionalised unevenness in wages, in life-chances and in ecological and labour laws between (and within) states is a precondition for the construction of a spatial fix for investment capital. As Don Mitchell has put it: “Social reproduction in an era of global flows demands the continual, geographical, reproduction of difference.”\textsuperscript{97}

Following from this, Lefebvre’s perspective lends itself to an interpretation that intensified globalization entails socio-spatial reconfiguration of the territorial state with concomitant adjustment to its functions, rather than a simple ‘collapse’ or disappearance of state space:

Little by little, slowly but surely, the modern state finds itself shaken and overwhelmed; growth is called into question; other forces such as multinational organisations take charge; differences among regions are accentuated. The principle function of the state is no longer simply to secure growth, but to reproduce the relations of domination.\textsuperscript{98}

In this context, it is helpful to observe that Lefebvre defines domination as producing a space that is:

\textsuperscript{96} Nor does Lefebvre’s observation that the territorial state “self expands globally while self-fragmenting” imply a firmly consolidated or stabilised post-Fordist state form. Rather, Lefebvre’s intention is to indicate the general tendency or trajectory of unfolding processes. In this context, the emergence of neoliberal hegemony in Mexico examined in the following chapter, should be viewed less as a coherent path towards a definitive spatial or institutional fix, than as a symptom of ongoing crises and disorder


\textsuperscript{98} Henri Lefebvre, cited in Brenner, Neil (1997) \textit{op. cit.} p. 155
... closed, sterilized, emptied out. The concept only attains its full meaning only when it is contrasted with its opposite and inseparable concept of appropriation. Appropriation cannot be understood apart from the rhythms of time and of life. Dominated space and appropriated space may in principle be combined ... But history – which is to say the history of accumulation – is also the history of their separation and mutual antagonism.99

The state seeks to make its territory into a kind of abstract ‘profit surface’ through which increasingly globalized capital flows can gain their spatial fix. This implies that national space must be ‘sterilized’ and ‘emptied out’ of those forms of sociality that do not contribute, and even hinder, the construction of the spatial fix. Thus, the state continues to play a central role in struggles to produce social space, even as the scales upon which these struggles are organised increasingly diverge from neat alignment with the national scale.

1.4 Centrality and the violence of ‘decorporealization’

There is an ideology of space. Why? Because space, which seems homogenous, which seems to be completely objective in its pure form, such as we ascertain it, is a social product. The production of space can be likened to the production of any given particular type of merchandise. Nonetheless, there are interrelationships between the production of goods and that of space. The latter accrues to private groups who appropriated the space in order to manage and exploit it

– Henri Lefebvre100

It has been noted that the one of the central tasks of the state mode of production is to manage the contradiction between the violence wrought upon everyday life by the accumulation process on the one hand, and the tendency to accelerate the accumulation process on the other hand. Lefebvre’s argument hinges on his insistence that the effective management of this contradiction depends on producing the cultural spaces of everyday life in an ever more abstract fashion, and thus upon the production of ever more alienated subjects who do not, however, recognise this alienation as such. Central to this,

99 Lefebvre, Henri (1991b) op. cit. pp. 165-166
100 Lefebvre, Henri (1976a) ‘Reflections on the politics of space.’ Enders, Michael J (trans.) Antipode, 8, p. 31 [pp. 30-37]
is the understanding that concrete space must increasingly be 'worked over,' so that those spatial practices informed by understandings and uses not in accordance with 'efficient' accumulation are delegitimised. Put differently, the relationship between representations of space (the way space is conceived 'from above'), spaces of representation (the way space is lived by consumers in accordance with a spatial imaginary) and spatial practice (the way space is commonsensically perceived and acted upon) must achieve increasing harmony. Ideally speaking, the relationship between these aspects would be configured in the following way:

Spaces of representation disappear into the representation of space – the latter swallows the former; and spatial practice, put into brackets along with social practice as a whole, endures only as the unthought aspect of the thought that has now pronounced itself sovereign ruler.

Such a project is obviously hostile to difference, insofar as this difference is not internal to the accumulation process itself. For those whom abstract space is a tool, Lefebvre argues:

... the relationship between repetition and difference is an antagonistic one ... [It] relies on the repetitive – on exchange, and interchangeability, on reproducibility, and on homogeneity. It reduces differences to induced differences: that is, to differences internally acceptable to a set of 'systems' which are planned as such.

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101 This relation between space, knowledge and power is made particularly explicit in The survival of capitalism:

Power is everywhere; it is omnipresent, assigned to Being. It is everywhere in space. It is in everyday discourse and commonplace notions ... It is in objets d'art as well as in missiles. It is in the diffuse preponderance of the visual, as well as in institutions such as school and parliament. It is in things as well as in signs (the signs of objects and object-signs). Everywhere and therefore nowhere ... [P]ower has extended its domain right into the interior of each individual, to the roots of consciousness, to the "topias" hidden in the folds of subjectivity

Lefebvre, Henri (1976b) op. cit. pp. 86-87. Original emphasis

102 The translation of The production of space actually terms this aspect of Lefebvre's 'spatial-triad' representational space, rather than spaces of representation. Most secondary sources, however, prefer the second version. For the sake of consistency, spaces of representation will be used throughout the thesis, including substitution within direct quotes from Lefebvre

103 Lefebvre, Henri (1991b) op. cit. p. 398
... [Within these systems] destruction and self-destruction, once accidental, have been transformed into laws of life ... ¹⁰⁴

This has two implications. First, it implies that 'life' becomes ever narrower, insofar as those dimensions not internal to accumulation strategies (and hence conducive to their continuation) are reduced and delegitimised. At the very least, they are commodified, which is much the same thing. This suggests that 'enjoyment,' for example, becomes subsumed and codified within an institutionalised sphere of 'leisure' cordoned off in the private (non-political) realm. In turn, this implies that the definition of 'politics' becomes ever narrower and subjected to more specialised forms of knowledge. Politics collapses to the preserve of a specific political class, bound ever more tightly with their access to and control of hegemonic forms of rationality. Modernity, Lefebvre insists, is dominated by the discursive spaces of philosophy and epistemology, and the sciences of abstract space. Moreover, claims to modernity come to rest increasingly upon control of such knowledge, and the administration of society on this basis. Implied here is the fact that the prestige of political elites, the state they represent, and specifically the ability to effectively mobilise a 'spatial fix' for capital, is defined primarily by the 'objective' organisation of social relationships, within which dissident constructs are suppressed and delegitimised by abstract/'true' space:

True space ... is formulated in the head of a thinker before being projected onto social and even physical 'reality.' ... True space is a mental space whose dual function is to reduce 'real' space to the abstract and to induce minimal differences. ... [It is] legitimated by conflating mental space and political space, so constructing a 'system' .... In consequence, not only the ideas of the True, but also that of meaning, and those of lived experience and of 'living,' are severely compromised¹⁰⁵

Lefebvre characterises abstract/"true" space in different ways — most generally as visual-geometric-phallic space¹⁰⁶ — but what is fundamental is Lefebvre’s insistence that

¹⁰⁴ Lefebvre, Henri (1991b) op. cit. pp. 395-396. My emphasis
¹⁰⁵ ibid. p. 398
¹⁰⁶ See: ibid. pp. 285-287
it is a space from which previous histories have been erased. As he puts it, “the time needed for living eludes the logic of visualization and spatialization … With the advent of modernity time has vanished from social space … Our time, this most essential part of lived experience, this greatest of all goods, is no longer visible to us, no longer intelligible.” In this context, perhaps the most significant aspect of Lefebvre’s typology of spaces is the emphasis on the progressive decorporealization of space. Lefebvre’s achievement is to establish a connection between the history of the body and the history of space and significantly, to comprehend the shift “from the space of the body to the body-in-space.” This process culminates in what Lefebvre characterises as the “spiriting-away or scotomization of the body.” As suggested by this phrase, Lefebvre’s consideration of capitalist ‘abstract space’ emphasises the power of its visual format. Lefebvre describes the advance of visualisation in a language of menace; it is “an intense onslaught” and “threatening gambit,” whose victim is the human body. It marks the erasure of the body itself as the gaze dominates space. The final victory of decorporealization is the installation of the abstract ‘spectacular’ space of late twentieth-century capitalism:

By the time this process is complete, space has no social existence independently of an intense, aggressive and repressive visualization. It is thus – not symbolically but in fact – a purely visual space. The rise of the visual realm entails a series of substitutions and displacements by means of which it overwhelms the whole body and usurps its role.

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107 ibid. pp. 95-96
108 ibid. pp. 196
109 ibid. pp. 201. Lefebvre’s was the first attempt to sketch a history of the body and spaces in a systematic fashion. Subsequent attempts have generally been independent of his work. See, for example: Foucault, Michel (1977) [1975] Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison. Sheridan, Alan (trans) (London: Penguin). Scotoma: an area of pathologically diminished vision within the visual field [Reader’s Digest (1986) Universal Dictionary (London: Reader’s Digest)]
110 Lefebvre, Henri (1991b) op. cit. p. 286. And, in a slightly different formulation: “The visual and the discursive are buttressed (or contextualised) in the world of signs … most of all, because of the process of localization, because of the fragmentation and specialization of space within a form that is nevertheless homogenous overall. The final stage of the body’s abstraction is its (functional) fragmentation and localization.” Ibid. p. 310
CHAPTER ONE - HENRI LEFEBVRE

Conceived as an objective and dispassionate viewpoint, and negating other forms of knowledge as subjective, emotional and thus inherently non-rational, legitimate knowledge of space and time becomes “fixed in a political centrality ... around the centres there are nothing but subjected, exploited and dependent spaces ... neo-colonial spaces distributed into peripheries that are hierarchised in relation to the centre.”

Lefebvre’s point here is that ‘centrality’ – the ability to determine the spatio-temporal organisation of life – is itself hierarchically centralised. This monopoly on ‘lived time’ is most clearly illustrated in The right to the city. Here Lefebvre describes the utopia of ‘New Athens’ as a possible (and all too likely) future where centrality is reserved for the privileged few:

In this centre occupied by the New Masters, coercion and persuasion converge with the power of decision-making and the capacity to consume. Without necessarily owning it all, the New Masters possess this privileged space, axis of a strict spatial policy. What they especially have is the privilege to possess time ... There is only for the masses carefully measured time. Time eludes them.

The rhetoric of time-space ‘colonisation’ is an important element of Lefebvre’s understanding of the development of capitalism as the centralisation of political control over the spatio-temporal organisation of society. In 1968, Lefebvre argued that “organized capital” had established colonies in the metropolis and was carrying “the colonial experience into the midst of erstwhile colonizing peoples.” By the 1980s, the message was even starker: “It could happen that one day ... an army of bureaucrats ...

111 For example: “[Thought] soars up into the abstract space of the visible, the geometric. The architect who designs, the planner who draws up master-plans, see their “objects,” buildings and neighbourhoods, from on high and from afar ... They pass from the “lived” to the abstract in order to project that abstraction onto the level of the lived.” Lefebvre, Henri (1970) La révolution urbaine (Paris: Gaillimard) p. 241. Cited in Gregory, Derek (1994) op. cit. p. 404. As Gregory goes on to note, this characterisation echoes Merleau-Ponty’s critique of pensée au survol: “the high-altitude thinking which maintained the Cartesian split between a distant, spectatorial subject and the object of his sight.”


will treat everyday life not ... as a semi-colony [but] quite simply as a conquered land.

In this context, the 'colonisation' of everyday life refers to the superimposition and hyperextension of abstract space. Time-space colonisation has inscribed within it an outward movement — it is a congeries of processes that spread, invade, occupy. This process is far from even, however, insofar as it structured by fragmentation and hierarchy. Different people are implicated in space-time colonisation in different ways. For some (those with 'centrality') these processes present new opportunities and responsibilities, revealing wider horizons and enhancing geographical imaginations. For others (those excluded from 'centrality'), they impose additional burdens and raise higher barriers, create further distinctions and diminish individual capacities.

In the name of these 'others' — who Lefebvre figures as actually constituting the social majority — Lefebvre figures his project as a restoration of centrality to marginalised groups, or more generally, the reformulation of society such that a space is maintained in which diverse groups can realise their own time in concert with others. What is therefore called for is:

... a renovated centrality, leaving opportunity for rhythms and use of time that would permit full usage of moments and places ... the rights not to be excluded

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116 This would appear to be what Doreen Massey means when she argues that, "different social groups have distinct relationships to ... differentiated mobility [of goods, capital, people, ideas etc.]: some people are more in charge of it than others; some initiate flows and movement, others don't; some are more on the receiving end of it than others; some are effectively imprisoned by it." Massey, Doreen (1994) Space, place and gender (Blackwell and Cambridge: Polity Press) p. 149

117 Lefebvre's treatment of time is multifaceted and complex. He fits most comfortably within the third of the three 'philosophical traditions' of time noted by Peter Osborne, though it would also be true to say that he maintains a productive tension between the three of them. The afore-mentioned 'third tradition' involves social or inter-subjective time, study of which implies a concern for the multiplicity of time-consciousness and their social composition through struggle over conflicting rhythms. The other traditions noted by Osborne are the time of nature (cosmological time), and the time of individual time-consciousness (generally referred to as phenomenological time). Osborne, Peter (1994) 'The politics of time.' Radical Philosophy, 68, pp. 4-5. However, even after 50 years of ceaseless interrogation, Lefebvre was still compelled to conclude, "the standing of time of as it relates to space is problematic and has yet to be defined clearly." Lefebvre, Henri (1991b) op. cit. p. 408. Kofman and Lebas provide a stimulating discussion of Lefebvre's influences in: Kofman, Elenore and Lebas, Elizabeth (1996) 'Lost in transposition — Time, space and the city.' Lefebvre, Henri (1996) Writings on cities. Kofman, Elenore and Lebas, Elizabeth (Eds.) (Oxford and Massachusetts: Blackwell) p. 29-30 [pp. 3-60]
from centrality and to participate politically in decision making ... centrality of course does not imply the centre of power but the regrouping of differences in relation to one another ... [T]he ludic in its fullest sense of theatre, sport ... fairs ... restores the sense of oeuvre conferred by art and philosophy and prioritizes time over space, appropriation over domination.\(^{118}\)

From this point of view, Lefebvre's understanding of effective transformative politics is much in agreement with the sentiments expressed in On the poverty of student life, a Situationist text produced during the 1968 Paris uprising. This fundamental pamphlet calls for a new relationship to the world: one in which anyone "who has no power over his own life and knows it," strives to "create a new situation" in which that absence of power and autonomy is no longer true — a new situation in which everybody grabs hold of the oppressive conditions of their circumstances and "détours" them.\(^{119}\) In developing these insights, Lefebvre joins with the Situationists in opening up the notion of class from a narrow Marxist focus on the industrial workers or 'proletariat.' Because space has become so central to the organisation and expansion of capitalism — because, that is, it has entered into production — class struggle is expanded to all those 'masses' alienated by the abstract space of capitalism and continually subject to representational delegitimation and 'redundancy.' Thus, in Guy Debord's The society of the spectacle (1967) the proletariat is defined in terms of those unable to freely determine their own lives and to shape the spatio-temporal organisation of society.\(^{120}\) In this context, class struggle implies the disruption of the abstract spaces through which capitalist domination is operationalised, via creation of 'situations' or 'moments' in which alienated subjects can achieve contingent self-realisation. Lefebvre's argument hinges on his insistence that any spatial practice — however seemingly alienating — potentially offers a glimpse into totality, understood as the recognition that we can intervene meaningfully in the banal.

\(^{118}\) Henri Lefebvre, quoted in: Kofman, Elenore and Lebas, Elizabeth (1996) op. cit. p. 19

\(^{119}\) This account based on Marcus, Greil (1989) Lipstick traces: A secret history of the twentieth century (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press) pp. 413-431

\(^{120}\) Debord, Guy (1994) [1967] The society of the spectacle, Nicholson-Smith, Donald (trans.) (New York: Zone Books) Thesis 115. Earlier (1963), the Situationists had argued that the proletariat, far from declining in significance, had now expanded and included "all people who have no possibility of altering the social space-time that society allots for its consumption." By contrast, "those who organise this space-time, or who at least have a significant margin of personal choice" constituted the 'ruling class.' Knabb, Andy (Ed.) (1984) Situationist International anthology (Berkeley: Bureau of Public Secrets) p. 108
conditions of everyday life. In this specific sense, a 'moment' is a sort of 'spatial event' in which the experience of spatialisation is that of detachment from the repetitive time of banality. As the Situationists commented: "The 'situation,' narrowly articulated in a site is thoroughly spatio-temporal. Moments made into situations could be considered as moments of rapture, of acceleration, revolutions in the individual everyday life." Insofar as such struggles turn on the reclamation and revalorisation of aspects of lived existence 'outmoded' or rendered 'redundant' by the hyperextension of abstract space, active struggle can differentiate and rupture the abstract nature of capitalist space by realising an alternative spatial order and a new form of space:

Today, more than ever, the class struggle is inscribed in space. Indeed, it is that struggle alone which prevents abstract space from taking over the whole planet and papering over all differences. Only the class struggle has the capacity to differentiate, to generate differences which are not intrinsic to economic growth ... that is to say, differences which are neither induced by nor acceptable to that growth.122

Within this project, Lefebvre places special emphasis on the 'instrumentality' or 'strategic function' of social space, drawing on the distinction that Marx makes between exchange and use value in his analysis of the commodity. Lefebvre transforms this opposition into one between the 'abstract space' of capitalism's rationalised economic and political systems, and the swirling 'lived space' of everyday life. As Gregory puts it: "The tension between these spaces transcodes a tension between integration and differentiation that admits of no final solution." The implication here is that Lefebvre figures capitalist modernity as lacking a unifying direction or authentic integration. There is no "meta-system" capable of uniting each of the partial subsystems, with "their cohesion [being rather] the object of a strategy."124

122 Lefebvre, Henri (1991b) op. cit. p. 55
123 Gregory, Derek (1994) op. cit. p. 275
At the theoretical level this betrays (rather than simply uncovers) a global strategy; it constitutes a new totality, whose elements appear to be both joined (joined in space by authority and by quantification) and disjoined (disjoined in that same fragmented space and by that same authority, which uses its power in order to unite by separating and to separate by uniting).\(^{125}\)

The use of 'betrays' rather than 'uncovers' is crucial. While Lefebvre notes the 'instrumentality' of social space for the reproduction and survival of capitalism and relations of domination, he also presents social space as an arena of emancipatory possibility. To the extent that social space conceals the strategies that underwrite modern capitalism, Lefebvre subversively suggests that: "a theory of the production of space that makes these strategies visible, that renders the contours en clair, is capable of underwriting a politics of resistance that must be (and indeed, can only be) a 'politics of space.'"\(^{126}\) As far as spatiality can be mobilised to subvert (that is, "betray") spatiality in this way, Lefebvre is able to insist, "the dialectic is no longer attached to temporality." Rather, "to recognize space ... [and] to recognize what takes place there and what it is used for, is to resume the dialectic."\(^{127}\)

### 1.5 The spatialisation of the dialectic

This 'spatialisation of the dialectic' is worked out most thoroughly in *The production of space*. Lefebvre declares that his project of meta-philosophy requires the "most powerful of 'synthesis' – that of Hegel – and its radical critique; this critique is rooted on the one hand in social practice (Marx), and on the other hand in art, poetry, music and drama (Nietzsche)."\(^{128}\) Lefebvre argues that whereas the dialectic of Hegel and the late Marx\(^{129}\)

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\(^{125}\) Lefebvre, Henri (1976c) *op. cit.* pp. 84-85

\(^{126}\) Lefebvre, Henri (1991b) *op. cit.* p. 17

\(^{127}\) Lefebvre, Henri (1976c) *op. cit.* p. 17

\(^{128}\) Lefebvre, Henri (1991b) *op. cit.* p. 406

\(^{129}\) Particularly in his work on the Paris commune, Marx reconsiders the model of historical progress in a way that bears a much closer affinity to the one described here as Nietzschean. As Ross notes:
seeks to blend the qualities of the elements (thesis-antithesis) into syntheses as a model of historical progress, Nietzsche holds that the traits of the original are never completely lost, and that syntheses are always falling back or apart. Hence, they are reversible; history can fall back on itself, as much as follow an arrow-like line of progress.\textsuperscript{130}

To this extent, one of Lefebvre's major contributions is to displace the conception of the dialectic as a smooth temporal succession through contradiction to resolution. The linking of the Marxist dialectic with Nietzsche's notion of the eternal return enables a spatialised view of history in which contradictions are not necessarily resolved — relegated to the past — but are preserved and accumulate. They are 'sedimented in the landscape,' not only in material form but also in the landscape of the social psyche or subconscious. As such, the dominant spatialisation or 'spatial fix' produced by state elites to facilitate accumulation is neither inert, settled, nor strictly self identical. To this end, Lefebvre proposes an archaeology of spatial architectonics, aiming to bring to light the more or less primal relations between the body and space ("sensory-sensual space") not fully erased by the production of subsequent spatialities:

\begin{quote}
In space, what came earlier continues to underpin what follows. The preconditions of social space have their own particular way of enduring and remaining actual within that space. . . . The task of architectonics is to describe, analyze and explain this persistence . . . \textsuperscript{131}
\end{quote}

\begin{flushright}
When Marx takes the Commune seriously, he must confront the possibility of a multiplicity of roads replacing the unique Highway of History; he must give new significance to the decentralization [sic] of socio-political power. . . . The Communards are out of sync with the timetable of the inexorable march of history . . . . The developmental model of Marx's own theoretical evolution is troubled by this autocritique: one that puts into question the very notion of maturity. Late Marx bends back and touches young Marx in a recognition of the inadequacy of unilinear, 'progressive' models of historical analysis. "Science, the new nobility! Progress. The world is on the march. Why shouldn't it turn around?" (Une Saison en enfer. And Lautreamont: "Plagiarism is necessary. Progress implies it" (Poesies II)
\end{flushright}

Ross, Kristen (1988) \textit{The emergence of social space: Rimbaud and the Paris commune} (Basingstoke, Hants: Macmillan Press) p. 25

\textsuperscript{130} Lefebvre thus embraces Nietzsche's assertion that man could never be complete, and that this was something that had to be faced rather than forgotten by (always premature) proclamations of the 'end.' Once this is accepted, it is no longer a matter of transcending a particular historical moment through history, but of overcoming the nihilism derived from the fact that history has not transcended anything — contra Hegel and late Marx, there is no end to history.

\textsuperscript{131} ibid. p. 228
With each new historical upheaval and round of 'space-time colonisation,' identity itself is radically transformed. As earlier indicated, Lefebvre generally couches this process negatively, associating it with a series of rearticulations that have progressively 'decorporealized' space. On the other hand, he also identifies a positive potential or virtuality, immanent to changes in the historical mode of space. These aspects are explicated in Lefebvre's 'long history of space.' Lefebvre insists that abstract space is inherently contradictory, providing clues to the survival of a differential space, and potentially its release into a new mode of the production of space in which the relationship between representations of space and spaces of representation is not inherently antagonistic. Lefebvre's history of space thus strategically presents a history of the present that opens a window onto possible futures other than that given by hegemonic understandings. He wants to insist that in spite of the violence of abstraction and the ever more pervasive colonisation of everyday life, concrete space is still a "space of 'subjects' rather than calculations." This becomes clearer when we consider in more detail the relationship between representations of space, spaces of representation and spatial practice. In order to conceptualise in one unitary 'social theory of space' the various 'levels of space,' Lefebvre proposes a three-part dialectic within spatialisation. This consists of:

132 ibid. pp. 229-400. By far the longest (and most contentious) part of The production of space is taken up by Lefebvre's explication of a series of 'modes of the production of space,' specifically, absolute space, historical space, abstract space, contradictory space and differential space.

133 Lefebvre's sequence of spatialities is best approached less as a definitive and determinative historical chronology, than as the announcement of a political project. Lefebvre seeks to disclose tendencies embedded in the history of the present, whose potential realisation is absent from our anticipations of the future. This implies an exercise in 'transduction,' or more simply, a "reflection on the possible." Lefebvre himself suggests that he advances this sequence as a "strategic hypothesis," which "straddles the breach between science and utopia, reality and ideality, conceived and lived. It seeks to surmount these oppositions by exploring the dialectical relationship between 'possible' and 'impossible'... " Lefebvre, Henri (1991b) op. cit. p. 60. Lefebvre terms this project "metaphilosophy": a bid to open philosophy to both the "real" and the "possible." From this point of view, Lefebvre's project is less a bid to establish foundations, than to provide an "orientation," "open up paths" and disclose a "horizon" concealed by conventional systems of thought. ibid. p. 368

134 Lefebvre, Henri (1991b) op. cit. p. 362. See also pp. 356, 381-382

135 The following characterisation draws on Lefebvre, Henri (1991b) pp. 5-45, and particularly p. 30, pp. 38-40
Spatial practice (perceived space) with all its contradictions in everyday life. This constitutes space as perceived in the commonsensical mode (percru), which is to say taken for granted and un-reflexively practised; ignored one minute, and fetishised the next. As Lefebvre puts it: “Spatial practice ensures continuity and some degree of cohesion. In terms of social space, and of each member of a given society’s relationship to that space, this cohesion implies a guaranteed level of performance.”

Representations of space (conceived space) or discourses on space. This is space as it is conceived in expert knowledge on space, at the level of the discursive, the numerical, and the disembodied mental (l’espace concu). Representations of space generate specific forms of knowledge (savoir) connected to formal and institutional apparatuses of power. Such forms of knowledge are technical and instrumentally rational, and for Lefebvre represent the increasing hegemony of a ‘logic of visualisation’ that serves to represent space as seemingly unproblematic, ‘natural’ and ‘transparent.’ For Lefebvre, the problem with such a representation of space is its depthlessness and implied self-evidence. As such it “evades both theory and practice” by obscuring the ongoing struggles and contestation over the meaning and use of space beneath a supposedly unambiguous and politically neutral surface.

Spaces of representation (lived space) or discourses of space. This is the third, or other term, in Lefebvre’s three-part dialectic; a qualitative experience of temporality that bursts forth as ‘moments’ of fully lived presence, shocking one into a new conception of the spatialisation of everyday life (l’espace vecu). Spaces of representation tend to generate forms of knowledge that Lefebvre terms connaissance. In opposition to the formal understanding offered through savoir, connaissance implies a less formalised, more local mode of reflexive understanding that tends to be geographically and historically contingent, and which find expression through socially specific spatial practices. As such, spaces of representation are generators of counter discourses which have not been

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136 ibid. p. 33
137 ibid. p. 7

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totally grasped by formal apparatuses of power, or which "refuse to acknowledge power."\textsuperscript{138}

Each aspect of this three-part spatialisation is in a relationship with the other two, altogether making up l’espace – the spatialisation. With reference to Lefebvre’s triad of the perceived (spatial practice), conceived (representations of space) and lived (spaces of representation), Rob Shields has noted that a common reading of their relationship within a dialectical schema may be summarised thus:

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Arguing that such a schema fails to capture the radicalism of Lefebvre’s project, Shields proposes that they make more sense if they are rethought as a dialectical contradiction of: everyday perception/practice (affirmation) v spatial theory/concepts (negation), relativised by moments of creative, fully lived space (negation of the negation). ‘Both (affirmation) -and (negation)’ may be restated as ‘both (affirmation and negation) - ‘and’ (the third, other, rather than negation of the negation). Analysis of these three aspects in a particular circumstance presents us with what Shields terms ‘the spatialisation’ (l’espace):

\textsuperscript{138} ibid. p. 10
CHAPTER ONE – HENRI LEFEBVRE

I Affirmation
Everyday practice and perceptions vs. Analytical theory and institutions

III Negation of the Negation
(Otherness)
Both overturned by unpredictable, fully lived moments

IV Analytical Synthesis
Social totality revealed by theoretical analysis
(l’espace: the spatialisation)

Rob Shields’ interpretation of the implications of the Lefebvrian spatialised dialectic

Viewed in this way the dialectic is spatialised in the sense that temporal supercession is problematised. The integration of Nietzsche’s conception of the ‘eternal return’ of irreducible tension into Marx’s dialectic, implies that the terms of the dialectic are not simply superseded, but instead ‘return’ to haunt and disrupt attempts at neat closure or synthesis. Thus, the terms are not only mutually dependent, but also relativise each other. Lefebvre’s dialectic is an “open ended movement, bringing together the conflictual and contradictory, and linking them in theory and practice.” The possibility always remains that those aspects seemingly eradicated in the construction of a dominant

139 Adapted from: Shields, Rob (1999) Lefebvre, love and struggle: Spatial dialectics (London and New York: Routledge) p. 120

140 Rob Shields argues that: “By opening the position of the negation of the negation as the place of alterity itself, otherness is brought into the dialectical schema without being reduced to the logic of the ‘other’ as merely a straightforward ‘negation’ of self, of thesis - an affirmation.” Diagrammatically, this point may be summarised thus: A (affirmation) /not A (negation) relativised by not A/not A (double negation [other]). This logical structure of Lefebvre’s triadic reconfiguring of the dialectic, can only, according to Shields: “be called postmodern and ... finds its roots to lie not only in Hegel, Marx and Lefebvre but also in the work of Emanuel Levinas’ ‘alterity,’ Edward Said’s ‘Orientalism’ and Gloria Anzaldúa’s ‘bordercrossing,’ and in the work of others who have sought to piece together the logic of stories told alongside official histories (Bakhtin).” Shields, Rob (1999) op. cit. p. 152

spatialisation ‘return’ to haunt attempts at closure. This implies that any ‘spatial fix’ is wracked with tension, and its ‘nature’ not restricted simply to what power says it is. While domination seeks to minimise otherness by aligning everyday practice (perceived) with technical knowledge of space (conceived) – thus ensuring predictability and the (re)production of space as an (alienated) object – resistance is expressed through the irruption of lived moments that exceed, interrupt and question the routine everyday practices conducted in its image. Space then, is an ongoing product of negotiation and contest:

The production of a new space commensurate with the capacities of the productive forces (technology and knowledge) can never be brought about by any particular social group: it must of necessity result from relationships between groups – between classes or fractions of classes – on a world scale.\(^{142}\)

In this important sense, whether the conceived nature of a space endures (that its planned purpose or function is reproduced over time) depends on the ability of planners to get users to share their interpretation and put it into practice. The attempt to achieve dominance is thus only ever a more or less contingent achievement (hence necessitating ongoing maintenance), and is only ever partially successful in excluding alternative interpretations and lived practices.\(^{143}\)

In this context, Lefebvre’s ‘long history of space’ and seeming nostalgia for a lost age of plenitude should be read as a strategic marshalling of the ‘outmoded.’ A focus on the ‘outmoded’ is best read politically as a form of resistance – an attempt to contest the forces of capital and the state’s representations of space, that ascribe the designation ‘outmoded’ or ‘backward’ to that which it wants to eliminate under the guise of ‘modernisation.’ An instructive comparison may be drawn with Walter Benjamin’s

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\(^{142}\) Lefebvre, Henri (1991b) op. cit. p. 380

\(^{143}\) In this regard, and with reference to the interpretation of Hegelian dialectics drawn on by Lefebvre, it is more useful to consider contradiction in terms not of the progressive resolution of difference to the same, but rather of the inability of the whole (the dominant representation of a space as a single homogenous system) to totally subordinate and mask the spaces of representation that introduce heterogeneity to the system. This failure of the totalising project to successfully and unambiguously subordinate difference is an aspect of Hegel’s logic recognised by Zizek. See Zizek, Slavoj (1989) The sublime object of ideology (London: Verso)
critical readings of memory and excavation of the historical layers of places. Benjamin seeks to recover the traces of people and events unremembered within ‘official’ stories of the past and unrecorded within monumental landscapes. The task of Benjamin’s ‘archaeology’ is to rescue past hopes and dreams, and redeem them for the purpose of contemporary political struggles. Against the monumental symbolisms of the triumphant, supposedly fixed authority and dominance of the present, Benjamin emphasises the ways in which they became open to contrary readings as their political contexts changed. During this ‘afterlife,’ Benjamin argued, the mythic, barbaric, and exclusionary dimension of hegemonic symbolisms could be exposed to subversive effect. This involves the “trick” of substituting a political rather than historical view of the past, thereby unleashing its revolutionary potential:

... destitution – not only social but architeconic, the poverty of interiors, enslaved but enslaving objects – can suddenly be transformed into revolutionary nihilism ... They bring the immense forces of ‘atmosphere’ concealed in these things to the point of explosion144

Associated with ‘spaces of representation’ in Lefebvre’s three-part dialectic within spatialisation, this explosive charge of the outmoded comes in part from its association with what Freud termed the uncanny: the return of material that was previously repressed. Lefebvre argues that this explosive potential of the uncanny has the potential to dislocate dominant norms and identities given by the spectacular relationship of abstract space. The return of such repressed historical materials – consigned by the dominant spatialisation to the archaic and backward – brings cultural elements from the ‘past’ into connection with socio-economic forces in the present: their evident ‘life’ and ‘presence’

problematising the dominant regime of visualisation by unsettling the boundary it has established between presence and absence.\textsuperscript{145} As Ball puts it:

... to conceive everyday life in such a way as to retrieve it from its modern state of colonization by the commodity form and other modes of reification. A critique of the everyday can be generated only by a kind of alienation effect, insofar as it is put into contact with its own radical other, such as an eradicated past ... or an imagined past\textsuperscript{146}.

The outmoded is thus associated with a disruptive power, with the reclamation and amplification of elements that threaten the neat closures of abstract space. Lefebvre's nostalgia should therefore not simply be taken as a longing to return to the past. As David Pinder has astutely noted of Guy Debord's theorisation of the spectacle, his occasional "almost aristocratic distain for aspects of modernisation and 'progress' ... are crosscut in his writings with a desire to struggle for different futures and to set out other understandings of modernisation and modernism."\textsuperscript{147} Lefebvre's objection is not that 'representations of space' are false, nor that the forms of technical and instrumental rationality that inform them are in themselves 'bad,' but rather that 'representations of space' are only a partial lens on the emergent 'truth' of space. Accordingly, Lefebvre's primary concern is to highlight the conceit and will to power of those who "identify what is lived [spaces of representation] and what is perceived [spatial practices] with what is conceived [representations of space]."\textsuperscript{148}

More than anything, then, a progressive political practice depends on realising difference in the face of tendencies that separate and fetishise difference. Lefebvre opposes such reduction by outlining a theory of difference that pursues increasing complexity of the world and society, and in which the creativity of the excluded can be

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\textsuperscript{145} This rupturing and its potential for sparking moments of social awakening is one connation of Benjamin's notion of "profane illumination." Benjamin, Walter (1979) \textit{op. cit.} p. 277

\textsuperscript{146} Ball, Edward (1987) 'The great sideshow of the Situationist International.' \textit{Yale French Studies}, 73, p. 30 [pp. 21-37]

\textsuperscript{147} Pinder, David (2000) "'Old Paris is no more": Geographies of spectacle and anti-spectacle." \textit{Antipode}, 32:4, p. 375 [pp. 357-386]

\textsuperscript{148} ibid. p. 38
developed into an alternative to the dominant social spatialisation. As Lefebvre uses it, 'difference' implies a practice of linking the near and far, the actual and utopian: "space in its totality or global aspect ... needs not only to be subjected to analytic scrutiny ... but also to be engendered."149 Implied here is struggle against 'indifference' – what Lefebvre characterises as a 'refusal of connection,' or reduction of complex processes to simple essences rather than as 'moments' in a wider circulation. Lefebvre's theory of difference may thus be seen as a struggle against imposed fragmentation and separation, and as a restoring of centrality through practice.

At the same time, Lefebvre is intensely sensitive that this not result in the reduction of differences through the installation of some new ordering principle. To subvert this tendency, Lefebvre's theory of difference also implies an assertion of absolute difference where it is strategically useful to do so; a pragmatic assertion of autonomy in the face of relations that are effectively uni-directional and structured by unequal exchange. This is because the power of abstraction operates by simultaneous tendencies to homogenisation, fragmentation, and hierarchy. From this point of view, a progressive politics must continually vacillate between a simple assertion of difference (or absolute location) and an assertion of relationally and unity within a wider whole. This follows from Lefebvre's insistence that the perpetuation of the global space of capital is dependent on spatial practices remaining either solely directed toward a local place perceived as bounded and naturalised, or else to a 'global' space in abstraction from the 'places' within it. Any substantial challenge must consequently recognise that the political power of representations of space ('conceived' space) over the spaces of representation ('lived' space) is "not a detachment of differentiated forces."150 Lefebvre explicates this point in the following passage:

It would be mistaken in this connection to picture a hierarchical scale stretching between two poles, with the unified will of political power at one extreme and the actual dispersion of differentiated elements at the other. For everything (the

149 Lefebvre, Henri (1991b) op. cit. p. 37
150 Merrifield, Andrew (1993) 'Place and space: A Lefebvrian reconciliation.' Transactions of the British Institute of Geographers New Series, 18, p. 526 (pp. 516-531)

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'whole') weighs down on the lower or 'micro' level, on the local and the localizable – in short, on the sphere of everyday life. Everything (the 'whole') also depends on this level; exploitation and domination, protection and – inseparably – repression. The basis and foundation of the 'whole' is dissociation and separation, maintained as such by the will above; such dissociation and separation are inevitable in that they are the outcome of a history, of the history of accumulation, but they are fatal as soon as they are maintained in this way, because they keep the moments and elements of social practice away from one another. A spatial practice destroys social practice; social practice destroys itself by means of spatial practice.

What such an understanding points to is the regressive and disabling nature of the tendency to act out everyday spatial practices in terms of a reified separation between the localised sphere of everyday life on the one hand, and the global whole on the other. As Lefebvre notes, it is "fatal ... to keep the moments and elements of social practice away from one another." Such a 'common-sense' understanding is 'fatal' to the extent that spatial practice conducted only within an understanding of 'the local' – as if it could be understood apart from other places up to and including the whole – can only perpetuate the ultimate domination of the whole over the sum of parts conceived as 'independent,' and hence dissociated and fragmented. From this point of view, the effectiveness of resistance is circumscribed to the extent that it remains 'localised.' On the other hand, spatial practices oriented to and operative solely in the global whole are essentially abstractions, since they are not 'grounded' in a concrete place from which to speak and act. As such, they are unable to create and maintain a space of their own and hence are inevitably transient and ephemeral. This points to the fact that it is crucially important for resistance to 'take place.' As Lefebvre insists, place "... contain[s] the resources needed and the stakes at issue." Struggles are 'dependent' on concrete places, since it is here that the particular forms of domination opposed by a social group achieve material expression. Thus, concrete place comprises the immediate area of struggle and contestation. Moreover, location in concrete place also gives access to 'resources': histories, memories, and rituals specific to the members of a marginalised group that

151 Lefebvre, Henri (1991b) op. cit. p. 366
152 ibid. p. 366
153 ibid. p. 366
furnish a 'location' from which to speak. Concrete place is thus an important resource to the extent it furnishes a 'space of representation' from which a 'counter-memory' can be extracted and opposed to 'official' memory. This implies that a struggle that does not 'take place' is effectively an abstraction. It must be 'embodied' and it must create a space through concrete struggle; it must create a 'space of the body' that opposes the attempt of power to isolate the body in a space of power's choosing.

This duality between the 'local' domain of concrete space and the 'global' domain of abstract space, suggests that it is not plausible to assert that all struggles for differences deserve support, nor that all struggles for unity should be condemned. Rather, Lefebvre insists that struggles are strictly situational. Thus, while it is appropriate to stress difference in the face of a power that seeks homogeneity, a power that also operates by fragmenting social groups and individuals one from another must be opposed by appeals to unity. In short, it is necessary to practice a 'strategic essentialism':

The answer to separation and dispersion is unification, just as the answer to forced homogenisation is the discernment of differences and their practical realisation. Struggles directed towards these goals, whether implicitly or explicitly, are waged on many fronts ... they need have no obvious links with each other ... some combat the tendency to separate while others combat the tendency to confuse. A politics that separates (by dividing and dispersing space) and fosters confusion (by conflating peoples, regions and spaces with states) continues to be opposed by political means.

This implies that there is no transcendent principle by appeal to which a group may assert its validity - there is no abstract 'right' to be different. Rather, this right must emerge through continuous struggle, through an existence that confronts and engages that which seeks to reduce it, and thus through the ongoing creation of a space of representation that For Lefebvre then, difference is not based on particularity, originality, or individualism; it emerges from struggle, conceptual and lived:

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124 ibid. pp. 418-419
The 'right to difference' is a formal designation for something that may be achieved only through practical action, through effective struggle — namely, concrete differences. The right to difference implies no entitlements that have not been bitterly fought for ... [It is a right] whose only justification lies in its content.\textsuperscript{155}

Conclusion

This chapter has introduced Lefebvre’s contention that globalization implies the restructuring of state space and the empowerment of the state in new ways. Emphasised was the fact that state space cannot be understood in terms of an ahistorical notion of sovereignty. Nor, on the other hand, can it be understood in terms of 'erosion.' The ‘territorial trap’ is insufficient to understand contemporary processes, as are analyses that occlude the importance of the state in its fixing of space in a political centrality. Understanding globalization as a reconfiguration and reterritorialisation of superimposed spatial scales rather than as an unidirectional dissolving of sub-global scales, the relation between the global and other scales — whether the state, urban-regional, the local or even the human subject — cannot be understood as a confrontation between strictly oppositional or mutually exclusive levels or forces. Instead, the fundamental question becomes not whether the state will live and endure on the one hand, or die and wither on the other hand, but rather how the state's relation to social space on all scales is being transformed within the processes of global capitalist restructuring.

Within the Lefebvrian perspective developed here, the globalization of capital and the reconfiguration of the state’s socio-spatial organisation are dialectically intertwined moments of the same multiscalar process of globalization. This understanding of state space as being restructured in tandem with the contradictions of capitalism on a world scale, was shown to be intimately linked with the simultaneous homogenisation and fragmentation of socio-social relations. Put more concretely, it was suggested that Lefebvre points to the central role of the state in managing the contradiction between the devastation wrought upon everyday life by the accumulation process on the one hand,

\textsuperscript{155} ibid. p. 396
and the tendency to accelerate this accumulation process on the other. Implied here is the production of social space to imbue it with exchange value; a process that reduces difference by delegitimising the multiple ways that spaces are taken up and used. Central to this strategy are visualisation and the production of spectacle, implying the increasing mediation of social relations via images.

Following from the characterisation of the terrain of progressive political practice as simultaneously global, fragmented, and hierarchical, it was suggested that Lefebvre's understanding preserves room for resistance through his understanding that the truth of space is not simply what domination wishes it to be – an array of hierarchically arranged, fragmented 'profit surfaces' – but is instead composed of different sorts of spaces (conceived, perceived, lived). Importantly, the situating of the human subject squarely at the centre of Lefebvre's theorisation of globalization maintains a space whereby political power can be critiqued and contested. Put differently, it provides a concrete point of entry into consideration of what the global economy actually implies on a human level. In this context, globalization reveals itself as the empowerment of specific forms of knowledge at the expense of others, implying a standardisation and reduction of social relations, and the 'centralisation' of spatio-temporal organisation of society to an ever narrower and more specialised class. At the same time, Lefebvre's understanding figures resistance as an integral aspect of the production of space under capitalism. The taking up of abstract space, as it is mediated through localised 'particularisms,' suggests that abstract space is not simply homogeneous or even self-identical. It is inevitably fragmented as representations of space are filtered through particularised spatial imaginaries and subject to consumption and use.

Lefebvre's wish to maximise the lived aspect of space, implies a politics of difference that seeks to introduce 'pollution' into narratives pertaining to the purity of spaces, and discontinuity into narratives pertaining to 'progress,' or unified 'modernity.' In this context, Lefebvre's concern is to uncover and empower 'counter-memories' rendered absent through the discursive practices informed by understandings of abstract space – such as 'rational' economic planning, redevelopment, and even national imagining – and
bring them into direct confrontation with the ‘presence’ privileged by the dominant
spatialisation. This implies the opposition of difference to a reduction that ‘unites by
separating and separates by uniting.’ It has been argued that this points to Lefebvre’s
insistence that resistance must be ‘strategically essential,’ simultaneously resisting
subsumption within ‘false unity,’ while also seeking to form contingent ‘more global’
alliances wherever possible.

The following chapters develop these themes. In the chapter that follows, the first
thesis question is addressed. That is, what does a Lefebvrian perspective tell us about
what happens to the social space of Mexican state territoriality, with the economic
restructuring associated with globalization?
CHAPTER TWO – SPACE, KNOWLEDGE AND POWER IN THE MEXICAN TRANSITION

Everything flows. Give me a place to stand

– Heraclitus

The dominant discourse of space ... robs reality of meaning by dressing it in an ideological garb that does not appear as such, but instead gives the impression of being ... 'beyond ideology.' These vestments [of rationality and rationalism] ... are responsible – precisely – for fragmentation, break-up and separation under the umbrella of bureaucratically decreed unity ... conflated with the rational power to discriminate. What is being covered up here is a moral and political order ... a convulsive degeneration (of Classical reason) into technological and technocratic rationality; this is the moment of its transformation into its opposite – into the absurdity of a pulverized reality

– Henri Lefebvre

1 Lefebvre, Henri (1991b) op. cit. p. 317
CHAPTER TWO - SPACE, KNOWLEDGE AND POWER IN THE MEXICAN TRANSITION

Introduction

Before 1994, modernising Mexico meant two things. To the opponents of government policy, 'modernisation' implied a betrayal of those principles bequeathed by the Mexican Revolution (approx. 1910-1920). For the government itself, modernisation represented the best path to achieve those same principles in a changed world. In this context, it is hardly surprising that Robert Scott observes the Mexican Revolution means: "everything to everybody and something different to each."2 According to Ramón Eduardo Ruiz, the 1917 Mexican constitution had proved "amorphous and contradictory."3 This implies the constitution was flexible enough to allow the maintenance of a pragmatic balance between social justice and economic growth, and freedom and stability. There was no commitment to an explicit ideology. Rather, Revolutionary symbols were used to institutionalise the Revolution in the form of the PRI (Party of the Institutionalised Revolution).4

For at least a decade preceding 1994, this ambiguity provoked a heated dispute over the Mexican nation between two opposed development strategies denoted as 'statist' and 'neoliberal.' Broadly speaking the statist position emphasised the economic role of the state, the development of the domestic market, Keynesian redistribution, the rejection of

4 PRI is the abbreviation for the oxymoronically titled Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Party of the Institutionalised Revolution). The PRI was the governing party of Mexico from the conclusion of the armed phase of the Revolution (approx. 1920) to the year 2000. The PRI has undergone several guises in this period. In 1929, the Revolution achieved its first institutionalisation through the formation of the PNR (Partido Nacional Revolucionario - National Revolutionary Party). In 1938, Lázaro Cárdenas restructured the PNR to form the corporate PRM (Partido de la Revolución Mexicana - Party of the Mexican Revolution). A final restructuring in 1946 to form the PRI followed this. The other main parties in contemporary Mexican politics are the rightist PAN (Partido Acción Nacional - National Action Party) and the leftist PRD (Partido Revolución Democrática - Party of the Democratic Revolution). The PRD is a leftist coalition party formed in the aftermath of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas' (Lázaro's son) failed 1988 bid for the presidency. Manuel Gómez Morín, the architect of Calles' economic program of the 1920s, formed the PAN in 1939 in opposition to Cárdenismo (particularly agrarianism which he condemned as inspired by a "false and artificial concept of struggle." See Krauze, Enrique (1997) Mexico - Biography of power: A history of modern Mexico, 1810-1996 (New York: Harper Perennial) p. 478. The PAN has progressively become the party of the business class, and finds its core support in the north. It is currently the ruling party of Mexico following the historic unseating of the PRI in the 2000 elections.
restrictive monetary policies, and fiscal reform to generate resources for the state. The neoliberal strategy expressly opposed itself to this position. The neoliberalism of presidents Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988) and Salinas de la Gortari (1988-1994) promoted economic integration through comparative advantage vis-à-vis the US (United States). Stressed were low labour costs, abundant natural resources, geographic proximity to the US, agricultural exportation rather than consumption, and the elimination of tariff barriers and other protectionist measures. Control of inflation rather than demand was placed at the centre of policy, with fiscal and wage austerity particularly during crises. Mexican neoliberalism of this period rejected protectionism and state intervention, arguing that this hampered the development of market forces and ‘efficiency.’

Speaking of the rise of the globalization thesis, David Slater has noted a tendency to the "erasure of imperial politics." Slater’s point is that there is a tendency in the literature to downplay the ways in which the ideology of neoliberalism underlies the totalising assumptions of much global thinking. For Slater, failure to appreciate this connection implies ignorance towards the unequal power relations involved in the correspondence between economic restructuring and the rise of the globalization thesis. This tendency is particularly manifest in the propensity in the literature to stress interconnections rather than interdependence, ignoring the inequitable ways that such interconnections have come about. This chapter concur with Slater’s insistence that it is more helpful to focus on histories of unequal power relations, rather than recourse to simplistic notions of ‘homogenisation,’ insofar as uncritical embrace of the latter tends toward the effacement of the operation of power. This implies the recognition that the global system is hierarchically ordered, and that the tendency toward homogenisation is a function of the power infused privileging of some ‘futures’ over others.

At the same time, it is important to refrain from viewing the consolidation of the neoliberal model simply as an external imposition of structural adjustment policies by

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International Financial Institutions (IFIs). As Slater has also noted, Anglo American scholarship on the globalization question is frequently marked by an unreflective “eurocentrism,” wherein it is assumed that the issue is simply not debated outside the West.\(^6\) In Mexico, it is clear that neoliberalism has been accepted and even embraced by some, whilst strongly resisted and criticised by others. This suggests that it is important to recognise that Mexicans are themselves active agents of knowledge, rather than simply the passive victims of external imposition. Consequently, one aim of this chapter is to maintain sensitivity to historical particularity vis-à-vis the exhaustion of alternative economic models (statist socialism/populism/structuralism etc.) and changes in political culture (the shift from políticos to tecnócratas), whilst at the same time linking these issues to changes in the international political economy more generally.\(^7\) Stressed in this chapter then, is the *interaction* between national and international processes.\(^8\)

This chapter seeks to develop two intertwined themes. The first theme addresses the *ideological dimension* of Mexico’s integration into the world economy up until 1994, analysing the transition from what has variously been termed an ‘economically active,’ ‘Fordist-Keynesian,’ ‘nationalist,’ and even ‘anti-imperialist’ statist economic policy, to one increasingly orientated to accommodation with neo-liberal institutions and principles. In 1995, Cockburn and Silverstein argued that: “no nation has been more rigorously servile than Mexico in implementing recommendations from the IMF [International Monetary Fund] and its sister institution, the World Bank, both of whom hailed the country as a model when its economy was riding high [in 1992].”\(^9\) This statement obviously implies the hegemony of the neoliberal model in the formulation of government policy. In order to understand this transition to neoliberalism, this first theme

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\(^8\) This approach is obviously informed by my general insistence that the ‘withering away of the state’ thesis is premature in relation to Mexico

finds its centre in the rise of the neoliberal tecnócratas (technocrats) to political ascendancy following the 1982 debt crisis. The main questions addressed here are: who are the tecnócratas and how do they think; why did they ascend to power; how have they interpreted and implemented neoliberalism in a Mexican context; and what tensions and contradictions has this implementation/interpretation exposed in the Mexican political system? Implied here is the understanding that the ascendancy of a technocratic free market ideology in Mexico between the early 1980s and 1994 is not simply a victory of neoliberal economics.

The neoliberal model relies upon a set of ideological assumptions regarding the role of the state and the market that will guide its application. The results of such a policy process will not be politically neutral, for choices will be made that benefit some Mexican social groups and exclude others. The scientific method of neoliberalism is thus not applied in a political vacuum. It is a product of both ideology and history, of method and substance, and theory and practise. The pressures of domestic and international interests, the organisational structure of the Mexican state, and the logic of bureaucratic politics around the presidency all helped shape the manner in which neoliberalism was applied in Mexico. At the same time, it is argued that while the use of Mexican Revolutionary symbols by the new technocratic elite is partly opportunistic, in some sense it is also deeply committed. It is not simply pragmatic or opportunist. As Centeno insists: "Salinas appears truly committed to the Revolutionary notions of nationalism, sovereignty, and justice." John Womack concurs, remarking in 1990 that President Carlos Salinas de la Gortari (1988-1994), "is trying to make sense of the Mexican Revolution at the end of the twentieth century. The world isn't the same as in 1910."

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10 Ed Brown has noted a "silence" in the globalization literature regarding the consolidation of neoliberal ideology. See: Brown, Ed (1996) 'Articulating opposition in Latin America: The consolidation of neoliberalism and the search for radical alternative.' Political geography, 15:2, p. 170 [pp. 169-192]. It is one aim of this chapter to address this issue.


12 John Womack, quoted in Los Angeles Times Magazine, November 25, 1990, p. 16
CHAPTER TWO - SPACE, KNOWLEDGE AND POWER IN THE MEXICAN TRANSITION

This first theme thus seeks to maintain sensitivity to what neoliberalism, and more broadly, globalization, has entailed in a Mexican context.

The aim of this first theme is to conceptualise technocratic discourse as manifesting the hegemony of what Henri Lefebvre terms *representations of space* in the production of Mexican space (l'espace ("the spatialisation") of Mexico). *Representations of space* refers to the way in which the power, knowledge, and spatiality of the powerful is inscribed in space. The technocratic viewpoint of the Mexican *tecnoératas* embraces this aspect of Lefebvre's three-part dialectic within spatialisation (the other two moments being *spatial practice* and *spaces of representation*) in that it conceives space as abstract rather than social. It is a ‘view from above’ as Michel de Certeau puts it, seeking to exert power over space through the presentation of its viewpoint as universal, rational, scientific, objective, and thus incontestable.

Imbricated with this theme is a second, which attends the question of what integration into the world economy via the hegemony of this aspect of Henri Lefebvre's three-part dialectic within spatialisation implies for the territoriality of the Mexican state. The aim here is to introduce a Lefebvrian conceptualisation of globalization, and use this to argue that transition in Mexico is best seen less as a case of the 'dissolving' of state space, than as a process of the scalar restructuring of state territorial organisation. Lefebvre defines the essential feature of the modern state as its territorially centralised organisational form, characterised by exclusive domination of a centralised administrative apparatus over a territorially delimited space. Following its consolidation during the seventeenth century, the territorial state has assumed a variety of forms, each of which has been intertwined in contradictory ways with historically specific regimes of capital

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CHAPTER TWO - SPACE, KNOWLEDGE AND POWER IN THE MEXICAN TRANSITION

accumulation. Contra to the tendency of much post-war state theory and international relations theory to view the interstate system and world economy as ontologically distinct or externally related entities, a Lefebvrian perspective conceives state territorially as an essential organisational and geographical component of world-scale circuits of capital. As David Harvey has consistently argued, capital’s impulsion to accelerate its turnover time and eliminate spatial barriers to its circulation process necessarily entails the production of relatively immobile spatial configurations. Each specific phase of capital development has been grounded upon distinctive forms of territorial organisation – a socially produced ‘second-nature’ of transportation, communications, and regulatory-institutional infrastructures – through which capital can circulate at socially average turnover times.

This moment of territorialisation – capital’s “spatial fix” – is rooted in long term investments in relatively immobile cities and territories that are revalorised and reterritorialised during each systemic crisis of capital accumulation. The territorial ‘fixity’ of state territories provides stabilised geographical scaffolding for the increasing spatial ‘mobility’ and ‘transience’ of labour power, commodities and capital on both supra- and sub-state scales. From Lefebvre’s perspective, each spatial fix must be viewed as a “precarious equilibrium,” constructed through the conflictual relations between various fractions of capital, state institutions, class fractions and social movements, as they are articulated at different geographical scales. It is in this context that forms of urbanisation and state territorial organisation are directly ensnared within the spatio-temporal contradictions of the capital relation, and that claims that the state is ‘withering away’ are best appreciated. Capital's ongoing struggle to “annihilate space

16 See, for example: Harvey, David (1982) The limits to capital (Oxford: Blackwell); Harvey, David (1989a) The condition of postmodernity (Oxford: Blackwell)
18 Lefebvre, Henri (1976d) De l’État, II: De Hegel a Marx par Stalin (Paris: UGE) p. 56
with time" generates a dynamic of creative destruction in which configurations of territorial organisation are periodically territorialised, deterritorialised, and reterritorialised as geographical infrastructures for each round of capital accumulation. From this perspective, changing forms of Mexican territorial organisation are best understood as relatively fixed and immobile spatial infrastructures within and upon which each successive wave of capitalist industrialisation has been grounded.

This viewpoint expressly opposes the notion that the Mexican state is subject to 'decline,' or a one-sided placeless dynamic of 'deterritorialisation' in the face of the post-1982 imperatives of economic globalization. As a methodological starting point, Lefebvre conceives globalization as a contradictory reconfiguration of densely interwoven, superimposed spatial scales, including those on which the territorial state is organised. From a Lefebvrian perspective, the global, state, and local/regional scales are intrinsically related, co-evolving layers of territorial organisation. This implies the theorisation of contemporary reconfigurations of state territorial organisation as contradictory, contested strategies of reterritorialisation. This reterritorialisation implies a process whereby the place-based and territorial preconditions for accelerated capital


20 As Anderson has put it: "The presentation of a simplistic 'choice' [in debates concerning the future of the state] between just two alternatives – life or death – obscures the possibility that something else is happening: a qualitative reshaping of states and nations, territory and sovereignty, which is not captured by notions of death or decline." Anderson, James (1996) 'The shifting stage of politics: new medieval and post-modern territorialities?' Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 14, p. 135 [pp. 133-153]


22 As Neil Smith puts it, some who have witnessed the restructuring of the political economy of capital, globalization, and an integral spatial restructuring at various scales, have "blended nostalgia with apocalypse in a reinvented vision of the annihilation of space by time." Smith, Neil (1996) 'Spaces of vulnerability: The space of flows and the politics of scale.' Critique of Anthropology, 16:1, p. 68 [pp. 63-77]. Smith cites, as examples of such commentators: Kunstler, James H (1993) The geography of nowhere: The rise and decline of America's man-made landscapes (New York: Simon and Schuster) and Meyrowitz, Joshua (1985) No sense of place (New York: Oxford University Press)

circulation are constructed on multiple spatial scales. Accordingly, state territoriality is less subject to 'erosion,' than it is subject to rearticulation and reterritorialisation in relation to sub- and supra-state scales.

In this chapter it is argued that the globalization of Mexican state territoriality in the post-1982 neoliberal period led to the intensification of uneven development within Mexico, as select geographical regions and social sectors were privileged, and others effectively 'delinked' from the development strategy of the 'new' Mexico. The ability to both carry out and politically manage this increasing spatial and social polarisation was facilitated in the 1982-1994 period by the success of the ruling elite in its imposition of a single model of truth upon the inherently contradictory interests of the diverse groups that make up the national community. Swyngedouw provides a useful definition of hegemony in the context of globalization and its associated 'politics of scale.' For Swyngedouw, globalization implies: “a series of highly contested, deeply contradictory, and variegated processes and power struggles that often revolve around scale, control over particular scales, the content of existing scales, the construction of new scales, and the articulation between scales.” In this context, hegemony is defined by “the capacity of a dominant group (or an alliance of class factions) to impose a series of social practices at a particular spatial scale that are to its (their) advantage, or, more generally, hegemony is the capacity of a model of social relationships to impose itself as the desired model on the rest of society.” This implies that the restructuring of the Mexican state form proved deeply functional to the unfolding and deepening of the process of economic globalization. The Mexican state did not prove an obstacle to the unfolding of globalization. Rather, the state was integral to this process. State territoriality is not simply being eroded, since the

24 Crudely speaking, this has implied the concentration of investment in the urbanised development zones situated in the north of Mexico, and in sectors dominated by capital-intensive high technology investment. Delinked from the benefits accruing to the macro economy, are those sectors such as traditional agriculture situated primarily in the south of Mexico. Taken to its limit, reform enacts 'annihilation of space by law and by reason,' the process both materially and discursively placing marginalised sectors outside the 'positively valued modernity' of the 'new' Mexico. This theme is developed in the following chapter


26 ibid. p. 147
reorganisation of capitalist accumulation on a world scale entails that the process of state
deterritorialisation operates in tandem with state reterritorialisation. The state, in short, is
subject to ‘creative destruction,’ and this process is — at least in part — managed and
incited by the state itself for accelerating capitalist accumulation.

The chapter is divided into five sections. The first section examines the ‘statist’ period
of Mexican state territoriality (1934-1982) in order to contextualise why and how
neoliberalism came to be embraced in Mexico. Examined are the main policies of this
period and the emergence of the new technocratic elite in the 1970s. Section two
examines the ideological shift to technocratic neoliberalism, situating this within both a
domestic and international context. Section three examines the ‘monopoly on truth’
through which the tecnócratas managed the consolidation of the neoliberal model and
marginalised dissent. Section four focuses on the redefined state implied by the
technocrat’s ‘new realism,’ and what this implied for social policy. Finally, section five
examines the implications of technocratic liberalism for Mexican territorial organisation.

2.1 Mexican statism (1934-1982)

This section provides an overview of economic policy formulation between 1934 and
1982. First, the shift from the populist, anti-imperialist policies of the Lázaro Cárdenas
government (1934-1940) to the policy of Stabilising Development (SD) (1946-1970) is
examined. Second, the increasing alienation of private capital occasioned by change in
government policy (President Echeverría’s ‘Shared Development’), and the eventual
discrediting of populist politics by the onset of economic crisis is highlighted (1970-
1976). This is followed by an examination of the intensified state intervention
occasioned by the discovery of vast oil reserves and the rapprochement with capital
signalled by López Portillo’s ‘Alliance for Production’ (1976-1982). The spectacular
collapse of this model with the onset of international recession is highlighted. The
purpose of these three sections is to provide some historical detail to the ‘statist’ period of
post-Revolutionary Mexican economic policy, and thus to contextualise the Mexican transition to neoliberalism.

Three main points emerge from this exercise. First, statist economics had already reached its limits by the late 1960s. The populism of Echeverría represents an attempt to regain government legitimacy without fundamentally addressing the structural problems that established these limits. The discovery of oil only extended a model of development that had become increasingly non-viable in a changing world. Second, repeated crisis and failure increasingly discredited statism in the eyes of the new elites (the tecnócratas) that gained influence as the 1970s wore on, and positioned these elites for ascendancy in the post 1982 period. Third, the prestige and influence of private capital and the free market gradually increased, and pulled Mexico ever closer towards both to the US and the 'economic orthodoxy' propagated by increasingly influential International Financial Institutions (IFIs).

Economic radicalism and the 'Mexican miracle' (1934-1970)

The world order from the 1930s through to the 1970s was generally permissive to expressions of economic nationalism, such as protectionism and nationalisation of foreign owned industries and resources in national territory. In the case of Mexico, the state mirrored this international tendency in the formulation of government policy. In The labyrinth of solitude (1961), Octavio Paz links this sense of nationalism to the myth of the Mexican Revolution:

National capitalism was not merely a natural consequence of the Revolution: to a great extent it was actually a creation of the Revolutionary state. If it had not been for land redistribution, major public works, government-funded enterprises, public investments, direct or indirect subsidies to industry and, in general, state intervention in the economy, our bankers and businessmen would not have had the opportunity to perform their work or to become part of the “native personnel” of foreign owned companies. It was indispensable, in a country whose economy has been stagnant for over two centuries, to accelerate the “natural” growth of our productive powers. This acceleration took the form of state intervention in the
economy and partial direction of it. Thanks to this policy, our evolution has been the most rapid and constant of any in America.\textsuperscript{27}

Mexican economic nationalism arose as a response to largely legitimate fears of vulnerability to US economic forces, expressive of a long history of both direct and indirect intervention in Mexican affairs.\textsuperscript{28} Consequently, economic nationalism celebrated the promotion of public and private capital that was distinctly Mexican. The most obvious manifestation of this was the dominance from the 1930s to the 1970s of a model of ISI (Import Substitution Industrialisation).\textsuperscript{29} This policy directly benefited Mexican big business – which under tariff protectionism, mimicked goods usually produced in the US – whilst also having positive spin-offs for small and medium sized businesses. During this period, there was a massive expansion of the public sector with the proliferation of public owned corporations, and expanded patronage of public employees. Agriculture was also subject to heavy state subsidisation. In this sense, whilst there was without doubt inequity within the system, state economic policy was broadly understood as providing benefits to the population as a whole.\textsuperscript{30} In the process, this consensus helped generate political legitimacy for the ruling PRI.

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\textsuperscript{28} The examples of US interference are legion. The most obvious instance is the armed annexation of 51 percent of Mexican territory (1,527,241 square kilometres) in the mid 19\textsuperscript{th} century, from which all or part of 10 current US states derive. John Ross notes that the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo signed on February 2\textsuperscript{nd}, 1848, signifies an event still referred to by Mexicans as "a permanent scar," "the great dispossession," and "the mutilation of the nation." Ross, John (1998) The annexation of Mexico: From the Aztecs to the IMF (Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press) p. 36. Territorial annexation was followed by the comprehensive opening of Mexico to the exploitation of US investors during the dictatorship of President Porfirio Diaz (effectively, 1876-1910), a state of affairs that directly contributed to the de-legitimisation of Diaz and the onset of the Revolution. Sovereignty, as expressed through a broadly anti-imperialist economic nationalism, thus became a central pillar of the Revolution's heritage. Sovereignty is a particularly touchy issue for Mexicans, as far as Mexico emerged from a colonial heritage, and has suffered continual foreign intervention and deleterious influence, that of the US being only the most obvious. This issue will be dealt with more thoroughly in the following chapter. For an interesting treatment of this issue, see: Valdés-Ugalde, Francisco (1999) 'Janus and the Northern Colossus: Perceptions of the United States in the building of the Mexican Nation.' The Journal of American History, 86:2, pp. 568-600
\textsuperscript{29} For an incisive discussion of this policy, see Buscaglia Jr., Edgardo (1994) 'Legal and economic development in Mexico: The steps ahead.' Journal of Interamerica Studies and World Affairs, 36:2, pp. 175-198
\textsuperscript{30} The period under discussion (late 30s to mid 70s) saw a sustained period of growth of the economy of just over 6 percent per annum. This compares favourably to other Latin American countries, making
\end{flushleft}
The high point of the economically active Mexican state came in the 1930s, when the Presidential authority of Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940) dominated Mexican state policy. In seeking to fulfil his radical vision of the thorough political reorganisation of Mexican society, Cárdenas enjoyed a level of popular support unparalleled in post Revolutionary Mexican history. In simple terms, the interpretation of the Revolution held by Cárdenas was that of an anti-imperialist socialist. Accordingly, Cárdenas sought to challenge those foreign interests that he saw as detrimental to the exercise of economic, political, and cultural self-determination. Implied in this challenge was a wide range of measures including extensive agrarian reform (including redistribution of some 104 million hectares), petroleum expropriation, nationalisation of railroads, the integration of organised labour and peasantry within the institutions of the state, socialist patriotic education, and the wide-ranging restructuring of political institutions. Perhaps above all was the most significant redistribution of income towards the poor in Mexican history, in a manner that appeared to fulfil many of the most populist commitments of the Revolution. The radically ‘statist’ position of Cárdenas placed a strong emphasis on the

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31 James Rochlin describes ‘national security’ in the period from the Mexican Revolution to World War II (1910-1940) as “defined in relation to highly nationalistic constitutional rhetoric with regard to both politics and economics, as well as with the identification of the United States as the principal external threat Mexico.” See: Rochlin, James F (1997) Redefining Mexican “security”: Society, state, and region under NAFTA (London and Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner) p. 3

32 Carlos Fuentes notes that having personally known all the post 1934 presidents, in his judgement “only one has attained true greatness: Lázaro Cárdenas. By greatness I mean ... the concept of nationhood, its people, its history and its culture, its destiny.” Fuentes, Carlos (1996) A new time for Mexico (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux) p. 156

33 Enrique Krauze argues of the oil expropriation and extensive land redistribution under Cárdenas: “Article 27 of the Constitution had finally been fulfilled in both letter and spirit. Mexico — from that moment — was more truly itself.” Krauze, Enrique (1997) Mexico — Biography of power: A history of modern Mexico, 1810-1996 (New York: Harper Perennial) p. 476. Article 27 was a central pillar of the 1917 constitution, and a fundamental source of legitimacy for successive post-Revolutionary governments until its amendment in 1992. It represents the (selective) incorporation of Emiliano Zapata’s radical agrarian demands (including redistribution, communal property rights, and limits on large land holdings), asserts the sovereignty of the Mexican nation over Mexican territory and all resources therein (particularly oil and mineral resources), and places strong limits upon foreign investment and ownership. For a full transcription of the 1917 Mexican constitution see: http://www.ilstu.edu/class/hist263/docs/1917const.html
economic role of the state, and the development of the domestic market. From this perspective, restrictive monetary policies were rejected, and fiscal reform encouraged in order to generate resources for the state. In Mexico, the most influential formulation of economic nationalism was known as underconsumption analysis. The key figures in this school during the time of the Cárdenas sexenio were based in the NIT (Nacional de Industrias de Transformación). Fundamentally, devotees of the underconsumption perspective wanted Mexican rather than foreign entrepreneurs, aided by the state, to push for rapid industrialisation. Moreover, the proposed customers for the products of this industrialisation were to be primarily Mexican. The central insight of this perspective was that producers shared a community of interests with their potential consumers. Accordingly, it was judged to be in the interest of the state and entrepreneurs to raise the living standards of workers. This seemed particularly important in Mexico given the extreme poverty of large sectors of the population. Accordingly, underconsumption analysis suggested that not only should workers be paid higher wages to produce a more dynamic market, but that a wide variety of rules should be slanted in favour of domestic producers. Central to this perspective was nationalisation, and where this proved impracticable, the preservation of key industries for domestic capitalists.

Beginning under the stewardship of Cárdenas, the Revolutionary state developed into an extremely strong corporate entity that as time went on, became increasingly committed to a program of rapid widespread industrialisation. Again, the imperative behind this drive was broadly anti-imperialist (at least in rhetoric), with a consensus emerging that the way out of the ‘backwardness’ bequeathed by a colonial origin and perpetuated by continued dependence on a succession of ‘benevolent’ great powers, was industrial modernisation.

35 ‘Sexenio’ refers to the six year term of office served by the Mexican president
36 Carlos Fuentes notes: “Between 1936 and 1940, Cárdenas gave the system its true form and content. He organized all the forces that had contributed to the Revolution – peasants, workers, and the middle class – into corporations within the party. This was not merely a gesture. Cárdenas made sure these organizations carried through revolutionary policies that strengthened the alliances of the social classes with the state and the party and, through them, with the nation - its goals, its independence, its well being.” Fuentes, Carlos (1996) op. cit. p. 70
Naturally, this impression was only reinforced by the intimate presence of the colossus of the north, otherwise known as the United States. For Mexicans of the mid twentieth century with ‘modern’ aspirations, the relative lack of technical and industrial development explained a great deal of the disparity between the two nations. Whilst Mexico was locked into cycles of poverty, dependency and a sense of crushing inferiority, the United States seemingly hurtled into the future on a wave of optimism and prosperity. Consequently, Mexican leaders chose to focus on the techniques that they believed had made their adversary great. In the process, a great national commitment to industrialisation emerged, with the breadth of this commitment generating legitimacy for the Revolutionary state. In order to fulfil this commitment to rapid development, the following two administrations (Manuel Ávila Camacho (1940-46) and Miguel Aleman (1946-52)) sought to moderate the radicalism displayed by Cárdenas, largely with the intention of building more cordial relations with the United States.37

This implied a strategic retreat from the radical statism of the Cárdenas years. Those influenced by underconsumption analysis increasingly found themselves under severe pressure both from the United States foreign policy establishment, and then the Mexican governments of the 1940s. Intense pressure was generated against any policies that would exclude US investors from Mexican markets and resources. Mexican nationalists were thus caught in a bind; however much they wanted to oppose US imperialism, they also needed US loans and technology for their industrialisation program. Any defensive measures that sought to limit the flow of American capital and influence into the country, also threatened Mexico’s access to capital and technology. The United States was itself central to the rolling back of the more radical expressions of the Cárdenista interpretation

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37 Cárdenas had himself begun to retreat from the full implications of his most radical reforms by 1938. In large part, this was due to the restrictions placed upon Cárdenas by the global economy, and this retreat was most clearly manifested in the shift in Cárdenas’ rhetoric from outright defiance to a more conciliatory tone. Increasingly, Cárdenas felt compelled to argue to a hostile US that the 1938 national expropriation of petroleum resources was but an isolated incident. As Cárdenas put it, nationalisation of oil was more a case of curbing powerful private interests (the US oil companies) virtually in insurrection against the state, than the prelude to a full-blown socialist revolution. See Nora Hamilton for a full discussion of the international constraints under which Mexican leaders of this period had to operate. Hamilton, Nora (1982) The limits of state autonomy: Post-revolutionary Mexico (Princeton: Princeton University Press)
of the Revolution. The Roosevelt administration—despite continued hostility concerning the 1938 Mexican oil nationalisation—resolved to follow an unprecedented policy of accommodation. After a general financial settlement in 1941, a period of intimate wartime co-operation followed, opening the door to the tidal wave of foreign investment necessary for the coveted dream of rapid industrial and economic development. This signalled the end of the populism of the 1930s, with the state now put at the disposal of those developers and investors who promised rapid growth. The earlier goal of reducing poverty was now relativised by the desire to increase production and support private capital.38

This was paralleled by a rapid change in elite composition. The sexenio of Manuel Ávila Camacho (1940-1946) marked a watershed in post-Revolutionary Mexico, with the old Revolutionary generals who had taken part in the armed phase of the Revolution purged from the upper echelons of power. In their place came a new generation of young lawyers, whom, as Enrique Krauze puts it: “once in power, radically changed the principles of the Revolution, on occasion for the better, and pretended that, by doing this, they were actually carrying them out.” The presidency of Alemán (1946-1952) confirmed this shift, heralding a situation in which “the goals of the Revolution had been wiped away without being resolved.” This is amusingly corroborated by the change of name the ruling party adopted that year: “a name that of itself implied a contradiction in terms and, therefore, a lie, but a lie accepted as truth: the PRI, Partido Revolucionario Institucional (the Institutional Revolutionary Party).”39

38 This new emphasis was clearly flagged during the presidency of Miguel Alemán Valdés (1946-1952) with the policy of wage freezes in periods of rapid inflation, thus making the poorest sectors of society the biggest contributors to capital accumulation.

39 All quotes from: Krauze, Enrique (1997) op. cit. p. 529]. Interestingly, some of the disillusioned revolutionary generals who had left the PRI following the rise of new professional elites formed their own party in 1954. Significantly terming it the Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution (PARM), these displaced elites strongly criticised the liberal shift of government policy. As a final note, it is not without significance that Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas launched his 1988 bid for the presidency after persuading the PARM leadership to allow him to run on its ballot line.
After the reversal of economic radical economic nationalism in the 1940s, there was a long period of rapid industrial growth that roughly corresponds to what is commonly called the ‘Long Boom’ (roughly, from the end of World War II to the crisis in the advanced industrial countries in the early 1970s). This was the period when the strategy of ISI (Import Substitution Industrialisation) expounded by the UN’s Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) was influential. In these three decades, a model that gave preference to private domestic capital in fostering growth dominated Mexican economic policy. However, since domestic demand was so low (given the poorly developed internal market), the state was harnessed to the development project in order to provide both capital and markets. The role of the state within what became known as Stabilising Development (SD) (roughly 1946 - 1970)\(^4\) was defined as maintaining a stable political environment and exchange rate, and thus a favourable fiscal climate. Within this model of development, the state fulfilled a protectionist role to support ISI, and guaranteed the political stability required by domestic and foreign investment. Policy was shaped by two criteria. First, the control of inflation, and second support for aggregate economic growth focused on urban industrialisation rather than agricultural investment and development.

By its own criteria, SD was a success. This prompted many to talk approvingly of a ‘Mexican miracle.’ Between 1959 and 1967, the economy grew at an impressive rate of 6.5 percent (percent) per annum, whilst inflation was minimal by Latin American standards (3.6 percent per annum). From a predominately rural agricultural country in the pre-World War II period, Mexico had become urban and industrial. However, it is clear that by the late 1960s the ‘Mexican Miracle’ had reached its limits. ISI was already beginning to falter, with “difficulties through the balance of payments, in overall

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\(^4\) Whilst the onset of SD is officially marked by the appointment of Antonio Ortiz Mena as Secretary of Treasury in 1958, there is consensus in the literature that Mexican economic policy demonstrated a remarkable continuity from the beginning of Alemán presidency in 1946, through the 1960s. On this point, and a fuller explication of Stabilising Development in general, see: Hansen, Roger (1980) *The politics of Mexican development* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press)
industrial and agricultural productivity, and to a lesser degree, in public savings.\textsuperscript{41} Moreover, the relegation of social welfare to a secondary role in government policy had contributed to an actual \textit{increase} in social and economic inequality. For decades, the government had argued that SD would lead to a convergence of interests between the poor and those who benefit from state support of industrialisation. This 'trickle down' effect, however, was not realised, and it soon became clear that there would be no continuation of the Cárdenista redistribution of income to help the poorest sectors of the economy. This suggests an emerging contradiction between Revolutionary subscription to social justice, and the actual practice of policy. Indeed, SD was characterised by a general stance of 'benign neglect' to the most underprivileged sectors. Carlos Fuentes notes that Lázaro Cárdenas' successors:

... stressed development for development's sake, growth directed by the government and its party, with the happy association of a capitalist class born with and from the revolutionary changes taking place... [this] divided the country in two - a modern or modernizing Mexico, relatively prosperous and satisfied with the Mexican miracle, and a poor, isolated second nation, whose only miracle, as the poet López Velarde wrote, was to stay alive and hope for a winning ticket in the lottery\textsuperscript{42}

This basing of post-war industrialisation on a forced extraction and transfer of surplus from the poor to the rich, and from the country to the cities had the effect of stimulating a rural exodus and the phenomena of rapid urbanisation.\textsuperscript{43} Through policies that encouraged urban centred industrialisation, the government was also responsible for fostering an unforeseen and unwelcome problem. By creating a relatively large urban middle class (approximately 20 percent of the population by 1968) and an increasingly alienated urban underclass, government policy unwittingly generated strong pressures to open up the autocratic political regime.


\textsuperscript{42} Fuentes, Carlos (1996) \textit{op. cit.} p. 74

\textsuperscript{43} Mexico City, for example - a city of only two million in 1940 - has increased exponentially in population to some 22.5 million by today
Carlos Fuentes argues that by 1968: "Mexico's very growth, thanks to the policies of the Revolution, had now surpassed the Revolution. New social actors were demanding new freedoms, a new justice for new realities that no longer coincided with those of 1910, 1920, 1930, or even 1968, when the system began to fall apart."44 Other commentators agree with this diagnosis. Centeno, for example, argues that 1968 signalled the weakening of the three post-Revolutionary pillars of political stability.45 First, the isolation, alienation and paranoia of president Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (1964-1970) signalled a weakening of the status of the presidency. Second, the massacre of pro-democracy protesters at Tlatelolco and other widespread instances of repression indicated a faltering of the party-state's representative legitimacy. Third, a marked slow down in economic growth promised that these pressures upon the state could only increase. As John Bailey concurs, ever since 1940 "the regime's pragmatic justification for authoritarianism stressed results: stability, material progress, proven leadership."46 By the end of Gustavo Díaz Ordaz's presidency, all three were in doubt, and this situation posed searching questions to the continuance of the Mexican political system.


This section highlights the attempt to return to the radical social commitments of the Revolution. The period 1970-1976 was marked by the attempt to restore legitimacy to the Revolutionary state through nationalist/anti-imperialist rhetoric, and the balancing of

44 Fuentes, Carlos (1996) op. cit. p. 74. Fuentes argues that the revolutionary compromise between the various social sectors encompassed within corporatism “lost both floor and roof” as the centralist system’s capacity to tend to the needs of those excluded from development deteriorated. Fuentes cites the breaking of the workers united front by independent union organising during Ruiz Cortines’ administration (1952-1958); the harsh repression of workers and peasants during López Mateos’ sexenio (1958-1964); and the alienation of the middle class and youth fronts occasioned by the 1968 massacre at Tlatelolco square, as key indicators of the: “utter incapacity of the rulers to answer a political challenge in political terms.” Ibid. pp. 74-75

45 Centeno, Miguel Ángel (1994) op. cit. p. 180. Centeno bases this analysis on Daniel Cosío Villegas’ definition of the three bases of Mexican political stability: the status of the presidency; the legitimacy of the party; and economic growth. See: Cosío Villegas, Daniel (1975) El sistema político mexicano (Mexico: Joaquín Mortiz) pp. 22-52

economic growth with redistribution. However, this dual policy served to alienate private capital, necessitating huge borrowing to finance the intensified role of the state in leading the development program, and eventually leading to devaluation and economic crisis. Highlighted in this section is conflict within economic institutions, signalling the existence of an emergent neoliberal technocratic elite. The section concludes that the failure of populism dealt a further blow to state led development, and boosted the prestige of private capital.

Following the disastrous conclusion of the sexenio of Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, Luis Echeverría (1970–1976) recognised the need to face the dilemma of economic stagnation and political delegitimation. The crisis was diagnosed as a contradiction between the pretence of an inclusionary Revolutionary dogma, and an exclusionary economic system in which the benefits of ‘trickle down’ had proved minimal. As growth slowed, so the pressure for change increased as the belief that things were going somehow to ‘improve by default’ became increasingly implausible. That is, the perception that economic growth would eventually ensure that Revolutionary commitments to inclusion and social justice would be upheld became tarnished. To many it was clear that what was needed was not ‘blind faith,’ but political change.

In response, the Echeverría administration put into operation an economic model termed Shared Development.47 The rationale underlying this model was to combine economic growth and social justice. This implied greater state participation in the economy and larger social expenditure, and was accompanied by the promulgation of a populist nationalist rhetoric. Echeverría used the mass media far more than previous presidents, and developed a rhetorical style akin to preaching.48 Echeverría sought both a wider range of trading partners to decrease dependence on the US, and tried to position himself as the leader of the cause for a new (anti-imperialist) global economic order,


indicating the continuance of nationalist and protectionist sentiment into the 1970s. Substantively, this translated into stricter controls upon foreign investment and profit repatriation. As well as a posture$^{49}$ of intensified anti-imperialism displayed in Echeverría’s efforts to rebuild popular legitimacy following the disaster of the 1968 massacre, the most concrete measures taken were the implementation of the LFI (Limits to Foreign Investment) and the FIL (Foreign Investment Law) in 1973.$^{50}$ This intensification of nationalist populism directly contributed to a massive expansion of the bureaucracy and the range of state activities, with domestic enemies being co-opted via patronage and an inclusive anti-imperialist discourse.

In many ways this implied that economics had taken over from politics in the quest for legitimacy, with political authority now being based more on the perceived ability to directly foster economic growth, than the mere provision of political stability. The debate at this point was not primarily between políticos and técnicos, but rather between monetarists and Keynesians within economic policy institutions themselves. Echeverría’s attempts at sound economic reform were ultimately frustrated by influential figures in the financial bureaucracy of the Ministry of Treasury (SHCP) and the Banco de México. In the case of the restructuring of the tax system for example, monetarists in these institutions allied with international capital to prevent a through fiscal reform aimed at balancing expenditure and revenue. It is in this context that Carlos Tello’s observation that it was Echeverría’s failure to fundamentally challenge “the system of privileges and protection” that ultimately led to the financial crisis of 1976, is best appreciated.$^{51}$

$^{49}$ That the tradition of anti-imperialism within elite discourse was more rhetorical than real, was clearly understood by US policymakers. Agee, writing in 1975, illustrates this point clearly when he notes: “Mexican security services are so effective in eradicating the extreme left that that we don’t have to worry about it.” Agee, Philip (1975) Inside the company: CIA diary (London: Penguin). Agee follows this with the aside that: “If the government was less effective, we would, of course, have to promote their repression.”

$^{50}$ This legislation spelt out those areas adjudged under the exclusive jurisdiction of the state, and included petroleum, mining and energy in general, and the communications infrastructure. All other areas were restricted to 49 percent foreign ownership. These developments closely paralleled those in the global arena more generally. For example, the 1973 FIL followed close on the heels of 1971 US legislation that had set a 10 percent tariff on all goods imported into the United States.

The first half of the presidency was marked by success, with economic growth, rising wage levels and indicators of an improvement in the living standards of the poorest sectors of the population. Yet Echeverría’s ‘success’ in social welfare terms is best evaluated by noting that the 51 percent growth in the economy over the period 1970-1976 meant that the ‘slice of the pie’ available for social expenditure was relatively larger. The actual percent of GDP devoted to social issues increased only marginally. During the period of 1971-1976 there was a four fold increase in the public deficit (from 2.3 to 8 percent of gross national product [GNP]), a sharp decline in private investment both foreign and domestic, and intense capital flight (amounting to more than $4 billion in the last 18 months of Echeverría’s government). This of course implied a huge increase in borrowing, with public sector indebtedness increasing by 700 percent in the same period (from 7.5 billion pesos in 1971 to 53.6 billion by 1976). Predictably, this intense reliance on credit fuelled inflation, with consumer prices doubling over the course of the sexenio. Moreover, in the same period, the trade deficit was subject to massive expansion. All this led in 1976 to Mexico being forced to accept a stringent austerity package.

The resistance of private capital – manifested most clearly in massive capital flight – largely explains this failure. The haemorrhaging of capital resulted in insufficient resources to continue growth, and this situation was compounded by the frustrated attempts to significantly alter the economic structure. Moreover, large sectors of the intelligentsia were mistrustful of Echeverría because of his participation in the repressions of 1968 and 1971. As the number of independent labour and peasant organisations increased, Echeverría became increasingly reliant on pouring public funds into the discredited corporatist structure and making ever grander anti-imperialist statements, in order to maintain political control. Such gestures were hardly comforting

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52 For example, between 1970 and 1973 the economy grew by 25 percent, with an overall growth of 51 percent during the sexenio. The minimum daily salary increased in real terms by 32.5 percent, whilst increased state subsidies helped reduce food prices. See Secretaría de Programación y Presupuesto (1982) Información sobre el gasto público, 1970–1980 (Mexico: SPP) pp. 1-32

to domestic and foreign investors. Ultimately, Echeverría’s rhetorical rejuvenation of the ‘Revolutionary Mantle’ had allowed him to co-opt much of opposition, but at the price of alienating private capital. Without more resources the government would be unable to replace private capital, nor would it be able to continue improving the living standards of the worst off sectors of the population. This must have affected the young bureaucrats who would gradually ascend to power in government. It was clear that without the support of domestic and foreign capital, all the good intentions in the world could not prevent the ultimate failure of government policy.

From hope to slump (1976-1982)

This section describes a period when it seemed that Mexico would inevitably hurtle into the First World, only for economic crisis to comprehensively disappoint. Accommodation with private capital is highlighted, signalling the emergence of a ‘new realism’ in government policy. The continued rise of the liberal leaning technocratic elite is described. However, it is argued that enhanced credit facilities linked to the discovery of vast oil reserves, served to artificially prolong the viability of the economically active state. Ultimately, this frustrated the attempts of these elites to impose monetary controls and limit state intervention in the market. However, the spectacular failure of government policy in the early 1980s only confirmed the technocrats’ analysis of the inefficiency of state led development, and left these elites in a strong position to gain ascendancy.

The ultimate failure of Echeverría’s presidency confirmed for many that the support of private capital was a necessary precondition for successful development. The opening
address of José López Portillo’s presidency (1976–1982) made this understanding explicit: “In the long run, the worst policy is to turn the country into a utopia. Populism does not solve anything, but complicates and enlarges problems.” In response to the alienation of private capital, López Portillo announced an *Alliance for Production*. This initiative envisioned a tripartite linking of government, labour and capital, and signalled the end of the confrontation between national and international capital. López Portillo concluded by announcing that the aims of his administration were to promote “justice, tranquillity, security, and confidence,” again signalling a clear break with the policies of his predecessor. Only the first of these goals (justice) could plausibly be linked to Echeverría’s *sexenio*.

Two new resources freed up López Portillo in his bid to promote massive economic growth. The discovery of extensive oil reserves made Mexico potentially a huge exporter. In turn, this gave access to massive international credit. This combination appeared to promise the inevitability of breaking the conflict between equity and growth, and thus served to quell the opposition of both the left and the right. With the private sector throwing itself into providing new infrastructure, the economy grew by 6.9 percent per annum from 1976-1981, and beginning in 1978 achieved a rate of expansion that eclipsed even the best years of the Mexican ‘miracle’/‘long boom’ (1946-1970).56

However, the conflicts within the public sector that had characterised the *sexenio* of Echeverría continued under López Portillo. These were of two main kinds. First was the conflict between the *expansionists* and *anti-expansionists*. Whilst the expansionists argued for an increase in oil production for export to the US, the anti-expansionists objected that this implied closer integration and thus dependence, particularly in terms of the massive debt accrued in the acquisition of capital-intensive technology. The second conflict was between the *structuralists* and *monetarists*. The structuralists argued that the

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state needed to take an active role both in the stimulation of production, and the reorganisation of consumption and distribution. The monetarists strongly objected, arguing for more monetary controls and stringent restrictions on the role of the state in the economy. Both the structuralists and monetarists were linked to specific sectors of the bureaucracy. The structuralists tended to be associated with what became known as the ‘Cambridge School’ – so called because most of their members had received their academic training in Britain (Flores de la Pena, Carlos Tello, José Ándres Oteyza). The monetarists on the other hand were mostly to be found in the SHCP (Ministry of Treasury) and the Banco de México, and had an academic background that tended more towards the Ivy League than Oxbridge.\textsuperscript{57}

The most important plans produced by these respective groups highlight their differences. These plans produce an insight into dominant visions of Mexico’s future before the constraints of the debt crisis, as well as illustrating the distinction between the left and right wing of the technocratic elite. The structuralists in Sepafin (Ministry of National Patrimony and Industrial Development) produced the PNDI (National Plan for Industrial Development). This emphasised state action, the restructuring of the internal market, redistribution, and social welfare. The monetarists in future president (1982-1988) Miguel de la Madrid’s SPP\textsuperscript{58} produced the PGD (Global Development Plan). Under the direction of a fast rising Carlos Salinas, the PGD stressed monetary control, and pinpointed inflation as the greatest threat to a sound economy. As well as preaching austerity and resistance to populist pressures, the PGD urged greater integration into the world economy. The ex-head of the SPP, Ricardo García Sainz, perhaps best expressed the ideological perspective of this particular sector of the elite, when he commented that the economy would best progress with “support for and incentives to capital and sacrifice and effort from the working class.”\textsuperscript{59} The difference in perspective of the two plans is

\textsuperscript{57} Centeno, Miguel Ángel (1994) op. cit. p 195

\textsuperscript{58} SPP (Ministry of Programming and Budget). Created in 1976, and initially headed by social democrat Carlos Tello. Taken over by Miguel de la Madrid in 1979, who brought on board Carlos Salinas de Gortari to create the \textit{National Planning System} (intended to produce plans for economic and social development)

also made clear by recognising that the PGD focused externally to the world market and on the management of economic apparatus without any change in economic structures. On the contrary, the PNDI focused internally and proposed radical socio-economic restructuring.

In the boom years of 1978-1980, those who favoured unlimited production and the expansion of the state’s role in the economy dominated. With reference to the groups introduced above, this implied the hegemony of the expansionists within economic policymaking, whilst neither the PGD of the monetarists nor the PNDI structuralists were adopted in their entirety. Certainly there was greater integration with the world economy, as the monetarists’ PGD had proposed. Moreover, there was little concerted state intervention in the sphere of social justice, and thus minimal socio-economic restructuring: whilst there was ample trickle down to placate labour and peasant demands, development expenditure far outstripped the welfare budget. On the other hand, the state involved itself directly in the provision of the massive infrastructure required for rapid oil based industrial development, as the structuralists’ PGD had demanded. This implied not only massive borrowing but also the expansion and entrenchment of the state sector, particularly in terms of labour power and the bureaucracy. Ultimately, the monetarists’ demands for austerity and tight monetary controls proved subordinate to the structuralist imperative for the state to directly lead economic development.

By 1981 however, Mexico faced a looming crisis. A combination of sharply declining oil prices, dramatically increased interest rates on the loans used to finance growth, and runaway inflation sent the economy into a 12 month tailspin. In this period approximately $22 billion of capital left the country, producing a liquidity crisis and a decline in private investment of 17.3 percent. With the public deficit reaching 16.9 percent of GDP and inflation of 60 percent per annum,60 López Portillo was forced to

devalue the peso. Faced with economic crisis, the Mexican elite considered two alternatives. The first was to reassert state control over the economy and challenge the creditor banks. Initially this seemed to be the chosen path. In his final State of the Union address, López Portillo accused the Mexican bourgeoisie of having “stolen more money from our country than the empires which have exploited us since the beginning of history.” Pinpointing the Mexican banks as particularly culpable in this theft, López Portillo nationalised the banking system as one of the last acts of his sexenio. It was notable however that president-elect Miguel de la Madrid did not comment on this proposal for three weeks – a clear sign of disapproval under Mexican protocol. Immediately upon taking office de la Madrid offered a further signal that his administration would not follow Portillo’s reassertion of populist statism, and instead favour the second strategy for addressing the economic crisis: a turn to the new economic orthodoxy based on freer markets, less intervention, and “fiscal responsibility.” De la Madrid immediately dispensed with the nationalisation program, floating 35 percent of the new state banks to private interests, and declaring that the time had come to end the “fictional economy” of his predecessor. In place of debates on how best to develop, the critical question now became how to divide the costs of decline.

61 Unfortunately for his subsequent reputation, this devaluation took place shortly after López Portillo had addressed the nation and demanded the defence of the peso as a patriotic duty. He, for his part, would defend the peso “como un perro” (like a dog). Enrique Krauze amusingly relates that for years afterwards, López Portillo’s entrance into a restaurant was habitually greeted with the cries of people barking como un perro. See Enrique Krauze (1997) op. cit. pp. 760-761.


64 López Portillo, José (1988) Mis tiempos (Mexico: Ediciones Editores)

65 Centeno, Miguel Ángel (1994) op. cit. p. 45
2.2 Technocratic revolution and the consolidation of neoliberalism

The onset of economic restructuring was clearly intimately linked to the preceding decade of recession and debt. The early 1980s collapse of state-led development in many ways reflected an inability to cope with changing international realities, and intellectual exhaustion in the face of recurrent crises. Following the global crisis of the Fordist-Keynesian developmental model that began in the 1970s, and that fully impacted Mexico in the 1980s, the state-centric geography of the international system found itself increasingly subject to reconfiguration. The simplest way to grasp the nature of the global crisis of Fordist-Keynesian, is to highlight the fundamental contradiction between the national scale of state regulation, and the globalizing thrust of post-war capitalist accumulation. The Fordist-Keynesian socio-spatial order implied the organisation of activities on very particular scales. For example, the wage relation tended to be nationally regulated, whilst currencies and trade tended to be regulated internationally. The collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1973, however, fundamentally questioned the continued viability of these scales of regulation. The ongoing deregulation of financial markets and the global credit system severely circumscribed the ability of states such as Mexico to exercise national-level demand management and monetary policies. Moreover, the intensified globalization of production, competition, and financial flows increasingly undermined the viability of autarkic strategies. It is in this context that the rise and policies of the tecnócratas are best evaluated. Faced with a rapidly changing international reality, it seemed increasingly counter-productive both economically and politically for Mexico to insulate itself from the world economy via protectionism etc. This implied that the future of the Mexican state could only realistically lay in a world of economic spaces larger than the national.  


67 This recognition first emerged in the 1960s, when the stagnation of SD (mainly due to the small size of the internal market) prompted the negotiation of regional free trade agreements with other Latin American countries.
Moreover, for the newly ascendant technocratic elite, their intimate experience of preceding economic disasters made a return to statist economic policies almost unthinkable, so badly had they been discredited. State led development had proved itself to create an entrenched bureaucracy, characterised by corruption, inefficiency, and ill-conceived economic planning. Following the collapse of SD (Stabilising Development), Echeverría’s misguided populism, and the false dawn of López Portillo, the incoming elite resolved to follow a ‘new realism’ that accepted Mexico’s position in the global system. However, this is best understood not as some capitulation to capital, but as a reasoned bid for accommodation with the global system on Mexico’s own terms. On one level, the embrace of economic orthodoxy represented a pragmatic choice. Without growth, it seemed impossible for the regime to fulfil its historic Revolutionary commitments: a situation that threatened a direct challenge to the legitimacy of the party-state.68 Consequently, Miguel de la Madrid and his advisors settled on the policy that promised the best chance of gaining the support of those with the necessary resources for growth – private capital and the International Financial Institutions (IFIs). For the new elite, such an accommodation was infinitely preferable to an outright battle with a global economic system characterised by IFIs (such as the IMF and World bank) that by the early 1980s were more powerful than ever, and increasingly hostile to ‘statist’ economics.

As the debt crises that characterised the Latin American region took hold in the early 1980s (precipitated by the collapse of commodity prices and the concomitant retreat of sources of private foreign and domestic capital) IFIs oversaw a vast increase in their own influence. The extended role of IFIs and their increasingly militant neoliberal stance was intimately linked to the rise to ascendancy of neoliberals within these institutions themselves at the turn of the decade.69 By the early 1980s, argues Roger Tooze, neoliberalism maintained “a special status in society ... [it being taken] to represent the

68 Centeno, Miguel Ángel (1994) op. cit. p. 191


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reality of the global economy, against which other views ... [were to be] judged and evaluated.\textsuperscript{70} This meant that Mexican access to finance became increasingly dependent on adherence to the austerity, export promotion, and liberalisation of the economy proposed by neoliberal dominated international institutions. The sexenio of Portillo had seen cheaply available sources of foreign credit linked to the discovery of vast oil reserves. In retrospect it is clear that this had served to artificially extend the viability of a state-led strategy of development that was already experiencing severe structural problems during the 1960s, and whose internal contradictions had only become worse over the course of the 1970s. Foreign credits linked to the promise of oil had temporarily allowed the Mexican state to generate a new dynamism to the economy through hugely intensified public spending, but at the cost of incurring a vast debt burden. Given these factors, the international recession that arrived at the turn of the decade hit Mexico particularly severely.

The ensuing crisis allowed the IFIs to point (with some justification) to economic incompetence, entrenched bureaucracies, and misguided development policies as the primary roots of the crisis.\textsuperscript{71} Given their monopoly over the supply of new credits and the arrangements for the rescheduling of the massive Mexican debt burden, the ability of these institutions to intervene directly in internal economic management was massively enhanced. In accordance with their analysis of the roots of the crisis, the structural adjustment and stabilisation programs designed by the World Bank and the IMF as conditions for access to foreign funds, sought to fundamentally restructure the Mexican

\textsuperscript{70} Tooze, Roger (1993) 'Conceptualising the global economy.' McGrew, Andrew and Lewis, Paul G (Eds.) Global politics: globalization and the nation-state (Polity Press) p. 235. Within the Latin American region generally, the dominant post-war economic model was, crudely speaking, 'statist' and Keynesian, whilst within Western debates more generally, Ruggie emphasises that 'embedded liberalism' represented the orthodox stance in economic debates. Ruggie, John G (1982) 'International regimes, transactions and change: Embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order.' International Organization, 36:2, pp. 379-415. Indeed, even in the late 1960s, proponents of neoliberalism were still derided as threatening to lead society down the 'road to reaction.' Finer, Herman (1963) Road to reaction (Quadrangle Books). In this sense, neoliberalism had to be promoted by particular actors in specific sets of circumstances. This implies that its rise to dominance was neither natural nor inevitable

CHAPTER TWO - SPACE, KNOWLEDGE AND POWER IN THE MEXICAN TRANSITION

This restructuring was designed to open Mexico (as elsewhere in the Latin American region) to the influence of international market forces, through emphases upon liberalisation, export promotion and fiscal austerity. This suggests that the options open to Mexican non-neoliberals seeking to form governments and influence policy in the 1980s were bleak. As Michael Watts – referring to Latin America in general – expresses the situation:

The 1980s brought debt, retrenchment and austerity; short-term crisis management, stabilization and the so-called counter-revolution in development theory were their handmaidens. Inflation, lack of investible funds and external conditionality imposed by global regulatory agencies rendered alternative development strategies, as much as statist development initiatives, largely irrelevant.

However, whilst the timing of neoliberal intellectual and political ascendancy had much to do with the take-over of IFIs by liberal economists at the end of the 1970s, it would be simplistic to reduce the consideration of neoliberal dominance solely to the affect of outside factors. Naturally, it is important to note the extent to which the pressures of domestic capital and the international economy constrained the autonomy of the Mexican state. It was clear, for example, that a continued challenge to capital past the rhetoric of López Portillo’s desperate bank nationalisation would have entailed a complete break

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with the economic status quo and necessitated radical change in the nature of the regime. However, the important question is not whether capital forced the regime in a particular direction, as if the state were nothing but the instrument of a dominant capital. Rather, the more significant issue is why Mexican elites were willing to acquiesce.

In this regard, it is worth reiterating that many of the tenets of neoliberalism had been central to Mexican neo-classical arguments with structuralists (state led development) since the 1930s. And as we have seen, whilst never achieving hegemony pre-1982, the liberal anti-structuralist perspective (the monetarists etc.) became increasingly influential in Mexican economic institutions and think tanks as the 1970s wore on. This already existing tendency found itself in consonance with the shift in perspective and increasing power of IFIs, and gained legitimacy with the onset of Mexico's economic crisis. This combination of factors helped facilitate a profound shift in internal policies that allowed the rapid consolidation of the neoliberal model. The 'methodological lenses' through which these newly ascendant Mexican liberal elites viewed the crisis were based on the economic orthodoxy of free trade and markets, embedded as they were in a social and professional world where autarky and contempt for property rights was almost inconceivable. This implies that the technocratic elites now positioned to take power supported economic orthodoxy not as a direct articulation of class interest, but because these programs appeared to be the only 'rational' option. Naturally, the definition of this rationale was partly determined by social position and first-hand exposure to an economic


75 The implementation of these policies was also aided by the authoritarian nature of the Mexican political system, which while in no way comparable to military regimes elsewhere in Latin America, facilitated the 'top down' imposition of the new model. Vasconi, speaking generally of the Latin American region, makes a point that well describes the efficacy of the authoritarian legacy of the Mexican political system. Under its influence, he argues, the domination of international capital was established and "the old 'compromise' or 'populist' state, was liquidated, the workers' movement and the popular movement were driven back ... their corporate organizations and fundamental policies destroyed." Vasconi, Tony (1990) 'Democracy and socialism in South America.' Latin American Perspectives, 17:2, p. 35 [pp. 25-38]

ideology learnt in Ivy League universities. Yet, at the same time it is vital to distinguish between pursuit of class advantage and identification of this with universal interests. As Centeno relates: "[T]he decision making process relies more on the indirect scientific-economic rationale for the social construction of reality than on the direct political/ideological commitment to a given class."\(^{77}\) Centeno's argument here is that it was less the new elite believed themselves to be expressing their own interest as a class, than that they tended to identify this interest with the interests of Mexico as a whole. For the tecnócratas, there was simply no distinction to be made between the interests of themselves and other sectors of society. Indeed, as we shall see, the belief that there could or should be individually or group held 'special interests' was one of the new elite's fundamental objections to the existing political system, implying as it did a discord that could only distract from the 'rational' ordering of the economy. Of course, it could be argued that whether restructuring proceeded from the self-interest of the new elite ("the direct political/ideological commitment to a given class") or from the hegemony of a particular form of power/knowledge ("the indirect scientific-economic rationale for the social construction of reality") is a moot point, in so far as the policies resulting from either may well be identical. However, this section concurs with Centeno's insistence that the difference in origin is crucial for understanding the transition from an economically active state to a neoliberal economic model. It is crucial, I wish to insist, because the hegemony of power/knowledge represents the ascendancy of representations of space within the production of Mexican space, and the related suppression of spaces of representation. The way in which this disproportionate relationship between two aspects of Lefebvre's three part dialectic within spatialisation fed into to the discourse of Mexican cultural nationalism and produced a 'spectacle' of Mexican modernity, is a theme more fully developed in the following chapter. For now, I wish only to contextualise the rise of the tecnócratas, and suggest that the fundamental point about this group was not their class origin, nor even their specific policies. What characterises

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\(^{77}\) Interview with Mexican bureaucrat by Miguel Ángel Centeno, New Haven, March 1986. Cited in Centeno, Miguel Ángel (1994) *op. cit.* p. 191
them above all is the particular form of rationality by way of which they conceived the space of Mexico.

2.3 Abstracting space and political centrality

At the root of the spectacle lies the oldest of all social divisions of labor, the specialization of power. ... By means of the spectacle the ruling order discourses endlessly upon itself in an uninterrupted monologue of self-praise. ... The fetishistic appearance of pure objectivity in spectacular relationships conceals their true character as relationships between human beings and between classes.

Guy Debord

The section examines the shift from the corporate system that dominated in the pre-1970 period, to the increasing influence of 'planning' through the 1970s, and the hegemony of this model of decision-making in the post 1982 period. 'Planning' refers to the increasing 'bureaucratization' and 'rationalization' of politics, and the hegemony of a compact group of 'experts' who saw themselves as uniquely qualified to discern the ‘reality’ of Mexico. Stressed here is a increasing specialisation of politics that leaves no room for viewpoints not in accordance with the technocrats’ definition of economic rationality, and the related enactment of an idealised split between politics and economics.

Before the 1970s, the Mexican government and its party served as an institutional arena in which various interest groups were represented. Decision-making tended to be dominated by professional politicians (politicos) who had risen through the ranks of the party, and who thus tended to have extensive experience of the breadth of the Mexican political system, and the various sectors encompassed therein. Whilst authoritarian, the politicos engaged in the bargaining and compromise that lie at the heart of genuine ‘political’ decision-making. Mexican corporatism had always sought to placate various

interest groups through the formal and informal mechanisms set up by Elias Calles and Lázaro Cárdenas. The regime took into account the political needs of the peasant and labour leadership through land reform, price support and pay deals, and thus sought to combine state support for the private sector with the creation of a relatively privileged and dependable class faction of unionised workers and peasants. Accordingly, decision-making was dominated by the pragmatic acceptance that each sector had its own specific interests, and that these had to be incorporated within government programs. Before 1970, therefore, the conduct of politics was guided by: "The predominance of political over administrative criteria in decision making, the dispersion of power within the government, the absence of a formalised structure, and the domination by a pragmatic case-by-case approach to the items on the agenda."

This implied the recognition, however limited, that different social groups were embedded in distinct 'spaces of representation' and this had to be taken into account in the formulation of policy. Mexican space was recognised as being 'fragmented.' Thus, Mexican social actors were 'located' both institutionally and geographically, and this implied that there was not a single truth to a government proposal. Rather, there was an acceptance that people thought differently based on personal histories of engagement within particular organisations and geographical areas. Put simply, it implied the recognition that many perspectives and viewpoints were legitimate and important. Of course, this is not to say that all views were equally important. But it is to say that the existence of different views was accepted as a natural consequence of being differentially located within national space. This changed radically as the 1970s progressed. López Portillo (1976-1982) appeared to believe that the best way to sort out the crisis inherited from Echeverría was to rationalise the administration through planning. In effect, this amounted to a "new legitimation of the system through knowledge" and a "new process of integration into the system of government personnel."

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79 Luna, Matilde (1988) 'La administración estatal y el régimen político.' Revista Mexicana de Sociología, 50:3, July-September, p. 253

80 Interview, Mexico City, June 1986, quoted in Centeno, Miguel Ángel (1994) op. cit. p. 214
of relating state and society, a new way of practising politics that denied the inevitability of conflict and asserted the existence of an optimal solution to social problems. This belief in the ability to first define and then obtain such an ideal state defines the technocratic system as inherently antidemocratic. More than their commitment to planning or a particular economic model, it was this faith in their own ability combined with refusal to recognise the legitimacy of conflicting interests and viewpoints that characterised the new elites (the tecnócratas) that rose in the 1970s and took over the state in the 1980s.

According to the father of the administrative reform project, Alejandro Carrillo Castro, the job of the new ideal type politician (the technocrat) was not to represent any one person, but to formulate the best policy for the whole. Thus, a “true” politician is: “fundamentally concerned with understanding which are the problems facing the population as a whole and not only on the level of individuals.”

This signalled a radical break with the old corporatism. No longer was there a role for compromises, gestures, and political spaces. Rather than negotiation, politically sensitive measures were to be formalised and bureaucratised.

This attitude also extended to the representational politics of corporatism, for the conflicts between the different groups and interests that characterised it appeared — from the technocratic perspective — to hamper the achievement of an optimal solution. Accordingly, the answer seemed to be the empowerment of a group with no prior commitments and loyalties to particular factions. For example, in 1974 Manuel Camacho (one of the PRI contenders for the 1994 presidential nomination) called for the development of a “compact, organised, efficient” group to guide the state.

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82 From the technocratic perspective this actually implied that the state would be more rather than less democratic, since it would shrink the available space for the corrupt practices and privileges that had characterised the old system.
and resist the hegemony of interest groups. Significantly, the new elite seemed to assume a complete and universal consensus regarding national goals. From this perspective, social and political conflict originated less in structurally determined perspectives on the same issue, than it did in erroneous policies that sought to represent special interests. An optimal solution would cause these conflicts to disappear, and this optimality was available via the application of scientific rationality. As López Portillo stated in a speech to the Economists League: “Economics is a science which allows us to conduct and guide the transformation of society.”

This hostility to political conflict necessitated the formulation of new forms of politico-economic participation that were not disruptive, as Salinas himself explicitly argued. For example, the new elite invited popular participation in the planning process, but this tended to be in the form of conferences in which interested individuals were invited to comment on policies, rather than any sort of direct vote on various proposals. Moreover, whilst these comments would be collected and presented to the President: “decisions of economic policy would be executed, according to a precise calendar drawn up previously.” ‘Democratic planning’ then, amounted to little more than a series of round tables whose function was to legitimate decisions already taken elsewhere.

Ultimately, the key to post 1982 technocratic discourse is its perfectly closed logic. The words and actions of the tecnócratas repeatedly confirmed a simple message: since we are the best at what we do, then our solutions are the best possible, therefore anyone who opposes them is unrealistic and not worth listening to. As Salinas emphasised during his time as Minister of SPP, Mexico was undergoing a modernisation imposed by the

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84 López Portillo, José (1988) Mis tiempos (Mexico: Editores) p. 821


conditions of the international economy; consequently, there was no choice but to continue. For given the “inescapable” conditions imposed by the crisis, the regime’s policies were in perfect “coherence with the reality facing [Mexico].” This belief in the existence of a single solution to Mexico’s problems left no room for political critique, philosophical divergence, or interest struggle: “The logic of science-technology-necessity-truth is proposed as the unifier of divergent perspectives to which all ideologies would have to submit.” This perspective supported an ideological homogeneity within the ruling elite that inhibited internal criticism.

The most significant aspect of the new politics was that the elite and its institutions came to be considered the only source of truth and objective reason. In the words of a member of the elite discussing opposition to privatisation: “If we are convinced it has to be done, then it has to be done.” In his memoirs, Miguel de la Madrid consistently defends the occasional economic failures of his sexenio by arguing that the problem was not the ideas themselves, but the incapacity of traditional politicians to carry them out. And there is a well known anecdote of Carlos Salinas arriving for a breakfast with leading economists, only to tell everybody present that they know nothing about economics; he then walks out without bothering to sit down. The harshest criticism (when they were acknowledged at all) was reserved for the left opposition, who were habitually derided for their “absurd infantilism.” For example, in 1987 José Córdoba responded to a critique by a well respected leftist economist (Licenciada Martínez) by acidly remarking:

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87 Interview in Secretaría de Programación y Presupuesto document (SPP no. 25.01.00.00/1.02.15.0) and speech before the National Congress of Economists (SPP no. 25.01.00.00/1.02.00.0), Presidential Archives of the Unidad de la Crónica Presidencial
89 Interestingly, Peter Smith argues that the policies of the regime originated less in the specific ideology of the tecnócratas than in the increasing exclusivity and solidarity of the ruling circle. See Smith, Peter (1986) 'Leadership and change, intellectuals and technocrats in Mexico.' Camp, Roderic (Ed.) Mexico’s political stability: The next ten years (Boulder: Westview Press) pp. 109-111 [pp. 109-125]
92 Anonymous cabinet member, quoted in: La Jornada (Mexico City) November 13, 1989, p. 10
“primitive, obsolete and decadent criticism leads to simplistic and incorrect analysis ... It appears that for Licenciada Martínez, the sun continues to revolve around the earth."\textsuperscript{93} She, in turn, consistently objected to the autocratic style of Pedro Aspe and stated that the leadership “had once again demonstrated its dogmatism."\textsuperscript{94} The point here is that the new elite consistently demonstrated itself to be impervious to opposing viewpoints, with individual members believing themselves beyond reproach. Perhaps the best illustration of this attitude was to be found on a 1988 pro-Salinas billboard. What Mexico needed, stated the sign, was, “less criticism, more solutions.”\textsuperscript{95}

This attitude is well illustrated by the way in which the \textit{tecnócratas} approached the potentially troublesome relationship between economic and political liberalisation. The \textit{tecnócratas’} definition of democracy focused on the term \textit{concertación}, implying harmony and solidarity rather than conflict and compromise. According to this understanding, democracy entailed convincing the population that government policy was right, rather than submitting it to popular judgement. Democracy in fact had little to do with ensuring domestic freedoms, rights and popular participation. Rather, as senior PRlist Manuel Camacho Solís explained, democracy was less an end in itself than it was a means of promoting progress through acquisition of international political legitimacy.\textsuperscript{96} Salinas reiterated this theme in a campaign speech, speaking passionately for a democracy that would make Mexicans more independent through the promotion of development. Again, this could only mean one thing: democracy was acceptable up to the point where it was constrained by the ‘reality’ of Mexico’s situation vis-à-vis the global system. That is, in so far as it did not interfere with government policy.

The Fourteenth PRI assembly in September of 1990 confirmed this extremely limited definition of democracy. The previous year Luis Donaldo Colosío’s had made an appeal

\textsuperscript{93} José Córdoba, quoted in: \textit{Proceso}, October 19, 1987, 572, p. 10
\textsuperscript{94} Licenciada Martínez, quoted in: Centeno, Miguel Ángel (1994) \textit{op. cit.} p. 143
\textsuperscript{95} Cited in Centeno, Miguel Ángel (1994) \textit{op. cit.} p. 222
for greater internal democratisation of the PRI. Whilst not explicitly referring to Colosio, Salinas declared that criticism of the party amounted to treason, and cautioned against making remarks that might damage the international image of the country. Most tellingly, he admonished those who spoke of democratisation but who “actually promoted division.” The two years following this assembly confirmed that there was little prospect that the party would become more democratic. Even worse, the party’s commitment to its traditional ideology practically disappeared. Two definitions by persons influential in the PRI, give a strong indication of the new constituencies to whom reform was to be addressed. Governor José Francisco Ruiz Massieu has described the redefinition of the party as involving understandings with business, the Church, and intellectuals. Significantly, he makes no mention of the urban poor or the agrarian sector. Similarly, while Mario Melgar Adalid notes the importance of the two institutions that could pressure the government (the Church and the US government), he neglects to mention unions, social movements, or grass-roots organisations.

A real democratic opening required willingness on the part of Salinas to either significantly attenuate presidential power, or compromise the economic program with political calculation. Here lies the central contradiction of a dual project of economic and political liberalisation. The ruling elite appeared to refuse to recognise that there might be a basic contradiction between economic austerity and electoral success: to ask a population to make sacrifices for some ill-defined future modernity is one thing, to ask for their vote is another. Interestingly, it was the supposedly ‘unrealistic’ sectors of the political class (the políticos) who were most clearly aware of this dilemma. According to the much-maligned políticos, the administration was trying to transform the system whilst at the same time refusing to accept the consequences of these changes. For example, a

member of the DF (Federal District) Assembly complained that the “technagogues” (tecnócratas) were not prepared to change aspects of their economic policies in exchange for votes, yet still required that he maintain control over his district.\textsuperscript{100}

Even if Salinas wanted to democratise, this would not be at the cost of economic policy. Salinas stated: “if you are introducing drastic political reform at the same time as strong economic reform, you may end up with no reform at all. And we want to have reform, not a disintegrated country.”\textsuperscript{101} This implied that whilst democracy may be a desirable long-term goal, “the priority is economics.”\textsuperscript{102} In general, the government envisioned a very selective democracy in which only votes for the opposition with whom it agreed could count, and only those voters ‘modern’ enough to choose correctly would be recognised. The government would decide which democratic results were legitimate. Since Mexico included communities that were ‘backward and marginalised,’ these (naturally) could not be trusted with the responsibility of self-government.\textsuperscript{103} Such a perspective implied the continuation of the ‘electoral alchemy’ for which the PRI is justly famous. This was only natural, for as Centeno notes, the “government’s perspective on democracy precluded the acceptance of the left as a “responsible” opposition.”\textsuperscript{104} Of course, the corporatist system was not democratic either. However, the assault of the tecnócratas upon it had less do with opening up the political arena, than it did on the perceived need to improve its efficiency.

The tecnócratas expected that there would be opposition to this new form of politics. As Carrillo Castro remarked, there would be “the normal resistance to all improvements from those who wish to place their personal interests over and above the global interests

\textsuperscript{100} Cited in Centeno, Miguel Ángel (1994) \textit{op. cit.} p. 154
\textsuperscript{102} Salinas de Gortari, Carlos. Quoted in \textit{Newsweek.} December 3, 1990, p. 39
\textsuperscript{103} Centeno, Miguel Ángel (1991) \textit{op. cit.} p. 18
\textsuperscript{104} Centeno, Miguel Ángel (1994) \textit{op. cit.} p. 225
Thus, from the perspective of the new elite the problem with the opposition was that it refused to accept the economic reality now facing Mexico. This was a reality, of course, that the tecnócratas felt uniquely qualified to define. The technocratic elite saw the definition of social problems and the formulation of their solution as relatively simple and obvious. If a business lost money, it should close; if the government could no longer afford a social safety net, then nothing could be done about it. A reasonable democracy would recognise such limits. This perspective was already abundantly clear in the early days of de la Madrid’s sexenio, when the president’s scathing attack on populism demonstrated the elite’s inherent distrust of radical attempts to alter the status quo: “It is very easy to ask for modifications to the political economy of the Mexican government when one does not have the responsibility to face the consequences of irresponsible options bereft of any technical sense ... We must be realistic ... any other way, the results are ephemeral.” Naturally, the costs of this ‘new realism’ were not evenly distributed, but to rail against this was, of course, unrealistic.

2.4 Redefining the state

This section examines how the state was reformulated in the neoliberal era to fulfil a role of ‘rectorship.’ For the tecnócratas’ this implied a modification of statist economics, with economic policy now subject to the ‘new realism’ described in the previous section. However, it is argued that rectorship is expressive of a largely unresolved contradiction between the old statist economics and neoliberalism, in which, while disavowing direct state led intervention in the economy, the technocratic elite nonetheless maintained tight control over a variety of social actors (including private capital) in order to enforce the

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105 Castro, Carrillo (1982) op. cit. p. 172
‘discipline’ necessary for reform. What this rectorship implied for social policy as this related to the Revolutionary commitment to social justice in general, and the agrarian sector in particular, is then examined. It is argued that while the tecnócratas’ discourse appeared to be marked by an unresolved contradiction between the maintenance of economic responsibility and social equity (reflecting the difficulty of completely abandoning Revolutionary commitments), the actual practice of policy appeared to demonstrate that the attitude of the technocracy was that the best they could do was ensure growth in the economy and hope that this might one day lead to greater equity. Consequently, accelerating inequality and social polarisation marks the neoliberal era.

One way of understanding the shift to neoliberalism lies in the way that the post 1982 governing elites managed expectations both nationally and internationally. As previously related, on the national level technocratic discourse tended toward the message that there was ‘no alternative’ to neoliberal restructuring. According to this rationale, unless the population wished to perpetuate a system of ‘boom and bust’ conjoined with disabling levels of inflation and social unrest, then they must submit themselves to the short-term sacrifices involved in the restoration of economic and political stability. As far as this rationale was accepted, then the social unrest that might be expected from the huge social costs of restructuring, and the displacement of traditional consent manufacturing power structures i.e. corporate patronage, should fail to appear. Internationally, the discourse of the elite stressed homogeneity and consensus both within domestic political and economic elites, and the ‘the people’ themselves. Speaking of the consolidation of the neoliberal model in Latin America, Ed Brown notes that:

... groups benefiting by their attachment to state bureaucracies are losing ground to sectors allied to international capital as liberalisation opens up the region to...
investment. The chief concern for these latter sectors is to establish a consensual vision of the country in the eyes of the international community, that is seen to provide stability and a suitable environment for the operation of international capital. These two intertwined dimensions (domestic and international) combine to form a meta-discourse stressing the socially accepted necessity of continued deepening of economic and political reforms, in an environment of politico-economic stability and acquiescence. This discourse was instrumental in redefining the Mexican state in a way conducive to the integration of the Mexico within a regional economy dominated by the US. According to German Sánchez, this has entailed the virtual abandonment of:

... efforts to win national independence and economic development — goals which to one degree or another they had pursued in the last decades. To begin with, we are in the midst of a profound and accelerated process of economic restructuring and foreign takeovers of Latin American productive systems. Industries characterized by low productivity and outdated technology, nearly all of them owned by mid-sized national capital, have been destroyed and replaced by speculation and imports.

Salinas provides a particularly explicit indication of the role of the state dictated by these changes. In a statement from his first State of the Nation address, Salinas argues: "[The] bigger state is not necessarily a more capable state; an owner state is not nowadays a more just state." As Salinas emphasised, whilst the Revolutionary state had historically fulfilled an economically active role, this kind of state was ill suited to current conditions. Indeed, subscription to such a state had increasingly: "resulted in less capacity to respond

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109 Brown, Ed (1996) op. cit. p. 179
110 For explication and illustration of this point across a regional panorama, see: Espinal, Roger (1992) Development, neoliberalism and electoral politics in Latin America. Development and Change, 23:4, pp. 27-48. In this context, it is possible to observe a growing stress on domestic norms, standards, and political leadership as integral to economic success, as far as these are recognised by both domestic and foreign elites as necessary to the consolidation of an attractive environment for foreign investment. Hence, the thrust towards the independence of the national legal system, and the generalised development of Mexican political culture in ways recognisable to an Anglo-American audience as 'progressive,' 'liberal,' and conducive to the manufacture of 'genuine' democratic consent for the continuance of economic reform.

111 Sánchez, German (1993) 'Neoliberalism and its discontents.' NACLA report in the Americas, 26:4, p. 20 [pp. 18-21]
to the social demands of fellow citizens.\textsuperscript{112} This explicit rejection of populism took place in spite of the fact that many amongst the new elite could not help but be influenced by the dependency perspective\textsuperscript{113} that had for so long proven persuasive in Mexico, as elsewhere in Latin America. Resolving this seeming contradiction between the embrace of free market orthodoxy on the one hand, and the suspicion that this implied greater dependency on the other hand, required that the way in which the dependency message was internalised be given a special technocratic twist. Centeno notes that the "attitude and behaviour [of the tecnócratas] often seemed to imply that Mexico would be better off if it could become a bit more modern and more important, a bit less Mexican. ... [Yet] it was clear that the tecnócratas were committed to Mexico's sovereignty and devoted to improving the economy. It was only a question of how one defined independence and development."\textsuperscript{114} For the tecnócratas, it was clear that in the evolving global system autarky was no longer (if it had ever really been) a viable option. Given this reality, the best way to ensure the continuing viability of Mexico as a significant actor in the international system was to accept "tactical autonomy in a strategy dominated by others."\textsuperscript{115} For the tecnócratas, acquiescence to 'reality' necessitated an abandonment of protectionist isolation, and the acceptance of Mexico's role as a supplier of cheap labour and resources, and dedicated debt servicer. Thus, to maintain control over its future,

\textsuperscript{112} Carlos Salinas de la Gortari. Both quotes cited in Centeno, Miguel Ángel (1994) \textit{op. cit.} p. 193

\textsuperscript{113} Following the classical Marxist tradition - particularly Lenin's writings on imperialism - the dependency perspective suggests, in brief, that third world countries are structurally kept in a position of underdevelopment by neo-imperial 'core' countries. These third world or 'peripheral' countries are used as sources of cheap resources and labour, whilst being deprived of the means to embark on indigenous industrial growth. At the same time, the relationship of unequal exchange generates huge wealth for the core, cementing and even deepening existing inequality. For representative examples of the dependency perspective, see: Baran, Paul A (1957) \textit{The political economy of growth} (New York: Monthly Review Press); Frank, Andre G (1969) \textit{Capitalism and underdevelopment in Latin America} (New York and Monthly: London Review Press); Emmanuel, Arghiri (1972) \textit{Unequal exchange: a study of the imperialism of trade in Latin America} (London: New Left Books). For good summaries of this tradition, see Blaut, James M (1975) 'Imperialism: The Marxist theory and its evolution.' \textit{Antipode,} 7, pp. 1-19; Blaut, James M (1994) \textit{The colonizer's model of the world} (London Guildhall); Slater, David (1977) 'Geography and underdevelopment.' \textit{Antipode,} 9, pp. 1-31. Lefebvre's position on the dependency perspective is outlined primarily in. While broadly in agreement, Lefebvre's central objection is the tendency of the dependencia school to underplay the role of the state

\textsuperscript{114} Centeno, Miguel Ángel (1994) \textit{op. cit.} p. 196

\textsuperscript{115} Centeno, Miguel Ángel (1994) \textit{op. cit.} p. 197
CHAPTER TWO - SPACE, KNOWLEDGE AND POWER IN THE MEXICAN TRANSITION

Mexico must accept the limits placed upon its autonomy and work with, rather than against them. As Salinas pointed out in 1990: "[N]ations that do not know how to adopt creatively to the new conditions will not be able to preserve their integrity." Accordingly, it was necessary to reformulate traditional notions of independence, in so far as dogmatic ascription to the past would actually prove counterproductive to Mexico's interests in the new world order.

By 1988, the fruits of this policy were clearly demonstrated (from the technocrats' perspective) by the fact that austerity had transformed Mexico from an economy internationally regarded as in crisis, to a 'model debtor.' Debt servicing had become the largest chunk of public spending, rising to 60 percent from approximately 30 percent of the annual budget between 1979-1982. During the same period, the proportion dedicated to social expenditure suffered a collapse from almost 30 percent in 1979 to barely 10 percent a decade later. This signalled a willingness on the part of Mexico to compromise on internal development, in order to ensure its continued acceptance in the global economic order. As Guillermo Ortiz, Salinas' Under Secretariat of the Ministry of Treasury (SHCP) noted: "In order to pay the external debt, the government had to effect an internal transfer. It had to gather resources from the society and transfer them abroad." By 1990, these tactics were (supposedly) proved correct with the resumption of foreign lending and accelerating investment. This provided access to the massive amounts of capital needed for 'effective' restructuring, but unavailable domestically.

Mexico's improved international reputation gave Mexico greater credibility in its bid to finally 'enter the first world' through the negotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the US and Canada. For the post-1982 elites, it had become increasingly clear that Mexico's place in a 'world of economic spaces larger than the national' could only be with the US, and not Latin America. Carlos Ferrat has recently

116 Salinas de Gortari, Carlos, quoted in the Los Angeles Times Magazine (1990) November 25, p. 14
118 Guillermo Ortiz, quoted in: Miguel Ángel Centeno (1991) op. cit. p. 32
(1999) argued that, while Mexico is “a Latin American nation – a deeply rooted historical, cultural, and linguistic concept – its history has been shaped, in good measure, by its geographical location in North America.”\(^\text{119}\) Ferrat goes on to argue, in an attitude clearly reflective of government attitude, that the 1990s was the time when Mexican politics stopped “fooling itself” and accepted the reality that it is nonsensical for politics to look south and economics to look north.\(^\text{120}\) The internationalisation of the economy had accelerated after 1986 when Mexico joined GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), and by 1989, virtually all import permits and tariffs had been eliminated. With the exception of the auto market, Mexico was to all intents and purposes a free market. The official acceptance that Mexico’s place in a ‘world of larger economic spaces’ lay with the United States rather than Latin America, was signalled by entrance into negotiations with the US and Canada to form NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement). In 1990, an official in the Secretariat of Commerce insisted that: “Mexico has never been part of Latin America.”\(^\text{121}\) For the tecnócratas, NAFTA was the natural culmination and vindication of their policies. Rogelio Ramírez notes that from this perspective NAFTA “is not just the icing. It is the cake, the oven, and the kitchen.”\(^\text{122}\) NAFTA promised guaranteed access to the US for domestic producers, but also for third country investors intent on basing their capital in Mexico. Most importantly, NAFTA was seen to serve as an institutional guarantee of Salinas’ policies. The triumph of Salinastroika became effectively tied to the success of NAFTA, not so much materially (for the actual economic benefits of NAFTA to Mexico are endlessly debatable), but because so many expectations were based on its success.

At the same time, it would be mistaken to assume that this entailed a complete break with the traditional role of the state in directing the economy. In an explicit disavowal of


\(^{120}\) ibid. p. 468


\(^{122}\) Rogelio Ramírez, quoted in: The Economist (1993) ‘Mexico Survey,’ February 13, p. 6

114
CHAPTER TWO - SPACE, KNOWLEDGE AND POWER IN THE MEXICAN TRANSITION

blind faith in the vagaries of the market to deliver development, Salinas commented: “If the free functioning of economic mechanisms implied the achievement of national goals, planning would be unnecessary ... the evidence indicates the inexistence of automatic equilibria and of spontaneous social harmony.” In this commitment he followed Miguel de la Madrid, who at the beginning of his presidency had declared: “We must regulate, orient, and induce the development of the private sector so that it supports national priorities and state policy.” Both presidents therefore shared the conviction of previous administrations that society should be directed from above, rather than left to the machinations of the market. However, where de la Madrid and Salinas did differ from their predecessors was in their belief that the state should not directly control or participate in the economy. According to the new orthodoxy, the state was to fulfil a role of “rectorship.” This implied that the state should serve as an overseer to impose the necessary order, discipline, and efficiency for a well functioning economy. According to Pedro Aspe, this ‘rectorship’ extended not only to the privatisation of the public sector, but also to the elimination of financial and material subsidies to the private sector.

The Solidaridad Pact (Pacto de Solidaridad Económica y Social) announced by Madrid in December 1987 and continued through the Salinas sexenio is perhaps best illustrative of the unresolved contradiction between the appeal of neoliberalism and the pull of the old statist economics. Solidaridad emphasised the adoption of a mixed program rather than pure monetarist policies, combining both tight government monetary and credit

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125 “Rectorship” is the term most often used by the new Mexican elites to describe the ideal role of the public sector/state. For example, in 1986 a prominent bureaucrat commented in a planning discussion that: “the solution to problems must be found under the rectorship of the state.” See Secretaría de Programación y Presupuesto (1986) Planeación en tiempos de crisis (Mexico: SPP) p. 242. Another prominent member of the elite (Sócrates Rizzo) comments in the same document that the National Development Plan was intended to ‘strengthen rectorship.’ p. 188

126 Aspe, Pedro (1992) ‘Mexico’s experience in economic reform.’ Bildner Center Working Paper, no. 12 (New York: Graduate School of CUNY) p. 6

115
controls, and a wage and price freeze designed to control inflation. As Centeno argues: "The Pacto demonstrated that the tecnócratas were not generic neoliberals who applied monetarist policies indiscriminately but were willing to utilize a variety of mechanisms to establish control over the economy." 127 The Mexican government demonstrated a fierce determination to exert tight control over a variety of social actors. This included not only the traditional grip upon the labour and campesino sectors, whose acquiescence was required in order to impose the costs of adjustment upon the bottom two thirds of the population. Most tellingly, the Salinas administration enforced the co-operation of private industry, threatening it with audits, sanctions and loss of contracts if it failed to collaborate. As Under Secretariat Guillermo Ortiz states, a fundamental precept of the new strategy was to "impose the discipline of international markets on [the previously protected] domestic producers." 128

The imposition of this discipline implied radical adjustments to existing socio-economic pacts. Before 1982, one of the cornerstones of the legitimacy of the party state had been the combination of national control over key industries, protection for domestic producers, and distribution of 'bread' to maintain the acquiescence of organised labour. However, with the rise of the technocrats and their redefinition of 'independence,' this 'cornerstone' was now seen less as a symbol of Revolutionary commitment, than as a clear example of the 'un-realism' of former policy. One of Miguel de la Madrid's first acts as President (1982-1988) was to announce a new economic model, termed the PIRE (Immediate Program for Economic Reorganisation). The PIRE targeted inflation, specifically slashing public expenditures. In 1983, state participation in the economy dropped for the first time since 1977, and continued declining. By 1988, 750 of the 1155

127 Centeno, Miguel Ángel (1994) op. cit. p. 195

institutions operative in 1982 had closed, contributing further to the already tight minority control over capital. By 1991, the state had divested itself of a further 250 companies, including major enterprises such as steel mills and the previously sacrosanct phone company. From 1982 and 1987, public expenditures (not including debt service) declined by 62 percent, with capital investments being worst effected, declining from 24.7 percent of expenditures to 9.6 percent by 1987. This process only accelerated under the Salinas administration (1988-1994), which saw federal expenditures decline from 31 percent of GDP in 1987 to 21 percent by 1990, and helped produce a fiscal surplus by 1991. For the tecnócratas, it was clear that the state should cease to be a proprietorial institution, ceding its interventionist responsibility for economic development to private capital and the ‘discipline’ of the global economic system.

This dramatic decline of the public sector, combined with a general opening of the economy to market forces, directly affected the poorest sectors of society. In practice, this translated into the fact that whilst the post-1982 percentage of the non-debt budget devoted to welfare increased (from 35.1 to 37.1 percent), the percentage of the total budget declined steeply from 19.1 to 12.1 percent by 1988. In real terms, this represented a decline of 35 percent in social expenditure over the course of de la Madrid’s sexenio, with the 1988 level per capita below that of 1974. These changes helped contribute to a dramatic decline in the health and nutrition levels of the average Mexican. In the face of such hardship, the tecnócratas refused to consider any radical socio-economic

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131 Figures cited from: Presidencia de la República (1991) The Mexican agenda (Mexico) pp. 77-78

132 By 1989, meat consumption per capita had declined by 50 percent from 1980 levels and was below that of 1975, whilst milk consumption levels had declined by 40 percent and were lower than in 1970. By 1990, the average calorific intake was approaching half of that recommended by the WHO (World Health Organisation). Furthermore, this period saw a reverse in the previously steadily improving infant mortality rates. See Barry, Tom (Ed.) (1992) Mexico: A country guide (Albuquerque: Inter-Hemispheric Education Center) pp. 93-99, from whence the preceding figures are cited

117
restructuring. From 1982, 'social equality' was effectively dropped from official discourse, to be replaced with an emphasis on an abstract 'justice' without reference to social structures.

In accordance with their redefinition of independence, the tecnócratas stressed that to tackle injustice it was necessary to first accurately diagnose constraints upon aspiration. In practice, this meant that justice tended to be future oriented, with justice only available as a by-product of greater economic efficiency. For example, as de la Madrid argued in 1980, "the sustained increase in employment will allow for a better distribution in income." Such a view reflected a belief that there were clear limits to the ability of the state to affect inequality. This amounted to a rejection of populism, as in the view of the tecnócratas this would detract from the building of the solid economic foundations necessary for future prosperity. This is well illustrated by the argument of a book that stands as a seminal intellectual justification of Mexican neoliberalism: Pedro Aspe's and Paul Sigmund's *The political economy of income distribution in Mexico*. Aspe and Sigmund state: "The Mexican experience with government action to promote social justice demonstrates that even with a political tradition that places a great emphasis upon government action against poverty, it is difficult to develop effective programs that alter income distribution." Ultimately, this leads Aspe and Sigmund to conclude that direct government action against poverty is not only 'difficult,' but also 'unrealistic.' Both Salinas and de la Madrid were effusive in their castigation of populism. In 1982, de la Madrid declared that he was committed to "support the weakest ... but without false paternalism and without demagoguery." Five years later Salinas reiterated the message: "We have learned that populism hurts the interests of the majority and constitutes the worst enemy of our aspirations for the popular welfare." Moreover: "It is intolerable

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that the rhetoric and actions to artificially elevate and disarticulate the living standards of Mexicans continue to postpone the creation of healthy and firm economic foundations."\(^{137}\)

For the tecnócratas, these solid foundations had to be built whatever the short-term social and political costs. After all, "to offer an easy solution would be irresponsible."\(^{138}\)

The Salinas sexenio did bring some improvements through PRONASOL, with expenditures for health, education, and social security increasing after 1988 (from 14.9 to 26.5 percent of the federal budget by 1991). However, it is important to note that these increased expenditures were aimed less at resolving the issue of social justice, than at providing the social stability necessary for the regime to implement its plans.\(^{139}\)

PRONASOL’s vision of solidarity emphasised national co-participation rather than class struggle, in an attempt to build national unity behind the reforms.\(^{140}\) In this regard it is worth noting that the rationale underlying Salinas’ initial proposal for PRONASOL (in his doctoral thesis), had less do with social justice than with how social services could be translated into political support.\(^{141}\) More generally, this tendency is reflected in fact that the discourse of the tecnócratas consistently emphasises individual responsibility over community, and property rights over communal holdings such as the ejido (peasant land

\(^{137}\) Salinas de Gortari, Carlos, quoted in: (1989) La Jornada (Mexico City) November 24, p. 28


\(^{140}\) Ibid. p. 29

\(^{141}\) Developing this point, Dresser refers to PRONASOL on the first page of her book, as a "social tranquilliser." Ibid. p. 1. Tellingly, the budget of PRONASOL never amounted to more than 1 percent of GDP, whilst only 3 percent of this went to Empresas de Solidaridad – the main PRONASOL program assigned to increase productive opportunities for the most disadvantaged. Pastor, Manuel (Jr.) and Wise, Carol (1998) op. cit. p. 76. Pastor and Wise conclude that: “while effective in securing political breathing space in the wake of harsh adjustment measures, the limited resources and demand-based nature of such programs means that they cannot be expected to do much more than that.” Ibid. p. 77
holding collectively worked by the community).\textsuperscript{142} For Salinas, PRONASOL "[does] not give away anything for free. It is not populistic. We do not print money as the answer to social demands. Neither is the program paternalistic. People must take the initiative and organise themselves."\textsuperscript{143} This signalled a move to a classically liberal conception of the individual, with a minimalist conception of the welfare state that targeted only those at the very bottom of the poverty trap. In this regard, Pedro Aspe's definition of a "just" Mexican system is telling. According to Aspe, justice would be achieved when inequalities were attributable to individual characteristics (thus affecting only the less able), and when access to resources would be guaranteed.\textsuperscript{144} And witness Salinas' emphasis on the personal responsibility of the individual: "The Mexican state is constitutionally committed to the welfare of the individual ... [but] the tasks of maintaining welfare and the research for a better quality of life are a shared responsibility."\textsuperscript{145} Moreover, Salinas emphasised that welfare programs would henceforth be directed not to those "who make no effort, who do not work ... [but to those] who try the hardest and struggle the most."\textsuperscript{146} Such liberalism, however limited, signalled a radical break in the discourse of Mexican politicians, and suggests the pertinence of Drainville's observation that national citizenship is increasingly shaped in accordance with the needs of the world economy:

National citizens are increasingly cast as bearers of economic rationality whose primary function is to bring to states claims for greater efficiency in the management of economic resources – and lead the assault on what Desmond King called the social rights of citizenship ... [T]his is part of the process of political

\textsuperscript{142} The ejido represents the selective incorporation of the radical agrarian demands made by Emiliano Zapata during the Revolution. Until Salinas' controversial amendment of Article 27 of the constitution in 1992, the ejido (communal land holding) system stood as a central pillar of Revolutionary commitment to the peasantry.

\textsuperscript{143} Salinas de Gortari, Carlos (1991) 'Interview.' \textit{New Perspectives Quarterly}, 8:1 (Winter) p. 29 [pp. 25-40]

\textsuperscript{144} Aspe, Pedro and Beristain, Javier (1984) \textit{op. cit.} p. 18


\textsuperscript{146} Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1989) \textit{First State of the Nation Address}. Translation by the Office of the Press Secretary of the President.
integration in the world economy that passes through states and is reliant on the ability of states to structure political participation, either through consensus building or coercive measures.\(^{147}\)

For the tecnócratas, inequity within the system was never going to change unless sacrifices were made now, and continued social disintegration avoided. Equity as a goal in itself increasingly became marginalised in the discourse of the Mexican elite. This was largely because aggregate demand policies as a way to tackle inequality were believed to have failed completely,\(^{148}\) and – as related earlier – preferential treatment for marginalised sectors was seen to reflect selfish rather than ‘global’ interests. Consequently, the elite viewed Mexico’s accelerating inequality as largely beyond their control, and were unwilling to consider any significant change in socio-economic structures to ameliorate it. The ultimate effect of government policy in the neoliberal period under discussion (1982-1994) was thus a substantial increase in economic inequity.\(^{149}\) For the tecnócratas, this was acceptable in so far as it was the ‘inevitable’ consequence of a ‘new realism’ that entailed the: “acceptance of maximal values of the traditional, basically quantitative indicators ... [through acceptance] of an economic realism that has no room either for the calculation of social and political costs or for questions relating to national independence.”\(^{150}\) Whilst this perspective clearly implied the loss of the trappings of


\(^{148}\) Aspe, Pedro and Beristain, Javier (1984) op. cit. p. 28

\(^{149}\) In 1994, the richest 24 families in Mexico (all billionaires) earned more than the poorest 25 million citizens of the population combined (out of a total population of 90 million). [Listed in the Fortune magazine’s roster of billionaires, and cited in La Jornada, October 1, 1994]. At the opening of the 1990s, there had only been 2 billionaires, and this at a time of plummeting wage levels for the majority. The period between 1984 and 1994 saw the richest decile of the population see their share of national wealth increase by 15 percent, while at the same time “25 percent of Mexico’s tiny middle class fell into the ranks of the poor.” Hollings, Ernest (1993-1994) ‘Mexico Reform First.’ Foreign Policy, 93, p. 99. By 1996, the bottom 50 percent of the population received only 10 percent of national wealth, corroborating the trend’s consistency. Of the 17.5 million Mexicans living in ‘extreme poverty’ in the first half of the 1990s, 13 million lived in the countryside. See Latin American Weekly Report, July 21, 1994, WR-94-27, p. 316. Even conservative observers such as the World Bank, noted (1994) that “[In Mexico] economic growth alone won’t necessarily address problems of income distribution and poverty,” signalling a (rather belated) recognition that poverty remained the premier threat to free market development in Latin America. See: The News, Mexico City, September 15, 1994

\(^{150}\) Cordera Campos, Rolando and Tello, Carlos (Eds.) (1981) Mexico: La disputa por la nación (Mexico: Editorial Siglo XXI) Quoted in: Centeno, Miguel Ángel (1994) op. cit. p. 200. It is well to note, however,
independence, from the technocratic perspective these costs were worth it as far as Mexican good behaviour in the international arena brought non-interference, thus allowing internal policies to be pursued autonomously. Mexico’s pliant economic policies helped the US ignore the continued flouting of democratic principle. Perhaps most importantly, the Mexican elite could point to external agents (who also happened to be their greatest supporters) as scapegoats for its limited social achievements. The absence of substantive progress in the sphere of social justice, so the rhetoric went, was the fault of the ‘rules’ of outsiders, that the government had ‘no choice’ to accept.  

2.5 Territoriality and uneven development

It has been noted that technocratic policies led to the increasing marginalisation of already excluded sectors. At the same time, other sectors were privileged by the tecnócratas’ policies. Most noticeable was the fact that neoliberal policies built upon existing uneven development and exacerbated it. As previously described, policy post-1982 was guided by the imperative of achieving maximum macro-economic growth through the embrace of neoliberalism. The parallel retreat from broadly Fordist-Keynesian statist economic policy clearly undermined the unity of the Mexican state as a

\[\text{151 A growing number of influential Mexican historians (i.e. Lorenzo Mayer, Sergio Aguayo and Enrique Krauze) have sought to reconstruct a counter-memory to the way that ‘official history’ has been marshalled to defend authoritarianism. Sergio Aguayo, for example, claims that his study of Mexican and American foreign policy elites forced him to ‘unlearn’ the official story of the United States and Mexico as antagonistic nations, with Mexico locked in a constant struggle against the deleterious influence of the United States. Aguayo instead points to the fact that Mexico’s foreign policy has consistently been based on its interests vis-à-vis the United States, rather than on principles. This has led to a recurrent pattern of isolationism and evasion, in which the Mexican government has manipulated nationalism in order to cut off Mexico from the outside world, thereby enabling the government to use coercion in the implementation of domestic policy. Integral to this process, Aguayo argues, is a consistent pattern of support by US elites for Mexican authoritarianism, in which US elites have collaborated by ignoring successive Mexican governments’ abuse of their own citizens. In sum, Aguayo argues that the relation between Mexico and US is best conceived as a pact between elites to prioritise Mexican order over democracy and human rights. See: Aguayo, Sergio (1999) ‘Democracy in Mexico—the complex role of the United States: A conversation with Sergio Aguayo,’ The Journal of American History, 86:2, pp. 456-66}
territorially self-enclosed container of socio-economic activities. Perhaps more significantly, however, is that this process also intensified the importance of Mexican territoriality as a scale-circumscribing strategy of state regulation and governance. That is to say, distinctively territorial strategies of regulation continued to offer a crucial support to the circulation of capital on both sub- and supra-national scales. Faced with the increasing mobility of capital, commodities and labour across national borders, the Mexican state increasingly oriented itself to the provision of immobile factors of production. This implied a re-scaling of Mexico’s internal institutional hierarchy in order to play an increasing entrepreneurial, supply-side role in financing, constructing, and organising the territorial infrastructures of capital accumulation within urban areas. In practise, this entailed an extraction of resources from those regions and sectors judged ‘uncompetitive’ and ‘backward’ by the ‘new realism,’ and the concentration of these resources in select urban development regions. This followed from the promotion of an urban centred ‘accumulation strategy’ through which select Mexican urban areas were promoted by the state as locational nodes for transnational investment.

Agricultural policy provides a useful way in to this issue. Since the Revolution, the development of the agrarian sector and the protection of the peasant had been one of the fundamental ideological themes of the regime. However, from the high point of 1930s land redistribution under the direction of Lázaro Cárdenas, the countryside had suffered decades of neglect. The south, in particular, remained disproportionately poor and underdeveloped. Poverty indicators from 1984-1996 show that whilst the north – richer initially – has shown progressive falls in poverty, the south has continued to increase its lead in the poverty stakes, registering big leaps in both 1990 and 1996. Indeed, whilst northern states show levels of human development similar to OECD countries, countries in Central America provide a more accurate comparison for those in the south. The relative prosperity of northern states is largely explainable by the north’s geographical proximity to the United States, and relatedly, its higher levels of infrastructure and human

capital. These advantages have allowed the north to capitalise on the opening of the Mexican economy. The south, on the other hand, has been hampered by its relative remoteness from Mexico’s premier source of markets and investment funds. This factor of distance has been compounded by its inferior infrastructure and investment in human capital, poorly developed immigration networks, and disproportionate dependence on a protected agrarian sector.153

By 1991, there were a total of 29951 ejidos (communal land holdings) in Mexico, encompassing 50 percent of the total land surface, and 25 percent of the population (some 20 million people).154 Faced with a growing population, the stagnation of the rural sector, and the imperative to focus development in more ‘dynamic’ areas, Salinas’ response was simply to argue that there was no more land to distribute to the six million landless peasant households. Agricultural policy would henceforth have to accommodate itself both to this ‘reality,’ and to the ‘reality’ that the agrarian sector had increasingly proved itself inefficient and thus an encumbrance to Mexico’s development. The solution as proposed and put into practice by the tecnócratas was to treat the countryside as just another factor of production, rather than as the home to twenty million peasants requiring assistance. It had to be accepted that Mexico simply did not have the resources to help them. Whilst the populist solution would have emphasised agrarian reform, credits, and social expenditures, ‘realism’ demanded the recognition that whilst suffering in the agrarian sector was indeed painful, there was nothing substantive that could be done about it. For the tecnócratas, it was in fact a banal point that the poor would have to bear most of the costs of development. This merely reflected the fact that other higher sectors could, and had, exited from the constraints of the national economy, whilst the poor remained imprisoned by it. This was never going to change unless sacrifices were made

153 Ibid. p. 72. The combination of these structural factors has left the south poorly placed to adapt to changes in the global economy; a situation only compounded by the ill co-ordinated intervention of the state. Consequently, the south has in many ways been effectively ‘delinked’ from Mexican ‘development,’ forming a zone of increasing marginality within the NAFTA trade block

now, and continued social disintegration avoided. This reflected the tecnócratas' belief that intervention would merely prolong the situation by draining valuable resources required for the economic development of the 'modern' (urban) Mexico. Without such development, the Mexican 'whole' would be retarded, all for the sake of an individual 'part' that appeared to be doomed anyway. Consequently, the thrust of government 'realism' amounted to a simple message: the 'redundant surplus population' residing in the poorest sectors of society were to henceforth incorporate themselves into the modern economy, and thereby 'drag them-selves into modernity.' As Centeno relates: "Agricultural reform was no longer considered a Revolutionary commitment but an inefficient policy measure." The agricultural sector was now little more than an obstacle or dead weight upon development, rather than (as it been for so long), a central symbol of Revolutionary commitment.

Whilst in some ways this implied a return to the pre-1970 policies of SD, the privileging of the urban over the rural was now conjoined with a accelerated fragmentation, as privileged regions and social sectors orientated themselves to the international rather than the national economy. This implied a significant change in the articulation between urbanisation and state territoriality. From the broadly Keynesian orientation of pre-1982 economic policy in which urban centres acted as transmission belts of redistribution in order to generate a broadly based national development, the post-1982 era heralded a situation in which privileged urban areas in central and northern Mexico increasingly 'delinked' themselves from more marginalised sectors. This suggests that with the increasing insertion of the Mexico into the global economy, state territorial power "self-expands globally while self-fragmenting," and this had profound implications for the role of the city/region as a co-ordinate and node of state territorial organisation.

155 Centeno, Miguel Ángel (1994) op. cit. p. 209

According to Lefebvre, cites are simultaneously basing points for capitalist accumulation (nodes in global flows) and organisational-administrative levels of territorial states (co-ordinates of state territorial power). The pre-1982 Fordist-Keynesian period was characterised by the tendency for these two dimensions of urbanisation to be spatially coextensive within the boundaries of the Mexican territorial state. As nodes of accumulation (loci of industrial production; centres of command over inter-urban; sites of exchange within local, regional and national markets), cities were framed within the territorial grids that underpinned the national economy. In this sense, Mexican cities served as the engines of Fordist production, forming an urban infrastructure within a global system compartmentalised into similarly distinct state-level territorial matrices. Assumed in this model was a tight fit between urban dynamism and the growth of the national economy as a whole, with regions and cities considered as mere sub-units of national economic space. It was assumed that the development of urban areas would function as a propulsive drive for the eventual development of the state's internal peripheries, thereby counteracting the problem of uneven geographical development. As co-ordinates of state territorial power, cities and regions were considered to function as transmission belts for the redistributive socio-economic policies of the central state, promoting growth and redistributing its effects on a national scale. In this sense, the growth of urban-based core sectors was integrally linked to the development and mitigation of the marginality of other areas such as the rural.

This all changed with the neoliberal era. The post-1982 reconfiguration of Mexican urbanisation in relation to the global and the state was closely linked to the perceived obsolescence of the technological, institutional, and social foundations of the Fordist-Keynesian regime of accumulation. The re-scaling of the Mexican state occasioned by

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neoliberal restructuring thus entailed a profound transformation of the relationship between the state, capital, and territory. The Fordist-Keynesian period of Mexican state territoriality was marked by the deployment of indirect territorial intervention oriented towards the reproduction of labour power (through redistributive social welfare policies), industrial location (through subsidies and tax concessions) and the promotion of collective consumption (through housing, education, transportation and urban planning policies). Since the onset of restructuring in 1982, this nationally scaled constellation of city-state-capital interconnections has been rearticulated and rehierarchised towards the global, super-regional, and local scales.

From a Lefebvrian perspective, this reorganisation of the Mexican state implies neither a weakening of state capacities nor an erosion of the national scale. Rather, reorganisation heralds the entrenchment of accumulation strategies designed to enhance the global competitive advantage of select Mexican urban development regions, thereby to secure a localised 'spatial fix' for capital accumulation. As previously noted, by 1982 continued economic crises had substantially undermined the capacity of the Mexican territorial state to regulate the accumulation process. However, it would be mistaken to assume that this reduced capacity signalled the commencement of a uni-directional 'erosion' of Mexican state territoriality. While the ongoing transformations in the global economy certainly suggested the partial erosion of central state regulatory power over global flows of capital, commodities, and labour power, the Mexican state remained a central institutional matrix of political power, a significant scale of territorial organisation, and a crucial territorial infrastructure for capital accumulation. The move to supply-side modes of state intervention by the Mexican state entailed a more direct and unmediated role for the state in the promotion of what Swyngedouw terms the "productive force of territorial organisation." Rather than merely being responsible for

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160 Swyngedouw, Erik (1992a) 'Territorial organisation and the space/technology nexus.' Transactions, Institute of British Geographers, 17, pp. 417-33
the reproduction of territorially based production complexes, the Mexican state increasingly involved itself in the *restoration, enhancement, intensification, and restructuring* of their capacity as productive forces. This implies, as Cerny has noted, “the state itself becomes an agent for the commodification of the collective, situated in a wider, market-dominated playing field.” In the Mexican case such “commodification of the collective” involved extended public-private partnerships, labour retraining programs, information sharing, venture capital provision, and urban development programs focusing on the provision of conference centres, hotels etc. as well as the commodification of national space via the reimagining of national culture examined in the next chapter. Taken together, these developments are best conceived as a concerted strategy for the intensification of the productive capacities of select urbanised regions through the construction of “territorially rooted immobile assets.”

In this sense, the post-1982 re-scaling of state territorial power toward the local level should be considered as state-directed attempt to propel cities and regions upwards in the global urban-regional hierarchy. This form of “urban entrepreneurialism” was evident in relation both to the industrial structure of the city’s industrial base and the spatial scale of its command functions. This entailed attempts by local and regional governments to promote industrial growth in globally competitive sectors and to acquire command and control functions in the world economy by providing territorial preconditions for transnational capital, such as transportation and communication links, labour power and


163 Amin, Ash and Thrift, Nigel (1995) ‘Territoriality in the global political economy.’ *Nordisk Samheallgeografisk Tidskrift*, 20, p. 10. Increasingly, the state’s own configurations of territorial organisation have become essential components of the circuits of capital, and therefore, significant locational weapons in the interspatial competition between cities, regions and states in the world economy

164 See: Harvey, David (1989b) ‘From managerialism to entrepreneurialism: the transformation in urban governance in late capitalism.’ *Geografiska Annaler B*, 71:1, pp. 3-18

128
place specific externalities. In this sense, the mobilisation of governance around the political economy of place entailed a double-edged strategy to reconfigure the territorial organisation of urban space. On the one hand, this strategy was socio-economic, and oriented to the construction of "new industrial spaces" for capital accumulation. On the other hand, this strategy was institutional, seeking as it did to create 'new state spaces' that enhanced the local state's capacity to mobilise and co-ordinate transnational capital investment within select urban locational nodes.

Globally, this was paralleled by two intertwined developments. First, the intensification in global interspatial competition between cities and regions has forced regions and local states to assume increasingly direct roles in promoting capital accumulation on sub-national scales. Second, Jessop has argued that the national level of state regulation is being increasingly "hollowed out." In the case of Mexico this manifested itself in the displacement of central state powers both upwards to supra-national regulatory institutions such as NAFTA (North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement), the IMF (International Monetary Fund) etc., and downwards toward sub-national scales of governance such as regional and local states. Taken in sum, these intertwined politico-economic shifts have resulted in the intensifying "denationalisation" of the autocentric Mexican national economy.

169 See: Sassen, Saskia (1991) The global city: New York, London, Tokyo (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press); Sassen, Saskia (1993) Cities in the world economy (London: Sage). "Denationalization" simultaneously emphasises the key role of the state in the globalization process, and the fact that this role is triggering a rescaling of the state itself. Denationalization of the Mexican national economy does not entail a lessening of the state's role as a relatively fixed matrix for the territorialisation of capital. Rather, the process of denationalization is best conceptualised as proceeding in parallel with a rescaling of state territorial organisation both more globally and more locally. From this perspective, the globalization of urbanisation and the reconfiguration of the territorial state (as an institutional-regulatory structure and as a city system) are intrinsically related moments within a single process of global capitalist restructuring.
This rearticulation of the national scale with sub- and supra-state scales entails a growing "territorial non-coincidence"\textsuperscript{170} between the scales on which capital accumulation and state territorial power are organised. As a node of accumulation, select Mexican urban development regions (particularly in the north) are increasingly embedded in flows of capital that do not overlap coextensively with national economic space. As co-ordinates of state territorial power, these cities occupy a contradictory, multi-scalar geographical terrain. Naturally, these cities are still situated within the Mexican state, defined as a bounded geopolitical space in the interstate system. Yet as the state increasingly transfers and dissolves regulatory functions both upwards (to NAFTA) and downward (to local areas of governance), an increasing 'territorial non-coincidence' emerges between the scales of state territorial organisation and those of capital accumulation. Of course, the scales of capital accumulation have never exactly coincided with those of state territorial organisation, yet the most recent round of globalization has intensified this scalar disjuncture to an unprecedented degree. This situation presents itself to the territorial state as a particularly intense 'scalar dilemma.' In so far as the glocal state remains a territorially bounded and immobile spatial configuration, it cannot recreate the relatively stable scalar symmetry between state structures and circuits of capital obtaining in the Fordist-Keynesian period. Moreover, the devolving of regulatory tasks downwards to the local level actually magnifies the territorial non-coincidence between the scales of state territorial organisation and capital accumulation. In this context, the promotion of NAFTA by the Mexican government represented an explicit attempt to address this 'scalar dilemma.' It is an attempt to reduce territorial non-coincidence by creating a supra-national scale of state regulation more in keeping with the scales of capital accumulation on one hand, and the scales of state territorial organisation on the other.

\textsuperscript{170} Murray, Robin (1971) 'The internationalization of the economy and the nation-state.' \textit{New Left Review}, 67, pp. 84-108
CHAPTER TWO - SPACE, KNOWLEDGE AND POWER IN THE MEXICAN TRANSITION

The northern development belt of Mexico is a dramatic instance of this disjuncture and an associated, highly polarised territorial politics. The dynamism of northern Mexico has been primarily based on its geographic proximity vis-à-vis the United States, the intensifying relocation of industry to this region, and the concomitant concentration of development resources and transnational investment.\footnote{The United States is obviously easier to export to than anywhere else due to its geographic proximity and unparalleled market. First oil, and then diversification in the eighties, meant that by the end of the decade the majority of manufactured exports were destined for the United States. This led directly both to a concentration of infrastructure development and industrial investment in the north of Mexico, and the general improvement of Mexican communications oriented towards the United States. This facilitated the mobility of labour, and also provided a strong 'pull' factor: the best economic prospects for both Mexico’s poor and the skilled middle classes were increasingly to be found in and around the United States-Mexico border.} With the onset of restructuring this regional economy has been delinked almost entirely from the declining cities, regions, and marginalised social sectors i.e. agriculture, located elsewhere in Mexico. What effectively amounts to a ‘two-nations’ accumulation strategy instigated during Miguel de la Madrid’s sexenio, and consolidated under Salinas de la Gortari, served to exacerbate spatial polarisation between a ‘modern’ northern economy increasingly integrated into the world economy, and a southern economy disproportionately dependent upon sectors characterised as ‘backward’ and ‘outmoded’.\footnote{This is obviously a simplified portrait, for there are sectors characterisable as ‘backward’ in the north, as well as ‘modern’ sectors in the South (for example: Cancun tourist resort, high technology modern agriculture, bio-diversity exploitation projects etc). The terms north and south are intended merely to point to a tendency to spatial polarisation, concretised in government strategy.} The formation of privileged sectors of the economy located in spatially concentrated areas became the politico-economic priority of the Mexican state as the 1980s and early 1990s wore on, at the expense of investment in declining regions and sectors of the economy. As Bartra has argued, this ‘new regionalism’ has implied the creation of new regional powers, under the rubric of economic-technical-administrative conglomerates linked to petroleum, irrigation, maquiladoras, centres of electrical energy, other large businesses (petro-chemicals) and tourist centres.\footnote{Bartra, Roger (1993) ‘Revolutionary Nationalism and national security in Mexico.’ Bagley, Bruce M and Aguayo Quezada, Sergio (Eds.) Mexico: In search of security (New Brunswick and London: Transaction) pp. 143-172} It is perhaps possible, therefore, to interpret Salinismo as almost a declaration of independence by northern and central Mexico and the individuals and groups dependent upon this spatial and social polarisation, with a
consequent disavowal of the social costs accruing to already marginalised sectors of the national community. This neo-authoritarian accumulation strategy of central government to propel select regions and social sectors into the global economy implicitly necessitates the suppression of local and regional territorial opposition. From this situation emerges a "politics of scale,"174 in which the territorial organisation of social relations becomes a direct object of sociopolitical contestation. In short, the relations between privileged development regions, and their host states, tend to be contradictory. The articulation of localised politics in such areas with broader regional and national political-territorial constellations can become highly antagonistic when territorially dependent interests located elsewhere within the state clash with the goals of new regional centres of power. This is particularly so in Mexico, since as Bartra observes, the development of economic and regional centres of power threatens Revolutionary Nationalism, since "nationalism goes hand in hand with centralism."175 In this context, the crucial question is how the socio-economic disjuncture between the privileged, the marginalised, and the territorial economy of the Mexican state is managed politically, through the construction of accumulation strategies and hegemonic projects.176

Conclusion

It has been argued that the period 1934-1994 may be subdivided into two main periods. 1934 to 1982 was characterised by a 'statist' approach to economic planning. This gave priority to national ownership of key industries and resources, Keynesian redistribution policies, protectionism, and direct state involvement in the economy. Whilst authoritarian, political decision-making was guided by the pragmatic acceptance that society was made up of diverse groups with distinct interests, each of which had to be factored into the formulation of policy. 1982 marks the beginning of the sexenio of

174 Smith, Neil (1992) 'Geography, difference, and the politics of scale.' Doherty, Joe; Graham, Elspeth; Malek, Mo (Eds.) Postmodernism and the social sciences (New York: St. Martin's Press) pp. 57-79
175 Bartra, Roger (1993) op. cit. p. 154
Miguel de la Madrid, and the onset of neoliberal restructuring. This restructuring was deepened under Salinas, president from 1988-1994. Neoliberal restructuring entailed a retreat from direct state intervention in the economy, and the enacting of an idealised split between politics and economics. Keynesian redistribution was, if not totally abandoned, rolled back substantially. Protectionist measures were eliminated, national enterprises privatised, and preferential treatment for domestic capital brought to an end. Paralleling this process was the de-legitimisation of the corporatist system as a way of carrying out politics. Post-1982, decision-making became increasingly subject to economic rationality, as dictated by the ‘realism’ of Mexico’s position vis-à-vis the world economy and the privileging of a ‘global’ rather than ‘sectarian’ view of society. Whilst elite discourse continued to be marked by (rather abstract) references to social equity in deference to Revolutionary social commitments, the actual practice of politics translated into the virtually unmitigated privileging of macro-economic growth over social justice. Moreover, building as it did upon an existing uneven historico-geographical uneven development, restructuring tended to exacerbate divisions and polarise society. This is clearly demonstrated in regard to the privileging of those urbanised areas in the north of Mexico that were picked out as development zones by government policy. Building upon their existing advantages (geographic proximity to the US, high levels of infrastructure, concentration of modern industry etc.), these areas spearheaded the emergence of a ‘new’ Mexico that by 1994 seemed poised to enter the First World. The concentration of development in these areas tended to ‘delink’ marginal regions (the ‘south’) and social sectors (e.g. agriculture). This is evident both in terms of a variety of socio-economic indicators, and in terms of the politics of representation of the technocratic governments of the late 1980s and early 1990s.

This politics of representation is the subject of the next chapter. The current chapter has sought to contextualise this politics of representation in terms of the emergence of a particular form of rationality, and the material restructuring of the Mexican economy. Specifically, this chapter has pointed to a shift in the role of Mexican territoriality in the neoliberal period, arguing that this does not represent an erosion of state territoriality, but
rather its restructuring in ways more conducive to the accumulation of capital in a changing international system. In this sense, the state is not opposed to neoliberalism/economic globalization, but is better thought of as an integral aspect of its unfolding. Mexican elites at both the national and local level have facilitated this process, purposefully rearticulating state territoriality with both sub- and supra- state scales. In effect, this has led to a sub-state fragmentation on the one hand, and the empowerment of supra-state institutional arrangements such as NAFTA and the IMF on the other. This process is at once both global (in the sense that this process must be understood within a totality whose ultimate limit is planetary, and that continually strives to achieve this limit), fragmentary (in the sense that this process seeks to divide and establish essential atomised identities for 'parts' (regions, social groups/classes etc.) that are connected within this totality), and hierarchical (in the sense that this process is neither 'natural' nor 'inevitable,' but instead is intimately connected to the power infused privileging of some 'futures' over others).

It has been argued that this globalization of Mexican territoriality was facilitated by the decision-making processes of elites who did not made these decisions as a direct articulation of class interest. Power in the context of transition is most accurately viewed less as the ability to produce solutions, than to delimit the sorts of questions that can be asked, and connectedly, the ways in which answers can be legitimately verified. The mantra of Mexican neoliberal restructuring included imperatives such as 'responsibility,' realistic appraisal,' and 'truly feasible solutions,' yet this only begs the questions: 'responsible to whom?' and 'feasible for what?' Why is it so 'realistic' that the satisfaction of these requirements automatically shifts most of the sacrifice to already marginal sectors? And why did the Mexican elite so readily accede to the demands of international capital? Ultimately, these issues are best viewed less as a case of some natural accommodation to the circulation of capital and commodities, than a product of the flow of knowledge. Those Mexican policymakers who first decided to restructure the economy in order to satisfy the debt, and then continued to restructure to facilitate ever-greater integration into the world economy, did so largely because it became increasingly
unimaginable to challenge the dictates of a hegemonic model of international behaviour. This suggests that within the technocratic worldview, democracy is viewed less as an end in itself, than as a desirable by-product. From this perspective, evaluation of ‘politics’ is based on the extent to which it does not interfere with ‘reason’ (the application of scientific rationality to the economy). This implies an idealised separation between ‘politics’ and ‘economics,’ whereby the economic sphere is subject to the dictates of rationality unencumbered by political considerations. The technocratic revolution is thus definable not so much by a specific economic dogma, than it is by the ascendancy of a worldview that is linear, formal, intransigent, and explicitly dismissive of contradictory viewpoints as irrational and even non-patriotic. The self image of the tecnócratas had much in common with their counterparts in Latin America in the 1970s, who described themselves as “pragmatic defenders and rationalizers of capitalist modes of economic modernization,” and who functioned as the “intellectual brokers between their government and international capital, and as symbols of the government’s determination to rationalize its rule primarily in terms of economic objectives.”

On the other hand, this chapter has also emphasised that the transition to neoliberalism is a messy and contradictory process. The tecnócratas are not simply neoliberals – as if they were turned out of a factory that produced subjects who applied its worldview indiscriminately. They are also national citizens, and their view of ‘the global’ is mediated by their position within a national space and the political system and institutions that structure it. Thus, the production of the neoliberal spatial fix is not merely a product of a unidirectional flow of knowledge, for it is also a response to the insecurity and crisis of previous attempts to ground capitalist development in a concrete place. Consequently, the neoliberal perspective to which the tecnócratas subscribe is mediated through a localised conjuncture, and in the process ‘the global’ is shaped through the mediation of dominant interpretations of what ‘the nation’ has, is, and should (ideally) be. This points to the fact that the relationship between the national scale and the global scale is a

dialectical process, in which the working through of global processes by the national scale, and the working through of the national processes via the global scale, potentially alters the meaning of both.

Given this situation, the transfer of responsibilities to international organisations - such as the IMF and NAFTA - is best seen as a 'calculated move' on the part of government elites to overcome the post-debt crisis of state power and authority. Ultimately, such a development is less a testament to the decline of the sovereign state, than it is a sophisticated 'coping mechanism' combining the empowerment of the international scale with the reempowerment of the state. The transfer of state economic control to 'more global' institutions is less the reduction in power of one scale - the Mexican state - than it is a way for state elites to reconfigure their control and hegemony. Fragmentation and hierarchy mark current global reconfigurations. The reality of 'reproduction in a deterritorialised context,' is a reality marked not by the end of territoriality, but by increasingly fragmented and hierarchised restructuring of space. From this point of view, the contemporary era of globalization is really more about a reconfiguration of space rather than the "end of the nation-state." Space, and the way people, goods, capital and ideas move through it are being radically restructured. While the role of the nation-state has undergone transformation, it can in no way be said that the nation-state is impotent or irrelevant. Rather, its rearticulation with both supra- ('more global') and sub- ('more local') scales constitutes, in Lefebvre's terms, an emergent political centrality that shapes the spatio-temporal organisation of everyday life, and provides the strategic terrain within which any progressive political practice must operate.

Of course, this is not to suggest that the pre-1982 period was not characterised by a form of politics that sought to direct and administer society from above. Corporate politics was itself authoritarian, representative, and elitist. Nor is it suggested that the pre-1982 period was free of social conflict, social polarisation, and the privileging of some geographically embedded social groups over others. Rather, this chapter has argued that these existing tendencies accelerated and intensified in the neoliberal period,
CHAPTER TWO – SPACE, KNOWLEDGE AND POWER IN THE MEXICAN TRANSITION

highlighting a growing disjuncture between the nation's formal framing of itself vis-à-vis the inclusive discourse of Revolutionary Nationalism, and the exclusionary practice of government policy. The post-1982 period is marked by the ever more explicit attempt to rationalise and legitimate this disjuncture within the terms of technocratic rationality. In the process, the technocratic elite sought to furnish a 'vision' of Mexico both to a domestic and international audience. In short, the tecnócratas engaged in a politics of representation that produced Mexico as a 'spectacle.' The term 'spectacle' implies the dominance of Lefebvre's representations of space within the spatialisation of Mexico, as propagated via the discursive practice of the tecnócratas. This chapter has pointed to the form of this discursive practice, rather than its specific content. It is to this content, specifically, the shifting discourse of cultural nationalism, that the next chapter examines.
CHAPTER THREE - THE PRODUCTION OF SPECTACLE

3

THE PRODUCTION OF SPECTACLE
REPRESENTING MEXICAN MODERNITY

The capacity for disassociating the Indian of yesterday from the Indian of today is a mental alchemy that endures to the present

— Bonfil Batalla¹

To create the myth of the modern man it is necessary to reconstruct the primordial original, to generate a tragic sense of the opposition between the barbarian and the civilised man, and to create for modern man a mythical past, so that this very modernity can, apparently, shed such myths and confront rationally the construction of the future.

— Roger Bartra²

The formal designation of space as either urban or rural is a rather sophisticated exercise of power ...

— Subcomandante Marcos³

CHAPTER THREE - THE PRODUCTION OF SPECTACLE

Introduction

One of the most impressive aspects of the neoliberal movement within Mexico was that not only did it grasp the significance of changes in the international economy, but that it also actively created its own vision of a new ‘modern’ Mexico suited to these changes. As argued by David Lehmann, the adoption of neoliberalism has meant that Latin American conservative thought has tended to rid itself of its “corporatist and organicist mould” and become enamoured of the market. As related in the previous chapter, this entailed an opening up of protected sectors, with serious losses for domestic capital. Additionally, continued sacrifice from the working class was necessary, both in terms of increasing unemployment as the public sector and protections to private industry were slashed, and because the attraction of Mexico to foreign investors was in large part based on its low wage costs vis-à-vis the United States. In the process, the embrace of the need to integrate the region both culturally and economically into the world market modified its traditional concern for Latin American identity.

This chapter examines Mexican national culture in its role as a central support of economic restructuring. From Lefebvre’s point of view, the production of a distinct visualisation of space is a fundamental aspect of securing a spatial fix for capital. It may well be, as outlined in the previous chapter, that state territoriality is simultaneously ‘self-expanding globally’ and ‘self-fragmenting,’ but this in no way suggests that articulations of national identity become less important in an era of globalization. Quite the contrary, for the nation-state remains a fundamental particularism for constituting the ‘the global’ in a specific time and place. In competing for comparative advantage, prestige, and power in the highly integrated and competitive system of the late twentieth century, the nation-state plays a key role in producing the identity of a place as distinct and grounded.

5 Commentators interpret such attitudes as having set Latin America apart from South East Asia in its pursuit of capitalist modernisation. See, for example: Fortin, C. (1991) ‘Rise and decline of industrialization.’ Cardoso, Fernando (Ed.) (1991) Eight essays on the crisis of development in Latin America (Amsterdam: CEDLA) pp. 53-86
As shown in the previous chapter, President Salinas – coming into office in the wake of severe financial and political crisis – had to enact far-reaching restructuring in the face of global economic pressure and competition. As noted, one central aspect of this process was the continued embrace of technocratic, instrumentally rational forms of knowledge. But just as important, this restructuring hinged on the mobilisation of a specific national identity and rearticulation of collective understandings of Mexican nationalism in order to ‘sell’ the economic potential of Mexico to international investors, secure greater integration through the negotiation of NAFTA, and pacify those social sectors increasingly impoverished by economic reform. Economic imperatives driven by global pressures were hegemonically crystallised around notions of what Mexico, as a nation, stood for, and what its distinctive contribution to global order could be.

This is important, because from Lefebvre’s perspective, the reimagining of nation space goes hand in hand with the restructuring of state territoriality, insofar as the propulsion of select regions and social sectors into the global economy implicitly necessitates the suppression of local and regional territorial opposition. Securing development by effectively delinking ‘unproductive’ social sectors, diverting national resources to local growth regions, and devolving governance capacities both to sub-state and supra-state levels, may well be an ‘efficient’ and ‘realistic’ way to overcome crisis. However, it can also be deeply unpopular insofar as it clashes with political understandings embedded in cultural self-understandings at least partly a product of previous attempts to ground capital development. By opening local and regional economies to both new dislocations and new relationships, the globalization of Mexican territoriality potentially produced multiple meanings and experiences because of the multiple ways the global was mediated through specific processes in specific sites. In this context, the crucial question became how the socio-economic disjunction between the privileged, the marginalised, and the territorial economy of the Mexican state was to be managed politically.

A key practice, therefore, centred around the ideological work used by the Mexican elite to rework the cultural logic behind formations of national identity, in order to redefine and empower its projects. This discursive reinvention of cultural understandings
and collective histories, served both to stabilise social dislocations produced as the economy was restructured, and to entrench those relationships emergent in an increasingly integrated world. In this way, the tensions produced by social upheavals occasioned by restructuring were stabilised and channelled, ultimately operating to define new forms of ‘acceptable’ and ‘deviant’ political identity, and so defuse the possibility of effective resistance.

The following chapter explores these issues. It is argued that Salinas’ ‘national imaginary’ was one of a harmonious nation unified behind a ‘spectacle’ of imagined community marching willingly towards progress. The construction of this spectacle was racialised, drawing as it did upon the manipulation of myths pertaining to ‘Mexicanness.’ In so doing a flattening of history was accomplished whereby race was aestheticised and thus removed from the political agenda. Thus, the restructuring of Mexican space proceeded not solely through an appeal to the politically neutral ‘realism’ of economic rationality. Rather, this technical knowledge was tightly imbricated with myths pertaining to an essential and knowable ‘Mexicanness.’ This underwrote the appeal to the so-called ‘realism’ of economic restructuring through the furnishing of a seemingly unproblematic image of homogenous ‘progressive’ Mexican identity. Two complementary goals were thereby accomplished. On the one hand, providing a cultural discourse appeared to establish continuity with the lingering preoccupation with nationalism. This helped placate an anxious internal constituency. On the other hand, this cultural discourse situated Mexico as a distinctive and secure investment space for international capital.

The chapter begins with a brief discussion of the tendency toward the aestheticisation of space occasioned by globalization, and Lefebvre’s understanding of nation space in its dialectical relation with the international. This is followed by a discussion of Mexican national culture, focusing particularly on the interplay between the racial categories of the Indian and the Mestizo. The third section provides a historical contextualisation of the role of the Indian and Mestizo within the construction of the Mexican revolutionary community and ideology of revolutionary nationalism. The fourth and fifth sections
discuss Salinas’ reworking of revolutionary nationalism in order to support the ‘going
global’ of the Mexican state.

3.1 National/International

Placed within an international context characterised by the expansion of accumulation
to a world scale, articulations of the identity of national space become increasingly
important. Historically, governments have engaged in a politics of representation aimed
at legitimating the nation as a national culture distinct from other nations. The specific
‘governmentality’ behind the shaping of cultural nationalism throughout the nineteenth
and early twentieth century was focused on creating a nationally manageable labour
force. As Shapiro notes, this required: “an attack by the state on older, more enduring
affiliations of clan and family, because ‘rulers and ruled’ had become ‘intertwined in the
same national economy.’”6 However, in the current condition of a global economy which
produces various flows – in the case of Mexico, massive outgoing migration, economic
integration, and cultural implosion – the state finds itself in an ideational bind: “It has to
live with an anachronistic form of nationalism that its policies of representation often
reasserts at the same time that it attenuates that nationalism with its economic policies.”7
The discourses and policies associated with rapid economic restructuring and the
violence wrought upon the sphere of everyday life by the intensified intrusions of the
accumulation process, potentially make apparent the instability of an order that wishes to
preserve for itself the status of essence. In these circumstances, it becomes increasingly
important to rework representations of national space, in order to narrow the gap between
the nation’s formal framing of itself, and the actual practice of government policy. As
Roxanne Lynn Doty has noted in relation to the uncertainty engendered by the
consciousness of deterritorialised ‘flows’:

6 Shapiro, Michael J (1997) ‘Narrating the nation, unwelcoming the stranger.’ Alternatives, 22, p. 6 [p. 1-34]
7 ibid. p. 6
CHAPTER THREE – THE PRODUCTION OF SPECTACLE

Flows imply a fluid and deterritorialized understanding of space that is at least potentially incompatible with the static notion of space inherent in the modern system of territorially based nation-states. Flows are performative, contesting the givenness of social space. They denaturalize the space of the sovereign state by raising issues of political authority, political community, national identity – things that governments would like to be taken for granted.8

On the other hand, as Lynn-Doty goes on to note, "the fear that we are losing control of our way of life ... serves a productive function, whereby the fear itself can be alleviated ... regaining control of our borders conjures up a mythic past, an age of purity."9 It is in this context that recourse to the mythical dimensions of national belonging become particularly acute. Faced with the fragmentations and dislocations occasioned by increasing cultural, political, and economic flows, it becomes imperative for the state to produce the space of the nation as an essential and stable presence. It is in this context that Kevin Robins has noted the need for a place presumed stable and secure is felt keenest of all. Robins has detected in the rise of ‘heritage centres’ a desperate desire toward restoration of stabilising ‘tradition’: “the driving imperative is to salvage centred, bounded and coherent identities – placed identities for placeless times.”10 This production of a ‘spectacle’ of identity is actually welcomed by many, since the dislocations generated by the accumulation process often makes a community that feels increasingly insecure unite around ‘tradition.’ In this sense, ‘a place called home’ can serve as a haven and source of emotional nourishment in an increasingly uncontrollable world. In other words, a romanticised and partially illusory appeal to the past may be mobilised in order to ‘re-instate’ community, reconnecting the present to some putative origin. In these circumstances, the visualisation of national space is a crucial strategy whereby a country can stabilise its position in an unstable world:

9 ibid. p. 180
Every time the nation is used to refer to a recognizable territory, belief in the existence and, however inadvertently, the legitimacy of the entity is reinforced. In this way, it lends credence to culturally and politically derived definitions by grounding them in physical, and consequently, conceptual space\textsuperscript{11}

While the generation of such images of our 'place in the world' lends a sense of stability and belonging, it can also serve a dual function of fragmenting space so enabling commodification and fetishisation. In an era of increasingly globalized capital, assertions of difference potentially become reduced to 'unique' selling points, thereby convincing capital to gain its 'spatial fix' in this place, rather than some other. This is so since the visualisation of 'special qualities' can be incited by the state to re-articulate and enhance a concrete position in a global economic system increasingly based on comparative advantage and international investment capital:

Capitalist hegemony over space puts the aesthetics of place very much back on the agenda ... The free flow of capital across the surface of the globe ... places strong emphasis upon the particular qualities of the spaces to which capital might be attracted ... This kind of reaction looks more strongly to the identification of place, the building and signalling of its unique qualities in an increasingly homogenous and fragmented world\textsuperscript{12}

The reproduction of state approved identity is thus increasingly not simply an exercise in manufacturing internal cohesion through nation building, but also an exercise in projection of an attractive conflict free 'profit surface' to global capital. States attempt to project distinctive national identities to international audiences in order to gain comparative advantage over other competing centres of capital friendly pull, and importantly, this provides a further impetus to the homogenisation of national polities. The imperative for the unification and rationalisation of social relations – always present within the rationality immanent to the state – is thus reinforced by the imperatives of capital accumulation. This translates to the coercive marginalisation and spatial restriction of the ambivalence inherent to national remembrance, in which consciousness

\textsuperscript{11} Jackson, Peter and Penrose, Jan (1993) The construction of race, nation and place (London: UCL Press) p. 8

\textsuperscript{12} Harvey, David (1989a) The condition of postmodernity (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell) p. 271
of the contradictions of space introduced historically by political struggle is marginalised and suppressed. As Johnston et al have observed:

Political, social and cultural activities are not merely responses to material differences; they are integral to the constitution of those differences since economics never takes place in a non-economic world. Hence, as well as economics being implicated in, say, cultural movements of resistances, culture is equally implicated in the nature of economic complexes.

It is in this context that Lefebvre castigates the rise of visuality as enacting a 'decorporealization' of space through its reduction to what Guy Debord terms 'spectacle'. Spectacle is associated in a growing number of works with the bid to suppress social discontent and secure capital. However, as Lefebvre and Debord use it, spectacle also refers to the more general structuration of everyday life by commodities, accumulation strategies, and visual imagery. The unification achieved by the expansion of capital to the global, is a homogenisation that dissipates the quality of places, draining them of their distinctive realities and at the same time reproducing new forms of separation. The spectacle dominates social life and space, homogenising and fracturing space, unifying and separating, and becoming "the perfection of separation within human beings." Lefebvre's objection, is that elevation of visualisation as a cultural dominant, increasingly implies the reduction of lived experience:

The predominance of visualization ... serves to conceal repetitiveness. People look, and take sight, take seeing, for life itself. We build on the basis of papers and plans. We buy on the basis of images. Sight and seeing, which in the Western tradition once epitomized intelligibility, have turned into a trap; the means whereby, in social space, diversity may be simulated and a travesty of enlightenment and intelligibility ensconced under the sign of transparency.

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15 Debord, Guy (1994) op. cit. Thesis 20

CHAPTER THREE – THE PRODUCTION OF SPECTACLE

This way of seeing is not simply the preserve of expert systems, for the gaze becomes ever more generalised. Through the naturalisation of these modalities, representations of space function as disciplinary technologies that produce dispositions of useful and docile bodies:

Living bodies, the bodies of ‘users’ – are caught not only in the toils of parcellized space, but also in the web of ... images, signs, and symbols. These bodies are transported out of themselves, transferred and emptied out, as it were, via the eyes: every kind of appeal, incitement and seduction is mobilized to tempt them with doubles of themselves ... 17

Implied here is Lefebvre’s understanding that institutions of capital and the state produce ‘ideal’ images or stereotypes of subjectivity through the production of spectacle, and through which national citizens are incited to recognise themselves. Lefebvre conceives nation-state space as characterised by the domination of a centralised political apparatus over a bounded territorial extent, within which commodity production and circulation takes place. This aspect is inherently linked to violence, insofar as the monopoly of legitimate violence stimulates a principle of unification and standardisation of social relations. Crucial here is a ‘politics of representation,’ implying the visualisation of places such that identity is secured and contradictions and social struggles obscured. The dynamism of capitalist territoriality tends toward the ‘creative destruction’ of existing space in ways that ‘work over’ the contradictory domain of concrete space, so as to align it with the ‘representations of space’ operative in abstract space. This implies purposeful action to construct the preconditions whereby capital can ground itself effectively. Because the rhetoric of ‘modernity’ is so important to capital – the sense that spatial configurations are ‘up with the times’ – established meanings and lived relationships of space are subject to replacement; new meanings and uses more conducive to accumulation are constantly conceived, imposed, and ultimately reproduced:

17 ibid. p. 98. See also pp. 308-310
The use value of a space of this kind is political – exclusively so. If we speak of it as a ‘subject’ with such and such an aim and with such and such means of action, this is because there really is a subject here, a political subject – power as such, and the state as such.¹⁸

More generally, this relates to Lefebvre’s theorisation of the state mode of production as occupying everyday consciousness, thereby generating a particular “mental space” through which political identities are validated and social consensus toward the legitimacy of the state established and legitimated. Importantly however, Lefebvre does not conceive the relationship between the global international order and the nation-state as that between opposed forces. For Lefebvre, the global international order is not simply the outcome of interactions amongst pre-existing and self-constituting national entities, for the global international order itself serves to reproduce, naturalise and generate the ‘nation form.’¹⁹ As Lisa Malkki has argued, nationalism and internationalism are always both local and supralocal. They appeal ‘locally’ to traits or distinguishing features, and ‘supralocally’ to other units that are functionally similar. In this sense, they must be understood as simultaneously particular and universal, appealing to a ‘uniqueness’ that is only intelligible in a wider system or ‘family’ of distinct yet equal partners. Accordingly, internationalism refers to a “transnational cultural form for imaging and ordering differences among people.” As Malkki emphasises:

... imagining the political community of the nation always necessitates – and even presupposes – the imagining of an international community, a ‘Family of Nations.’... Internationalism does not contradict or subvert nationalism; on the contrary, it reinforces, legitimates, and naturalizes it ...”²⁰

In other words, various articulations of ‘the nation’ (as a distinct people or culture) to an international audience can serve to situate an identity and highlight the unique

¹⁸ ibid. p. 287
CHAPTER THREE – THE PRODUCTION OF SPECTACLE

‘contribution’ that can be made to global order. With judicious ideological work, notions of ‘the global’ are able to coalesce around notions of who or what constitutes ‘the nation.’ Yet for many people within the national space, this kind of articulation is problematic because difference constructed by elites in the past was produced by establishing boundaries that served to delimit the ‘inside’ of the nation from the ‘outside.’ So while reliance on this production today helps highlight the differences between nations, it also serves to (re)produce internal exclusions, such that those failing to conform to a designated national ‘type’ are excluded from national proceedings. In turn, this ‘national difference’ predicated on both internal and external exclusions, becomes an instrument to reform a subtly newer cultural identity seen as compatible with global forces. In this way, power relations that constituted difference in the past are emptied of historical and political content in the present. The nation is understood primarily in terms of how past elites manufactured and secured a particular identity. Yet, precisely because of the imagined nature of the nation, its constructions are malleable and open to interpretation. Therefore, the framework of the nation lends itself particularly well to hegemonic projects, because as the dominant power, state elites have the ability to subtly manipulate versions of history in order to reinvent collective understandings and re-mythologise the ‘national’ and ‘unique’ past.

3.2 National culture

In Tiempo nublado [Stormy weather], Octavio Paz draws the following lesson: modernity is not feasible if there is no break with the past, yet a break is only possible if there is reconciliation with those traditions. Paz identifies the United States as a nation that, in seeking to break from the past so easily, practices only a ‘deficient’ modernity:

Loyal to their origins, the United States ... have always ignored the other. Domestically the black, the chicano, the pureto rican; externally: marginal cultures and societies. Today the United States face powerful enemies, but the deadly ones are not outside but inside. ... In order to defeat its enemies the United States first have to contain themselves; they have to turn back to their origins. But not to repeat them but to rectify them: the other and the others – minorities within as well as foreign marginal peoples and nations – exist. We are not only the majority of the human species but every marginal society ... represents a unique and precious
version of humanity. If the United States would sometime recover their integrity and lucidity, in order to recover themselves they have to be able to recover the others: the excluded of Western civilization\(^21\)

The most interesting dimension of this quote for the current discussion is not so much the sentiment expressed – with which I am in broad agreement – but rather the blindness that Paz’s comments express in relation to his own culture. Reading this quote from one of Mexico’s most respected literary figures, it would seem that Mexico, contrary to the US, was a country that had embraced its ‘marginal’ cultures. However, following centuries of direct coercion of the indigenous population, the social knowledge embodied in the space of Mexican national culture provides a space for exploitation. This space depends on invoking the dualistic version of ‘indigenous traditionalism.’ On one hand, Mexican national culture emphasises devotion to the ‘backwardness’ of the past to justify and explain contemporary exploitation, while the ‘positive aspects of tradition’ are glorified in a manner that obscures this continuing exploitation and cultural domination. The political meaning and irony of both mythical images echoes Raymond William’s description of tradition as a highly selective reading of history, and ideological device invoked to justify the status quo.\(^22\)

It is in this context that Anthony Smith argues nationalism is primarily a “myth-symbol complex,”\(^23\) positing a myth of origin/foundation and a myth of descent. Rather than being purely philosophical questions, such ‘fictions’ may become what Michael Taussig terms “a high-powered tool for domination and principal means of political action.”\(^24\) In the case of Mexico, the origin of the nation now known as Mexico is imputed by national ideology to lie with the founding of Tenochtitlan in 1325 by the Aztec/Mixteca people (the current site of Mexico city). This constitutes Mexico’s core symbol of national


\(^{22}\) See: Williams, Raymond (1975) The country and the city (St. Albans: Paladin)

\(^{23}\) See, for example: Smith, Anthony D (1986) The ethnic origins of nationalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell)

sovereignty. This central myth of origin and foundation is conjoined with a myth of joint racial and cultural descent, known as mestizaje.\textsuperscript{25} As Gutiérrez has argued however, "These selective motifs and narratives endorse only the history of the dominant mestizo majority of the population."\textsuperscript{26} As Gutiérrez continues, this dominant 'myth-symbol' complex of Mexican nationalism rests on two assumptions. First, that "historical continuity is common to an ethnically homogenous population and second, that the nation shares a unity of racial and cultural descent."\textsuperscript{27} Consequently, the dominant myths of foundation and descent tend to the exclusion of those groups that do not form part of the mestizo populous and that do not share the same 'myth-symbol complex.' Other groups' concepts of descent and origin "are eliminated from the nationalist agenda."\textsuperscript{28}

This tendency to collapse the origins of diverse peoples within a single mythical narrative is intimately tied up with the fact that "the official notion of mestizaje is connected to concepts of nationality and territory."\textsuperscript{29} The 'functionality' of this 'myth' has been described by Guillermo Gómez-Peña in the following terms:

The Mexican government has constructed this myth, which is that we have a univocal identity, one that is monolithic and static, and that all Mexicans from Cancun to Tijuana, from Matamoros to Oaxaca behave, act, and think exactly the same. By homogenising all Mexicans and saying that, for example, Mexicans have a hard time entering into modernity, the Mexican state can offer itself as a redeemer of Mexicans, as the one who is going to guide them by hand into modernity.\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{25} Gutiérrez, Natividad (1999) Nationalist myths and ethnic identities: Ethnic identities and the Mexican state (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press) p. 3. At the time of the 1990 census, the Mexican population consisted of 68,331,078 mestizos and 10 million indigenous. The census further noted that the indigenous population was to be found in 27 of the 32 states of the republic, and that this population could be divided into 56 distinct groups by language. ibid. p. 5

\textsuperscript{26} ibid. p. 4

\textsuperscript{27} ibid.

\textsuperscript{28} ibid.


This points to the paternalistic dimension of the Mexican state – its mythical self-image as a modernising, progressive force, faced with an immature society stubbornly recalcitrant to embrace progress. This highlights the fact – as Roger Bartra has argued at length\(^\text{31}\) – that myths pertaining to ‘Mexicanness’ are an expression of the dominant political culture. According to Bartra, “hegemonic political culture is bound by the set of imaginary power-networks that define socially accepted \textit{forms of subjectivity} and that are customarily considered as the fullest expression of national culture.”\(^\text{32}\) From this point of view, ‘Mexico’ produces the subjects of its own national culture by bounding them to universal archetypes or stereotypes. In the process the assumption that ‘Mexicanness’ – and by implication, the space of articulation of ‘Mexicanness’ (Mexico) – exists, is reproduced. These ideas regarding forms of ‘allowable subjectivity’ are best regarded as myths rather than expressions of ideology. Whilst ideological expressions are highly individualised, mythological expressions accumulate into a meta-discourse. This meta-discourse constitutes the intricate network of points of reference shared by ‘Mexican’ subjects, giving a sense of unity to the national space, and rendering it identifiable relative to others.

From the articulation of a set of stereotypes pertaining to the characteristics of Indian and mestizo, peasant and worker, country and town, “a complex mythology has been formed which tends to ... [produce] an imagery that provokes an irrational type of social cohesion.”\(^\text{33}\) The irrationality of this mythology lies in the fact that: “The idea that a unique subject, the ‘Mexican,’ exists in national history is a powerful cohesive illusion. ... The definition of ‘the Mexican’ is rather a description of how he or she is dominated and, above all, how exploitation is legitimised.”\(^\text{34}\) Consequently, the ‘opacity’ generated by the forces of a cultural and psychological nature that trace the frontiers separating

\(^{31}\) See Roger Bartra’s magnificent and highly original examination of Mexican national culture: Bartra, Roger (1992) \textit{The case of melancholy: Identity and metamorphosis on the Mexican character}, Hall, Christopher (trans.) (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press)

\(^{32}\) Bartra, Roger (1992) ibid. p. 2

\(^{33}\) ibid. p. 3

\(^{34}\) ibid. p. 6
‘authentic’ Mexican subjects from ‘inauthentic’ Mexican subjects (the internal and/or external other), obfuscate “the profound motives that lead men to tolerate a system of domination and, by the forbearance they display, to give a seal of legitimacy to injustice, inequality, and exploitation.”

The ‘static’ appearance of this myth is a quality that serves hegemonic social groups. It seems unproblematically to ‘exist’ in the present, as if it had been passed down unchanged and complete from the past. Yet, the content of this ‘myth’ has historically been forged in relation to two primary forms of ‘otherness.’ Coco Fusco has distinguished forms of otherness within Mexican discourse from what she calls “First-World” discussions. ‘The other’ in Mexican discourse, Fusco argues:

... conjures a different set of signifieds. It refers not so much to the Third-World ‘foreigner-outsider’ as to the indigenous peoples that existed there prior to the Conquest and the cultures that form the symbolic foundation of contemporary national identity. The term also refers to the external Other – i.e. Mexico’s northern neighbour – a construct that ‘legitimates’ the myth of Mexican cultural homogeneity.

On one hand, articulations of Mexican nationalism have consistently embraced a highly romanticised version of the Mexican peoples’ pre-conquest ancestors and their contribution to the national character. In order to create a national patriotic unity, but also to invoke a rhetorical distance from the colonised past, Indian myths, values and history have been incorporated within the national allegory to present a “nativist, nationalist culture as an affirmation of self-pride.” As Goldman has emphasised:

In Mexico nationalism has been one of the greatest forces impelling change. It has been deeply entwined with a necessary sense of dignity, pride, and affirmation. To counter engendered feeling of inferiority (stemming from a colonized past),

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36 Fusco, Coco (1995) op. cit. p. 104
intellectuals have reconstructed the past and in so doing have created a mythology of ancient utopias.\textsuperscript{38}

Persistently however, this idealisation of the past has been marked by the "simultaneous embrace of a culture and rejection of the people who originate it."\textsuperscript{39} It is in this context that Natividad Gutiérrez has recently (1999) argued the revolutionary project of building a linguistically and culturally homogenous nation harbours an "intrinsic ambivalence."\textsuperscript{40} Whilst integrationist policies such as Indigenismo and mestizaje seek to assimilate living Indians, the creation of a national culture has entailed the selective usurpation of indigenous cultural life and history. This selective usurpation potentially introduces into national culture a source of instability, as far as valorisation of 'Indianness' points to the authentic origin of the nation as lying within indigenous culture itself. However, as Alex Nemerov has argued in his discussion of Indian images in late nineteenth century American art, this valorisation is in fact deeply instrumental for dominant culture's control over 'living' expressions of the Indian 'past':

As a marker for an idealized past, the image of the Indian was in one sense interchangeable with other antimodern representations. Like images of medieval culture, colonial America, or the Old West in general, it appealingly suggested a proverbially simpler time ... In another sense, however, these Indian images must be read apart from their nostalgic themes. They differ because they alone helped sanction the decimation they represented. By equating Indian cultures with the past they implicitly accepted a theory of social evolution that posited the disappearance of 'primitive' peoples before the inexorable advance of 'civilization'.\textsuperscript{41}

Clearly, Nemerov is writing of an earlier time (the nineteenth century) and within a specific field (art). However, the central strategy he identifies, whereby 'primitive' peoples are integrated within representation as a means to both justify their demise and

\textsuperscript{38} Goldman, Shifra M (1977) ibid. p. 8
\textsuperscript{39} Fusco, Coco (1995) \textit{op. cit.} p. 66
\textsuperscript{40} Gutiérrez, Natividad (1999) \textit{op. cit.} p. 1
\textsuperscript{41} Nemerov, Alex (1991) 'Doing the “Old America.”' Truettner, William H (Ed.) \textit{The west as America: Reinterpreting images of the frontier} (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press for the National Museum of American Art)
posit the inevitability of the 'civilization' that presides over this demise, continues to exercise influence. In the case of Mexico, this has historically positioned living indigenous in a contradictory relationship to dominant constructions of culture. On one hand, official ideology proclaims their superiority, yet on the other sociopolitical circumstance betrays the reality of prejudice. As Judith Friedlander has expressed the situation, Indians “are discriminated against for being Indian and at the same time admired for being the ‘real soul’ of Mexico, living proof of Mexico’s noble heritage.”

This leads onto the second form of otherness identified above by Fusco: “the external Other — i.e. Mexico’s northern neighbour — a construct that ‘legitimizes’ the myth of Mexican cultural homogeneity.” As with the internal other (‘The Indian’), the external other (‘The West’) has historically exercised both a repulsive and an attractive quality to Mexican elites. Whilst it would be true to say that Mexican identity has been constructed largely in opposition to a ‘threatening’ external other — an unsurprising fact given that Mexico’s origin as a post colonial nation was followed by continuous foreign intervention — it is equally true that the Western other has exercised a positive attraction. This is so insofar as ‘the West’ has historically presided over and actively disseminated hegemonic conceptions of ‘nationalism,’ ‘modernity,’ ‘development,’ and ‘progress.’ Thus, at the same time Mexican elites have sought to differentiate their nation from others and make it a success, they have been compelled to do so via a ‘universal slide rule of success.’ It is unsurprising then, that the national culture of Mexico is marked by a pervasive contradiction between symbolic appeals to an ‘original’ and ‘authentic’ past,
and a bid for modernity that has tended to render ‘living’ expressions of this past ‘dysfunctional’ and ‘backward.’

3.3 The production of Mestizo identity

_We are surrounded by ruins and severed roots. How can we reconcile ourselves with our past?_

— Octavio Paz

The following section provides a historical contextualisation of the elevation of the mestizo to the status of quintessential Mexican within the discourse of revolutionary nationalism. The section begins by examining the nineteenth century liberalism of the Porfiriatro, followed by discussion of the Mexican Revolution. Such a long term perspective may appear surprising given the focus of the thesis on the period of neoliberal hegemony (1982-) and its interruption in 1994. However, the following discussion is necessary to understand some of the key dimensions of Mexican revolutionary nationalism, and to provide a minimal contextualisation of the ‘500 years of struggle’ around which the Zapatista insurgency examined in the next chapter coalesced its discourse.

The dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz (approximately 1876-1910) that preceded the Mexican Revolution was strongly defined by its racism towards the indigenous population. This translated into the virtually unmitigated embrace of economic liberalism, with concentration of wealth, status and power in the hands of the ethnically ‘white’ (both Mexican and foreign) justified through appeals to the racial ‘backwardness’ of the majority Mexican populace. For the Porfrian liberals, Indian society stood on the margins of progress, nationality, and history. Consequently, Indianness was something that had to be overcome rather than — as in the colonial period — overseen. In

combination with the class situation, this provoked a positive valorisation of ‘whiteness.’ Consequently many colonial era racialist ideas persisted, particularly those that referred to Indian cultural backwardness and the inferiority of dark skin, and those that valorised whiteness as a desirable ideal. This situation only intensified as the nineteenth century progressed. While the post-Independence period entailed a transformation from a caste to a class system, the ethnic framework was not wholly eliminated. Moreover, as Chávez Orozco has noted:

[A]s the nineteenth century progressed, the complex of ideas regarding the total incapacity of Indians matured and, what is worse, a prejudice was created wherein Mexico's backwardness and its difficulties in becoming democratic were attributed to the fact that Mexican nationality had to bear the enormous weight of the retrograde Indian conglomerate.

It is therefore unsurprising, as Krauze notes: “the Porfiristas – dedicated admirers of the dead Indian – cared little about studying or learning from the present, living Indian, and even less with identifying with him. The Indian was the burden of the Mexican nation.”

The nation that was desired had to imitate the European model, particularly that of France, and increasingly that of the model provided by the US. Under the liberals, Carlos Fuentes argues, Mexico chose the path of: “civilization, understood as European, urban, progressive, legalistic, and romantic, over barbarism, understood as agrarian, Indian, black, Iberian, Catholic, and Scholastic.” “For the liberals,” Luis González emphasises, “there was an insuperable antagonism between the historical antecedents of Mexico and her future greatness.” The biggest problem for the proclaimers of this ‘future greatness’ was the simple fact that the desired modern Mexico was only to be found in certain

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corners of the large cities. 'Modernity' was an imported product and its successful implantation limited. It is in this context that Francisco Valdés-Ugalde summarises the nineteenth century as a:

... stage of 'choice' where Mexicans contemplated a parade of images of the 'modernity' to be adopted and selected the institutional framework to shape political life. But the selection was blighted by the incapacity of political elites to design a system capable of successfully naturalising modernity in the Mexican setting.\(^{49}\)

For the Porfirians, the identification of those responsible for this state of affairs focused on the indigenous population. The presence within lived cultural practices of despised and backward Indian ways of being characteristic of the vast majority of the Mexican populous was in itself the radical denial of the modern Mexico. To 'be' Indian in this context was effectively to be an enemy of the national project. It was, paradoxically, to be an embarrassing stain on an imagined community that itself claimed legitimacy through explicit professions of fulfilling an Indian legacy.

By contrast, the emphasis of official expression was focused on the benign and even beneficent effects of a convergence between white and Indian: mestizaje.\(^{50}\) This finds eloquent expression in the words of Justo Sierra: "As Mexicans we are the children of two nations, of two races; we were born from the conquest; our roots are in the land that the indigenous people inhabited and also in the soil of Spain. This fact dominates our whole history; to it we owe our soul."\(^{51}\) However, the indisputable fact remained that there was no reciprocity in this encounter, or at least, that this encounter continued to take place in a system of profoundly unequal exchange. Consequently, "in accordance with


\(^{50}\) For the complex of views regarding mestizaje, particularly in relation to the United States, see: Rodriguez O., Jaime E., and Vincent, Kathryn (Eds.) (1997) Common border, uncommon paths: Race, culture and national identity in US-Mexican relations (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources) pp. 51-53

\(^{51}\) Sierra, Justo (1991) [1901] The political evolution of the Mexican people (Texas: University of Texas Press) p. 50
the ideology of the time, the government's concern with the Indians, almost exclusively, was first to put an end to their ancient institutions, and second, to repress them during their rebellions." Relatively, the engagement of the Porfirian elite in the task of state building configured the Indian as an inherently antinational—even antirational—element requiring swift and if necessary forcible assimilation. As Alan Knight observes: "The logic of Porfirian 'development' conspired with imported ideology to create a climate of racism that was both official (that is justified, albeit not uniformly, by elite intellectuals) and, more important, unofficial (practised by the regime's minions and by social elites more generally)."

Whilst such processes were not in themselves new, the deployment of a scientific basis to their rationalisation through social Darwinism was. Barbara Tenenbaum notes that the magnificent statue of Cuauhtémoc erected by the Porfirians in the centre of Mexico City was "a kind of social Darwinism in stone"; an image consistent with the elevation of evolutionary positivism as state sponsored intellectual orthodoxy. It was not coincidental that the official veneration of Cuauhtémoc and the Aztecs coincided with the material impoverishment of living Indians through the expropriation of their lands through increased use of the Reform laws, new legislation, and economic 'development.' Jose Maria Vigil expresses the dominant perspective of the elite vividly: "The semifabulous glory of the Aztec kings refers to a period and a civilization that can be of interest only to the antiquary." Ironically, the memorialisation of the dead Indian was used to bolster and justify a system that rendered the living Indian a dead weight on the

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52 Moisés González Navarro, quoted in Bonfil Batalla, Guillermo (1996) op. cit. p. 104
54 For example, as in colonial countries the "myth of the lazy native" was invoked to explain resistance to proleterisation, and in order to justify coercion to overcome it. See Knight, Alan (1990) op. cit. p. 79.
march to modernity and progress, and that consequently sought at best to ignore or subsume, and at worst, eliminate him.  

This discussion highlights why a reverence for the past should not be confused with a respect for the living present, insofar as official discourse rehearsed a rigid separation between the symbolism of a (selectively) venerated Indian past, and the actuality of a despised Indian reality. A decade before the outbreak of the Revolution, Justo Sierra noted, "this country has not lost an ounce of its religious devotion to its history ... [but] it lives as if possessed by a fever for the future." This 'religious devotion to its history' Sierra claimed for the Porfirian period was above all a way of establishing a linear genealogy that passed up from the 'guardians of the patria' the Porfirians claimed as their antecedents, to the Porfirians themselves. It was a way of marshalling the past to serve ends in the present; the establishment of a universal history and culture that (naturally) achieved its noblest manifestation in the agents of its identification: the Porfirians. In thrall to the evolutionary positivism of a conjoined Herbert Spencer and Comte, for the Porfirians knowledge of the past was to be subordinated strictly to state order and its smooth development and progression into the future.

Ultimately, the net result of the Porfirian period was not a nation of free and equal citizens, as early liberals such as Mora had envisioned. On the contrary, for as the

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57 Compare Krauze’s statement that “For the Porfiristas, the dead Indian was a fossil from a remote and symbolic past, almost totally alien to their everyday experience. The living Indian was his real heir, all that remained of him, but the memory of the dead Indian served the political purpose of legitimating the state, while the living Indian was a blemish on the landscapes of modern, progressing Mexico." Krauze, Enrique (1997) op. cit. p. 39

58 Sierra, Justo (1991) op. cit. pp. 367-368

59 Justo Sierra’s historical writings are a definitive expression of this tendency. For Sierra – the most influential Porfirian era historian – the past could be divided into clear-cut periods moving in a single, steady, ascending direction. See: Sierra, Justo (1991) [1901] The political evolution of the Mexican people (Texas: University of Texas Press)

60 Jose Mora, an extremely influential nineteenth century liberal, led a veritable 'liberal crusade' for the integration of Indians within the nation, arguing “[We do] not recognize the distinction between Indians and non-Indians, substituting it instead with that of poor and rich, and extending the benefits of society to all.” José María Luis Mora, Obras Sueltas, vol. 1, pp. 262-263. This translation adapted from Lomnitz-Adler (1992) op. cit. p. 275
centennial (1910) approached the country found itself almost entirely in the hands of a
class of white hacendados and foreign investors. Democracy was a sham. In sum, the
country belonged economically, politically and culturally to the few. It is in this context
that Carlos Fuentes has observed: "The history of Mexico and Latin America is that of a
deep cleavage between a vigorous continuous culture and a fragmented, failed, weak
political and economic life." At the time of the Porfiriato, Amado Nervo (approvingly)
summarised the accomplishments of the 'imaginary' Mexico thus:

[E]verything good we have in this country is artificial and opposed to its
surroundings, and achieved, therefore, in spite of popular opinion. It is with the
palpable disgust of the masses in the country that we have a liberal constitution;
with the open repugnance of the people and the rich classes that we established the
separation of the church and state, and secularized public education; and with the
patent opposition of the Mexicans that we have railroads and telegraphs and ... even
the republic.

The Mexican Revolution that began in 1910 and concluded its armed phase around
1920, was a profound demonstration of the failure to reconcile this 'imaginary' Mexico
of the Porfiriants with the "palpable disgust" of the majority. However, contrary to the
official version of the Revolution created in its aftermath by the conjoining of its
victorious factions, the Revolution was not a unified rising of the Mexican people in the
name of a single principle such as opposition to foreign exploitation. The Revolution in
fact consisted of a great diversity of uprisings, each flowing from very particular local
and regional conditions. The formal unity achieved by the 1930s and expressed in the
official cultural production mirroring the new national imaginary, represented only the
confluence of the victorious currents, and their interpretation of the other demands and
interests that had been subordinated. Naturally, some were simply ignored or
occasionally even demonised, but most were subtly recuperated such that their subversive
potential was neutralised and (at least superficially) seemed to find fulfilment in the
official version of the victors.

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62 Amado Nervo, quoted in: Bonfil Batalla, Guillermo (1996) op. cit. p. 110
CHAPTER THREE – THE PRODUCTION OF SPECTACLE

The paradigmatic example of this tendency was the elevation of Zapata to the status of hero of the Revolution, in an ideological alchemy that blithely passed over the fact that the victorious currents of the Revolution were his executioners. The programme initiated by successive revolutionary governments was not that of the poor Indian campesinos who had revolted in the name of socially radical agrarian reform whose clearest expressions were found in Zapata’s 1911 Plan de Ayala and the agrarian degree of 1914. Certainly, demands for the restitution and distribution of the land were incorporated into the revolutionary program, symbolised most profoundly in Article 27 of the new constitution. However, this is not to say that the revolutionary program identified with the deeper objectives and the fundamental meaning attributed to Article 27 by the campesinos themselves. Moreover, this revolt of the campesinos was not some sudden and unprecedented occurrence. Indeed, the nineteenth century was filled with peasant insurgency and the expression within these revolts of what Alan Knight has termed “popular nationalism.”83 In such ‘popular’ forms of nationalism, the ‘imagined’ national community was realised and exemplified in a specific local community, such that defence of the local community was associated with defence of the patria. Ignacio Ramírez famously put it thus: “El municipio es la nación.”84 Alan Knight persuasively argues that this conflation of community and nation – patria chica and patria grande – was emblematic both of the nineteenth century and the Revolution, such that in the final analysis “peasant patriots could claim that they had defended the nation no less vigorously – in fact, probably more vigorously – than had the local elites.”85

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Knight, Alan (1994) op. cit. p. 147. Knight cites Florencia Mallon on this point. See: Mallon, Florencia (1987) ‘Nationalist and antistate coalitions in the war with the Pacific: Junín and Cajamarca, 1879-1902.’ Stern, Stephen J (Ed.) Resistance, rebellion and consciousness in the Andean peasant world (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press); and Mallon, Florencia (1994) ‘Reflections on the ruins: Everyday forms of state formation in nineteenth-century Mexico.’ Joseph, Gilbert M and Nugent, Daniel (Eds.) Everyday forms of state formation: Revolution and the negotiation of rule in modern Mexico (Durham and London: Duke University Press) pp. 69-106. That this patriotism was not in the form as envisaged by elites, and that indeed, elites generally had little control over it, does not invalidate peasant patriotism. Indeed to do so is to swallow the condescending prejudice that peasants – conceived as illiterate, parochial, lazy and intellectually inert – are incapable of patriotism. At the same time, the notion of a qualitative distinction
Peasant patriotism, premised as it was on 'extended' defence of the local community or *patria chica*, was explicitly hostile to the pretensions of the centralising state. As we have seen, elite nationalism of the nineteenth century was orientated precisely to the strengthening, centralising and augmentation of the power of the nation-state, modelling itself after the example of the American and French revolutions. Consequently, in the mid nineteenth century Juárez spurned his peasant allies and crushed localist sensibilities upon achieving national power. As Stern puts it: "The cruel irony ... is that an effective national state gained strength by crushing an authentic but independently fashioned peasant nationalism." Perhaps it could hardly be otherwise, given that the logic of peasant/popular patriotism was by its nature hostile to the aspirations of official nationalism promulgated first by Juárez, then Díaz, and finally the victorious currents within the Revolution itself. Peasant patriotism was decentralising, autonomist, and sought a patria grande consisting of a loose federation of patrias chicas. Official nationalism, by contrast, was centralising, integrative, and sought to subsume the patrias chicas into a unified and indivisible nation-state.

Hence, the radical difference between the interpretation of agrarian reform by the revolutionary campesinos on one hand, and the revolutionary leaders and planners on the other. For the campesinos, agrarian reform was fundamentally concerned with the recovery of a territory that was not only a physical resource, but also a social space of symbolic and emotional meaning. Land for the campesinos was a means to regaining control over their own culture; of rolling back four centuries of cultural control imposed upon them. As Zapata himself declared: "The land will be our possession, it will belong to all the people — the land our ancestors held and that the fingers on paws that crushed us

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67 Wolf, Eric (1973) *Peasant wars and the twentieth century* (London: Faber) p. 294
snatched away from us." For the revolutionary elites on the other hand, agrarian reform might well have been about social justice, but more fundamentally, it was about incorporation of the Indian within the nation. Through this development, it was anticipated, the Indian would be drawn out of their backward and parochial ways and become a Mexican, a citizen within a new society. Agrarian reform was thus strictly subordinate to an overall plan of national development; the building of a new nation and society, and a completely new identity. This identity was not plural, and especially not Indian. It was — could only be — mestizo.

The revolutionary elevation of the Mestizo

*First they are Mexicans, and then Indians*

— Jose Vasconcelos

For the revolutionary elites economic nationalism was primarily a means rather than an end: it was part of a grander design of state and nation building that established an essential continuity with Juárez and Díaz, and was given greater urgency by the experience of a conflict that had threatened to destroy state and nation altogether. Where it differed from the Porfiriato was that economic nationalism was part of a broader interpretation of the Revolution as a search for a national identity that would differentiate Mexico from the United States. Carlos Fuentes has recently characterised the Revolution as primarily a cultural revolution, profound in its aesthetic, social, and political implications. It was: "an attempt ... to recognize the cultural totality of the country, none of whose components should be sacrificed." It was, he argues, characterised by the explosion within the present of all Mexican times, all pasts, all of which for a time lived and breathed. In the wake of the Revolution he concludes: "Never again can we hide our Indian, mestizo, European faces: they are all ours."

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68 Manifesto issued in Nahuatl by Emiliano Zapata. Quoted in Krauze, Enrique (1997) *op. cit.* p. 274
69 Fuentes, Carlos (1996) *op. cit.* p. 66
70 ibid. p. 68
Post-revolutionary thinkers thus explicitly aligned themselves against the overt racism of the Porfiriato. In a movement known as Indigenismo, respect for Indian customs and the rehabilitation of Indian history were emphasised. The ultimate purpose was of course integration within the national project, yet the new Indigenistas argued that this was now to be based on notions of respect and 'enlightened' planning rather than outright coercion. As Manuel Gamio — one of the most influential Indigenista figures — put it, the development and integration of the Indian population would henceforth be carried out "without this, of course, signifying the annihilation of the original [Indian] population." Indeed, many believed that a properly integrated Indian population that was bilingual, educated, and politically conscious would be better able to preserve its own culture, than one that remained marginalised, uneducated, and politically inert. Nevertheless, whilst official Indigenismo encompassed a range of positions and emphases, its various protagonists shared the common assumption of the need to integrate the Indian within the nation, albeit it in a self professed 'enlightened' fashion. The official policy of Indigenismo thus represented the latest in a long line of formulations of 'the Indian problem' imposed from the outside. Relative to its colonial and Porfirián predecessors, the indigenismo of the Revolution was certainly more sympathetic. Nevertheless, the Indian remained object rather than author, as the Indigenistas themselves frankly conceded: "you will not awaken spontaneously. It will be necessary for friendly hearts to work for your redemption ... [The Indian] does not know, the appropriate means to achieve his liberation ... [it is the task of others, to] forge ... an Indian soul."

The Revolutionaries took to the task of overseeing the Indian’s redemption with gusto, particularly as most concurred with Caso’s observation that the Indian lacked, “the essential sentiment of the citizen, that political solidarity which is the very base on which

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72 Gamio, Manuel (1960) ibid. pp. 22, 94-95, cited in Knight, Alan (1990) op. cit. p. 77. Elsewhere, Gamio maintains that the mestizos are “the eternal rebel, the traditional enemy of the class of pure or foreign blood, the author and director of uprisings and rebellions and the class which has best understood the just lament of the Indian class.” Cited in Knight, Alan (1990) op. cit. p. 86. My Italics
the principle of nationality rests." It was thus vital to inculcate the nationalist sentiment and so convert passive subjects into active citizens. Within this project, there was no place for Indian enclaves or autonomous nations, the essential task being to bind the disparate population of Mexico into a patriotic union. Thus, while the Revolution recognised that the Indian did possess positive and preservable values, it was not content to leave it at that. The Revolution intended to 'redeem' these 'natural' values, thereby integrating those that bore them within national, and through it, 'universal' (Western) culture. Within the 'imagined community' of the victorious revolutionaries, Mexico simply was a mestizo country. Indigenismo fitted well with this vision since the aim of Indigenismo was to 'mestizo-ise' the Indians, and at the same time to 'Indian-ise' the mestizos, thus creating a national synthesis based on (supposedly) reciprocal contribution.

In practise, this translated into an appropriation of all the symbols of the Indian that could possibly be used to construct an image of a mestizo country. Within this official version, the Revolution is rendered as the final event in the struggle of the Mexican/mestizo people as the heirs by right to the nation: by sweeping away the Porfirian state, the Revolution also swept away the domestic agents of foreign exploitation, influence, and contamination. In doing so, a fresh foundation was established upon which to establish effective instruments of mediation and legitimation.


74 The 'recovery' of the Indian within the post-revolutionary ideology of mestizo, tended to imply negative connotations for other 'races' and nations i.e. blacks, Spaniards, and Chinese. From this perspective, Alan Knight has argued that it is not easy to disentangle whether antipathy is strictly racist or nationalist. Sinophobia was the clearest expression of revolutionary racism, and functionally related to indigenista nationalism. Knight, Alan (1994) op. cit. pp. 96-97

75 Historiographical tradition generally marks 1921 as the point of departure for modern Mexican art, and the elevation of the mestizo as the 'quintessential Mexican' in nationalist cultural discourse. This date is significant since it marks the date of the first post-revolutionary murals, and the year that José Vasconcelos initiated his program of 'cultural redemption' of the Mexican nation. Karen Cordero Reiman notes that: "Visual commentary in major art works on the events that came to be known as the Mexican Revolution appears only after 1920, with the construction of the myth of a unified rebellion as part of the process of legitimation of the post-revolutionary regimes." Cordero Reiman, Karen (1993) 'Constructing a modern Mexican art, 1910-1940.' Oles, James (Ed.) (Ed.) South of the border: Mexico in the America Imagination, 1914-1947 (Washington and London: Smithsonian Institution Press) p. 15 [pp. 11-48]

165
CHAPTER THREE – THE PRODUCTION OF SPECTACLE

This effort to establish a duality of authoritative and allocative power was to involve a prodigious effort of education, art, radio, theatre, rhetoric, the press, sport, social reform, party organisations etc. in which the new myths and symbols of the Revolution – Madero, Villa, Zapata, agrarismo, the constitution, Indigenismo, mestizaje – were married to older liberal-patriotic myths and symbols, creating a cultural nationalist fusion.76

Consequently, those dysfunctional elements not yet subject to mestizaje should integrate themselves as quickly as possible. This view is clearly expressed in a work that was to prove highly influential with the revolutionary elites. Molina Enríquez published Los grandes problemas nacionales in 1909. In this work, Molina states: "The fundamental and undeniable basis of all work dedicated in the future to the good of the country has to be the continuity of the mestizos as the preponderant ethnic group and as the political class directing the population."77 For Molina, the mestizos were the only fit agents of integration. The Indians, as usual, were dismissed out of hand as an archaic and backward obstacle to progress. The creoles were judged no longer significant as a class, nor capable of embodying Mexican nationalism. Since the liberal triumph of 1857, Enríquez argued, the product of an enriching confluence of two races and cultures had taken that historical role: the mestizos. The mestizos did not want to become creoles, and much less to become Indian. They wanted to become something other, though of what this ‘other’ consisted, was, as it has always been, left tantalisingly undefined.

The program of ‘cultural redemption’ undertaken under the direction of Vasconcelos was the most influential attempt to put some meat on the bones of this vague concept. Vasconcelos envisaged Mexico as a cauldron – a great melting pot – in which the components of race, religion and language had been mixed in the previous centuries to produce something genuinely new: the ‘cosmic race’ of the mestizo. Opposed to this great civilisational project was the ‘Nordic Empire’ of the United States. During the

76 Vaughn, MK (1982) State, education and social class in Mexico (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press) chp. 8

77 Molina Enríquez, Andreas (1909) Los grandes problemas nacionales (Mexico City: Imprenta de A. Carnage e Hijos) p. 308. Quoted in Batalla Bonfil, Guillermo (1996) op. cit. p. 110

166
nineteenth century, Vasconcelos argued, the ‘cosmic race’ had been continually threatened and repressed by the encroachments of this foreign civilisational project. “Monroism,” he asserted, “appears like a snake constricting the lethargic body of Hispanic America.” The condition of emergence of the ‘cosmic race’ was thenceforth rendered as resistance to absorption by United States attitudes and values. This resistance, naturally, found its absolute expression in the Revolution, which within Vasconcelos’ discourse represents the fulfilment of destiny of the mestizo. Its profound opposition to the influence of the United States thus marks the origin of mestizaJe as official state ideology, and all that this had entailed in the period preceding the Revolution. Emphasised here was annexation, foreign ownership of Mexican industries and resources such as the oil and the land, foreign investment equated with exploitation and dependence, and the spread of United States attitudes and values. With the coming of the Revolution:

... it would be possible to conclude that we [the mestizos] are the tomorrow while they [the ‘Nordic’ United States] are becoming the yesterday of the world. They will end building the last great empire of a single race: the final empire of white power. Meanwhile, we will continue suffering the chaos of the formation of a new lineage ... The final outcome will be the ultimate race, the synthesis of integral race, made with the genius and blood of all peoples

The Indian, as one part of this synthesis of ‘genius and blood,’ was naturally central in the overall strategy of delineating a Mexican identity distinct from that of the United States. Within the artistic and cultural production sponsored by the government until 1940, the Indian roots of the nation were always recognised. Murals glorified pre-colonial Mexico, and as had become customary, situated Cuauhtémoc within an internal struggle for national sovereignty. Indian symbols preside over the allegories of the history and destiny of the country. Archaeology, as under Díaz, became a patriotic task.


Nationalistic music tried to revive instruments and rhythms that sounded pre-Hispanic. As the 1923 Manifesto of the Union of Technical Workers, Painters, and Sculptors affirms: "The art of the people of Mexico is the greatest and most wholesome spiritual manifestation in the world, and the country's indigenous traditions are the best to be found."\(^{80}\) The exaltation became so strong that by 1925, an increasing conflation of the terms 'popular' and 'indigenous' is evident. The exhalation of the Indian as the quintessential Mexican, endowed with 'natural' artistic abilities linked to Prehispanic antecedents, becomes strongly emphasised.

However, this exhalation was not innocent, nor was it necessarily sincere. For the express purpose of the visual arts was the integration of peasants and workers through concrete, practical activities, in a process supplementary to Vasconcelos' emphasis on high culture and spirituality. By offering the Indians a means to aesthetically valorise their own surroundings, and by emphasising their 'naturally superior' ability to do so, it was intended that their integration into the nationalist project could be accomplished through seemingly innocuous means.\(^{81}\) Integral to this project was the aesthetic abstraction of the Indian into a faceless symbol of a timeless world, evident particularly in the mural art of Diego Rivera. Whilst Rivera certainly included the occasional recognisable personality, the vast majority of the figures that parade through his murals are unknown peasants. Rivera, like many other revolutionary era artists — American as well as Mexican — idealised the rounded faces of the Indians. This tendency was to reach its pinnacle in Olin Dow's woodcut *Steps, Taxco, Mexico* (1933), within which the face is reduced to a flat and featureless shape. Rather than as unique individuals, Indians are rendered as conveyers of eternal values and traditions within an anonymous collective whole: symbolic denizens of a dreamlike rural Mexico. Generally, contemporary life is repressed, with Mexico’s poverty "seen through a rose-coloured lens, as an escape rather

\(^{80}\) Monsiváis, Carlos (1976) *op. cit.* p. 351. Quoted in Bonfil Batalla (1996) *op. cit.* p. 113

than a call to arms."\textsuperscript{82} For example, \textit{La Familia rural} (1923) by Roberto Montegero depicts a treatment of country life in which the ravages of war, hunger, and poverty have been banished, to be replaced by agricultural abundance and familial harmony. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the home of this work was the office of Vasconcelos himself in the Ministry of Public Education.\textsuperscript{83}

The clearest expression of the project's underlying ideology is to be found in a debate between Vasconcelos and Manuel Gamio on the subject of Indian education. In response to Gamio's suggestion of minority education, Vasconcelos declared emphatically: "First they are Mexicans, and then Indians."\textsuperscript{84} Daniel Cosío Villegas summarises this attitude particularly well:

The poor and the Indians, traditionally bypassed, should be a principal and visible sector of this new society. Thus it was necessary to exalt their virtues and achievements: their dedication to work; their good judgement; their withdrawal; their sensibility, as revealed in dance, music, handicrafts, and theater. But it also necessary to push them into the stream of universal culture ...\textsuperscript{85}

Pushing the Indians into 'the stream of universal culture' was the intellectual project that complemented the other aspects of the revolutionary plan. All sectors were to be integrated into a society that may have been defined in opposition to the United States, but that nonetheless had set out on the path of Western modernisation. To achieve this project it was necessary to reduce the distance separating those sectors lagging behind


\textsuperscript{83} Certainly there were counter currents to this production of idyllic universalist allegories. Beginning in 1923 these embodiments of 'spiritual nationalism' increasingly became transformed into rural scenes inserted in concrete social and historical realities under the political and artistic leadership of Diego Rivera. Yet this style was itself to become a new orthodoxy, so much so that by the end of Maximato (the domination of Plutarco Elias Calles first by Presidency and then by proxy between 1924-1934) the initial diversity of the mural movement was repressed in favour of Rivera's – by now – ultra-official version of Mexican history

\textsuperscript{84} Jose Vasconcelos, quoted in: Bonfil Batalla (1996) \textit{op. cit.} p. 114

\textsuperscript{85} Daniel Cosío Villegas, quoted in: Bonfil Batalla (1996) \textit{op. cit.} p. 114
modern Mexico. The difference of the Indian was not recognised as a difference as such. Rather it was considered a product of inequality stemming from a position within an inferior level of historical development. If this inequality could be made to disappear – so the reasoning went – then cultural differences could be made to disappear at the same time. Consequently, the benefits to be provided to the 'poor Indians' would at the same time become the instruments for their integration within the 'universal culture' of the nation. Development projects were to be governed by this principle, which in fact was tantamount to de-Indianisation. The right of equality was recognised, but not that of the right to difference.

The Mexican Revolution thus introduced a new dynamic to constructions of race/ethnicity. Within the space of national culture, both the Indian and the mestizo were reappraised, with the mestizo rather than the creole\footnote{Creoles' refers to those of pure Spanish blood, born on Mexican soil. The creoles appropriated leadership of Mexico upon Independence from Spain (1821). The term also has an association with cultural westernisation, as in 'creolisation,' referring to 'whitening' through embrace of 'modern' American values and culture} becoming the official protagonist of Mexican history. Indian culture and history were also revalorised in a movement known as Indigenismo. Indigenismo fundamentally reformulated the relationship between race and nation. Whilst the Liberal and Porfirian eras had viewed the Indians as an atavistic element encompassed by a modern European-oriented nation, Indigenistas reconceptualised Mexico as the product of the civilisational clash between independent nations (that of the Spaniard and the Indian). Out of this clash emerged the prototypical hero of the Mexican Revolution: the mestizo. Indian values, myths, and history were integral to the new nationalism. It was now less a case of disparaging Mexico's European heritage than of valorising the process of racial and cultural mixing that had created the unique Mexican people. According to official ideology, the old European/Indian thesis/antithesis had given way to the higher synthesis of the mestizo. This synthesis was neither simply Indian nor European, but quintessentially Mexican. Physically both Spaniard and Indian, and spiritually avoiding both the atavisms of Indian culture and the exploitative nature of the European, the mestizo became the defining symbol of nationalism. Gamio put it thus, with lyricism:
In the great forge of America, on the giant anvil of the Andes, virile races of bronze and iron have struggled for centuries ... [to create the mestizo, the “national race” of Mexico, and carrier of] the national culture of the future. ... [Now (1916) it is time for Mexico’s leaders] to take up the hammer and gird themselves with the blacksmith’s apron, so that they may make rise from the miraculous anvil the new nation of blended bronze and iron.  

Molina Enriquez concurred, but with a surprising twist: “Over time, the anvil of Indian blood will always prevail over the hammer of Spanish blood.” From this perspective, Lomnitz-Adler has argued, “the racial ideology of Mexicanness can be understood as a qualified (but not absolute) critique of Westernization and imperialism.”  

In this context, Indigenismo – which is best thought of as revalorisation of Indianness within the national schema dominated by the mestizo – contains a subtle matrilineal principle with anti-imperialist implications. By emphasising the mestizo’s maternal (Indian) over its paternal (Spanish) side, Indigenistas were able to claim the transcendence of an ‘Indian soul’ distinguishable from one that was ‘European’ or ‘North American.’ According to this understanding, the ‘soul’ of Mexican culture is Indian, and it is the destination of the political body to be guided against forces of foreign imperialism by mestizos.

The choice of the mestizo as the protagonist of revolutionary nationalism thus allowed both for the construction of a strong anti-imperialist state and the retention of European values of progress and development. Moreover, Indigenistas used the image of the hierarchical Indian community in the recreation of national community. The complex of ideas known as Indigenismo was central to the justifications of a protectionist state that subsumed the free market to the interests of the national community: “the adoption of Indigenismo and of the mestizo as the national race meant that liberalism was subsumed

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87 Manuel Gamio, quoted in: Knight, Alan (1990) op. cit. p. 98
88 Molina Enriquez, quoted in: Knight, Alan (1990) op. cit. p. 85
89 Lomnitz-Adler, Claudio (1992) Exits from the labyrinth: Culture and ideology in the Mexican national space (Berkeley: University of California Press) p. 2
90 Lomnitz-Adler argues that this motivation underlay Chávez Orozco’s (1943) study of Indian “democratic institutions,” and Alfonso Caso’s list of “positive” and “negative” Indian traits. Lomnitz-Adler, Claudio (1992) op. cit. p. 279
into a protectionist regime that defined a national community made up of social sectors, and not merely of individual citizens.\textsuperscript{91} By drawing on the Indian comunidades as a model of hierarchy, the Indigenistas were able to introduce the anti-liberal element necessary for the justification of the proposed ‘strong’ state and ‘mixed economy.’

The preceding section has examined the construction of race/ethnicity in the post-revolutionary period. The Revolutionaries' identity as mestizos allowed a reformulation of Mexican national culture as a mestizo culture. This formula resolved many of the old nationalism's problems, by providing an elegant resolution of the contradiction between the identity of the political elite and the ‘the people,’ and establishing a mythical platform for a protectionist economy and strong state. The policy of Indigenismo – ostensibly an ‘enlightened’ approach to the indigenous population – is best thought of as a new and more sophisticated means to facilitate the integration of the Indian within the national ‘imagined community.’ Consequently, the notion of \textit{mejorar la raza} (‘bettering oneself’) through \textit{blanquearse} (‘whitening oneself’) did not disappear in the post-revolutionary period. Revolutionary nationalism proposed the goal of progress for the whole community. ‘Progress’ however, continued to be defined in terms of achieving or even surpassing the levels of development found in the United States or Europe. For this reason mestizos tended to regard the assimilation of European (white) culture and industry as both a right and a patriotic duty.\textsuperscript{92} In this sense, revolutionary nationalism continued to value ‘whitening’ for the community as a whole, yet at the same time was against merely turning over the country to the ‘whites’ themselves. Revolutionary

\textsuperscript{91} ibid. p. 300

\textsuperscript{92} In this context, it is significant to note that elite males have generally married blond wives, and the prevalence of the slogan \textit{gringos no, gringas si} (‘white men no, white women yes’) Lomnitz-Adler, Claudio (1987) \textit{op. cit.} pp. 278-279. Moreover, Alan Knight has made the point that no Mexican president has ever married a woman darker than himself. Knight, Alan (1990) \textit{op. cit.} p. 97. In 1931, the League of United Latin American nations won a 1931 case at the US Supreme Court, arguing that Mexicans were of the white race and therefore school segregation was illegal. This followed a 1924 US law that banned immigrants who had more than fifty percent Indian blood, but that to save confusion had classified Mexicans as white. As Rodriguez and Vincent note, the Mexican government did everything it could to convince the US people, “that from an ethnological standpoint, Mexicans belonged to the same white race and that they therefore had the same rights as Caucasian North Americans.” Rodriguez O., Jaime E., and Vincent, Kathryn (Eds.) (1997) \textit{Common border, uncommon paths: Race, culture and national identity in US-Mexican relations} (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources) pp. 63-65
nationalism manifested a different spin on the deep historical tendency to 'whitening.' Whilst the colonial caste system allowed people to manipulate their ethnic identity in order to climb the status hierarchy through purposeful strategies, and nineteenth century ascension to whiteness depended primarily on money, revolutionary nationalism recast 'whitening' as a process supposedly in the hands of the state, and in the interests of the collectivity rather than purely self-seeking individuals.

This conjuncture between 'mixed economy' and mestizo nationalism proved potent and durable. The new myths and symbols of the Revolution – coupled with radical socio-political changes – were able to create a potent, cultural nationalist fusion, establishing "a forged nation of genuine social reform and pervasive political clientism."93 However, the Constitution was designed to be "amorphous and contradictory, permitting perpetual reinterpretation and allowing the new state extensive ideological license."94 Thus, although nationalist ideology was used to foster popular identification with the post-revolutionary order, it also became a way to institutionalise the ruling party and its specific, fluctuating projects. Throughout the twentieth century, populist nationalism has become an integral instrument in the facilitation of capitalist modernisation, providing the veneer of a mandate from the imagined national community to proceed with modernising goals. As capital modernisation occurred from 1940 on, enough revenue was generated to maintain a level of state corporatism that included expanded public sector subsidised commodity production, and continued land reform. These state led activities repeatedly reaffirmed the constitutional provisions by placing the needs of the people, especially rural needs, within the national constitutive agenda.

93 Knight, Alan (1994) op. cit. p. 154
3.4 To a second revolution

However, as outlined in the previous chapter, this conjuncture between a ‘mixed economy’ and mestizo nationalism was increasingly undermined by the bankruptcy of the protectionist state, and the consequent shift towards a more open economy. In this sense, the technocratic elites of the 1980s and 1990s found themselves back in the double bind of the nineteenth century. An attempt to articulate a national culture based on their own identity as a class heavily influenced by North American values, would undoubtedly run up against the strong tendencies within national culture that stressed anti-imperialism and economic and political autonomy. On the other hand, to fail to tackle this disjuncture between their own identity as a class and these tendencies embedded within national culture was unthinkable. Inaction threatened both the state-party’s continuing hegemony and the successful continuance of economic reforms, particularly insofar as restructuring depended on presenting Mexico as a politically acquiescent site for foreign investment capital. From this point of view, it was necessary to rework popular understanding of Mexican nationalism, since this nationalism had “established itself in a mythic form hardly coherent with the development of Western Capitalism typical of the twentieth century.” This mythic form was a capitalism, continues Roger Bartra, “dependent, corrupt, and behind the times.” By the mid 1980s, “the nationalist revolutionary myth [had become] a dysfunctional element, but it is also necessary to point out that this ‘dysfunctionality’ comes in large part from its ‘popular’ and ‘anti-capitalist’ origins. The myth of nationalism shelters a large measure of bitterness, protest, revolt, and resistance.”

This ‘dysfunctionality’ raised the question how national culture could be aligned more convincingly with the tecnócratas avowed purpose to make Mexico a modern and progressive nation, fully integrated within the world economy. Left as it was, the revolutionary myth was deeply unattractive to those foreign investors and elites that the

tecnócratas depended on both for economic and political capital. Moreover, it also constituted a forum around which disaffected domestic politicos were able to coalesce their opposition and rally the 'masses.' It is in this context that the modernisation project proposed by the tecnócratas needs to be evaluated. Faced with the potential breakdown of PRI hegemony, the tecnócratas devised a version of modernisation "directed at avoiding, or at least manipulating, the spirit of democratisation that loom[ed] as a threat to the enormous privileges accumulated by the hegemonic political bureaucracy." 96

The social contract was first eroded during the sexenio of Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988), and then irrevocably altered by the administration of Salinas de la Gortari (1988-1994). Already weakened by the debt crisis and the resulting structural adjustment programs, the state's official efforts were dealt a further blow by Salinas' 'Technocratic Revolution.' Explicitly designed to make Mexico more open to changes in the international economy, this new 'revolution' stressed modernisation, which, because of the economic bent of the tecnócratas, necessarily privileged private economic reform as the catalyst from whence all other change would spring. Salinas' objectives were thus threefold. First, Salinas aimed to court the private sector and thus secure long-term access to private domestic capital. Second, the administration wished to cultivate and secure international financial support. Third, Salinas wished to bring back constituents into a relationship with the state, and isolate them from the growing powers of opposition parties. At the same time, Salinas was aware of the dangers presented by his strategy. In particular, it was clear that breaking with statist economic policies would sharply curtail elites' capacity to employ revolutionary nationalism in order to bind a heterogeneous and fractious coalition. 97 To address this problem, Salinas sought to rework the collective understandings of revolutionary nationalism. This was done to infuse it with 'modern' sensibilities and to demonstrate the benefits of the state's new leanings abroad. In order to prove that the latest changes were just a natural progression within a long national narrative of progress and adaptability, Salinas updated the understanding of revolutionary nationalism.

96 Bartra, Roger (1993) op. cit. p. 153
97 Centeno, Miguel Ángel (1994) op. cit. p. 237
nationalism by linking his discourse with references to the past and to pre-existing understandings of what constituted national identity. In doing so, Salinas attempted to project the sense of a unified national community behind neoliberal reforms by foregrounding an essential 'Mexicanness' that drew its legitimation firmly in the 'Indian past.' This reworking proved to be a crucial instrument in securing global investment, yet at the same time proved to have a marginalising effect on the very people around which the identity was framed: the Mexican indigenous. In the “quixotic search for the modernity promised by Western civilization,” Salinas' rhetorical highlighting of the 'modern' and adaptive qualities of the 'new' Mexico, in turn effectively silenced those in places seen as unmodern and uncivilised.

Salinismo

The election of Carlos Salinas de Gortari to the presidency of Mexico in 1988 came at a time of, to borrow from Alan Pred, “severe rupture” of Mexican modernity in which “a set of key turning points” provided the “fast fade of an era.” During the 1980s, under the imperatives set forth by the debt crisis, the increasing inroads of capitalist integration had steadily weakened the statist economy. This hastened a radical break from historic, socially-oriented provisions of the state and thus redefined state-society relations in a number of ways. As noted in the previous chapter, many of these changes can be attributed to a dramatic shift in political actors with the emergence of the tecnócratas to political ascendancy. The tecnócratas diagnosed Mexico’s troubles as solely financial and vowed to follow a ‘new realism.’ This approach stressed collaboration between the state and private sectors and relegated the state to a simple role of guidance or ‘rectorship.’ Under the direction of the tecnócratas, Mexico accepted its debt burden and – guided by the International Monetary Fund – implemented a strict structural adjustment program designed to control inflation by limiting wage increases and reducing

government deficits. The ensuing reforms had a number of social and political impacts. They imposed severe hardships on the majority of Mexican people, as welfare expenditures were drastically cut and public investment in agriculture, manufacturing and oil production dropped sharply. Moreover, there was also a crisis emerging in the ruling party. With the shift in elite composition, important sectors of the political class had been displaced as the government shifted its locus from political areas of government to that of a bureaucratic administrative elite. Consequently, the PRI "lost ground as a legitimator of the regime." Many traditional PRI supporters were alienated, the governing coalition was split, and opposition parties gained a stronger foothold with the Mexican constituency. The situation was in fact very similar to that described by Gramsci:

If the ruling class has lost its consensus, i.e. is no longer ‘leading’ but only dominant, exercising coercive force alone, this means precisely that the great masses have become detached from their traditional ideologies, and no longer believe what they used to believe previously, etc. The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear

It is in this context that the modernisation project proposed by the tecnócratas needs to be evaluated. Faced with the potential breakdown of PRI hegemony, the tecnócratas devised a version of modernisation: "directed at avoiding, or at least manipulating, the

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CHAPTER THREE – THE PRODUCTION OF SPECTACLE

spirit of democratisation that loom[ed] as a threat to the enormous privileges accumulated by the hegemonic political bureaucracy.104 As Bartra pointedly observed in 1988:

Is the nationalist political culture able today to perform the legitimating function that the system appears to demand? A part of the political bureaucracy is aware of the complexity and the enormous difficulties that arise in the attempt to renew Mexican nationalism under the current conditions under which the country is passing. It realizes that Mexican nationalism contains ingredients that are no longer acceptable to large and significant sectors of society, and it sees in nationalism the stamp of a period of time that must be superseded105

It was this situation that faced Salinas as he took office. In order to reconcile the demands of the marketplace and a bureaucratic elite with the party’s historical social commitments, and, just as crucially, to reconcile these internal tensions with the expectations of international actors, Salinas had to revive and transform the Mexican political system. Well aware that economic survival in a globalized world depended on both domestic and international support, the Salinas administration adopted new political mechanisms for fostering support of its economic policies. Most notable about this change of direction, was the exceptional way in which Salinas framed his neoliberal project for both the international and domestic audiences.

Salinas’ ‘imagined community’

A year into his Presidency, Salinas declared to his domestic audience that the foundations of the state were outmoded and required a change. In his 1989 State of the Union address, he stated: “[m]ost of the reforms of our revolution have run their course and no longer guarantee the new development that Mexico demands.”106 This statement made explicit the view that if the traditions of revolutionary nationalism had become outmoded in the contemporary era, then it is legitimate to ‘modernise’ them. In the vacuum left by the displacement of these ‘old’ revolutionary values, it then became

104 Bartra, Roger (1993) op. cit. p. 153
105 ibid. p. 153
necessary to articulate a new support upon which Mexican national identity would come to rest; a 'new revolution.' Identifiable in this type of reworking is the tendency of nationalism, as Kandiyoti describes it, "to present itself as a 'modern' project, that meets and transforms traditional attachments in favour of new identities and as a reflection of authentic cultural values culled from the depths of a presumed communal path." In the case described here, the new foundation of nationalism envisioned 'modern' meanings and identities for traditional revolutionary ideals, for as Salinas noted: "we are living at a moment of history when we are looking for new frames of reference to explain past events, to understand the present and prepare ourselves for the future." 

Accordingly, key ideals rooted in the Revolution and Constitution such as sovereignty, justice and liberty, came to be defined in relation to the world market. Within a domestic context, Salinas made it clear that these ideals could currently only be upheld by entering the world economy more fully. As Dresser relates, Salinas:

... justified ownership of the state airline ... by arguing that continued public ownership would consume resources that otherwise would be used to assist the poor [This approach allows] Salinas and his team to declare that social considerations are guiding the dismantling of the state and leading to a new, socially determined form of state intervention in the economy

In this way Salinas was able to link historical traditions – a revolutionary commitment to social justice – with an international leaning, thereby grounding his claim that the administration's approach was "social liberalism, a synthesis of Reform and Revolution." Thus, Salinas called on a new 'revolutionary' Mexico that is firmly anchored within the global economy.

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110 Steele, Christopher (1995) 'Zapatism at the close of the century: Hybrid Cultures, neoliberalism and the recent Maya uprising in Chiapas.' d'Avila, Neto (Ed.) *Social development: Challenges and strategies* (Rio
situated within the world economy in order to uphold its commitments to justice and liberty as laid down in the 1917 constitution. Salinas appeared to recognise the irony of this situation when he commented that: “Although it may seem paradoxical, through change we will ensure that we continue as a free and sovereign nation in the twentieth century.” The situation was indeed paradoxical, for Salinas’ domestic articulation of the new revolutionary nationalism served to endorse economic liberalisation at the same time as it masked the concomitant social tensions being produced while liberalisation was being framed and aestheticised around the revolutionary commitments of the past.

It was also important that Salinas convey a similarly aestheticised image to international actors, since as Centeno points out: “it would have been practically impossible for [reforms] to succeed without external assistance including financial support, diplomatic legitimacy, and the accolades of the international media.” In submitting themselves to this necessity, Centeno goes on to acknowledge, the Salinas administration was “particularly successful in convincing the relevant international actors that its survival was crucial and that it required support.” The way in which the tecnócratas sought to present the changes in a way attractive to an international audience, whilst at the same maintaining contact with Mexico’s revolutionary heritage and identity, is particularly striking. For central to this strategy was the deployment of a mestizo identity, marked in the aftermath of the Revolution by its explicit opposition to American values such as liberalism, and now reworked for the express purpose of greater integration into an American defined, neoliberal world economy.

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112 Centeno, Miguel Ángel (1994) *op. cit.* pp. 238-239

113 ibid.
The revolutionary elevation of the Mestizo: part II

In the attempt to situate the Mexican nation into the larger system of the global community, it was imperative to highlight those factors that would allow Mexico to be seen as a legitimate and attractive member. In doing so, Salinas painted a specific picture to the international audience in order to emphasise Mexico's worthiness. This articulation was accomplished by referring back to the historic construction of Mexicanness and implicitly, to the all-important role of the adaptable Mestizo. As Salinas pointed out in 1992: "Mexico is a nation rich in age-old cultural expression that attests to its capacity to endure, to assimilate and change, to open up to the world ... we see our plurality as an opportunity of exchanges that enriches and strengthens our own identity." 114 Seven months later, Salinas became even more explicit about the 'essential' role of Mexican culture, and the unique contribution it can make to the world order. In the face of global economic change, he argued:

We have preserved the one thing we hold to be essential and that gives us self-confidence: our age-old culture. Composed of both influences and originality, with a wide variety of expressions that survive today, this culture is alive and we will not allow it to become a thing of museums and distant relics: on the contrary, it will continue to define our identity. With it, the world represents an opportunity for us and not a risk from which we must hide and protect ourselves.115

In an implicit reference to the process of mestizaje, Salinas here suggests that Mexican culture has historically been constituted by transformation and adaptability, and as such, these qualities have become part of Mexican identity. In turn, and in a way reminiscent of his justification for privatisation of state industries, Salinas suggests that the vitality of Mexican culture is in danger of being turned into "museum relics." In order to prevent this Salinas implies that change is necessary to preserve the character of "our age old culture." This, combined with the prior invocation of "cultural change" and "plurality," can plausibly be interpreted as an invitation to the transformative capabilities of foreign

114 Salinas de Gortari, Carlos (1992) op. cit. p. 71
115 Salinas de Gortari, Carlos (1993) op. cit. p. 744
investment to share the responsibility of keeping Mexican culture full of vitality and diversity. To the international community therefore, Salinas presented this "inherent" nature of Mexican cultural identity – multicultural and accommodating – as a symbol of modern Mexico’s willingness to change and thus, that which gives the country its edge economically.

In addition, Salinas’ extolling of the national character of Mexicans relied on a reproduction of the historic valorisation of the Indian during the post-revolutionary order, as the one who reflects and upholds the soul of the nation. By highlighting Mexico’s “age-old culture,” Salinas calls forth the ancient and utopian vision of a glorious and virtuous Indian past, in order to help furnish contemporary Mexico with a distinct identity, the better to highlight its unique contribution (and place) within the global market. Therefore, embedded within Salinas’ discursive deployment of Mexican culture is a new articulation of ‘Indianism’ that was to become a crucial part of the strategy to highlight Mexico’s willingness to ‘go global.’ Aside from Salinas’ speeches, this ideological approach can be seen in very concrete ways. In a costly and aggressive public relations campaign to boost economic investment and tourism and foster Mexico’s position in global affairs, the role of Mexican culture and history – and specifically that of the Indian – is expressly highlighted. In a 1990 issue of Fortune magazine, the nation’s “natural adaptability and endurance” theme is showcased in a government-sponsored ad, designed to highlight Mexico’s changing economy and boost trade. The accompanying text notes that Mexico has: “over twelve centuries of trading, first with neighbouring tribes and later with the nations of the world ... [These experiences] have strengthened our sense of commerce.” Moreover, by placing a Diego Rivera mural depicting the commerce of the Aztec civilisation above the text, the ad implicitly links this “natural talent” to Mexico’s Indian past. Here again, the Indian and by extension mestizo influences are identified as the source of Mexico’s ever dynamic culture. The government also sponsored several advertising supplements in US newspapers. One in

the *Washington Post* entitled “Mexico: Its History and its pride,”117 details Mexico’s “unique past” of ancient civilisations and revolutionary roots. An article in the *New York Times*118 describes the advertising strategies deployed by the Mexican tourism board in magazine supplements. According to the article, marketing strategy is designed to portray Mexico as a “sophisticated cultural oasis” by highlighting ancient ruins, charming villages and Indian art. Moreover — and somewhat ironically given Salinas’ statement about not relegating Mexican culture to museum relics — the Mexican government facilitated major cultural exhibits in the United States, including the “unprecedented exhibition of its ancient culture at the Metropolitan Museum in New York City, ‘Mexico: Splendours of 30 Centuries.’”119 It is instructive to consider such displays in light of what Pred sees as the role of “spectacle as a vehicle for the introduction or continued promotion of ... hegemonic discourse.”120 Moreover, this celebration of a multicultural heritage also serves the crucial function of securing international capital. “Pluralism,” Yudice notes, is: “the ideology of contemporary neoliberalism ... [allowing it to] camouflage itself behind an egalitarian mask whereas it in fact neutralises class conflict and the claims of new social movements.”121 Thus, promoting multiculturalism internationally becomes a way for Salinas to gain control over concepts of what constitutes the nation, and henceforth claim Mexicans are willingly moving forward as a united and cohesive entity. Consequently, Mexico’s integration into the international networks of global capitalism is further expedited via the effective de-classing of Mexicans, with a consequent obscuration of dissent on the national and local levels: by explicitly presenting the essence of Mexicanness and the Revolution as a willingness to assimilate and adapt to the new demands on market

119 Yudice, George; Franco, Juan; Flores, Jean (Eds.) (1992) *On edge: The crisis of Latin American culture* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press) p. x
121 Yudice, George; Franco, Juan; Flores, Jean (Eds.) (1992) *On edge: The crisis of Latin American culture* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press) p. ix
integration, Salinas implicitly positions those not consenting to or taking part in the neoliberal change as unpatriotic and backward.

This final point is significant because it leads us to ask how Salinas' nationalist discourse materialised in specific locales within Mexico. In reference to the preceding chapter, the construction of the space of national culture tended to privilege the identification of those geographically embedded social groups already most integrated into the new 'modern' Mexico. On the other hand, those areas perceived as falling 'outside' Salinas' vision of the adaptive and dynamic mestizo type came to be those that were marginalised the most through the process of neoliberal transformation. In particular, peasant agriculture, as the sector most antithetical to a westernised modern Mexico, was seen as requiring an update in order to be coherent with Salinas' portrayal of Mexico as a unified nation propelling itself towards progress. The following section will briefly outline how Salinas' international leanings expedited rapid change in the Mexican countryside, and severely affected the rural agrarian sector and its (predominantly Indian) inhabitants.

3.5 Projecting the rural 'outside'

Beginning in 1991, the promised benefits of becoming a signatory to NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) were at the forefront of the Salinas administration's stated concern with efficiency and modernisation. NAFTA promised to bolster investor confidence and thus the supply of external finance, by offering on one hand an important signal of future intentions, and on the other making concessions to US capital. It also promised an expanded market for Mexican export-orientated activities through improved market access. However, the incorporation into NAFTA required the support of the US Congress and American public interest groups. The accountability to these groups generated an increased impetus to Salinas' attempt to construct a secure and distinct national identity. Consequently, the pressure was increased to highlight everything modern and progressive about the 'new' Mexico, and to eradicate those parts of Mexico that did not conform to this image. Central to the perceived contamination and even
wilful sabotage of the ‘new’ Mexico were the rural sectors, insofar as they were judged inefficient and stagnant. To rectify this, Salinas quickly abandoned land reform and the historically entrenched measures designed to protect agrarian lifestyles that had characterised the post-revolutionary period. These measures to ‘update’ the countryside were accompanied by a specific strategy of en-framing the rural in order to secure legitimation.

The process of identity formation is by definition exclusionary. Scholars such as David Campbell, in their discussion of the mobilisation of identity by elite actors, stress the recourse to a ‘strategy of otherness’ predicated on exclusionary practices. These practices construct boundaries and demarcate spaces to privilege and reinforce a stable and coherent interiority, by focusing on aspects deemed antithetical and projecting them as ‘deviant’ and thus ‘outside’ identity. However, in that the construction of any self-image depends on that which it purports to exclude, traces are always left. Understood in this sense, a ‘map’ is a case study in abjection: the always unsuccessful attempt to expel the ‘opposite’ and supposed antithetical – the other that is inside precisely through the persistence of the attempt to force it out. Thus, each of these apparently opposed spaces are dependent upon the other, the geographical imagination being wrought from a profound spatial interconnectivity.

In this context, it is helpful to note that Salinas de la Gortari rationalised his policies by claiming that he was leading Mexico out of the “Third World wilderness.” The notion of Mexican space as a ‘wilderness’ implicitly suggests an antithesis to be accomplished. Marginalised spaces are central to whatever meaning and significance a particular mapping may have, and are clues to the dominant ideology that governs the production of space. Clive Bush expresses this quality thus:

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122 See, for example: Campbell, David (1992) Writing security: United States foreign policy and the politics of identity (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press)

[I]t is impossible to divide up our experience of space. In an important sense, the farmlands imply the wilderness, and the wilderness the farmlands. The city implies the countryside and the countryside implies the city. The domestic hearth implies the public domain and the public domain the hearth. Further, we divorce the geometric from the bodily, the economic from the political and the personal from the social only at a certain risk.\footnote{Bush, Clive (1989) "'Gilded backgrounds': Reflections on the perception of space and landscape in America." Gidley, Mick and Lawson Peebles, Robert (Eds.) \textit{Views of American landscapes} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) p. 13 [pp. 10-23]}

Lefebvre attaches particular importance within representations of space to the discourses of spatial science (mainstream architecture and urban planning) and the spectacularisation of urban space, which together combine to sustain \textit{l'illusion urbanistique}. It's dual, or negation, is what Karnouh has characterised as \textit{l'illusion rustique}:

Everything urban people have lost: identity, direct relation to others, community of knowledge, and that consumerism cannot fill, lead them to a search for the impossible completeness of a world exploded into artificial needs. The imaginary countryside brackets daily alienation and creates the momentary illusion of a recovered unity ... [this is] part of a program preestablished by merchants of leisure within the décor of urban scenography.\footnote{Karnouth, Claude (1986) "The lost paradise of regionalism: The crisis of post-modernity in France." \textit{Telos}, 67, p. 20 [pp. 11-26]}

Such a 'dual illusion' is necessary because the increasing abstraction of space and commodification of social relations accelerates what Polanyi once referred to as the "annihilation of the human and natural substance of society," as dominant practices become "disembedded" from social institutions.\footnote{Polanyi, Karl (1944) \textit{The great transformation} (Boston) pp. 137-139} Thus, in order to produce docility amongst necessarily alienated yet potentially fractious citizens, a spectacle of glorious (urban) modernity is produced and complemented with an equally spectacularised unity of origin, typically residing in the calm stasis of the rural. However, the lauding of the rural is reductive in the sense that it is typically emptied of inhabitants and their lived practices. It manifests a landscape, or frozen utopian ideal emptied of social relations.
Where persons are included in such an image they are similarly rendered timeless, or more specifically, as signifiers of that which time has not affected. As such, visualisation of the ‘authentic’ can be mobilised as a site of origin and nostalgic compensation on the one hand, and as a signifier of how far we have moved, on the other hand. In this way, the reciprocity of the ‘dual illusion’ is occluded. The rural becomes a fetishised, naturalised sphere disconnected from the ‘history’ that takes place in the ‘modern urban.’ This artificial distinction — the association of the rural with ‘space’ and the urban with ‘time’ — in turn depoliticises the rural and the agency of subjects therein.

This kind of discussion is particularly germane to the argument of this section, given Salinas’ attempt to highlight the ‘Western’ modernity of Mexican society. In order to demonstrate to both an international and domestic audience that Mexico was ready for and united behind the particular interpretation of modernity signified by inclusion in NAFTA, Salinas looked to those places considered most antithetical to this ‘progressive’ and ‘efficient’ future in order to demonstrate that which Mexico no longer is or wants to be. Doreen Massey provides a useful theorisation of the analytical opposition between space and time that is helpful to the elucidation of my argument. Massey argues that space and time have each come to be conceptualised with specific qualities attributable to dichotomies. These qualities are specified in terms of presence and absence, or, as Massey puts it, “A/not-A”:

... it is Time which is conceived of as in the position of ‘A,’ and space which is ‘not-A.’ Over and over again, time is defined by such things as change, movement, history, dynamism; while space, rather lamely by comparison, is simply the absence of these things ... With time are aligned History, Progress, Civilization, Science, Politics, and Reason, portentous things with gravitas and capital letters. With space on the other hand are aligned the other poles of these concepts: stasis, (‘simple’) reproduction, nostalgia, emotion, aesthetics, and the body.

This brief discussion serves to highlight the ideological rationalisation underpinnings Salinas’ plans for the updating of the rural. Salinas’ reforms were predicated on the

notion of progress as a rational movement forward: a change that merely reinforced Mexico’s historical character. On the other hand, the growing stasis of rural spaces represented the irrational nostalgia for the ‘old’ Mexico, thus ‘inciting’ a need for it to be brought up to speed with the ‘new’ Mexico. Significantly, within Salinas’ discourse rural areas are rendered as threatening – by their very nature – the image of a progressive Mexico that Salinas wishes to project both internationally and domestically. Cast as ‘inefficient’ and ‘backward,’ rural places do not ‘fit’ with the rhetoric of a unified forward looking nation, and thus become the internal ‘disorder’ that threatens the coherence and integrity of Mexico’s self proclaimed national type. Insofar as rural places are seen as lacking ‘adaptability’ – that essential Mexican/mestizo characteristic called forth in Salinas’ national rhetoric – they are deemed as unworthy to form part of Mexican national space.

Further, this characterisation implicitly extends to those people who inhabit these places. Insofar as their identities are ‘territorialised’ with signifiers of absence or lack, these subjects are rendered as not truly ‘Mexican.’ Their association with those places that are ‘not-Mexico,’ serves to render them deficient embodiments of the national character. This construction reinforces a distinction between the ‘Indian’ and the ‘mestizo,’ insofar as within the cultural nationalist discourse of the Revolution, the rural has always been seen as the domain of the racialised Indian.

As earlier related, representations of Indians within nationalist cultural production have tended to portray Indians as ‘conveyers of eternal values and traditions within an anonymous collective whole: symbolic denizens of a dreamlike rural Mexico.’ Whatever the deficiencies of this representation, it did at least position the Indian as central to national identity. Moreover, a more than rhetorical recognition of the need to preserve agrarian lifestyles is evident in pre-Salinas policy. This recognition had been manifested most strongly in the centrality accorded to land reform by successive post-revolutionary governments, guided by Article 27 of the constitution and the principle of communal rather than private land rights. Yet as has been indicated, the actual operation of elite policies directed towards the primarily rural indigenous has consistently been premised
on their integration within the national whole. Whilst in revolutionary discourse the living Indian did not generally receive the overt disparagement meted out in the liberal dominated era of Juárez and Porfirio Díaz, the symbolic association of the Indian with ‘eternal values and traditions’ has proved a source both of veneration and concern. “[T]he government commitment to Indian programs,” notes Barry, “... can be explained by its concern that ‘backwards’ Indian communities slow the pace of modernization and nation-building and present a source of political instability.” The “symbolic denizens of a dreamlike rural Mexico” have in fact always been regarded as antithetical to national modernisation and integration. Understood in this way, Salinas’ articulation of the rural as a signifier of stasis and nostalgia simply makes explicit the rationale underlying the ideology of Indigenismo since the Revolution. Thus constituted by a ‘strategy of otherness’ projecting them outside the boundary of the ‘positively valued modernity’ of the ‘global Mexico,’ that which is Indian comes to be associated with deviance. In this way, those that seek to affirm Indian ways of being are denied agency within, or recourse against, the system that continually marginalises them.

In turn, this production of the rural helped rationalise material agrarian reforms, most notably through the modification of Article 27 of the constitution in 1992. These amendments to a central pillar of the 1917 constitution effectively ended the policy of land redistribution to landless campesinos, and opened new loopholes that allowed for the concentration of up to 300,000 hectares in the hands of a single corporation. Because the private sector had complained that the ejido system — with its land-holding ceilings, threat of expropriation, and emphasis on community rather than private ownership — had

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129 Michael Foucault has demonstrated the relationship between the ‘official’ discourse of the state and political practice and control. This discourse is constantly legitimated by the state and by academic institutions, consequently becoming part of daily societal practice, linguistic forms, and ideas about the norms of everyday life. Within this framework, it follows that any attempt by minorities or ethnic groups to manifest opposition to subordinate positioning not only will be resisted by the forces of the state but also will be labelled ‘deviant’ or ‘subversive.’ See, for example: Foucault, Michel (1980) Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972-77, Gordon, Colin (Ed.) (New York: Pantheon)

discouraged investment, Salinas sought to dismantle a system that had been a symbol of the revolutionary state's commitment to peasants. Although in the future this change promised to be effective in pushing some farmers into export production, "the remaining millions, whose plots are too small and/or whose land is of marginal quality, will be isolated from the institutional and financial supports that allowed them to continue to farm in the face of unfavourable market conditions." The implications of this move were thus catastrophic for rural Indians, for by opening existing communal land holdings to the vagaries of the market whilst at the same time ending price support for their products, the reforms posted a question mark over the continued viability of communal control of land. Given the centrality of the land to Indian communities as a fundamental emotional and symbolic resource in the maintenance of cultural autonomy, the reforms thus represented a direct and potentially devastating threat.

Moreover, the accompaniment of these material reforms with further discursive manoeuvres by the Salinas administration effectively marginalised the space from which dissent could be mobilised. In ways that express a continuance with those strategies previously explicated, Salinas co-opted opposition by making resistance appear as if it were rejecting the basic tenets of the Mexican nation: democracy, freedom and justice for the people. This strategy is explicit from the first public announcement of the modification of Article 27. In this speech, Salinas subtly finessed the motives behind the change, claiming that the government's primary intent was to remedy the inefficiency of past land reforms (rather than failed state policies), so that Mexico could continue to fulfil nationalist goals in a new era:

We aren't making changes because land reform has failed. We are making changes because today we live in a different demographic, economic and social reality in rural Mexico, which the current land reform program contributed to. New conditions demand new policies to achieve the same nationalist goals.

131 Barkin, David (1994) 'The specter of rural development.' NACLA report on the Americas, 27, p. 32 [pp. 29-34]
This kind of rhetoric has the effect of reinforcing the notion that previous rural policies, hampered by ‘internal’ problems unrelated to the good intentions of the national sphere, need to be updated. Implicitly, it is posited that the rural suffers from a ‘natural’ stagnation: a stagnation that can only be remedied by new initiatives at the national level that will open the rural to the advance of progress, and thereby fulfil the revolutionary promise of promoting freedom and justice in the countryside. Tellingly, in a treatise accompanying the reforms entitled Ten points of freedom and justice for the countryside, Salinas couches his reforms in the language of democratisation, arguing that his initiatives represent an attack on government paternalism, and facilitate the empowerment of the individual. As Barry argues, this treatise highlights the ‘pro-peasant’ elements of the reforms by: “pointing to a new freedom that ejidatarios would have to manage their individual parcels and common land.”\(^1\) This is reinforced by the claim that: “Peasants should be the subjects, and not the objects, of change,”\(^2\) thereby positioning the government as merely reacting to peasant’s initiatives and desire for reform, rather than as an active agent in the construction and promotion of this desire. Consequently, the appearance of an invigorated commitment to agrarianism is generated to justify the actual dismantling of a number of its central pillars. In the process, Salinas and the PRI assert a degree of ‘ownership’ of the crucial legitimating revolutionary slogans that have worked to solidify PRI rule in the countryside throughout the century.

**Conclusion**

The preceding sections have shown how, in seeking to foreground Mexico’s supposed modernity, the tecnócratas formed a Mexican identity firmly grounded in the ‘lackings’ of rural Mexico. Particularly disturbing about rural restructuring was the way in which poor Indian campesinos were simultaneously marginalised both materially and

\(^1\) Barry, Tom (1995) *op. cit.* p. 118


191
politically; two aspects that in fact went hand in hand. By constructing a unified Mexican identity around the ever adaptable figure of the mestizo; utilising familiar strategies of Indian symbolisation to support this; constructing the rural as a signifier of stasis and backwardness and extending this representation to its inhabitants; and situating reforms as the fulfilment of national revolutionary ideals, Indian peasants were effectively denied any institutionalised position from which to speak. Discursively positioned as not ‘truly’ Mexican, attempts at protest were a priori cast as ‘deviant’ and ‘outside’ the national project.

This chapter has sought to demonstrate how such strategies link with a long history of indigenous marginalisation. The forms of this marginalisation have varied over time, but what has remained consistent is the distinction drawn in national discourse between a symbolic Indian past used to legitimise the nation, and an Indian present that on the contrary has been used to signify that which is deficient in the national project. At times, as during the initial period of the Revolution, the living Indian has been subject to veneration. However, this veneration has not been couched in terms of genuine understanding, nor have those identified as Indians themselves been allowed to speak. Rather, where the living Indian has been accorded recognition, this has been limited by the extent to which they are seen as ‘survivors’ or ‘relics’ from a bygone era, rather than active subjects in their own right.

In this context, the discursive practise of the tecnócratas represents a rearticulation of a long historical tendency to the hegemony of representations of space within Lefebvre’s three-part dialectic within spatialisation. I have argued that the extent of the hegemony of representations of space within the discursive practise of Salinismo is usefully understood through reference to the concept of the spectacle. The concept of spectacle highlights the reductive and exclusionary nature of Salinas’ discourse, as it relates to the space of Mexican national culture and modernity. The spectacle privileges a particular interpretation of Mexican history, figuring ‘the present’ as the full and natural expression of Mexican historical destiny. This interpretation represents itself as the ‘truth’ of the space of Mexican national culture, obscuring its complexity and contradictory character.
It seeks to impose one meaning upon history, establishing a circular relationship between power and knowledge in a regime of truth that privileges particular individuals and social classes, whilst excluding others. The nature of this exclusion is to render some groups 'deviant' and 'outside' the 'positively valued modernity' of contemporary Mexico, thus constructing an 'inside' of a (supposedly) secure identity. Silenced is the diversity of Mexican space-times, with the space of national culture being reduced to an apparently homogenous, aestheticised space. Consequently, individuals and social classes are rendered as 'spectators' of an ideal Mexican identity, and thus of themselves.

In a world in which access to investment and development capital is increasingly dependent on ascription to 'norms' of politico-economic rationality and the reformulation of state administrative institutions on this basis, a politics of representation comes increasingly to the fore. This is because while capital must be placed, it is relatively free to choose the particular place where it sites itself in the global circuit of capital. In these circumstances, the discourse of nationalism and the political institutions of the state remain central means of structuring participation and thus restricting political possibilities. This implies the concrete manufacture of consent (or at least the appearance of consent) through manufacture of an aestheticised rendering of national space, as a means to attract an increasingly 'footloose' capital via the appearance of political stability and 'distinctiveness.' In this context, the role of states in visualising conceptions of national identity becomes ever more affirmative. In a context in which the world seems ever more uncertain, and everyday life is increasingly riven by the abstraction and alienation of the accumulation process, recourse to notions of spatial stability, fixity and vision (in its most general sense, as seeing into the future or running ahead of time) lend a sense of security and comfort. In order to present an image of distinctiveness to international investors and governments, and simultaneously to present to a populous having its everyday life riven by the accumulation process a comforting sense of their 'place in the world,' an image of static identity becomes a central dimension of securing political possibilities within the institutions of the state, and thus preventing the actualisation of potentially disruptive transnational possibilities.
Elite hegemony is thus reinforced via an assertion that it is only through 'going global' that Mexican sovereignty and independence can be secured in the long term. Necessarily, the question is for whom this 'independence' and 'sovereignty' is acquired. As the previous chapter has argued, 'going global' implied the delinking of the nation-state from historic commitments expressed via protectionism, preferential treatment for domestic producers, and redistributive measures, insofar as these were unattractive to global capital investment and the negotiation of the NAFTA accords. In this context, 'Mexican space' increasingly came to be operationalised abstractly as a means to elite empowerment. The reformulation and restructuring of Mexican space was above all an accumulation strategy that homogenised the diverse social actors encompassed within the national community. This was achieved by reducing their inherently contradictory interests as individual subjects embedded within complex relations expressive of contradictory interests, to a collective interest as defined by neoliberal macro-economic rationality.

This recourse to utopian celebration constitutes a covert suppression of real places and a calculated cancellation of contemporary struggle. In the context of domestic crises and the compromise of the historical commitments of nationalism, Salinas' mappings can be read as an attempt to massage away anxieties with promises of a not-to-distant future of community, participation and stability. Such a discourse of the future perfect is less a means of analysing space than a means of sanctioning contemporary restructuring. The cartographic imagination that informs the mappings of the Salinas administration is thus essentially idealist; reforms are presented as impacting on a generalised physical and social body politic, as opposed to specific groups in specific places. The determining significance of existing material differentiation is downplayed, if not ignored completely.

The Zapatista struggle examined in the following chapter is a struggle against the reduction of 'life' (desires/non-capitalist modes of being) to the dictates of 'representations of space' that find their inspiration within the myths of 'allowable' forms of Mexican subjectivity, interpreted through and legitimated by the mechanisms of instrumental/technical rationality. In order to justify their restructuring of the Mexican
economy, the *tecnócratas* searched through the pool of reusable stereotypes (myths of 'allowable' and 'deviant' subjectivity) in order to deploy those deemed useful to facilitate the integration of Mexico within the world economy. The Zapatistas, on the other hand, exposed this process, taking advantage of the multiple fields within which these stereotypes may be deployed, and connecting them to an alternative interpretation of Mexican history in order to articulate an 'anti-spectacle' of an exclusive Mexican modernity. It is to an analysis of this 'interruption of spectacle' that the following chapter turns.
INTERRUPTING SPECTACLE
ZAPATISMO AND SPACES OF REPRESENTATION

This state ... has as one of its functions the organization of space, the regularization of its flows, and the control of its networks. ... Pressure from below must therefore also confront the state in its role of organizer of space. ... The state defends class interests while simultaneously setting itself above society as a whole, and its ability to intervene in space can and must be turned back against it, by grass-roots opposition, in the form of counter-plans and counter-projects designed to thwart strategies, plans and programmes imposed from above.

— Henri Lefebvre¹

We went to sleep in the First World and woke up in the Third World

— Paco Taibo²


CHAPTER FOUR – INTERRUPTING SPECTACLE

Introduction

The preceding chapter has argued that ‘the global’ is not some free floating space of flows, but rather, is only ever actualised in place. Global processes are inevitably mediated by and constituted within regional or local sites. ‘The global’ is in this sense locally specific, for it must, if it is to move beyond an empty abstraction, become articulated with and work through the identity of a place. The competition for economic advantage, prestige and power in the highly competitive and increasingly integrated system of late twentieth century capitalism incites the state to play an active role in the production of nation-state space as a distinct, identifiable, and ‘grounded’ cultural identity.

Understood in this sense, ‘the global’ is both a production of the circuits of capital and a narrative, with the nation-state having a vital role to play in constituting the meaning of ‘the global’ for a political community (‘the nation’) in a specific time and place. The monopoly on the meaning of ‘the global’ in turn reproduces the identity of ‘the nation.’ This is because the nation-state must define for itself what exactly the preferred relationship between ‘the nation’ (the political community it presumes to embody) and ‘the global’ actually is. In doing so, the nation-state actively ascribes an identity to ‘the nation’ that accords with this preferred relationship. In Mexico, as we have seen, the preferred relationship for much of the pre-1982 post-Revolutionary period was hostile and antagonistic. Post-1982, on the contrary, this preferred relationship was reconfigured to one of active accommodation and integration to global circuits of capital. As Neil Smith has argued, “[i]nsofar as the ruling class attempts to reproduce its own vision of the world, it also seeks to establish a definition of global alongside national citizenship. The erasure of difference implied in ‘the universal subject’ is one insinuation of such global citizenship ... ‘The global’ is very actively constructed.” From this point of view, 1982-1994 visualisations of the ‘the

3 Stuart Hall has described this process as the way global processes work through “particularisms” – including, for instance, cultural movements, and power relationships embedded in political systems and national ideologies. See: Hall, Stuart (1993) ‘Culture, community, nation.’ Cultural Studies, 3, pp. 349-363

nation' went hand in hand with a visualisation of 'the global.' This facilitated global economic integration by reducing Mexican space into a fragmented slice of 'investment space' on the one hand, and by coalescing the diverse communities that make up the national space into a 'whole' harmoniously striving for this end (a 'global' Mexico) on the other.

As a 'spectacularised spatial fix' for capital, understandings of 'the nation' were thus explicitly reformulated to function as a 'selling point' for transnational capital and the (closely associated) global judges of national prestige and success. This centrality of national space in an era of globalization may appear counter-intuitive, given the persistent chorus of claims that the state is 'withering away' at the hands of globalization. However, as the previous chapters have insisted, national space is better thought of as undergoing a process of 'creative destruction' in which it is being restructured in ways more conducive to the latest round of space-time colonisation by capital. Visualisations of national space are an integral aspect of this process, insofar as they stimulate an image of space in and through which capital can gain its 'spatial fix' and repress alternative understandings that may 'threaten' this image. This is an essential dimension of what Lefebvre means when he argues that space is becoming increasingly 'fragmented' and 'hierarchised.' One effect of this abstraction is the purging of history, memory and imagination from space insofar as it does not reproduce the relations necessary for accumulation. Within a Lefebvrian schema, such developments may be read as symptomatic of the eradication of meaning and spatial difference except for those produced in terms of spectacle itself. Technocratic spatial practices may thus plausibly be understood as the attempted destruction of a 'social unconscious' inimical to the production of space in terms of a preferred 'spatial fix' for capital.

Implicit here is an understanding that the process of 'outmoding' is intrinsic to the creative destruction of capitalism. In the case of Mexico, as we have seen, the most pervasive example of 'outmoding' has been the ascription of inherent 'backwardness' to the rural spaces of the peasant indigenous. In the neoliberal era, this strategy proved integral to the rationalisation of the 'going global and self fragmenting' of nation-state space, implying the justification of uneven development (the hierarchical fragmentation of space) and accommodation with global institutions and capital as a
'realistic' response to the contemporary conjuncture. The inscription of this border between the 'positively valued modernity' of a (primarily) urbanised 'new Mexico' and a 'negatively valued pre-modernity' of a rural/indigenous, 'backward Mexico,' is thus explicitly functional. It is a legitimating mechanism for the tecnócratas' annihilation of space by law. That is, measures such as the amendment of Article 27 are attempts to delink networks of exchange adjudged non-functional within the spatial fix, and thereby 'empty out' space so that it might be available for more 'efficient' accumulation. The cumulative effect of such policies is to render social groups located in the 'backward Mexico' as effectively 'non' or even 'anti' nationals within the 'new Mexico.'

From this point of view, the stability of the 'spectacular spatial fix' painstakingly constructed for accelerated accumulation is dependent on the ongoing bringing to presence of the 'new Mexico,' and the simultaneous rendering absent of the 'backward Mexico.' The 'backward Mexico' cannot be allowed into vision, except, that is, symbolically, as a marker for a 'far away' in time and space that is being willingly superseded. However, this reliance on reductive articulations of cultural identity in the construction of 'the nation' as a spectacularised spatial fix is a potential "space of vulnerability." This is because those social sectors and groups marginalised within the production of abstract nation space have the potential to mobilise alternative understandings of national identity that can work back and mediate global-local articulations. From this point of view, the space of national culture mobilised for the purpose of integration into the global economy presents itself as a strategic terrain for conflicting forces. Thus, Stuart Hall has insisted:

[The] tension between the tendency of capital to develop the nation-state and national cultures and its transnational imperatives is a contradiction at the heart of modernity which has tended to give nationalism and its particularisms a peculiar significance and force at the heart of the so-called new transnational global order.


Thus, it is precisely because constructions of ‘the nation’ are so central to the process and meaning of globalization that contests over the meaning of the nation have acquired such importance.

This chapter is concerned with the attempt of a specific social group to expose and subvert the processes of their marginalisation, and so enter representation within ‘the nation’ on their own terms. The subject of this chapter is Zapatismo: a term that refers to the diverse struggles that have coalesced around the insurgency of the EZLN (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación / Zapatista Army of National Liberation) and that began in the southern state of Chiapas on January 1st 1994. The chapter proposes an examination of select aspects of Zapatismo. It will be demonstrated how, insofar as ‘globalization’ is dependent on the production of a spatial fix for capital through representation of ‘the nation’ as a static and homogenous abstract space (‘spectacle’), globalization is vulnerable to the strategic insertion of alternative visions of national cultural identity. More specifically, it will be shown that Zapatismo expresses a strategic subversion of the boundary between the ‘new’ and ‘backward’ Mexico, rendering the ‘presence’ of Mexican space as a univocal, static identity identifiable in time and space deeply problematic. Thus, this chapter examines the ‘interruption’ of the spectacle of Mexican modernity. To begin, we will turn to a brief recap of the way Lefebvre theorises resistance.

### 4.1 Lefebvre and resistance

*As in Judo, the best answer to an opponents manoeuvre never is to step back, but to re-use it to your own advantage as a base for a next phase*

—Michel Foucault

Greil Marcus once pointedly observed that the major problem facing any transformative politics was to adequately address the question: “How do people make history, starting from conditions pre-established to dissuade them from intervening in

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In many ways, this statement stands as a fitting description of Lefebvre’s abiding concerns. It will be recalled from the opening chapter that Lefebvre seeks to intensify the production and experience of creative moments in everyday life, ultimately seeking to create situations that would amount to an effective collective ‘revolutionary festival.’ To this end, Lefebvre always tries to connect moments and social totality, yet he is fully aware of the practical difficulties involved. Central to this difficulty is the fact that space produced in terms of spectacle encourages specific sorts of relationships between people and the institutions of capital and the state. Spectacle promotes what the Situationist International term ‘situations’: specific spatio-temporal arrangements through which people must live their lives and relate to each other. This would all be to the good if the space formatting these relationships were not a social construction that privileges ‘mental’ space, marginalises ‘social space’ and compromises ‘lived’ experience. That is, if spectacular space were not inherently oppressive and perfect for a project of social domination, due to the fact that the hyperinflation of mental space installs a cultural dominant: “the space of reductions, of force and repression, of manipulation and co-optation, the destroyer of nature and the body.”

Lefebvre’s point is that alternative ways of practising space are increasingly devaluated within the abstract space produced by spectacle. Implied here is a relation between presence and absence. A ‘modern’ conception of the construction of presence – as Lefebvre characterises it – is implicated in ‘proximity’ (space) and a ‘now’ (time). Lefebvre argues that an attempt to construct a pure space of presence (proximity and ‘now’) always implies the production of absence (the far away and ‘not now’). From this point of view, absence is central to the construction of presence. In order to reinforce the self-evidence of a ‘positively valued presence,’ a central aspect of hegemony over space is the continuous identification of some ‘other’ that threatens the purity of presence. Typically, this ‘other’ is associated with the qualities of absence – its ‘proper place’ is ‘far away’ in time and space – thus

10 Ibid. p. 354
rendering the ‘other’ as something that does not properly belong. Lefebvre’s point is that the construction of ‘pure’ spaces is a prerogative of power – pure spaces are the product of ongoing practices that seek to maintain clear divisions between an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside,’ and thus stabilise identity against a ‘threatening’ outside. A privileged identity must continually be brought to presence through the vigilant repetition of practices enacted in its name, lest its ‘naturalness’ becomes an object of debate and contestation. As such, the ‘self-evidence’ of presence is reaffirmed through ongoing acts that deny the ‘right to presence’ of alternative cultural understandings or ways-of-being in the world.\textsuperscript{11}

Lefebvre’s burning political question may be thus stated: how is it possible to disturb the monopoly on ‘presence’ spectacular space assigns to itself? Lefebvre recognises that space, while increasingly spectacularised by the infusion of spatial practices informed by forms of technical knowledge he terms ‘representations of space,’ is not just abstract space. Rather, what he terms ‘spaces of representation’ resist the reduction of space through tactics of evasion and subterfuge. Emanating from the body as a lived practice, as a site of use rather than exchange value, ‘spaces of representation’ suggest space as it is lived and experienced by human subjects actively reflecting upon the specific situation in which they find themselves. Implied here is the exercise of what Davies and Starn have defined as counter memory: “the residual or resistant strains that withstand official versions of historical continuity.”\textsuperscript{12} Lefebvre’s point is that there is always a gap between the way space is represented to us ‘from above,’ and the reality of how subjects actually use space in the conduct of their lives. That is, actual subjects are formed from histories of highly personnel experiences of space (the space of the body) from which dominant representations of space are in turn interpreted and practised – often in ways quite contrary to the way in which they were originally conceived ‘from above.’

From this point of view, Lefebvre’s concern is to uncover histories and geographies rendered absent through the discursive practices informed by understandings of


\textsuperscript{12} Davies, Natalie Z and Starn, Peter (1989) ‘Memory and counter-memory.’ Representations, 26, p. 2 [pp. 1-20]
abstract space – such as ‘rational’ economic planning and redevelopment – and bring them into direct confrontation with the ‘presence’ privileged by spectacle. Such a focus on the ‘absent’ is best read politically as a form of resistance – an attempt to contest the forces of capital and the state’s representations of space, that ascribe the designation ‘outmoded’ or ‘backward’ to that which it wants to eliminate under the guise of ‘modernisation.’ The return of such repressed historical materials – consigned by the dominant spatialisation to the archaic and backward – brings cultural elements from the ‘past’ into connection with socio-economic forces in the present: their evident ‘life’ and ‘presence’ problematises the dominant regime of visualisation by unsettling the boundary it has established between presence and absence.\(^{13}\) The outmoded is thus associated with a disruptive power, with the reclamation and amplification of elements that threaten the neat closures of spectacle.

Lefebvre thus recognises that the representations of space provided to us by spectacle, and the forms of relations they promote, are resisted all the time. However, Lefebvre also insists that this simple fact of resistance is not enough. It is all very well individual subjects subverting representations of space by drawing on their personal histories, but this in itself is not enough for a genuinely progressive politics. Resistance that remains at this level tends to be highly individualised and private, and so does little to disrupt the apparent ‘presence’ of the dominant spatialisation. Indeed, in some ways it reinforces it, potentially contributing to the fragmentation of subjects into alienated individuals separated from one another. Lefebvre therefore always insists that it is necessary to ‘regroup difference,’ not in the name of some overweening principle, but rather in terms of an affirmation of the relations and experiences that connect particular individuals or social groups with others, and assault on those things that keep them apart in the interest of some other social group.

The problem here is reappropriation has to take place within a strategic terrain in which space has been fixed in a political centrality – a terrain which is both global (insofar as it submits all within it to a homogenising logic) hierarchical (insofar as some social groups have more control over this process than others, and thus are able

\(^{13}\) This rupturing and its potential for sparking moments of social awakening is one connation of Benjamin’s notion of “profane illumination.” Benjamin, Walter (1979) One way street and other writings, Jephcott, Edmund and Shortner, K (trans.) (London: Verso) p. 277
to realise their time whilst denying other groups theirs) and fragmented (insofar as hegemony is maintained by artificially separating individuals and social groups by restricting them within a limited and limiting space of power’s choosing). Thus, Lefebvre’s key point is that the attempt to create ‘a space of the body’ requires recognition that a particular struggle in place is not necessarily the “sphere in which contending forces are deployed.”¹⁴ This is because the immediate expressions of domination encountered in place are the ‘thing’ form of flows and practices that operate over various spatial scales. The perpetuation of the global space of capital is dependent on spatial practices remaining fixed in, and directed toward a place perceived as bounded and naturalised. Any substantial challenge must consequently recognise that the political power of representations of space (‘conceived’ space) over the spaces of representation (‘lived’ space) is “not a detachment of differentiated forces.”¹⁵ For Lefebvre, an emancipatory politics must proceed by way of a particular set of spatial practices informed by a dialectics of space. Implied here is the sense that “any emancipatory politics presupposes a dialectics of space: a particular set of theoretically informed spatial practices aimed at overcoming separation and dissociation between the global ‘whole’ and the ‘local’ everyday. Apprehending that the maintenance of the conceived global whole is dependent on the local lived level is somehow integral for informing subversive spatial practices.”¹⁶

This implies that for struggle to be effective and progressive, it must be embedded and embodied in a place, yet it must also incite ‘resistance events’ at other scales. It must connect, that is, to other struggles, and implied here is a ‘politics of scale’ that actively engages with the particular form of ‘power geometry’ or ‘scalar organisation’ imposed in order to maintain the hegemony of particular social classes over others. The import of this project for social movements lies in its questioning of the supposed rigidity and fixity of political space. Insofar as we are able to claim that political space is constructed via conflict and is thus inherently unstable and ‘in movement,’ then theoretical room for manoeuvre is opened up for those whose lives are shaped by

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¹⁴ Lefebvre, Henri (1991b) op. cit. p. 366
¹⁶ Merrifield, Andrew (1993) op. cit. p. 526
dominant geopolitical practices and socio-spatial relations. Empowerment in this context is a strategy whereby a struggle's protagonists seek to link their movement to 'rhetorical' events at those levels - the global, the national, the regional etc. - adjudged to give advantage. Typically, a weak 'local' struggle seeks to link to processes operating at more 'global' scales, thereby forging alliances and networks of relations. The 'politics of scale' is therefore a strategy of generalising a 'local' struggle to regional, national, or global scales through the construction of networks. In this way, politics is practised as the discourses within which the struggle is constituted are actively modified. The discourse is 'stretched' or 'contracted' across space, and mutates as it is brought into contact with or withdrawn from encounter with new interpretative communities. Scale is thus "situated relationally within a community of producers and readers who give the practice of scale meaning." 

From this point of view, the strategic use of the outmoded is an attempt to turn aspects of the present against itself in order to figure other futures. It is an attempt to 'break out' out of the constraints imposed by power by directly 'interrupting' the mechanisms and rationale whereby these constraints are imposed and maintained. In the discussion that follows, such a strategic insertion of the 'outmoded' involves the insertion of cultural memories and alternative spatial practices excluded by the spectacle as signifiers of the 'backward Mexico,' within the 'presence' of the 'modern' Mexico. Thus, within the Zapatista struggle, the moment when this site - the supposed backward archaic world of the indigenous/peasantry - is being superseded and slipping into history, is privileged as offering potential insights for a critical reading of current conditions. In this context, the EZLN's protest against the reconstitution of rural areas according to values promoted by the production of a spatial fix for capital accumulation (through heritage and tourist schemes, and large scale agri-business for instance) are best understood as attempts to expose and undermine the representational regimes through which such productions of space are being constructed, thus contesting the language of the spectacle.

17 Delaney, David and Leitner, Helga (1997) 'The political construction of scale.' Political Geography, 16:2, p. 97 [pp. 93-97]
18 Jones, Katherine T (1998) 'Scale as epistemology.' Political Geography, 17:1, p. 26 [pp. 25-28]
19 As a politics of the "out of time," Lefebvre's privileging of spaces of representation explains his insistence on the spectacle's break with "historical time" and its eradication or repackaging of identities, historical layerings, and collective memories.
This contestation took place with an implicit awareness of Lefebvre’s point that effective resistance has to take hold of spectacle itself, by countering the ‘official’ spectacle with a spectacle of one’s own making. The way to regain control of life is to literally remake the situation that others impose, transform dominant images, and counter spectacle with even more spectacular spectacles. As spectacles and images are transformed through such actions, so too will relationships between people be reconfigured. From this point of view, it is necessary for any revolutionary organisation to fan the flames of resistance (of both everyday and more spectacular variants) into a full-scale spectacle that disrupts the apparent self-evidence of imposed relationships. In the process of course, the struggle itself is transformed, not least because its meaning is subject to interpretation by a ‘more global’ audience, and because this global audience may take actions in the name of the struggle that broaden its scope. The following discussion explores these issues.

4.2 Chiapas and place: Constructing a space of representation

*A place on the map is also a place in history*

Edward Said

This section examines the construction of place in twentieth century Chiapas. The purpose here is to contextualise the emergence of the EZLN within relationships specific to the place of Chiapas, as national ideology is filtered through more local structures. At the same time, it is emphasised that the continuance of memory and alternative spatial practices gradually coalesced into the ‘network of an anti-discipline’ that evaded hegemonic constructions imposed from above.

History for the Chiapan indigenous has been characterised by the perpetuation of colonial relations with the state, and the concurrent promotion of what is best termed an ‘exclusionary politics.’ Since the Revolution, these experiences have been linked with the two dominant institutional projects in Chiapas. First, the development and promotion of a commercially viable agricultural sector, and second, the advancement

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CHAPTER FOUR - INTERRUPTING SPECTACLE

of official Indian assimilation policies. In turn, these projects have had the effect of subsuming regional development to the requirements of both local and national elites, compromising the political agency of local communities.

The goal of consolidating a national, modern state in the aftermath of the Revolution meant, in part, the promotion of regional agricultural development. Accordingly, the effort of the agricultural sector to modernise and make profitable its commercial pursuits was assisted by the enactment of several national policies. Central here was the promulgation of *Indigenismo*, a development oriented approach to Indian policy that stressed the assimilation of the Indian into the national sphere, presented under the guise of respecting, and seeking to advance, indigenous heritage. As noted in the previous chapter, this stance advocated, amongst other things, literacy missions, redistribution of land to indigenous communities and Indian Congresses designed to foster ethnic consciousness. On one hand, *Indigenismo* became a crucial tool of legitimation for the ruling elite, insofar as it was expressive of elite concern for the situation of the indigenous. However, it also became an incredibly powerful ideology around which to crystallise modernisation policies and subsequently, to facilitate a colonial relationship to the area, all with great detriment to the productive capacities of indigenous communities.

Within Chiapas, in its efforts to appear pro-Indian, the national government appointed bilingual Indians, or *caciques*, to be the main points of contact between the local indigenous communities, or municipios, and the various layers of the Mexican government.21 Because it was an important lever of *indigenismo*, the *caciques* were also responsible for promoting Indian social consciousness and self-pride through periodic Indian Congresses. The role of the *cacique* thus had two important results in furthering state colonial relations with the region. First, through “skilful employment of favors and punishments”22 the national government was able to create a powerful network of alliances who were accordingly indebted to enforce the needs both of local agricultural, and national, political elites. This included enforcing labour contracts between peasants and commercial plantations and selectively handing out land titles.

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22 Benjamin, Tom (1989) *ibid.* p. 203
and state grants based on political affiliation. Secondly, by fostering localised ethnic identity, the state ensured that Indian populations would stay tied to their own community, thus precluding any class based organisation and in turn, inducing a powerful factionalism between communities. Collectively, such government policies that favoured commercial agriculture and that were woven through with *Indigenismo* "formed a regional branch of the national government better adapted to administer national policies than to defend and promote regional policies.""

This period between 1920 and 1950 is particularly important, because in entrenching national policies whilst simultaneously marginalising indigenous communities, it was extremely important in cementing power relations that have continued to characterise Chiapas throughout succeeding decades. For example, as debates about national modernisation continued unabated in the following decades, the *ejido* sector became chronically underdeveloped, and peasants were increasingly forced to colonise new, and very often marginal, lands especially in the eastern lowlands of the Lacandón rain forest. While the 1970s saw a period of rising class-consciousness and peasant mobilisations the state, threatened by the disruption of colonial ties this threatened, brutally repressed both militant peasant organisations and peaceful demonstrations alike. By the 1980s, the region became militarised in order to weaken widespread opposition and unrest, and to empower the presence of the PRI in threatened areas.

However, whilst these processes formed an important role in the formation of the EZLN, it is simplistic to paint the relations within Chiapas as those between an undifferentiated, oppressed class of peasants and a manipulative, repressive state. As

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23 Collier, George A with Quaratiello, Elizabeth L (1994) *Basta! Land and the Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas* (Oakland, CA: The Institute of Food and Development Studies) p. 36
24 Benjamin, Tom (1989) *op. cit.* p. 201
a number of Chiapas scholars have pointed out, it is important to note the persistence of internal community divisions and a recent, widespread breakdown of community life, both of which the PRI have been able to take advantage of in its effort to maintain control over the area. For instance, Collier notes that the oil boom of the 1970s and later debt restructuring created huge differences in wealth in several highland municipios in Chiapas. As a minority of wealthier indigenous farmers and small business owners come to control resources and labour, the majority of the indigenous population have found themselves "utterly marginalized." Moreover, individuals have used such wealth as a route to power and prestige, becoming leaders who seek to further the modernisation (and thus the income earning potential) of municipios, often with the financial backing from PRI social programs. Therefore, many leaders acquired power through PRI funding, and thus have done little to court the support of poorer, peasant constituents.

The recent reforms, begun under de la Madrid and vigorously continued by Salinas, have served to make effectively unsustainable the lives of many peasants trying to make their living from the land in highland Chiapas. The amendment of Article 27 in 1992 dashed the hopes of those seeking grants of land in the old ejido system, whilst effectively resolving land disputes — often of decades long duration — between peasants illegally expelled form their communal landholdings and local strongmen, in favour of the latter. Moreover, in opening the Mexican market to heavily subsidised US food staples and international land speculators, the remaining communal land holdings found themselves under severe pressures. Many peasants have been left with little choice but to move to the marginal lands, colonised since the 1960s, of the lowland Lacandón rain forest in search of subsistence. There they join thousands of

28 Collier, George A with Quaratiello, Elizabeth L (1994) op. cit. p. 109
29 The reforms to Article 27 were proposed in November 1991 and adopted in January 1992. Swiftly following in late February was a new Agrarian Law that established the new regulatory framework for the agricultural sector. Neil Harvey has summarised the four main changes embodied in this law, as follows. First, communal land holders were given the legal right to sell, rent or use as collateral the land of the ejido. Second, private companies were allowed to purchase land. Third, the reforms allowed associations between private capitalists and ejidatarios, with the ejidatarios providing land as 'T' shares in joint ventures. Fourth, in order to ensure 'security' for private property, those provisions of Article 27 allowing for petition for redistribution, were deleted. Harvey, Neil (1995) 'Rebellion in Chiapas: Rural reforms and popular struggle.' Third World Quarterly, 16:1, p. 53-54[pp. 39-73]
recently converted Protestant peasants, expelled from their municipios by traditional catholic caciques,\(^{30}\) and in-migrants from war-torn Guatemala and El Salvador, all finding a place in the Lacandón. Whilst this exodus has created a landscape of disenfranchised people, the general poverty of the Lacandón colonists have nonetheless fostered a point of collective identity as a marginalised class and has thus helped rally alliances in the lowlands,\(^{31}\) a fact crucial to understanding the emergence of the EZLN out of these areas.

This, broadly speaking, is the ‘margin’ from which the EZLN’s ‘local’ has attempted to come into representation. In all, the multiple ‘development’ projects and prevalent racism within Chiapas relegated select indigenous groups to what can be seen as both a literal and metaphorical ‘territory of exclusion.’ This status stems from the way in which the relationship of these groups to the national and local elite was cast solely in dichotomous terms; that is, as traditional, static and uncivilised actors to the otherwise modern, progressive nation-state of Mexico. In turn, this radical exclusionary politics based on racialised appeals to the Indian being outside the ‘positively valued modernity’ of the visualised national space, played a significant role in the formation of the EZLN and provided the framework around which the EZLN would coalesce their rebellious discourse. However, it is important to emphasise that it is the combination of market forces and internal tensions that have historically produced and reproduced marginalising processes and relationships within Chiapas. That is, the EZLN are the product not only of recent globalizing forces, but also emerge from multifaceted and unequal power relationships within the place of Chiapas, which the more recent ‘glocalization’ of Mexico at the hands of the tecnócratas has only tended to exacerbate. In Mexico – as the previous chapter has demonstrated – the rationalisation of notions of ‘the national’ via racial ideologies has meant that indigenous communities have historically been treated as antithetical to modernisation and progress, and as such, have been dominated and denied subjectivity.


\(^{31}\) Nash, John (1995) op. cit.
Yet, these successive rearticulations of marginalisation via representations of national space have not precluded the development and reinforcement of an "interpretive politics" stemming from the nexus of memories, histories and experiences in a specific place. It is perhaps easy to view the indigenous as being in a process of absorption by the outside world. According to this viewpoint, the indigenous represent an outpost of pre-Colombian life gradually succumbing to modernity. The problem with this portrait is that it assumes the indigenous are losing an isolation that they never actually had. Most historians now agree that throughout their postcolonial history the Chiapan Maya have been firmly integrated into the outside economy, and that village institutions that appear superficially pre-Colombian owe at least their formal structure to outside influence. Peter Canby has noted that: "[a]nthropologists refer to these as ‘barrier institutions’ because although on the outside they have been carefully designed to fit the demands of non-Maya society, on the inside they provide the means by which the Maya can hold on to their ancient worldview ... ." The distinction is important, because if one adopts the first viewpoint then the indigenous are painted as a kind of ‘endangered species,’ whose every accommodation with the outside world is only to be regretted. By contrast, if one regards the indigenous as a colonised people who have retained their identity by continually adjusting their institutions to the demands of the modern world, their culture can be regarded as a vital and ever expanding one that provides an extremely resilient and vibrant ‘space of representation.’ As Michel de Certeau once reflected in *The practice of everyday life*:

Submissive, and even consenting to their subjection, the Indians nevertheless made of the rituals, representations, and laws imposed on them something quite different from what their conquerors had in mind; they subverted them not by rejecting, but by using them with respect to ends and references foreign to the system they had no choice but to accept – they escaped it without leaving it.

This is important because practices and discourses of resistance require some form of co-ordination and communication. Thus, they rely on material social spaces and socio-spatial networks that are insulated from control and surveillance. Such

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32 Canby, Peter (1994) *The heart of the sky: Journeys amongst the Maya* (New York: Kodansha America)

localised ‘spaces of representation’ – deriving from space as it is lived and experienced according to localised ritual and memory – offer a distinctive position from which to maintain dignity and identity in the face of marginalisation. Within these sites of solidarity, resistance can be organised and conceptualised, allowing marginalised subjects to “nurture the seeds of their own form of representation.” Such sites are created, claimed, defended and used (strategically or tactically) in the practice of resistance. From this point of view, the terrain of the Lacandón jungle has served as a material base for the creation, organisation, and subsequent emergence of the Zapatista movement. This ‘homeplace’ of resistance was created out of an intimate knowledge of the local physical terrain, established by the guerrillas from years of living and organising in the jungle and mountains. The important point here is that the Zapatista struggle emerges from a material base; a concrete experience of place from which they have been able to infuse their resistance with legitimacy and historical presence. It has provided, in short, a ‘space of representation’ that has allowed the members of a marginalised community to speak as active subjects reflecting on and creating their own history.

4.3 The emergence of the EZLN

*If we had not lifted our rifles, the government would never have worried about the indigenous people of our lands and we would now continue to be not only poor, but forgotten ... it was necessary for Zapatista rifles to speak so that Mexico could hear ...*

– Subcomandante Marcos (20th January 1994)

It has been emphasised how the indigenous were effectively marginalised and silenced by the latest articulation of colonial style relations expressed by the discourse of *Salinismo*. In response, the EZLN adopted a strategy that turned on an articulation


CHAPTER FOUR - INTERRUPTING SPECTACLE

of a specific history and culture in place. This discursively disrupted the homogeneity of Salinas' imagined nation that had facilitated the ever-increasing internationalisation of Mexico's economy. The discourse and practise of the tecnócratas, in articulating the new 'global' Mexico, set the parameters for locally contesting the boundaries that had historically circumscribed national space and identity within Mexico, and that had, in turn, recently facilitated market relations. By focusing attention on the historical marginalisation, racist disregard, and systematic exploitation of large numbers of the Mexican constituency, and situating the NAFTA accord as the latest in a long line of such exploitations, the EZLN disrupted the politics of forgetting implicit in the attempting reworking of modernity undertaken by the Salinas administration, and reopened the question of modernity as it related to the Mexican people.

The rebellion of the EZLN was staged as one against the simultaneously real and symbolic marginalisation of the Chiapan indigenous within the production of the national space by successive Mexican governments. To disrupt this marginalisation, the EZLN engaged in a furious "war of words" that sought to expose the processes by which the various dimensions of this marginalisation were reproduced. In particular, the EZLN targeted the institutionalised racism at the heart of Mexican society, and made explicit appeals to the Mexican nation to recognise and correct this historic betrayal at the hands of what the Zapatistas have continually termed "the bad government." The EZLN's declaration of war on the Mexican government began simultaneously with the distribution of its "Declaration of the Lacandón jungle" leaflet and the seizure of several Chiapan townships. The date chosen for the uprising was symbolically important, since January 1st 1994 marked the ratification of the NAFTA accords, and thus the symbolic entry of Mexico's entry into the 'first world.' The declaration, addressed to "The people of Mexico," detailed the historic exploitation of the indigenous and calls attention to the way that institutionalised racism has facilitated the "development" of the country. Thus: "We are denied the most elementary of educations so they can use us as cannon fodder and plunder our country's riches." In opposition to this marginalisation, the very first public lines of

the EZLN situate the indigenous as active agents, central to the making of the most profound events celebrated within national history and culture, and by extension, subversively situating the Zapatistas as the latest in a quintessentially Mexican series of struggles against injustice:

We are the product of five hundred years of struggle: first against slavery; then in the insurgent-led war of Independence against Spain; later in the fight to avoid being absorbed by North American expansion; next to proclaim our Constitution and expel the French from our soil; and finally, after the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz refused to fairly apply the reform laws, in the rebellion where the people created their own leaders. In that rebellion Villa and Zapata emerged – poor men like us

Thus, the struggle of the EZLN is aligned with patriotism – a deeply felt devotion to the Mexican nation:

... we tried to do everything legally possible ... we are patriots and our insurgent soldiers love and respect our tricolored flag ... We reject, in advance, any and all efforts to discredit the just cause of our struggle by accusing us of being drug traffickers, or drug guerrillas, or bandits ... Our struggle is in accordance with our constitutional rights ...

We invoke ... our Constitution, Article 39, which says:

“National Sovereignty essentially and originally resides in the people. All political power emanates from the people and is constituted for the benefit of the same. The people have, at all times, the inalienable right to alter or modify their form of government.”

Congruent with this Declaration of War, we ask that other Powers of the Nation to take up the fight to depose the dictator [elsewhere referred to as the “illegitimate head of state”] and restore the legitimacy and stability to this nation.38

The philosophies and goals of the EZLN brought forth through this initial declaration came to be solidified in the subsequent issuance of numerous communiqués. Written primarily by a non-indigenous member of the army, “Subcomandante Marcos,” these open letters to the Mexican public and international

38 All quotes from: EZLN (1994.01.01) ibid. pp. 52
actors gained for the EZLN a wide following and provided insight into both the
dynamics of the group and its message. Written in straightforward language, and
mixing Mayan poetics\(^{39}\) with popular cultural referents, humorous irony and a
sophisticated internationalism, the communiqués “went straight to the jaded hearts
and minds of students, activists, intellectuals, artists, nihilistic teens and even
apolitical middle class professionals.”\(^{40}\) Most importantly, they were used as a forum
to disrupt the ‘official’ history marshalled in the production of the spectacle of
Mexican modernity, repositioning the indigenous as authentic national actors who
call on fellow citizens to change Mexican society from the ground up. The
communication network employed by the EZLN proved highly effective in
disseminating their message to hundreds of thousands of Mexicans and international
citizens alike. Addressed variously to “the people and government of Mexico,” “to
the peoples and governments of the world,” “to the national and international press”
as well as to specific individuals and groups with whom the EZLN seek solidarity, the
communiqués were reprinted in Mexican newspapers, read over local radio, faxed
across the globe, and disseminated via the internet. Because they are intended for
multiple audiences, the communiqués thus operate, and can be understood, at many
different scales. For the purposes of the following section, particular attention will be
paid to the articulation of the national scale in the communiqués. In so doing, the way
in which the EZLN inserted itself into Salinas’ (inter)national narrative and, in turn,
disrupted the historical construction of Mexican nationalism will be examined. This
will illustrate how the ‘local’ – in contesting the elite deployment of a singular
nationalism – was able to mediate and alter Salinas’ ideological tool – the national
intermediary – for entrenching capitalist social relations in an apparently seamless
manner.

\(^{39}\) Marcos often emphasises the indigenous particularity of the struggle by reciting indigenous creation
myths and other aspects of mythology. See, for example: EZLN (1994.06.28) ‘Communiqué about the
end of the consultations.’ Zapatistas: Documents of the New Mexican Revolution. Chp. 11: The
consultations. http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/Zapatistas/

[pp. 89-98]
4.4 Disputing ‘the nation’

*Will all this at least serve to teach Mexicans to say ‘Chiapas’ instead of ‘Chapas’ and ‘Tzeltales’ instead of ‘Setsales’?*

— Subcomandante Marcos. January 13th

The agrarian community, with its hierarchies, its beliefs, its values, and its networks of internal relations, is the subject and author of rebellion ... [Moreover, while] this has been proven empirically in rebellion after rebellion in Mexican history ... this phenomenon is always assimilated with difficulty by the dominant regime, which interminably searches for outside agitators to explain rebellions by the dominated, who are presumed to have neither thoughts of their own nor a capacity to take the initiative. This negation is a psychological need that legitimates domination, even as it is one of its weaknesses at the hour of revolt

— Adolfo Gilley

The dominant response to the rebellion was initially marked by elite reliance on notions of the rural indigenous as inhabitants of a realm of stasis. According to such a notion, there can be no genuine agency within the rural – no considered and purposeful political movement. The major problem faced here by the EZLN was the weight of a national culture that had effectively constructed the ‘indigenous world’ as backward and antithetical to a ‘new’ and ‘progressive’ Mexico. Condemned to a realm of stasis by hegemonic constructions of the rural indigenous, it was a natural move in accordance with the worldview of the elite to claim that the revolt was ‘spontaneous,’ ‘irrational’ and thus a priori ‘non-national.’ Change within stasis can only take place in terms of disjuncture, and for the elite, this disjuncture was inherently anti-national, since elite discourse had colonised ‘Mexican modernity’ with images of a homogenous and harmonious community moving seamlessly along the path to ‘globalized progress.’ Unsurprisingly, therefore, the government’s initial

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42 EZLN (1994.01.13) ‘War is a matter of politics.’ ibid. p. 74

response was to characterise the rebellion as the work of “outside agitators,” specifically Guatemalans and Cubans. As the work of ‘outsiders’ who had misled the ‘simple’ and ‘backward’ indigenous, the rebellion could be written off as ‘not’ Mexican or effectively ‘outside’ Mexico, and therefore irrelevant (and perhaps even supportive) to hegemonic constructions of Mexican space. This was paralleled by insistence that the rebellion was “totally circumscribed and local.” As a ‘faraway’ province, the elite insisted that Chiapas experienced the greatest degree of marginalisation and poverty precisely because of its lack of integration with the nation’s destiny. From this perspective, the rebellion represented a desperate attempt to gain access to the capitalist modernisation signalled by NAFTA. To this extent, and to this extent only, the government showed itself willing to ‘accommodate’ the rebellion’s ‘demand’ for greater access to the fruits of macro-economic growth. By promising to build a schools, roads and hospitals, the elite proposed to ‘forgive’ the rebels and thus make a few concessions that would fulfil their ‘understandable demand’ to share in the ‘new Mexico.’ Such an attitude shows a keen awareness of EE Schattschneider’s forty-year-old lesson that “the most important strategy of politics is concerned with the scope of conflict.” Schattschneider’s point was that the ability to restrict a conflict or struggle to a scale of one’s choosing is a vital aspect of the maintenance of hegemony. By the same token, for a struggle to disrupt

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45 This point will be developed as the chapter proceeds. In brief, the identification of the insurgency as the work of outsiders furnishes an ‘other’ against which the state can enact further boundary policing activities, thus reinforcing its own sense of self as an essential and authentic ‘presence’ to be defended


47 This interpretation also found credence in mainstream reporting: “The Chiapas insurrection underlined the fact that much of Mexico’s population is still irremediably poor – so poor that hundreds of thousands will risk their lives to support the demand for a share in economic growth.” Scott, Noll (1994) “Tremors at the heart of Mexico.” *The Guardian: FOR*, March 25, p. 14

hegemony, it must somehow ‘break out’ of the constraints imposed upon it. State institutions and structures are, by their nature, designed in such a way as to influence the direction that political struggles can and do take. Insofar as the EZLN allowed their movement to be interpreted in this way, then they would accede to its ‘channelling’ in directions manageable and amenable to bureaucratic decisioning, thereby removing it from the sphere of politics. The state’s characterisation of the rebellion was thus explicitly aimed at isolating the struggle. By so ‘localising’ the rebellion and preventing its articulation with interpretive communities at different scales, the aim of government discourse was to reassure domestic constituents, the ‘developed nations’ and international investors that the rebellion had no substantive bearing on national politics or the economy.

It was bold indeed, therefore, that the movement chose to label itself as the Zapatista Army of National Liberation and from the beginning insist that theirs was a “national revolutionary” struggle. Faced with attempted confinement, it was imperative for the EZLN to immediately contest the ideological marginalisation of the indigenous and assert their position as national actors with a right to speak on national issues. Thus, the EZLN undertook within its communiqués to subvert the established boundaries between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ within national space, in the process establishing a position from which to speak, and undercutting the assumptions underlying the PRI’s attempt to ‘go global.’

Lefebvre points out that one of the most powerful methods available to resistance movements is to use and occupy the symbols of the dominators for alternative purposes. In this way, the very imagery of political legitimacy can be used to expose the illegitimacy of those in power. Lefebvre terms this tactic détournement, which involves the appropriation of images and cultural artefacts colonised by the spectacle, ripping them from their context and articulating them with a new situation to make

49 Similarly, Bachrach and Baratz argue in a classic 1962 article that power cannot be understood fully by attention only to its application; in addition, it is necessary to focus on the dynamics of non-decision making whereby potential conflicts are kept out of the political arena in the first instance. Bachrach, P. and Baratz, M.S. (1962) ‘Two faces of power.’ American Political Science Review, 56:4, pp. 947-952

them mean something different and subversive. Détournement is thus the practice of taking images produced by spectacular society, and warping them into critique. Where the spectacle seeks the continual purification of space and society, of history and possibility, Lefebvre urges continual transgression, a kind of productive pollution of (apparently) neat, pure spaces. The EZLN appeared to be well familiar with this tactic, for it is plausible to argue that their actions were aimed at a détournement of the tecnócratas' colonisation of national space through use of their communiqués to expose the ambiguity of the term ‘nation.’ Since appeals to the nation have been so successful for successive Mexican governments in securing legitimacy, the EZLN reappropriated the ideological purchase of ‘nation’ in order to reclaim an identity for those like themselves, excluded from constructions of the national space. In so doing, Salinas' assertion of a unified nation behind neoliberal restructuring became problematised.

For example, the communiqués continually assert that if Mexico was a nation constituted by an Indian heritage – as elite discourse explicitly insisted – then to be indigenous was to be Mexican. From the Declaration onwards, the EZLN have sought to reconfirm the centrality of the indigenous to Mexicanness. For example, on the opening day: “We are the heirs of people who truly forged our nation”; on January 13th, “Mexico's original inhabitants”; and on January 20th, “Mexico's first patriots.” By keeping his references to history “thoroughly Mexican” throughout the communiqués, Marcos asserts historical presence and subjectivity in the national realm of politics. For example, in response to portrayal by the Mexican state and elements of the mass media as terrorists influenced by foreign powers, and thus as an unpatriotic ‘other’ to be expelled by force for the preservation of territorial sanctity, the EZLN insist their military tactics were learnt not from:

51 See: Lefebvre, Henri (1991b) op. cit. pp. 167-168
...Central American insurgent movements, but rather from Mexican military history: from Hidalgo, Morelos, Guerrero, Mena; from the resistance to the Yankee invasion in 1846-1847; from the popular response to the French intervention; from the great heroic feats of Villa and Zapata; and finally, from the indigenous struggles of resistance throughout the history of our country.

Similarly, following the comment of government negotiator Cordoba that the EZLN is a “political force in formation,” Marcos responds, “this must be some kind of joke. What does it mean? That the misery of the indigenous people does not exist, but rather is “in formation”? ... Why this repeated denial of reality? Do they still believe they can fool society, or are they trying to fool themselves with this negation, “in formation”? Marcos then launches an attack on the supposed will of the government to negotiate, arguing that rather than a genuine attempt at dialogue it instead expresses a will to ‘bound’ and isolate their struggle by continued appeal to the stereotype of the rural indigenous as ‘backward’ and ‘immature’ and hence not ‘fully Mexican’:

... Why does the federal government take the question of national politics off the proposed agenda of the dialogue for peace? Are the indigenous of Chiapas only Mexican enough to be exploited, but not Mexican enough to be allowed an opinion on national politics? ... What kind of citizens are the indigenous people of Chiapas? "Citizens in formation" ... children, that is to say, “adults in formation”? Through storytelling of their ancestors’ experiences with historical events and actors central to elite constructions of national culture, the EZLN insistently position Mayan history as thoroughly enmeshed with Mexican history, such that it becomes difficult

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54 EZLN (1994.01.06) ‘Here we are the forever dead.’ op. cit. pp. 56-57 [pp. 55-61]


56 EZLN (1994.01.31a) ibid. Similarly, in response to PRONASOL, Marcos gave voice to general disgruntlement:

PRONASOL has the mentality of a son of a bitch that sees the indigenous people as children, as ill-bred children. Instead of giving his kids a spanking like they deserve, the father – who is so understanding and generous – is going to give them candy after getting them to promise not to misbehave again, right? A dictator, then, a dictatorship

to consider the two separately. The purpose here is to turn the indigenous from symbolic objects ("they didn’t see the Indian as anything other than an anthropological object, part of a 'Jurassic Park' which, luckily, would disappear with a NAFTA that includes them only as disposable waste ...") into historically subjective agents with a right to speak and participate in the 'nation' as Mexicans. By contrast, the tecnócratas are situated within a narrative of infamy, displacing them from their self-image as fulfillers of national destiny:

But today we say enough! We are the heirs of people who truly forged our nation, we are the millions of the dispossessed ... caused by the insatiable ambition of a seventy-year-old dictatorship, led by a small inner clique of traitors ... ready to sell out our country ... [T]hey are the same people who opposed Hidalgo and Morelos ... those who sold more than half our country to the foreign invader, those who brought a European prince to govern us, those who formed a dictatorship of científicos porfiristas, those who opposed the Petroleum Expropriation, and those who massacred the railroad workers in 1958 and the students in 1968 — they are all the same ones who today take everything from us, absolutely everything.

Through historical references familiar to all Mexicans — to Independence, the Reform, the Porfiriato, Cardenismo etc. — the Zapatistas explicitly declare themselves, as indigenous, central to the course of national history. Thus: "We have the right to make our opinions known about diverse aspects of public life in Mexico, as all members of the EZLN are Mexicans by birth." However, they are doing more than this, since the nation they belong to is not the nation of the winners, the nation of those who write history to exclude them. This latter nation, and those that lead it, rely on the transmission of authority given by their control over national history — it is their destiny to lead, guide and define Mexico. However, this assertion of rightful power is détourned (polluted) by associations of betrayal and self-aggrandisement.

57 EZLN (1994.01.13) 'War is a matter of politics.' op. cit. p. 73 [pp. 72-74]
58 'Porfriano scientists.' It will be recalled that the Porfiriato (roughly 1876-1910) was dominated by a technocratic elite that combined Comte and Herbert Spencer to inform state policy with a kind of 'positivistic national selection,' thus legitimating virulent racism, concentration of wealth and dispossession of indigenous communities. Given the centrality of opposition both to this group and these policies within Revolutionary ideology, aligning the tecnócratas with them is a deeply unsettling move within national consciousness
59 EZLN (1994.01.01) 'Declaration of the Lacandón jungle: Today we say enough.' op. cit. p. 52 [pp. 51-54]
60 EZLN (1994.01.31b) 'We have only one face.' op. cit. p. 103 [pp. 102-105]
The Zapatistas, by contrast, position themselves as belonging to a parallel, equally real nation of those who have fought and been betrayed, who died with dignity for their ideals:

It has been said, quite wrongly, that the rebellion of the people of Chiapas has its own tempo, which does not correspond to the rhythms of the nation ... If the voices of those who write history are not accurate, it is because the voice of the oppressed does not speak ... not yet. There is no historical calendar, national or regional, which records all the rebellions and protests against this bloody system, imposed and maintained by force throughout every region of the country.

Accordingly, Chiapas is not a world apart, for its history is intimately connected to the experiences of all those others throughout Mexican history who have 'fought and lost,' and moreover, continue to be oppressed and excluded. In turn, having asserted their right to citizenship, the EZLN demanded that their fellow citizens had a moral responsibility to stand up against the corruption of national ideals by the tecnócratas. As a communiqué asserted on January 6th, “Mexicans have united with us [of all social and ethnic backgrounds], more will do so in the future because our struggle is national and not limited to the state of Chiapas.” Here it insisted that the EZLN insurgency is not just one group's struggle for its own narrow ends. Rather, the EZLN propose that the problems of Chiapas – lack of democracy, freedom and justice – are problems that affect all Mexicans. Thus: “[We] have understood since the beginning that our problems, and those of the entire nation, can only be resolved through a national revolutionary movement with three principal demands – freedom, justice and democracy.”

In one of Marcos' most eloquent communiqués (Chiapas: The southeast in two winds, a storm, and a prophecy, released to the press on 27th of January) the inherent

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62 EZLN (1994.01.06) ‘Here we are the forever dead.’ op. cit. p. 57 [pp. 55-61]
63 EZLN (1994.01.20b) ‘Our flag joins other forces under the Mexican flag.’ op. cit. pp. 92-93 [pp. 92-93]
64 EZLN (1994.01.27) ‘Chiapas: The southeast in two winds, a storm, and a prophecy.’ op. cit. pp. 31-51
**Mexicanness** of Chiapas is hammered home repeatedly. Marcos begins: "The one [wind] from above tells how the almighty government was so touched by the misery of the people of Chiapas, that it gave them hotels, jails, a military barracks, and a military airport ... the beast feeds on the blood of the people." Following this stark indictment of state repression, Marcos conducts a guided tour to orientate the reader, situating the previously little known state of Chiapas not simply as some hinterland ignored by power, but as the deep historical node of various networks of extraction, exploitation and domination. Marcos explicitly names those places that are implicated in these networks, emphasising that they are both close in and far away, regional, Mexican and global. Thus, Marcos does not restrict his attention simply to the national level, though he does this also: "fifty five percent of the nation's hydroelectric power comes from this state," while "tropical trees [are] taken from Chiapas and sent to Mexico City, Puebla, Veracruz, and Quintana Roo." His emphasis is on the full range of scales from and through which power exploits and dominates. Thus, honey is "fully integrated into the European and American honey market"; while "69 percent of the cocoa goes on the national market ... thirty-one percent goes to the United States, Holland, Japan, and Italy." Marcos wants to establish Chiapas as a concrete place, and the people that live there as real people with real bodies and faces. And he wants to insist that Chiapas and these people are subjected to the conditions they are, not because they are insufficiently integrated into development, but as a *direct result* of relations at all scales up to and including the global. As Marcos emphasises:

Chiapas is bled through thousands of veins: through oil ducts and gas ducts, over electric wires, by railroad cars, through bank accounts, by trucks and vans, by ships and planes ... And what tribute does this land continue to pay to various empires? Oil, electric energy, cattle, money, coffee, bananas, honey, corn ... and Chiapan blood flows out through a 1,001 fangs sunk into the neck of southeastern Mexico ... to various destinations: the United States, Canada ... but all with the same destiny: to feed the empire. The dues that capitalism imposes on the southeast corner of the country ooze out, as they have since the beginning, mud and blood. A handful of businesses, among them the Mexican state, take the wealth of Chiapas and in exchange leave ... the trademark of capitalism: ecological destruction, agricultural waste, hyper-inflation, alcoholism, prostitution, and poverty.

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65 Ibid. p. 34  
66 Ibid. pp. 32-33
CHAPTER FOUR - INTERRUPTING SPECTACLE

This promulgation of colonial style relations of exploitation is not merely the result of recent globalizing tendencies however:

But this state does not just respond to the fashions of six-year presidential terms; its experience with plunder and exploitation goes back hundreds of years. Chiapan veins have always bled the very same loot ... all headed for the metropolis ... [N]ow at the peak of neoliberalism and 'libertarian revolutions,' the southeast continues exporting natural resources and manual labor, and, as it has for five hundred years, still imports the primary product of capitalism: misery and death.

Such statements have the important effect of disrupting the ascription of 'newness' to Salinas' technocratic revolution and the 'globalization' of Mexican space. Moreover, it situates seemingly 'peripheral' geographical places such as rural Chiapas as 'always already' integrated within the space of the whole. From this point of view, the discourse of the EZLN concurs with Gupta's and Ferguson's insistence to always begin:

... with the premise that spaces have always been hierarchically interconnected, instead of naturally disconnected ... [Thus] social and cultural change becomes not a matter of cultural contact and articulation but one of rethinking difference through connection.

Kevin Robins has argued that globalization, "as it dissolves the barriers of distance, makes the encounters of colonial centre and colonised periphery immediate and intense." He continues:

Whereas Europe once addressed African and Asian cultures across vast distances, now that 'Other' has installed itself in the very heart of the western metropolis. Through a kind of reverse invasion, the periphery has infiltrated the colonial core. The protective filters of time and space have disappeared, and the encounter with the 'alien' and 'exotic' is now instantaneous and immediate.

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67 Ibid. p. 36
68 Gupta, Akhil and Ferguson, James (1992) 'Beyond "Culture": Space, identity, and the politics of difference.' Cultural Anthropology, 7, p. 8 [pp. 6-23]
The western city has become a crucible to which world cultures are brought into direct contact ... Time and distance no longer mediate the encounter with 'other' cultures\textsuperscript{70}

Here Robins emphasises the impact of the arrival of the margins at the centre, and hypothesises that this has triggered a concern with the identity of place. The discourse of the EZLN inverts the assumptions of this question, asking what might the issue look like if it were posed not from the perspective of the centre, but of the periphery. For those in the periphery, Marcos seems to ask, how new is the encounter between margin and centre? How new is the shrinking of distance and invasion of place? Marcos makes clear that for the indigenous populations of the periphery there have seldom been 'protective filters of time and space' to buttress them as the forces of the 'centre' impose their presence. Bearing this in mind, the discourse of the EZLN disrupted the ability of elite actors to ascribe to their policies 'newness' and 'purity of purpose,' by characterising these policies as the latest instance of invasion and imposition by the forces of the 'centre' upon the 'periphery.' As David Slater has noted in a different case, this exposes the operation of an elite strategy whereby:

The statements, conceptual priorities, lines of classification and the meanings that guide are all characterized by a politics of forgetting, which is vital in the construction of a new truth. It is as if the societies have never experienced previous waves of capitalist penetration and modernization ... It is as if, in the historical annals of real development, progress is set to begin with structural adjustment\textsuperscript{71}

This point is given a particularly Mexican flavour by the situating of the current wave of restructuring within a narrative of 500 years of capitalist exploitation, thus establishing continuity between the colonial period -- "Since the time that vestments and armor conquered these lands, dignity and revolt have lived and spread in these stormy skies\textsuperscript{72} -- Independence, the liberal Porfiriato and indeed the Revolution. This clashing juxtaposition of two 'good' periods (Independence and the Revolution) and two 'bad' periods (Colonialism and the Porfiriato) within the same narrative --

\textsuperscript{70} Robins, Kevin (1991) ibid. pp. 32-33  
\textsuperscript{71} Slater, David (1993) 'The geopolitical imagination and the enframing of development theory.' Transactions Institute of British Geographers New Series, 18:4, p. 427 [pp. 419-437]  
\textsuperscript{72} EZLN (1994.01.27) 'Chiapas: The southeast in two winds, a storm, and a prophecy.' op. cit. p. 46
asserting their fundamental similarity – is deeply subversive of ‘official’ history. On the one hand, the tendency of national culture to characterise the post-Independence period as a symbolic ‘reunion’ with an ‘authentic’ pre-Colombian indigenous past is disrupted. On the other hand, the Revolution is relativised as merely a rearticulation of the subordination and exploitation of the indigenous, rather than its abolition. In an explicit attack on the official state doctrine of mestizaje as a largely harmonious and positive process, of mutual benefit and respect to both Indian and Spaniard, Marcos insists “five hundred years after the ‘meeting of two worlds,’ indigenous people have the option to die of misery or repression.” The current conjuncture of neoliberal hegemony is thus figured as a distinct, yet integral part of a history of domination and violence, that finds its most resonant echo in the Porfiriato demonised by post-Revolutionary culture.

For example, describing the town of Ocosingo, Marcos notes the juxtaposition between the most impressive buildings (a jail, a whorehouse, the state police office, the rancher association office and Pemex headquarters) and the “little houses all on top of each other that rattle and shake” of the ordinary people. The constant description of jails, checkpoints and army installations, and the deficiency of educational facilities, hammers home the point that the ‘stability’ of Mexico’s spatial-fix for capital is intimately related to direct coercion and the generation of fear and ignorance, rather than consensus. Marcos asks: “Well, what’s it seem like to you? A hacienda from the time of Porfirio Díaz? But that period ended seventy-five years ago!” And then, a few lines later: “What? The Civil Defence Committee? Oh yes. It is a group of heroic ranchers, businessmen, and union sell-outs who organize ‘white guards’ to threaten and evict people. But didn’t I just say that the Porfiriato ended seventy-five years ago?” Again, the effect here is to incite a resonance in the present with aspects of the ‘past’ from which official culture seeks to disassociate itself. This is so as far as the Porfiriato is indelibly associated by national culture with virulent racism and shameless accommodation with foreign interests. This highlights the extent to which the tecnócratas have strayed from Revolutionary ideals, fingerling

73 Ibid. p. 36
74 Ibid. p. 39
75 Ibid. p. 40
them as paradoxically *returning to* and *reproducing* the very situation that the Revolution that confers their authority is celebrated as a *negation of*.

An important quality of this communique, and many others produced by the EZLN, is the extent to which the specificity of the situation in Chiapas is highlighted, so establishing a localised 'space of representation' from which to speak. Much of Marcos' discourse is thus expressive of an 'anti-geopolitical eye,' that explicitly acknowledges his own corporeality and refuses the systematising 'eye from above.' For example, he is consistently at pains to acknowledge his own positionality, the place from which he writes and acts: "... I will put the date, hour and place on this prologue, so that the readers will know that I finished writing this one before dawn on the morning of June 28, 1994, that the watch on my left wrist read 02:30 hours, it was raining hard, and that a good while ago Tacho told me he was going to sleep. The place, for a change, is ... From the mountains of the Mexican Southeast, Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, Mexico, June 1994."76 In *Chiapas: The southeast in two winds, a storm, and a prophecy*, this 'embodied' aspect of Zapatista discourse is very much in evidence. It expresses a viewpoint not from above, but rather at ground level, as the body moves through space and experiences what the abstractions of national space actually mean when concretised in a particular place. What dominates here is not an 'overview,' but precisely the discomfort, both physical and emotional, of having one's ability to move – as an indigenous peasant – impinged upon and formatted by an immigration checkpoint, a police station, an army base. By the constant reminder, that is, that a 'global Mexico' does not involve the 'dissolving of space into flows' for many of its citizens, but rather the continued structuring and policing of the space of 'everyday life' in ways that, according to elite representation, have been superseded.77

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77 As Massey puts it, this power geometry is marked by the fact "different social groups have distinct relationships to ... differentiated mobility [of goods, capital, people, ideas etc.]: some people are more in charge of it than others; some initiate flows and movement, others don't; some are more on the receiving end of it than others; some are effectively imprisoned by it." Massey, Doreen (1994a) "A global sense of place?" *Space, place and gender* (Blackwell and Cambridge: Polity Press) p. 149 (pp. 147-156)
Of course, the state is quite willing to recognise that in some obscure periphery there may be problems; that the situation in Chiapas is unique and unreflective of elsewhere. To counter this recuperation, the evocation of a 'space of representation' – a seemingly 'subjective' experience of space – is always followed in the EZLN communiqués with explicit efforts to connect the situation in Chiapas with elsewhere. For example, at the conclusion of this literary 'walk at ground level' through Chiapas, Marcos is quick to ask: "Do you want to go home? Other places? In what country? Mexico? You will see the same thing: the colors, languages, landscape and names will change, but the people, the exploitation, the misery and death are the same. Just look carefully. Yes, in all the states of the republic." The point here is to refuse the spatial containment of struggle to the state of Chiapas, to the indigenous, or even one particularly disgruntled group of them. The problems of Chiapas may have their own specificity, but Chiapas is not an isolated or unique case without relevance to 'elsewhere.' Rather, it is a crystallisation or localised articulation of relations that are at play throughout Mexico. Understood in this sense, the EZLN consistently make the assertion that 'Chiapas is everywhere' in the nation, or even, at some points, that 'Chiapas is Mexico.'

In so doing, a discursive disruption of elite historiography and contemporary national culture is articulated. 'Mestizo Mexico' is not the benign, even romantic story of convergence between two nations, two cultures, and their synthesis into a harmonious whole. On the contrary, the whole enterprise is marked by exclusion, exploitation and violence – relations that the latest 'leap into modernity' only threaten to exacerbate, not attenuate. Indigenous culture has never been respected and the technocratic revolution of Salinismo has done nothing to change this: "We have lived and died without security for at least 501 years." By so linking indigenous identity to national identity, and positioning the plight of the Indians as the plight of the nation as a whole, the EZLN did two things. First, it made it increasingly implausible for the PRI to deny that this was indeed a national uprising enacted by 'insiders,' and second, it began to blur the rigid distinctions between 'Mexican' and 'Indian' as separate identities. The unauthorised movement of bodies between the inside and the outside

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78 EZLN (1994.01.27) 'Chiapas: The southeast in two winds, a storm, and a prophecy.' op. cit. pp. 40-41 [pp. 31-51]
79 EZLN (1994.01.31b) 'We have only one face.' op. cit. p. 104 [pp. 102-105]
CHAPTER FOUR – INTERRUPTING SPECTACLE

of the constructed boundaries of the ‘new’ Mexico created a situation of excess, in which the meanings and identities crucial to these assumptions could no longer be contained or sustained. In this manner, the Zapatistas revealed the illusory ‘given’ connection between the signifier and the signified, rendering it unclear to what the ‘presence’ of Mexico actually referred to. Moreover, the violently coercive attempts of the state to re-in(state) Mexican space actually further exposed its fictional and performed character, since the images of this violence contradicted the tecnócratas’ prior assertions that the ‘new Mexico’ was harmonious, multicultural and democratic. In this sense; the state’s actions made clear where the boundaries of the ‘new Mexico’ were, precisely insofar as power judged they had been transgressed, and visibly acted to reassert them. In this manner, the consensual and beneficent ‘development’ and ‘multiculturalism’ so lauded by the Mexican government and international institutions was shown to be inherently problematic.

4.5 Interrupted modernity

Did you notice the exquisite, cultured air of these postscripts? Aren’t they worthy of our entry into the first world? Don’t they call attention to the fact that we “transgressors” are also preparing ourselves to be competitive in NAFTA?

– Subcomandante Marcos. February 6th 1994

We have to rethink what modernity means. If modernity is seen to be homogenous and exclusive of alternative cultures then it is not really modernity at all. If we want only a modernity as defined in our large cosmopolitan cities, it is a false modernity. Modernity must be inclusive of plurality. Especially in a world that tends towards uniformity, it is healthy to remember that there are other people that have alternative values, alternative ways of life, alternative languages

– Carlos Fuentes (1994)

From the foregoing discussion, it should be clear that Zapatismo is not simply an assertion that location in a concrete situation makes their perspective different from

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80 EZLN (1994.02.06) ‘You can’t have a good conscience and a heart.’ Subcomandante Marcos and the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (1995) op. cit. p. 115 [pp. 113-115]

others. While this move is indeed important, it bears the constant danger that their politics will become a mosaic politics, or a politics of "isms." Remaining at this level would render the Zapatistas as a ‘unique’ movement of ‘essential identity,’ insofar as their location would be grounded in the stasis of absolute space. To subvert this tendency, the practice of the Zapatistas has instead continually affirmed that their location is produced, and that this production takes place through ongoing relations of marginalisation, exploitation, and resistance. Zapatismo insists that the location of the people that are doing this marginalising (the ‘modern’ Mexico, the ‘developed’ West) fundamentally depends upon the way that they have constructed the marginality of places like Chiapas and the people therein. This amounts to the assertion that it is precisely because the ‘new’ Mexico strategically renders particular social sectors, regions and communities as ‘backward’ realms of ‘stasis’ resistant to modernisation and development, that it can in turn reproduce itself as, on the contrary, a ‘modern’ realm of ‘dynamism’ welcoming modernisation and development. With this second move, the profound question of how we are located is introduced. This amounts to the addition of those qualities habitually associated with time and history (dynamism, movement etc.) to the notion of absolute location introduced by the first move. Location is constructed, not given, and it continues to be constructed, not only by the act of observation, but also by the fact of being observed and in relation with others. Location or perspective is relative to others, and ‘our’ location depends on the existence of these others. It is in highlighting these links between knowledge, space and power, and the culpability of the ‘modern’ for the reproduction of ‘backwardness’ that the Zapatistas have proved particularly effective. The ‘modern’ depends on the ‘backward,’ with the ‘backward’ being absolutely functional for the wealth and self-identity of those in a position of hegemony.

In these attempts to revitalise the meaning of the ‘the nation,’ the EZLN forefronted the ambiguity of the national space as defined by the ruling elite, by employing words and symbols that powerfully contested the categories that have empowered the PRI for decades. In doing so, they were effective at placing the burden of explaining the vague rhetoric of Salinismo back into the hands of the technocrats, in turn drawing attention to the limits of this discourse in capturing the political dynamics of the state. Through embodied resistance and communiqués, fuelled by strategic use of the media and solidarity actions throughout the globe, the Zapatistas managed to create an ‘anti-
spectacle’ to the spectacle of Mexican modernity produced by the technocrats. In so doing, the EZLN problematised the limits of an elite representation of national space, constructed through notions of modernity and race, by speaking very publicly and politically from the nation’s designated margin. The result has been a revitalisation of a place previously relegated by elite discourse as strictly apolitical and backward – a literal ‘spatial event’ or cultural encounter that has reshaped the relationship of place to identity.82

By voicing dissent against the marginalising tendencies of neoliberalism, the EZLN seriously compromised Salinas’s tool for seamlessly incorporating global capital. As has been shown in the previous chapter, Salinas painted a specific picture to his international audience of the qualities that make Mexico a ‘good candidate’ to join the First World community. In response, the EZLN have drawn attention to that which makes Mexico unsuitable for membership and in so doing, form a new discourse concerning exactly what it is to be ‘modern’ and ‘progressive’ – to include notions of justice, freedom and democracy rather than just economic stability. Jorge Castaneda, writing in the immediate aftermath (January 6th) of the uprising’s outbreak, asked:

... how is that a nation theoretically propelled into the First World by NAFTA and the free-market technocrats has suddenly been rocked by Indians fighting a modern army with machetes as well as automatic weapons? The answer, of course, lies in the mistaken nature of the initial assessment: Mexico has not been, nor will it be any time soon, the modern, lily-white, middle-class and democratic society its rulers and their friends in Washington desperately want it to be83

As a result of the subversion of the tecnócratas' discourse and the exposure of the truly national aspects of their resistance movement, “a public, collective soul-searching ensued – questions of self-perception, and self-representation, as a people, a society, as a nation, filled the pages of the Mexican press.”84 A representative example is this reflection by Carlos Fuentes:

82 Shapiro, Michael (1997) ‘Narrating the nation, unwelcoming the Stranger.’ Alternatives, 22, pp. 1-34
The Chiapas revolt has revealed the deep multi-cultural rifts that have been masked by official glorification of Mexico’s pre-Hispanic past …. The events of Chiapas have reminded us that Mexico is a multiethnic, multicultural country. Mexico has the desire to be, and regards itself, as a mestizo, or mixed race, country. But this does not mean that we can simply put aside the fact that there are 10 million Indians in Mexico who speak 42 languages and have alternative cultures and values. They are not barbarians or uncivilized people. They are simply people with another culture. The challenge for mestizo Mexico after Chiapas is to come to grips with this multicultural and multiethnic reality ...

Moreover:

... there is a deeper point to be drawn from Chiapas. People who have been traditionally exploited would rather go on being exploited than become marginalized [culturally]. They will not be left out altogether and become non-persons in a non-economy. This is what would happen if the global market-type technocrats were to take over the Chiapas economy. The world economy simply cannot be organized in an enduring way if it only incorporates 30 percent of the world’s inhabitants, leaving the remaining 70 percent — some have called them the “lumpenplanet” — to dwell or die in destitution

In so problematising dominant notions of the nation, many Mexicans felt empowered, for the first time, to speak back to the government and to contest Mexico’s new version of modernity from the ‘bottom up.’ For example, only days after the EZLN uprising, over ten thousand demonstrators marched on Mexico City’s Zócalo in a move that seemed to validate the Zapatistas message to the government. Shouting “First World, ha, ha, ha!” the protestors defiantly contested Salinas’ international imagining of Mexico’s arrival in the first world via NAFTA. Moreover, showing their solidarity with the Zapatistas, the protestors demanded the withdrawal of troops from Chiapas by chanting “todos somos Marcos” [“We all are Marcos”] and holding signs that proclaimed “Chiapas es [is] Mexico,” signalling that the EZLN’s assertion of commonality between local and national problems was well understood. This demonstration greatly interfered with Salinas’ claim that the uprising was locally circumscribed because it was evident the fact that the movement, which publicly

86 Fuentes, Carlos (1994) ibid. p. 56
named the causes of poverty and misery in the country, had found broad support nationally. As PRI federal deputy Gustavo Carbajal put the mood amongst the elite, until then content to gloss over the possibility of social conflict arising from its policies, “Chiapas is but a sign of things to come – a flashing red light of warning.”

In turn, such demonstrations had the effect of destabilising market relations within Mexico. There are those who maintain that, indirectly at least, the EZLN has been the major catalyst for the political and economic upheavals that the country has experienced in the years following the uprising. For example, in December 1994, incoming President Ernesto Zedillo was forced to devalue the peso 15 percent, in turn requiring the acceptance of bailout loans totalling over $20 billion from the US government. This can be attributed partly to the instability generated by the EZLN and the political infighting that ensued. Because of the EZLN’s adamant assertion that democracy must be returned to the country’s political system before Mexico can truly progress in a unified manner, the PRI fractured in the aftermath of the rebellion into camps supporting the move towards a more democratic system, and those, like the technocrats, that felt threatened by such a move. This split was demonstrated graphically in March 1994 when prominent PRIist Ernesto Colosio, tipped as the next president and who had spoken publicly of the need for greater democratisation following the Chiapas uprising, was assassinated – an event that some insist must be traced right back to Salinas himself. To the international community, such political ruptures signal an inherently unstable investment environment and therefore mandate a cautious approach to investment, both economic and political. As Larry Cairns of the private Council on Hemispheric Affairs noted with concern on March 25th, the assassination of Colosio was a violent blow following quickly in succession from the emergence of the Zapatistas: “Until now it looked as if we were going to have a healthy, blooming NAFTA. Now we face the possibility of having a kind of

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cadaverous NAFTA. If Mexico is not considered a reliable investment environment, then investors are going to say ‘Why go to Mexico? We’ll go to Bangladesh.’ Indeed, over the course of 1994 and 1995, Robertson notes that Mexico experienced a “massive withdrawal of investment,” and in October 1995, because of ongoing currency instability, then President Ernesto Zedillo was forced to negotiate another deal to rally the Mexican economy.

In turn, this further suggests the centrality of the national to the international, or put another way, the state to globalization. As Drainville has pointedly observed:

There are, in the age of the new world order, no citizens of the world economy; only national citizens in the world economy. The restoration and strengthening of national ties of citizenship is central to the political management of the contemporary world economy ... . [N]ational democracies are not “mortally wounded" by the internationalisation of accumulation. They are reinforced and transformed by the political difficulties of managing global accumulation ... [increasing] the political importance of state-bound democracies as centers of political validation for the imperatives of global accumulation. ... [T]he world economy remains socially rooted in the space of the nation-state, and politically dependent on the ability of states to strike social compromises

In casting themselves as new kinds of citizens who are able to appeal simultaneously to the interactions occurring between many scales, the ELZN demonstrate the necessity of destabilising the concept of bounded, autonomous community, that somehow has a unique and singular characteristic to sell to the global marketplace. Instead, the EZLN have sought to replace it with articulations of the horizontal connections between local, national, and international communities, and this linking and consequent reconfiguring of scales, in turn demonstrate that places are not naturally bounded entities. Instead, they are always in the process of being constituted through particularisms, and in this case, multiple understandings of

91 Robertson, Tom (1995) ‘Infighting ruptures Mexico’s ruling party,’ The Seattle Times, October 29, A23
‘culture’ and ‘nation.’ In highlighting the hierarchical power relations, racism and poverty at their own local level, the EZLN called attention to the uneven operation of Mexico’s politics and cultural understandings.

When Marcos insists that NAFTA is a “death sentence” for the indigenous, he is pointing out that the ‘modernity’ proposed by the tecnócratas – and by extension, the globalized spectacular society of which they are Mexico’s most obvious representatives – is inherently exclusionary. It privileges some social groups at the expense of others, and it does this through the creative destruction of space. NAFTA is a death sentence because it seeks to empty out those spaces it identifies as inimical to ‘modernisation’ by formatting their production according to logic of accumulation and commodification. In doing so, neoliberal reform seeks to annihilate the social space through which those deemed redundant – such as the members of the EZLN – wish to ‘live’ by creating their own situations. Such a narrowing of possibility effectively means that ‘other’ ways of being are increasingly under pressure to stop being ‘other,’ as the possibility of a ‘space of representation’ in which they might endure and create is narrowed almost to the point of extinction.

It is in this context that Zapatismo reworked the ‘no alternative’ of globalization, by arguing that faced with exclusion, marginalisation, and economic, political and cultural ‘redundancy,’ there is ‘no alternative’ but to resist. Here it is important to focus not only on the structural determinants of why people rebel, but also on the way that the choice issue was appropriated by the Zapatistas themselves, where having ‘no alternative’ simultaneously became a source of agency and dignity, a resistance to moral judgments and justification for their status, and an elegant détournement of the mantra of globalization’s acolytes that globalization is inevitable. This potentially extended to all those diverse individuals and social groups whether in Mexico or elsewhere, excluded by the technical forms of knowledge associated with neoliberal

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93 More broadly, this suggests that it is a somewhat misplaced question to enquire whether that study or practise of a genuinely progressive politics is properly focused on a particular scale, be it the global, the national, or even the local. For a focus on a geography of resistance in parallel with a geography of power indicates that the local, the global and other constantly shifting geographical scales are themselves the outcome of processes of sociospatial contestation and struggle. In other words, scale must be understood as something that is produced continuously through sociospatial struggle. In this sense, concern is most effectively invested in examining the ways that the continuous reshuffling and reorganisation of spatial scales is an integral part of social strategies and struggles for control and empowerment, rather than seeking to ‘anchor’ theorisation in any scale in particular.
economy rationality. The Zapatistas helped expose the fact that Mexico’s “quixotic search for the modernity promised by Western civilization,”⁹⁴ was implicitly exclusionary and marginalising, and that those excluded and marginalised were not necessarily willing to be ignored. Ultimately, this alternative visualisation of Mexican reality contributed to the radical destabilisation of the seemingly inevitable entrenchment of internationalised market relations.

Conclusion

We can take as an obvious and graphic example of the attack on verticality the Communards’ demolition of the Vendôme Column, built to glorify the exploits of Napoléon’s Grand Army. ... For Mendès the destruction of the column abolishes history – makes room for a timeless present, an annihilated past, and an uncertain future. ... [Whereas] for the Communards, the existence of the column freezes time: “a permanent insult,” “a perpetual assault.” ... Whose time is it?

Time, said Feuerbach, is the privileged category of the dialectician, because it excludes and subordinates where space tolerates and coordinates. Our tendency is to think of space as an abstract, metaphysical context, as the container for our lives rather than the structures we help create. The difficulty is also one of vocabulary, for while words like “historical” and “political” convey a dynamic of intentionality, vitality and human motivation, “spatial,” on the other hand, connotes stasis, neutrality and passivity. But the analysis of social space, far from being reactionary or technocratic, is rather a symptom of strategic thought ... that poses space as the terrain of political practice. An awareness of social space, as the example of the Vendôme column makes clear, always entails an encounter with history – or better, a choice of histories.

- Kristen Ross⁹⁵

Like the Communards confronting the Vendôme column, both Lefebvre and the Zapatistas want to demolish a monument. Lefebvre once described Hegel as “a sort of Place de l’Étoile, with a monument to politics and philosophy at its centre.” Situated at this ‘view from above’:

... historical time gives birth to that space which the state occupies and rules over. ... Time is thus solidified and fixed within the rationality immanent to


space. ... What disappears is history ... time, dominated by repetition and circularity, overwhelmed by the establishment of an immobile space which is the locus of the environment of realized Reason ... loses all meaning.\textsuperscript{96}

To disrupt this tendency, Lefebvre brings Hegel into confrontation with Nietzsche and Marx. In so doing, Lefebvre seeks to expose the processes whereby ‘abstract space’ has historically subsumed ‘lived space’ (spaces of representation), and thereby open the means to disrupt it. From this point of view, Lefebvre’s contribution is to show how deeply implicated in our everyday lives are the \textit{images} of life produced for us by capital and the state, and how the resulting alienation not just from nature and the means of production but from every aspect of our lives is both the norm, and the fulcrum upon which revolutionary change can be leveraged.

For the Zapatistas, the aim is similar. Of course, their discourse is not peppered with allusions to Hegel or Nietzsche, and seldom even to Marx but, in many ways, their target is the same. The spectacle of Mexican modernity constructed by the \textit{tecnócratas} was itself a space in which “time, dominated by repetition and circularity, overwhelmed by the establishment of an immobile space which is the locus of the environment of realized reason ... loses all meaning.”\textsuperscript{97} A space whose very existence “freezes time: ‘a permanent insult,’ ‘a perpetual assault’” and insistently begs the question: “Whose time is it?” A space, in short, whose destabilisation is necessarily “a symptom of strategic thought ... that poses space as the terrain of political practice ... [and] entails an encounter with history – or better, a choice of histories.”\textsuperscript{98}

It is clear from the preceding discussion that the spectacle established to reinforce the spread of commodity relations is neither utterly monolithic, nor does it ensure the hegemony of a single visual order. However, one lesson made clear by both Lefebvre and Zapatismo is that we have no choice but to ‘use the master’s tools’ if we want to do any deconstruction. It is necessary to retake and reshape abstract commodified spaces because commodities are now so utterly pervasive. We have to work within a

\textsuperscript{96} Lefebvre, Henri (1991b) \textit{op. cit.} p. 21
\textsuperscript{97} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{98} Ibid.
history and geography that is not of our making and make it our own, through strategic interruption and the creative articulation of situations in a way more beneficent to our every day life. Above all, we have to create a new space, for as Lefebvre insists, “a revolution that does not produce a new space has not realized its full potential; indeed it has failed in that it has not changed life itself.”

What is clear is that contest over culture is a contest over space – over its control, its production, over who is allowed in and who is kept out, and over the nature of acceptable activities in that place; over what constitutes a 'pure space' filled only with acceptable behaviours, and over what constitutes transgression of that assumed purity. The production of cultural spaces is a complex dialectic between the maintenance of the old and its creative destruction. Cultural politics, or as I choose to call it, progressive political practice, is ultimately about strategising in the realm of practice and meaning to create new worlds, new histories, new ways to live, whilst selectively preserving and articulating this with the ‘old’ in ways more beneficent to the actualisation of human communitas.

The crisis of the Mexican state occasioned by the emergence of the EZLN was not just one of democracy, but also control over discourse – the nature of things discussed. By strategically projecting an anti-spectacle to the official spectacle of Mexican modernity, Zapatismo threatened to upend the construction of a ‘spectator’ state in which the flow of information mimicked the flow of production and consumption. As Habermas has put it, there is an important distinction “between a public which makes culture an object of critical debate and one that simply consumes it.”

Zapatismo upset the spectator state by bringing resistance into full view, in the spaces that under girded the heart of state and culture: the agrarian sector and the deployment of fetishised Indian identity in the construction of the national space. Spectacle is not just a one-way street – it is a dialectical movement of potential transgression. Zapatismo is an important and significant act of resistance and transgression to spectacular society, to the extent that it changes from an underground movement of resistance and itself becomes a spectacle – a hyped and accessible event. As Don Mitchell insists, organised resistance must be public, and claim a space for

99 Lefebvre, Henri (1991b) op. cit. p. 54
representation. A new situation – if only a temporary one – was created in which people were united in a public space. If never solid enough to become a new order, it was at least a situation in which spectacle was set against itself. Zapatismo created a ‘moment’ – a time and place where history was made under conditions that it never should have been, given spectacular Mexico’s and spectacular global society’s insistence on its own inevitability and ‘realism.’ This was not necessarily a making of history as conventionally thought. Yet, Zapatismo made and continues to make history all the same, by radically transforming the cultural terrain within and through which lives are lived. Zapatismo ‘made history and geography’ because it so thoroughly shook the ‘self-evidence’ of the carefully manicured ‘situation’ within which subjects were supposed to acquiesce and be content. As such, Zapatismo disrupted modernisation’s justifying vision: however real economic gains might be, they are in jeopardy if not accompanied by a sound and genuinely inclusive vision of society and culture. In so doing, it opened a space within which questions could be asked, and other, previously repressed possibilities, could be experimented with. From this point of view, Zapatismo was expressive of a generalised demand for the construction of forms of political community such as (though not only) ‘the nation,’ that can aid – rather than repress – the creation of more human ‘situations’ in the wake of the corrosive effects of economic change.

Late twentieth century capitalism, through its production of an abstract space, entails more than a simple physical exclusion. As both Lefebvre and the Zapatistas insist, the production of space carried out under its sway is also implicated in a narrowing of ‘life.’ This narrowing implies the exclusion of memories, fantasies, dreams, emotions and collective enjoyment insofar as they are not conducive to the reproduction of the relations pertaining to abstract space. Taken to their limit, the relations promoted within abstract space stifle humanity as a project. Faced with


102 This is not to say that abstract space does not furnish an image of humanity, for it is humanist in the sense that it provides a model of what it is to be human. The striving for humanity as a project by Lefebvre and Zapatismo is in this specific sense an anti-humanism insofar as it maintains that the dominant image of humanity is not human enough. Compare the fact that Foucault’s anti-humanism is motivated above all by a deep suspicion of the humanist tendency to impose limits to human freedom: “What I am afraid of about humanism is that it presents a certain form of our ethics as a universal model for any kind of freedom.” Foucault, Michel (1988) ‘True, power, self.’ Martin, L.H.; Gutman, H; Hutton, P (Eds.) (1988) Technologies of the self (Amherst: university of Minnesota Press) p. 15
this situation, it is understandable that those whose identity is threatened or denied through the advance of abstract space become increasingly particularistic and inward looking, resorting simply to a militantly defensive or individualistic assertion of identity. The danger here is that such recourse to a romanticised and essentialised identity separates from, rather than unites with, others. Ultimately, this self-alienating move amounts to the extension of abstract space’s denial of humanity to the struggle against it. Or as Guy Debord once put it, “revolutionary organization must learn that it can no longer combat alienation with alienated forms of struggle.”

By contrast, the ‘here we are’ of the Zapatistas is not simply the ‘here we are’ of a threatened identity, for theirs is a declaration that simultaneously asserts and transcends identity. The unproblematic valorisation of ‘knowledge as experience’ makes one’s ideas and one’s being indistinguishable: it occludes the insight of the constructed consciousness. Yet, as the Zapatistas demonstrate, it is important to hold onto experience as a valid, if contestable and non-foundational concept. The value of experience lies not primarily in its appeal to authenticity, but in its function as a recursive source for informing ideas and actions, and building knowledge of the functioning of power relations and dominant structures. Progressive politics, as the Zapatistas continually affirm, is about deconstructing and reconstructing multiple identities in order to undermine dominant mythologies that sustain power relations. This suggests a context dependent creativity in which essentialism is deployed strategically rather than ontologically. Zapatismo is above all about forging solidarity, about making links with other struggles. From this point of view, the Zapatistas deploy their identity differently in relation to different interpretive communities. Marcos’ clearest statement on this issue makes the point perfectly. In response to the question of ‘who is Marcos?’ he provides the answer:

The majority disguised as the untolerated minority ... Marcos is gay in San Francisco, a black person in South Africa, Asian in Europe ... a Palestinian in Israel, an Indigenous person in the streets of San Cristóbal ... a housewife in any neighbourhood in any city in any part of Mexico on a Saturday night ... a dissident against neoliberalism, a writer without books or readers, and a Zapatista in the Mexican Southeast. In other words, Marcos is a human being in this world. Marcos is every untolerated, oppressed, exploited minority that is

resisting and saying, "Enough!" He is every minority who is now beginning to speak and every majority that must shut up and listen. He is every untolerated group searching for a way to speak, their way to speak. Everything that makes power and the good consciences of those in power uncomfortable – this is Marcos.\(^{104}\)

Thus, the 'here we are' of the Zapatistas is manifestly not just that of a particularised identity, but of "all of us who, in whole or in part, have been painted out of the world's picture of itself, all of us who have been told, in a million of subtle or unsubtle ways, that we do not, or should not, exist."\(^{105}\) And it is here, in the margins that hope lies. As Marcos emphasises: "If humanity still has hope of survival, of being better, that hope is in the pockets formed by the excluded ones, the left-overs, the ones who are disposable."\(^{106}\) Zapatismo turns space into a strategic location: a source of community for those oppressed by dominant social categories. Experiences of marginalisation and exclusion, and the spaces created by these processes, have the capacity to be turned into a strategic resource. They can become a speaking position for voices that previously went unheard; a place in which old social categories are resisted by new processes of identification. As Homi Bhabha puts it, perfectly in my view:

[The] marginal or 'minority' is not the space of a celebratory, or utopian, self-marginalisation. It is a much more substantial intervention into those justifications of modernity – progress, homogeneity, cultural organism, the deep nation, the long past – that rationalise the authoritarian, 'normalising' tendencies within cultures in the name of the national interest or ethnic prerogative.\(^{107}\)

Consequently, the practice of Zapatismo turns our attention away from the givens of social categories and towards the strategic process of identification. It forces us to accept the complexity, ambiguity and multi-dimensionality of identity and captures


\(^{107}\) Bhabha, Homi K (1994) The location of culture (London: Routledge)
CHAPTER FOUR - INTERRUPTING SPECTACLE

the way that class, gender and 'race' cross-cut and intersect in different ways at different times and places. It sum, it provides an opportunity to move beyond a preoccupation with social division — with what holds people apart — and think about what is to be gained from a discourse of belonging. Ultimately, theirs is a struggle not simply of a past to be defended — though it is that also — but of a world to be constructed. The EZLN insurgency reopened the space of the political — not just in Mexico — in the sense that the political may be located as the space in which the answer to the question 'who are we?' is continuously interrupted and deferred. In this sense, Zapatismo is a form of politics expressive of an ethos that David Owen has summarised particularly well: "Our political modernity lies in our belonging together as our belonging to the question 'who are we?' and our maturity lies in our belonging together as the belonging to the openness of this question." From this point of view, the Zapatistas propose to society as a whole, not a programme of purely peasant-indigenous demands, but alternatives within which the indigenous are an integral part of the radical democratic transformation of social life and the state.

Our fundamental understanding and position is that whatever efforts are made will only postpone the problem if these efforts aren't made within the context of new local, regional, and national political relationships — relationships marked by democracy, freedom, and justice ... a free and democratic space for political struggle. ... The EZLN has its idea of what system and proposal are best for the country. The political maturity of the EZLN ... is shown by the fact that it doesn't want to impose its proposal on the country. The EZLN demands what is shown by their example: the political maturity of Mexico and the right for all to decide, freely and democratically, the course that Mexico must take.

Or, as Marcos has put it more forcibly elsewhere: "We want a world in which there are many worlds, a world in which our world, and the world of others will fit: a world in which we are heard, but as one of many voices."

Yet, it is perhaps easy from the vantage point of the present to dismiss the Zapatista movement. After all, the victory of the socially conservative and militantly neoliberal

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110 EZLN (1994.01.20b) 'Our flag joins other forces under the Mexican flag.' op. cit. p. 93 [pp. 92-93]
PAN headed by Vicente Fox in the July 2000 elections has seemingly ushered in an acceleration of economic and political integration within the NAFTA trading block. Moreover, this has followed the steady progress of integration over the second half of the administration of Ernesto Zedillo. Yet, it is important not simply to adopt the point of view of some more ‘advanced’ stage of capitalism’s development, and thereby reread into the ‘event’ of Zapatismo the values of this critical vantage point. From the perspective of the present, it is all too easy to situate oppositional voices or moments as the ‘always already co-opted’ of the forward movement of capital.

Bearing this in mind, it is important to consider that Zapatismo’s ‘presence’ – as invocation of name, as visible and ongoing event, as slogan (‘Ya Basta!’ ‘Justice, Freedom, Democracy!’ ‘We are all Zapatistas!’) – post-1994 is not so much the inheritance of a ‘thing,’ as the embrace of a situation. It expresses a posture in the world, the conditions for community and the invention or dream of new social relations. What is transmitted is not a solitary, reified historical monument – as the state wished to enshrine Zapata in marble and mural as a support for its own project, or the state and traditional left wishes to isolate Zapatismo as an anachronistic irrelevance that it has accommodated – but rather the strategies that constructed and mobilised it, and ultimately undercut any attempt at its own momentualisation.

Today, we are used to thinking of sloganeering in terms of a brief striking phrase used in advertising or commercial production. However, ‘slogan’ finds its etymology in the Celtic, meaning “battle cry of the dead.” The Zapatistas prose and practice functions as an orchestration of the ‘dead,’ understood in the specific sense of those who have been rendered absent within a official remembrance that figures centrality as the domain of a privileged few. However, the function of the Zapatistas sloganeering and performance is not simply nostalgia for the past. It does not simply want to repeat it, for what would be the point of repeating or simply reversing a situation marked by exclusion and negation? Rather, it is a kind of interpellation across space and time, a diachronic constellation or latent community. Put simply, its express purpose is to call forth a future crowd. In Alice Kaplan’s terms, a slogan potentially offers a condensed accounting for history, and “if the suggestion it offers is sufficiently powerful in the social sense of the term, it will be, as it were, ‘present’ for the interpretation of the next historical generation as it happens ... [In this way,
From this perspective, the past achieves its resolution in the future – in what it makes possible and what it inspires.

Understood in these terms, an appropriate model is one of historical relays. This suggests a notion of repetition close to that of Gilles Deleuze where repetition, instead of being repetition of the same, is experienced as a ‘breaking forth’ or passage beyond. It is a repetition with a difference, in which the putting to work of an event in a new situation produces different and often contradictory meanings. “No space ever disappears entirely,” insists Lefebvre, “[w]hat are being described in this way are metamorphoses, transfers and substitutions.” For instance, it is arguable whether the recent events in Seattle and Genoa would have been possible without the Zapatista struggle. As US Senator Tom Hayden put it in 2000:

I was at the Seattle demonstrations ... That was a turning point for the discussion about globalization. The demonstrators non-violently stopped the WTO operations. The expressions by civil society, as they call it in Mexico, were very positive. It intervened in Seattle in opposition to the governments of the world. The demands of the indigenous of Chiapas were very important in the spirit of Seattle

What is clear is that at both these events, and within the growing ‘anti-globalization’ movement more generally, is that Zapatismo is continuously cited as rationale and inspiration, and becomes something other in the process. In this sense, it is the ‘future vigour’ or ‘virtuality’ of an ‘actual’ event – the strategies that it will help form, its displacement across time and space – that is the most vital part of its history and its contribution to history. As Lefebvre puts it, “might what is misunderstood today not be perfectly well understood tomorrow? Might it not indeed be the potential centre of future thought and action?” Or, as Calhoun phrases the issue: “The role of social

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113 Lefebvre, Henri (1991b) op. cit. p. 164
115 Lefebvre, Henri (1991b) op. cit. p. 420
protests lies in setting the agenda for a much more widespread discourse. It is as such physically bounded protests become the occasion and topic for far-flung conversations that they have their profound effects.\textsuperscript{116} For the force of an idea lies not in its susceptibility to be immortalised in stone, but rather, in its ability to be displaced.\textsuperscript{117}

The task of a progressive politics is above all to recognise the corporeality of vision, and reach out from one body to another in a spirit of humility and solidarity. While such a politics dispenses with the privileges traditionally accorded to 'History,' it nonetheless manifests a reflexive attitude toward many different histories; a dialogue between past and present conducted as a historical geography of the present. In seeking to connect a history of the body with a history of space, and so identifying and expressly opposing the decorporealization of space, Henri Lefebvre strove, and Zapatismo continues to strive, for a genuinely progressive politics in precisely this sense.

\textsuperscript{116} Calhoun, Craig (1989) 'Tianamen, television and the public sphere: Internationalization of culture and the Beijing Spring of 1989.' Public Culture, 2, p. 69 [pp. 54-71]

\textsuperscript{117} Compare this formulation by Michel Foucault:

Richard Rorty points out that in these analyses I do not appeal to any 'we' - to any of the 'wes' whose consensus, whose values, whose traditions constitute the framework for a thought and define the conditions in which it can be validated. But the problem is, precisely, to decide if it is actually suitable to place oneself within a 'we' in order to assert the principles one recognises and the values one accepts: or if it is not, rather, necessary to make the future formation of a 'we' possible, by elaborating the question. Because it seems to me that that the 'we' must not be previous to the question; it can only be the result - and the necessary temporary result - of the question as it is posed in the new terms in which one formulates it.

CONCLUSION

This book has been informed from beginning to end by a project ... I refer to the project of a different society ... where social practice would be governed by different conceptual determinations. No doubt this project could be explicitly formulated ... But it is far from certain that such an approach would allow us to make forecasts or to generate what are referred to as 'concrete' proposals. The project would still remain an abstract one. Though opposed to the abstraction of the dominant space, it would not transcend that space. Why? Because the role of the 'concrete' leads via active theoretical and practical negation, via counter-projects or counter-plans. And hence via an active and massive intervention on the part of the 'interested parties'

— Henri Lefebvre

Restatement of thesis

At the beginning of this thesis, it was suggested that retreat from the assumptions of the territorial trap has brought in its wake debilitating implications for effective transformative politics. Highlighted was the tendency to theorise the relationship between the nation-state, the global and the local as mutually exclusive, as if awareness that the increasingly problematic nature of state-centric assumptions necessarily implies a downgrading of the state in theorisation of ongoing transformations. Often this downgrading has been subtle – taking place implicitly by omission – but subtle or not, theorisation of global processes often seems inimical to consideration of the nation-state level. This thesis has taken a different route, suggesting that the writings of Henri Lefebvre offer important insights into the central role of the nation-state to the unfolding of globalization, and following from this, insights into the possibilities of effective transformative politics. The thesis has addressed three central questions. First, what does a Lefebvrian perspective tell us about what happens to the social space of Mexican state territoriality, with the

CONCLUSION

economic restructuring associated with globalization? Second, what does Lefebvrian analyses suggest about the consequences for the Mexican national imaginary during globalization? And third, what do the answers to the previous two questions imply for a transformative politics?

Contribution of the chapters

First, what does a Lefebvrian perspective tell us about the consequences for Mexican social space with the economic restructuring associated with globalization? In the case of Mexican economic restructuring examined in chapter two, the thesis has shown how the post-1982 period entailed an accelerating situation of territorial non-correspondence, in which the relatively tight bundling of the scales of capital, urbanisation and state territorial power obtaining in the post-revolutionary period increasingly diverged from one another. This ‘unbundling’ did not imply the deterritorialisation of Mexican social relations in a world scale ‘space of flows,’ but rather their reterritorialisation into both sub- and supra-state configurations of socio-spatial organisation. Specifically, a Lefebvrian analysis highlights that the advent of NAFTA is best conceived not as a loss of state power, but rather an integral aspect of an accumulation strategy in which the state can re-empower itself in midst of political and economic crisis. Similarly, the devolving of aspects of state governance to local ‘growth’ regions in northern Mexico with greater strategic and geographical access to the world market, is also shown to be part of this same state led accumulation strategy.

A Lefebvrian analysis demonstrates that the unfolding of these processes was enabled by the embrace of forms of instrumentally rational knowledge well described by Henri Lefebvre’s insistence that the advance of capitalism implies the ever more total subsumption of ‘spaces of representation’ and ‘spatial practice,’ to ‘representations of space.’ Put differently, the embrace of neoliberal orthodoxy by post-1982 Mexican elites entailed the enactment of an idealised separation between economies and politics, and the effective collapse of the latter into the former. Increasingly, politics arose as the prerogative of a specialised class, with the legitimacy of other viewpoints recognised only to the extent that they did not interfere with the ‘efficient’ administration of the economy. This judgment follows from
CONCLUSION

Lefebvre’s insistence that claims to ‘modernity’ and ‘development’ by the nation-state vis-à-vis the global economy, are bound up with its ability to ‘format’ the everyday life of its citizens in ways conducive to accumulation. Implied here, is the production of socio-spatial organisation in ways that eradicate or — at the very least — seek to delegitimise political struggles and contradictions. Within this image, the (supposed) ‘modernity’ of Mexican social space in an era of intensifying globalization is colonised by notions of ‘efficiency’ defined in terms of the maximisation of accumulation potential. Therefore, if state territoriality is ‘collapsing,’ this is because state elites actively collude as a means to re-empowering the state in a changing international environment. Such deterritorialisation constitutes a way for the state to reconfigure its hegemony, enabling reterritorialisation in ways better suited to the maintenance of societal control in a changing world. It is a response, that is, to the instability threatened to elite hegemony by recurrent crisis.

Second, what does Lefebvrian analyses suggest for the Mexican national imaginary during globalization? In chapter three, the centrality of the nation-state to the orderly unfolding of globalization was emphasised through examination of the Mexican state’s manipulation of cultural representation, in order to ‘visualise’ Mexican space in ways that legitimated the ‘going global’ of Mexican territoriality. The way that this happened in Mexico is obviously quite specific in many respects, drawing as it did upon tendencies within national culture of deep historicity. It would obviously be misleading to suggest, for example, that the manipulation of ‘Indianness’ would find great resonance in other cases. Notwithstanding these ‘unique’ aspects, as this thesis has argued, ‘difference,’ insofar as it can be induced and spectacularised, is an integral aspect of any accumulation strategy, and in this regard, the mobilisation of reductive identity of a political community – the ‘nation’ – is no exception. Drawing on a series of myths within the space of national culture, and tearing them from their inevitably contradictory existence as sites of social contestation, struggle, and interpretive ambivalence, the rendering of ‘Mexicanness’ as essential, static, and knowable proved a crucial aspect of constructing a spatial fix for capital. Lefebvrian analysis suggests, therefore, that if national culture is becoming ever more commodified and aestheticised, then this is also a prerogative of a state faced with the dual imperative to attract capital and maintain a space through which national citizens validate their political identities. An aestheticised national culture is a means to re-
in(state) national space in a time when flows threaten to undo the structures whereby political possibilities are restricted within the nation-state. As such, it is a means to curtail transnational possibilities and thus format national space as a stable investment environment within which the state strikes those social compromises necessary for capital to secure its spatial fix. Fundamental here, is Lefebvre’s insistence on the dialectical relation between flow and fixity – the insistence that is, that the hypermobility of capital characteristic of the latest round of globalization is made possible only by a simultaneous investment in fixed capital and imagery.

Finally, what do the answers to the previous two questions imply for a transformative politics? First of all, the Lefebvrian lens used in this thesis encourages us to note that the production of a spatial fix for capital does not take place without opposition, insofar as the production of national space as a ‘profit surface’ inevitably implies both the material and symbolic marginalisation of some social groups at the same time others are empowered. It is not enough however, simply to point to the existence of marginalisation and exclusion. What is crucial is not that these situations exist, for they are endemic and as such banal. What is key for Lefebvre is to establish a constitutive relation between this situation, and claims to modernity itself. That is, to establish that this situation exists not through insufficient inclusion in a positively valued modernity, but precisely through an inclusion on unequal terms. As far as the existence of this mutually constitutive relation can be established and sustained, it constitutes an intervention into those justifications of modernity that are framed in terms of universal progress, justice and development of both political, economic, and cultural institutions.

Lefebvre’s analysis suggests that the discursive demobilisation of social movements vis-à-vis globalization has been compounded by the lack of common articulation against whom or what any challenge to globalization is targeted. This tendency, disseminated and encouraged by the decline-of-sovereignty thesis, encourages a stance toward the state and the world polity that is problematic for any effective normative challenge to globalization. While ‘progressive’ social movements have traditionally sought to promote solutions that criticise and transcend the state and its capacities, a return to the state may well be necessary to meet the dislocations generated by the latest round of globalization. Thus, social movements need to
articulate how a return to the state is possible in an era of changing sovereignty, and as part of this reassessment of the 'moral capacity of the state,' must address the growing belief in the powerlessness of the state vis-à-vis economic forces—a belief deliberately encouraged, as this thesis has argued, by governments' frequent adoption of a rhetoric of powerlessness to divest themselves of broader social responsibilities.

Central to this insight, is the recognition that a transformative politics that ignores the state, and attends only to the local or global, is impoverished. This is not to say that the local is unimportant, or that the global is irrelevant, and it is certainly not to suggest that the state is itself some autonomous force whose overthrow is tantamount to liberation. Rather, this thesis has argued that effective resistance must be embedded in a concrete place from which it can extend to the global, and the nation-state remains a central administrative-organisational matrix which structures the routes that this journey can take. This is not an assertion of determinism. Rather, it is an assertion that the fact that concrete places are embedded in institutional-administrative structures and 'containers' within which formulations of identity have historically been defined, and that these derive to a significant extent from the nation-state as the historically dominant mode of socio-spatial organisation, remains important.

This also suggests that in a world where 'localist' forces are pitted against large-scale interests aligned with the state, traditional labels of 'left' and 'right'—defined as they are, around different ways of organising state power—are not useful categories for distinguishing such movements. The key aspect of such movements is that, simply by existing, they challenge the world order and the authority of the state system that is an essential component of that order, and by extension the capacity of the state to mobilise reductive articulations of political community. The politics of 'left' and 'right' struggling for state power becomes increasingly irrelevant in the face of a politics in which those opposing state power rebel through assertions of alternative identities and through attempts at self-governance outside the state-organised system of hegemonic rules. From this point of view, to quote Marx's judgement on the Paris Commune, Lefebvre's understanding points towards a "revolution against the State itself ... a resumption by the people for the people of its
own social life."\(^2\) Such movements are emancipatory because and to the extent that they do not form a state, and proclaim their historical capacity to organise aspects of social life freely. In this sense, political emancipation in a world that is simultaneously global, fragmented, and hierarchical, means emancipation from politics as a specialised activity; as the prerogative of a specific class of people over others.

Finally, if visions of the nation are so central to global ordering and the ability of capital to secure a spatial fix, then the nation state and the forms of knowledge that undergird it present themselves as a vital terrain of contestation for progressive political practice. Clearly, the Mexican case is highly specific in many respects, and this limits the applicability of the analysis. This is obvious even regionally, when we note that immediately north of Mexico is the global hegemon of the US, whilst to Mexico's south is Guatemala, one of the poorest and weakest of nations. Indeed, it has been oft noted that Mexico is the only place on earth where the 'First World' directly borders the 'Third.' The uniqueness of the Mexican case is also reinforced by the fact that it is one of the few countries to experience a truly wide-ranging social revolution of significant duration, and until the fall of the PRI in the year 2000, boasts the distinction of the longest serving political regime of the last century. It might further be added that the Zapatista movement is extremely unusual in that it explicitly theorises the contestation of elite formulations of the nation as an integral aspect of anti-neoliberal resistance. Marcos himself recognised the contingency of this move when he noted in 1997: "A parenthesis is now convenient in the theme of indigenous rebels: the Zapatistas think that, in Mexico (attention: in Mexico) the recuperation and defence of national sovereignty is part of an antineoliberal revolution."\(^3\) One intimation here is that the rebels were able to draw upon a still vibrant discourse of revolutionary nationalism, both in order to 'expose' the manipulation of this discourse and in order to validate their resistance as 'authentically' Mexican. Obviously, while most countries have a tradition of nationalism, few have one so thoroughly tied up


with revolutionary traditions of anti-imperialism and socialism; nor in most countries do such traditions continue to exercise such profound emotional resonance.

In the fourth chapter, Lefebvre was conjoined with Zapatismo to suggest that to the extent state power is bound by its visibility – its ability to produce stable images of space attractive to the domestic populous, capital, and international political and economic elites – the visual media relied upon for state reempowerment may not be as stable or reliable as desired. Because territoriality has become more global, it has also become more surveyed, not just by other states, but also by other citizens. The proliferation of media technologies – 'the democratisation of surveillance' – may in fact mean that neoliberal strategy ends up by exposing its own weakness and contingency. Other realities, rendered momentarily absent by the spectacularisation within which states attempt to reempower themselves, come back to haunt and destabilise attempted closure. This potentially leads to a situation in which sovereign states are not reempowered, but instead their effective disempowerment is visually proliferated.

To this extent, 'globalization' is a powerful ideology increasingly under contestation. Recent highly publicised events in Seattle, Prague and Genoa – in which protestors demonstrated violently and in great numbers in the cause of 'anti-globalization' – make clear that significant sectors of society are no longer willing to uncritically embrace the latest meta-narrative of progress and development. Lefebvre once noted that: "The hypothesis of an ultimate and preordained meaning of historical becoming collapses in face of an analysis of the strategies deployed across the surface of the globe."4 Lefebvre's general trajectory suggests that the contradictions occasioned by globalization offer potential signposts to the recovery of space – its production according to a logic within which differences are not only respected, but are also a defining feature of a fully lived space on a world scale. This is, however, merely an 'orientation,' and its realisation not subject to abstract speculation or the provision of a definite 'one size fits all' agenda. As Lefebvre insists, the desire for a better world will need to emerge at the meeting place of many movements of resistance – as many, in fact, as there are sites of closure and exclusion. In this sense,

4 Lefebvre, Henri (1991b) op. cit. p. 418
it is necessary to internationalise resistance, yet only by centring it on immediate issues that have an urgency of their own beyond the discourse of states, and that present specific organisational prospects and concrete points of entry into the global economy.

The originality of the thesis lies in its attempt to use an under explored theoretical perspective to selectively examine a concrete situation, namely, the production of Mexican space. The thesis has argued that globalization, whatever its effect on everything from capital to the sphere of everyday life, does not herald the end of the territorial nation-state. It does suggest, however, that there has been a reconfiguration of power, in which the nature of state sovereignty has been transformed. Attention to Lefebvre is important as part of a wider recognition that Marxist analyses continue to offer important signposts as to why the clarion call that there is 'no alternative' to globalization continues to be, and indeed should be, resisted on both a theoretical and ethico-political level. To this extent, the introduction of Henri Lefebvre's radically humanist perspective combines with his strongly Marxist insights on political economy and state power, to suggest that the appropriate question in this debate is not whether the nation-state is here today or gone tomorrow, but rather, that it is what happens to space after its supposed collapse that truly matters.
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